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"The Turkish Republic is facing its gravest threat yet. A social earthquake could cut 
one part of Turkeyfrom the rest, and we could all be buried beneath it. " 
Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey, 13 NOl'(.'lllber 1993. 
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Abstract 
This thesis examines the motivations, mechanisms and prospects of Turkish Kurdish 
international migration in relation to the Environment of Insecurity as a set of 
combined socio-economic and political factors triggered by an ethnic conflict. The 
analysis focuses on three different, but complementary, levels of analysis. The research 
comprises first, the analysis of the environment of insecurity in Turkey emphasising its 
broader socio-economic, legal-political, and demographic aspects; second, the patterns 
and processes of international migration involving Turkish Kurds investigating the 
motivations, the mechanisms, and the future migration potentials; third, the role of the 
expression of ethnicity and of ethnic conflict. 
A mixed method approach combining qualitative and quantitative methods to address 
different levels of analysis and different aspects of migration is adopted. The analysis 
of Turkish Demographic Health Survey data examines the extent to which an 
environment of insecurity exists for Turkish Kurds. The findings of the Turkish 
International Migration Survey data outline the patterns of individual migration 
motives, mechanisms and future intentions. Finally, semi-structured in-depth interviews 
examine the role of the ethnic conflict and the expression of ethnicity to clarify the 
relationship between Turkish Kurdish international migration and the ethnic 
environment of insecurity while also presenting a live account of migration motivations 
and mechanisms. 
The research shows that the environment of insecurity is an issue of ethnic conflict and 
it constitutes the major facilitating factor in Turkish Kurdish international migration 
resulting in large asylum migration flows. Due to the armed ethnic conflict between the 
PKK and the Turkish Army in Turkey during the last two decades of the last century, 
recent migration patterns of Turkish Kurds are dominated by clandestine migration. 
Along with legal migrations (e.g. economic, family, education), irregular migration 
appears as a strong trend involving asylum migration and illegal migration. Tightening 
immigration controls in Europe also prompts this. The conflict situation also serves as 
an opportunity framework for some who wanted to migrate. While migration is 
appearing as a liberating event for Turkish Kurdish ethnicity it is found that Kurdish 
immigrants have not fully exploited the opportunities for exercising their ethnicity. 
However, for many, migration from Turkey to Germany is an act of escape and so is an 
expression of ethnicity. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction: emigration from an environment of insecuritv 
<I 
1.1. Introduction 
The inspiration for this work appeared during my visit to Cizre, a small border town in 
South East Turkey in 1994. Cizre was one of the main battlefields where brutal clashes 
had taken place during the peak years of the war between the Turkish Army and the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). It is also the oldest urban settlement in the region 
dating back to 4000 BC. I took a bus to this ancient town and during the journey, I 
became aware of the naked poverty that was obvious in the region. After the city of 
Gaziantep, a different world appeared, an endless landscape, vacant shops and petrol 
stations on both sides of the road and huge military police stations along the 700km 
from Gaziantep to Cizre. These military fortresses were built as defences against the 
PKK. Frequent controls on the road by patrolling military police were a usual practice 
that residents had become accustomed to. A city of soldiers, policemen, and special 
troops along with a silent populace under a heat over 50 degree celsius welcomed me 
on arrival. A different regime was in power than that I was used to in Izmir. Every 
public site in the city was under video surveillance by the police. The explanation for 
this surveillance was: 'to provide secure and pleasant living conditions in the city'. This 
however has never been the case in any western city of Turkey during the same period. 
The city looked like a battlefield rather than an urban centre. Damaged, fired and 
collapsed buildings, the remains of rockets, shootings and bombs were all around the 
place. The high street was just a dead shopping centre with more than half of the shops 
closed. Unemployed men were yawning in coffeehouses. The most visible aspect of the 
town was the sizeable military population in the city and the continuous surveillance all 
over the city 'to stop any suspicious action'. This was the exact picture of "the 
environment of insecurity" discussed in this thesis compiled years after that first \'isit to 
'an inner country \vithin my own country' I. 
The international migration literature on migrant groups is dominated by many studic:-; 
of 'con\'t~ntionar national cases such as the Italians, Irish, Chinese. Je\\s. Turks and 
I This c:\prcssion belon~s to a Turkish Kurdish poet and pcrfonnance artist, ytlmaz lrdog.an, 
/n traduction 
other Asians (see for example Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; Wilpert 1992; Martin 1991: De 
Rosa 1994; Hannan 1970; Wasserstein 1997; Bates 2001). At the same time, these 
nationality-based approaches to international migration have paid little attention to 
minority movements - possibly because of the lack of reliable data (Courbage 1998). 
This trend has changed in recent years as studies of oppressed minorities have begun to 
appear more frequently e.g. on the Berbers of Morocco and Algeria (Keohane 1991: 
Brett 1996) and the Kurds (Behrendt 1993; Hassanpour et al. 1996; Van Bruinessen 
1998). There are two reasons for such a shift: a) the influence of ethnic tensions and the 
revival of these tensions in countries of immigration, and b) the role of new post-
modem approaches in the social sciences such as attempts in population geography to 
understand difference and diversity among migrants (Halfacree and Boyle 1993; 
Graham 1995; Gutting 1996a). In recent years, there has been a growing literature on 
Kurds but none of these studies have detailed their migratory regimes (i.e. Entessar 
1989; Fuller 1993; McDowall 1996; Mutlu 1996; Barkey and Fuller 1997; Olson 1996). 
They are either simple historical accounts or political analyses emphasising the 
situation in the Middle East. 
This study aims to understand migration from Turkey as a population movement not 
only of Turkish but also of Turkish Kurdish people by making visible the latter in the 
forty year long history of migration from Turkey to Europe. Moreover, it explores the 
migration patterns and lives of Turkish Kurds in a particular country of destination to 
understand the role of the expression of ethnicity in migration within a context of 
migration from an "environment of insecurity" to that of "security". It aims to present a 
comprehensive account of emigration of Turkish Kurds using a multi-method approach 
comprising an analysis of survey data, the TIMS (Turkish International Migration 
Survey) and TDHS (Turkish Demographic Health Survey), with a qualitative research 
based on in-depth interviews conducted in Cologne, Germany, one of the major 
destinations for immigrants from Turkey (Sen 1996:559). Overall, this study will, for 
the first time, present a comprehensive account of the emigration of Turkish Kurds. 
For a better understanding of international migration and migrants in destination 
countries, studies on oppressed minorities such as Kurds and Berbers are necessary 
because the migration patterns and processes of these minority populations may differ 
from the broader regimes of migration that characterise their countries of origin. There 
are yolumcs of literature on migrant communities in \Vestern European countries such 
as the Moroccans in Belgium (Reniers 1997; Lievens 1997b), Algerians in france 
Introdllction 
(Trebous 1970), Pakistanis in Britain (Anwar 1985; Shaw 1988), and Turks in 
Gennany (Abadan-Unat 1976; G6kdere 1978; Gitmez 1983; Atahk and Beeley 1993: 
Sen 1996). However, there is no distinction made between the internal divisions within 
these communities under the labels of nation states. Studies on the Kurds have 
generally focused on Kurdish refugees rather than Kurdish migrants (Sheikmous 1992: 
Wahlbeck 1996a, 1998a, 1998b and 1999) with very few referring to Kurdish migrant 
populations (Van Bruinessen 1998; Hassanpour 1996). In this regard, this study is not 
only an initial study of Turkish Kurdish migration as an oppressed minority but is also 
a step further in the study of migration of oppressed minorities generally. 
1.2. Objectives of the study 
This study provides a comprehensive study of the international migration of Turkish 
Kurds from Turkey to Gennany from a comparative perspective. The overall aim of the 
study is to improve the understanding of the direct and indirect causes and processes of 
Turkish Kurdish international migration to Germany with regard to the ethnic conflict 
which declares itself in the fonn of an environment of insecurity. Furthennore, it gains 
insight into these patterns and processes of international migration along with the 
expression of ethnicity through the migration process. The findings are intended to 
serve as a pioneer understanding of Turkish Kurdish international migration and to 
provide the basis for improving instruments for policy making and to serve as a 
reference point for estimating future migration. 
This study does not measure the volume of migration but investigates the ways in 
which migration starts and continues. It focuses on the factors influencing the migration 
flows. Assuming that migration potential is created by socio-economic factors and 
political and economic insecurity, the factors and circumstances that tum this potential 
into an actual migration are investigated. It delineates the individual characteristics and 
circumstances that detennine migration. In other words, which characteristics and 
circumstances distinguish a migrant from a non-migrant? 
At the same time, this study also focuses on questions such as: What characterises the 
environn1ent of insecurity (EO!) that facilitates Turkish Kurdish international 
l11igration? Which specific socio-economic and political circumstances form the 
material and non-material aspects of this EOI'? \Vhat is the role of ethnicity and the 
on~oin~ ethnic conflict in Turkey in the formation of the EOI? \Vhat are the 
L L 
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implications of the ethnic conflict and the expreSSIOn of ethnicity in the migration 
process of the Kurds? How do the Kurds relate their relative depri\"ation to their 
expression of ethnicity within the context of international migration? 
Thus the aim of this study is to analyse Turkish Kurdish international migration with 
particular reference to migration to Cologne, Germany in relation to the ethnic conflict. 
The subsequent objectives of this study are: a) to examine the characteristics of the 
background context which determines the environment of insecurity for the Kurds, b) 
to identify the Kurds within the Turkish international migratory regime by examining 
their distinguishing migration patterns, c) to outline Turkish Kurds' migration patterns 
in terms of household characteristics and who moves who stays, d) to examine their 
migration mechanisms in terms of their migration strategies, migration networks, e) to 
investigate the factors determining future migration trends in terms of perceptions, 
intentions, and remittance patterns, f) to examine the role of ethnicity and the 
expression of ethnicity in relation to their migratory moves. 
1.3. Organisation of the thesis 
This study aims to analyse the relationship between an environment of insecurity and 
international migration of Turkish Kurds with a specific emphasis on migration flows 
to Germany. The thesis is organized into seven chapters. A brief synopsis of each 
follows. 
Chapter 2 presents a reVIew of the international migration literature in order to 
highlight the conceptual building blocks of the study referring to ethnic conflict, 
deprivation, and migration. The first section of this chapter examines the environment 
of insecurity as a background conceptualisation in which (or under its influence) 
international migration took place. Later, the relationships between socio-economic and 
political deprivation and migration are examined with particular reference to the ethnic 
conflict between the Kurds and the Turks. The chapter concludes with the examination 
of the expression of ethnicity on the move. Two central issues in recent migration 
research of relevance to this study, networks and transnationalism, are also reviewed. 
The third chapter discusses the context of Turkish Kurdish inteIl1ational migration. In 
the first section of this chapter. the Turkish context is reviewed referring to its 
background association with the ethnic question in Turkey, socio-economic une\'enness 
In traduction 
and the political context with a historical perspective regarding the Kurdish question. 
The elaboration of Turkish international migration referring to the potential role of the 
Kurds is followed by the review of migration from Turkey to Germany and, in 
particular, Cologne. An evaluation of the numbers of Turkish arrivals to Germany oyer 
the time and the number and geographical distribution of Turkish migrants living in 
Cologne and Germany since the 1960s is also presented. 
In Chapter 4, the research methodology is described and the research process is 
presented. Starting with the appraisal of the use of mixed methods in geographic 
research, the qualitative and quantitative components of the research are described. The 
various data sources, data collection, and analysis are outlined. The different stages of 
the qualitative research are explained in detail and problems in the field are discussed. 
The chapter is concluded by remarks on how the findings are presented in the thesis. 
Chapter 5 is the first analytical chapter of the thesis, focusing on the environment of 
insecurity that sets a background for Kurdish international migration. It is assessed in 
three sections emphasising the socio-economic, political, and socio-demographic 
dimensions respectively. Within this framework, the relation between the environment 
of insecurity and international migration is analysed with regard to Kurdish ethnicity. 
In the analysis, the characteristics of the environment of insecurity are outlined in 
relation both to the Turkish Kurdish population and their Turkish counterparts. At a 
macro level, Turkey's comparative position is discussed against the destination 
countries, while regional discrepancies within Turkey are also investigated. The second 
section focuses on the political, legal and military aspects of the environment of 
insecurity targeting Turkey's Kurdish population. The final section is reserved for a 
discussion of the socio-demographic aspects contributing to the deprivation that the 
Kurds experience. 
Chapter 6 presents a detailed comparative account of the migration patterns of the 
Turkish Kurdish population. It moves from the aggregate level of analysis to household 
and individual levels. The analysis and discussion focus on two main questions: What 
are the characteristics of migrant and non-migrant populations? How do Turkish 
Kurdish en1igrants themselyes formulate their motivations and reasons for migration'? 
In Chapter 7, the process of n1igration is analysed in terms of the role of information 
and networks in migration. The migration strategies followed by Turkish Kurdish 
immigrants are also discussed in this chapter based on the -results of 3.+ in-depth 
Introduction 
interviews. In Chapter 8, the focus of the analysis shifts to migration potentials. Both 
the findings of the TIMS and the qualitative data are discussed in order to highlight 
possible future avenues of Turkish Kurdish international migration. Migrants' and non-
migrants' perceptions of migration are discussed. Individuals' migration intentions and 
migrants' return plans are discussed. Investment patterns of migrants are also discussed 
to investigate clues for future migrations. 
Chapter 9 brings the investigation towards the key aspect of Turkish Kurdish migration 
in response to the environment of insecurity: the expression of ethnicity. The Kurds' 
self-ascription of their ethnicity, their understanding of 'us' versus 'them' are 
discussed. The role of international migration in accessing cultural freedoms and the 
role of ethnicity in managing international migration are discussed. Thus, the first half 
of the chapter focuses on understanding the relationship between international 
migration and the expression of ethnicity. The second half examines the changing 
social relations and perceptions of homeland, diaspora, and return. The analyses 
presented in this chapter are based on the findings from the in-depth interviews. 
Chapter 10 concludes the discussion with a review of the results of the study, including 
an evaluation of the experiences of migration and ethnic conflict among Turkish 
migrants in Cologne, Germany within a broader context which is described in earlier 
chapters. 
1.4. Definitions and Notes 
This study primarily focuses on international migration of Turkish Kurds from Turkey 
to Germany with regard to an environment of insecurity facilitated by the ethnic 
conflict in Turkey. The terms 'migration' and 'migrant' are mostly used to describe 
'international migration' and 'international migrant'. The population under 
investigation is the Kurds who live in Turkey and are compared with their Turkish 
fellow citizens. To distinguish the Kurds who live in Turkey from others living in other 
countries (i.e. Syria, Iraq and Iran), the terms 'Turkish Kurdish' and 'Turkish Kurd' are 
used. However, in n1any places, the term the 'Kurds' is also used to refer Turkish 
Kurdish people. 
The analysis of the TIMS data contains phrases to define certain groups of people. 
These phrases \\'ere used in the broader international suney conducted by Netherlands 
6 
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Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in seven countries and are adopted in 
this study as well (Schoorl, J. et al. 2000). Accordingly the following categories haye 
been used in the analysis. Households and individuals are grouped according to their 
migration status: recent versus non-recent and current versus return migrants. Recent 
migrants are those who have migrated abroad within the past ten years prior to the 
(TIMS) survey, which was conducted in 1996. Current migrants are those who moved 
abroad and still live abroad. Return migrants are those who have returned home after 
living abroad for at least one year. 
Throughout this study, the term region will be used synonymously for the regIon 
populated mainly by Turkish Kurds. This region may also be defined in terms of the 
territory, in which an armed ethnic conflict is ongoing since the mid-1980s. This region 
is defined as "East" in the TDHS survey's five-region categorisation and consists of the 
following provinces (Figure 1.1): 
Adlyaman Bitlis Elazlg Igdlr Mardin Slrnak 
Agn Batman Erzincan Kars Mu~ Tunceli 
Bingol Diyarbaklr Erzurum Malatya Siirt S·Urfa 
Hakkari K.Mara~ Sivas Van 
Although explained in Chapter 4, the TIMS regions were different than those of the 
TDHS. There were four regions: region one contains two mid-western provinces of 
Turkey (U~ak and Denizli); region two is composed of two Central Anatolian provinces 
(Aksaray and Yozgat); and regions three and four are composed of four South Eastern 
provinces (K.Mara~, Adlyaman, S.Urfa, and G.Antep), which corresponds to the region 
East of Chapter 5. Both refer to the Kurdish populated areas: West (region 1 of the 
TIMS), Central (region 2), and East (region 3 and 4) (Figure 1.1). 
Describing the geography of Turkey is also worthwhile for a full understanding of 
Turkish Kurdish international migration studied here. Turkey is a country lying down 
in the edges of two old continents Asia and Europe with a large portion in the former 
and with a large and long lasting claim to be included in the latter. Neighbours are 
Greece and Bulgaria to the west and north-west; the former Soviet republics of 
Arn1enia and Georgia to the north-east; Iraq and Iran to the south-east; and Syria to the 
south. All the northern and most of the western and half of the southern borders of the 
country are surrounded by sea. For the main focus of this research the region populated 
mainly by the Kurds must be identified. It might be defined as the greater south-east 
region of the country \yhich is bordered by Iran in the East and Iraq and Syria in the 
South. The East region in the Figure 1.1 may represent the Kurdish populated region. 
Figure 1.1. Regions and provinces in Turkey as used in the TIMS and TDHS 
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Chapter II 
Conceptualising International Migration, Ethnicity and Conflict 
2.1. Introduction 
To date, the literature on international migration has largely focused on key sub-
disciplinary areas, such as labour migration, refugee studies and illegal migration. This 
division, however, often hides the complexity of migration processes, which may 
involve different types of flows at the same time. For example, it is often not easy and 
sometimes impossible to distinguish an asylum seeker from an economic migrant as 
asylum seeking and economic migration are often interrelated. Another significant 
point raised by this study is the need to further incorporate political aspects in a 
coherent way in the analysis of migration, for example in the case of Turkish Kurdish 
ethnic conflict. This review, therefore, examines the existing literature to incorporate 
the role of ethnic conflict within international migration. It is not argued here that there 
is a lack of political approaches to the study of international migration but as the 
literature shows, isolated views focusing on the political, economic or socio-cultural 
dimensions have been dominant (e.g. Massey et al. 1993; Schoorl 1995; Cadwallader 
1992; Portes 1997; Zlotnik 1998). 
Conflict may be a key factor underlying both the decision to move and the volume of 
'border crossings' and 'overstaying,.2 This study attempts to understand Turkish 
Kurdish international migration as a unique case involving ethnic conflict within an 
established migratory regime (the Turkish migratory regime). The main reference point 
here is the EOI and its influences on the international migration of Turkish Kurds and 
their expression of ethnicity. Thus it examines the relationship between the migratory 
move and the expression of ethnicity. In this regard, theoretical considerations 
comprise an understanding of migration patterns, causes and mechanisms of migration, 
and the expression of ethnicity on the move. 
Inten1ational migration is not simply a moven1ent based on the decisions of individuals 
or groups on their own. It must also be understood as a part of a broader framework 
within \\'hich 111igrants are both constrained and enabled. In the case of Turkish Kurds, 
2 Here one can raise the question about conflicts other than the ethnic one and rightly, it has to be noted 
that all sorts of contlict situations create some kind of hybridisation of migration fllms. 
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the primary framework underpinning migration comprises the ethnic conflict in Turkey 
and the multi-faceted relative deprivation experienced by Turkish Kurds \yhich 
interacts with it. 
The conceptual framework for this study draws upon the background concept of the 
'environment of insecurity' (EOr) which provides a basis to incorporate ethnicity. 
conflict, and migration in understanding Turkish Kurdish emigration. This background 
can be considered to comprise push factors of international migration but with the 
addition of ethnic conflict it puts the emphasis more on migration as one of the strategic 
options imposed on people subjected to the Eor as in the case of Turkish Kurdish 
migration. This study also considers international migration as a holistic phenomenon 
associated with a variety of other processes such as ethnic conflict. Given entry 
difficulties into Western European countries, more clandestine migration flows (e.g. 
asylum seeker flows from Turkey during the last two decades) are occurring as a result 
of this EOr. Thus the conceptual framework of this study links the political and the 
economic influences on migration within the context of the EOr. 
Existing theoretical and empirical work on international migration and migrants can be 
classified into five major areas which focus on: the causes of migration; determinants 
of its perpetuation; uses of immigrant labour; the integration of immigrants into the 
receiving society; and changes in both the receiving and sending societies due to 
migration (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Borocz 1989). However, the two 
dynamics (causes and consequences) of migration are not separable in migration 
analysis (Morokvasic, 1984). Migration itself may also constitute a cause for further 
Inigration once it was started or it may be a consequence of other events such as natural 
hazards and conflict situations. 
A more holistic approach is 'transnationalism' which blurs the distinction between 
concepts such as 'origin', 'voyage', and 'destination' - as well as weakening 
distinctions between asylum-seekers and other migrants - and allows consideration of 
other aspects including the construction of identity on the move. 
The following sections of this chapter discuss these conceptual reference points. It 
sta1is with the EOr framework, which is followed by the discussion of rele\'ant 
conceptualisations of international migration. These n10dels are di\'ided into two 
groups. One c0111prises those focusing on economic aspects and the other draws more 
upon political aspects. The follo\\'ing t\\·o sections elaborate the networks and the 
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expreSSIon of ethnicity with specific reference to the conceptualisation of 
transnationalism. The chapter concludes with a summary of conceptual reference points 
for international migration and ethnic conflict in the context of an environment of 
insecurity. 
2.2. The Environment of Insecurity as a Conceptual Background 
The EOI is examined here to help understanding the international migration of Turkish 
Kurds in relation to ethnic conflict in Turkey and in relation with the established 
international migration conceptualisations. iyduygu et al. have highlighted the effects 
of "an environment of insecurity as a poor structural context ... on the Kurdish ethnic 
nationalist mobilisation in Turkey" (1999:991). Although they examined the structural 
push factors of migration, theirs was not a study of migration but of ethnic conflict. 
One of the starting points for the initial study was the concept of the 'relative 
deprivation' of Kurds in Turkey (Gurr 1984; Gurr and Harff 1994). Therefore, in 
combination with understanding of the causes of migration, the introduction of the EOr 
is helpful, at least in understanding the Turkish Kurdish case. It refers to ethnic conflict 
and also to socio-economic and political deprivation, all of which play significant roles 
in international migration. 
"A mixture of economic hardship and separatist conflict in South-eastern Turkey swells 
the waves of Kurdish migrants currently lapping Europe's shores ... Turkey says they are 
economic migrants ... Human Rights groups say harsh tactics against Kurdish separatists 
drive civilians abroad. .. Employment (in the Southeast) is scarce and average annual 
household incomes are around $3,500, compared with more than $11,000 in Istanbul" 
(Reuters quoted in jr;duygu et al. 1999:995). 
This report by Reuters on Kurdish illegal migrants landing in Italy highlights the 
potential significance of the EOI (TDN, 18 January 1998). 
The EOI is conceptually divided into components of 'material insecurity' and 'non-
material insecurity'. "Material insecurity is measured by the relative amount of and 
secure access to the following: income, material possessions, education, health, state 
services and life itself. Non-material insecurity is roughly divided into the categories of 
language, culture (identity) and belonging (the opposite of alienation),' Oyduygu et al. 
1999:992). These two kinds of insecurity are intelTelated.3 
J i~duygu ('/ al. also notl' "it should be obvious that some \ariables (such as language) playa role in both 
matcrial and non-material insecurity. The t\\O kinds of insecurity are of course interrelated; our division 
of the t\\O i~ for the sake of conceptual clarity and understanding" (1999:992). 
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Figure 2.1. Environment of insecurity and international migration 
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The second part of this conceptual package argues that there exist four strategic options 
for Turkish Kurds to cope with the material environment of insecurity. First they n1ay 
preserve the status quo and continue to live in between the two sides, the government 
and rebels. Second, they can migrate to other parts of the country or abroad. Third, they 
can support the government forces against rebels. Finally, they can decide to join 
opposing rebel forces against the goven1ment forces Ci<;duygu et al. 1999:995). The e 
options necessarily result in other strategies related to the expression of ethnic identity 
(Figure 2.1). In the lneantime, these categories referred in the diagram lnu t not be read 
as e eluding each other. In fact they n1ay happen simultaneou ly or lnay be pre£ ned 
interchangeably. 
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The diagram above depicts migration as a dynamic movement from area of origin 
characterised by an environment of insecurity to the less insecure destination or to areas 
which offer a relative security. However, the migration decision making is very likely 
to be affected by the conditions in and perceptions about both destination and the place 
of origin. The term actor in Figure 2.1 refers to individuals and groups who are under 
the influence of the Eor and thereby have to opt suitable strategies which are possible 
under the given conditions. Migration abroad may be a preferred option within the exit 
category as opposed to the status quo because of possible ethnic and political freedoms 
and socio-economic benefits to be gained abroad. rn return, the availability of this 
migration option may also influence the EOr at the origin and the decision making of 
actors as it may produce remittances to be used to improve living standards back home. 
Nevertheless, the migration option can also involve some characteristics of insecurity 
such as discrimination and language barrier despite bringing some other freedoms 
(Figure 2.1). For example, the dislike of foreigners in Western European societies, 
racial discrimination, difficulties of settlement after migration can result in another kind 
of insecure environment which is reflected in the lower part of the diagram in Figure 
2.1. The migration abroad option operates as a movement from the Eor at the place of 
origin towards the destination which may reflect an environment of relative insecurity. 
The role of ethnicity in international migration and its transformation through the 
migration process is discussed in later sections of this chapter, as there can be an 
interaction between migration and the expression of ethnicity. The coping strategies 
arising from the Eor however can also influence the choice of ethnic identity or the 
way in which ethnicity is expressed. Turkish Kurds may opt to completely choose the 
dominant ethnic identity (e.g. Turkish in this case) with all the components of language 
and culture and reject the rival identity (e.g. Kurdish). Alternatively they can accept 
only the civic identity of the dominant ethnicity, call themselves Turkish citizens and 
keep practising their original ethnic identity in the private realm. Alternatively, as a 
final option, the dominant identity can be wholly rejected, and a politicised ethnicity 
takes the stage (i<;duygu et al. 1999:998). The mechanistic separation of identities here 
is to provide conceptual simplicity. However one should keep in mind the fact that 
people generally adopt multiple identities, and strategically use them according to 
conditions. Hence, they can be changeable and situational. 
Within this frame\\'ork option two on the material side, and option three on the non-
material side are significant to inte111ational migration. \Ve may expect that a person or 
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a family, who rejects the dominant ethnicity and its polity, may opt to leaye its po\\'er 
realm and move abroad. In cases of high ethnic tension as in Turkey, such refusal may 
be significant. One may say such responses to the EOI may contribute to migration 
flows including a very high involvement of asylum seekers. 
However neither the role of the EOI nor identity preferences are static. They evolye 
through movement, as migration is a dynamic process through time and space. This 
indicates a gap in the conceptualisation of the EOI. The processes associated with such 
an evolution are the change of environment on the one hand, and the shifts in reactions 
to and perceptions of it. If we view migration as a response to the Eor then it may 
follow a path starting from insecurity, going through relative insecurity4 and finally 
settlement in a secure environment. However, on the other hand actors' perceptions 
may change. They can begin to consider previous conditions, the Eor of the past, 
differently than they did before. It may be, for instance, that the next destination is also 
an EOI. As a third condition, time seems significant. For instance, at the time of 
migration, the place of origin might have been perceived as an EOr in terms of ethnic 
conflict or conversely migrants may not have been aware of it. Those who decided to 
return home might face an EOr in the place of origin because when they were abroad, 
conditions might have changed or their perceptions about them might have changed, 
and obviously their identity preferences might have changed in time. Those who choose 
the exit/refusal option may still suffer from a similar EOr in the aftermath of their 
departure from the country of origin. This EOr may continue in the destination possibly 
in other forms such as xenophobia, poverty and legal restrictions. 
rf the EOr is considered in conjunction with ethnic identity, it becomes more obvious 
that ethnicity strengthens as conflict rises (Esman 1994). This can be observed both in 
the form of ethnic conflict in the region of origin or through conflict in the form of 
discrimination in the destination. Thereby members of the ethnic group who were 
deprived at the place of origin may continue to live under similar conditions after 
en1igration; what can also be called an environment of 'relative security'. 
The EOI is relative because while there are often some improvements of cultural and 
political rights, there is no guarantee of economic betterment linked to migration. 
Moreover, after Inigration, a ne\v deprivation in the form of discrimination can occur. 
The receiving country, as a non-in\'olyed party in their primary cause. may \velcome 
.j Thanks to Paul White for suggesting this phrase. 
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their ethno-national challenge. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean an 
affirmative action leading to high living standards and more employment opportunities 
for immigrants, which is the case in many European countries (Friedrichs 1998: Faist 
1998; Kloosterman et al. 1998). 
As shown in Figure 2.1, migration can appear as a strong option among others for those 
experiencing the EOr. The question here is to incorporate the migration literature 
including contributions from recent studies of transnationalism in order to understand 
the case of Turkish Kurdish migration that involves ethnic conflict, clandestine fOnTIs, 
and transnational processes of migration and identity formation. The following sections 
therefore start by elaborating perspectives on international migration, and then moves 
on to discuss the role of networks and the relevance of transnationalism. 
2.3. Conceptual Considerations on International Migration 
The EOI is defined as the background for the conceptual framework of this study. This 
needs to be synthesised with approaches to the study of international migration which 
are essential to enhance the understanding of Turkish Kurdish migration. Theoretical 
pluralism is a necessity for this research since it has to deal with different aspects of a 
complex population movement which involves international migration, ethnic identity 
formation, and ethnic conflict and operates at different levels of analysis. The lack of a 
theoretical unity in migration studies also contributes to such need since different 
approaches provide explanations for different aspects of the migration phenomenon. 
Many scholars have underlined the fact that there is no single, unified, coherent theory 
of international migration, only a fragmented set of theories - conceptualisations - (e.g. 
Kritz et al. 1981; Zelinsky 1983; Portes and Borocz 1989; Cadwallader 1992; Massey 
et al. 1993; Bauer and Zimmermann 1995). Some have stressed the inadequacy of 
available approaches as they predict only a small subset of regularities (Stark 1991 :56; 
Stillwell and Congdon 1991 :5). Hendricks (1999:417) has recently argued that 
understanding migration is difficult, hindering the development of a consistent theory 
of inte111ational migration, because "migration observations directly contradict the 
central in1plications of common theoretical frameworks" (Hendricks 1999:4 17). 
Theoretical pluralism is \\'elcomed by some researchers because of the complexities of 
causes, processes and patte111S and thus they suggest \\'e do not need a theory of 
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migration but theories of migrations (Hammar et al. 1997; Baubock 1999; Faist 1997a). 
Alejandro Portes similarly argues that "as a data driven field of study, immigration has 
not had to contend with grand generalizations for highly abstract theorising ... the bias 
has run ... towards ground-level studies ... " (1997:57). In the same discussion, Portes 
concludes by stressing "this kind of endeavour" (search for a unified theory of 
migration) "would be futile. The reason is that the different areas that compose this 
field are so disparate that they can only be unified at a highly abstract and probably 
vacuous level" (1997:810). 
A final point before the elaboration of theoretical perspectives needs to be noted. This 
study rejects categorisations imposed by previous studies of migration. Migration and 
migrants need to be analysed as unified categories to include all kinds of migration 
flows and migrants ranging from labour migrants to refugees as several recent studies 
have now recognised bridging the gap between refugee and migration studies (Koser 
1997a; McDowell 1997; Wahlbeck 1996b; Cohen and Vertovec 1998; Van Hear 1998; 
Crisp 1999). 
Three building blocks in the conceptualisation of this study reflect three broader areas 
of central concern in the migration literature that are of relevance to this research: a) 
economic differentials, b) political differentials, and c) networks. The following three 
sections present a brief appraisal of these approaches to the understanding of 
international migration. This elaboration is followed by an examination of approaches 
to the expression of ethnicity with a particular reference to international migration. 
2.4. Economic Deprivation and International Migration 
Most of the literature on international migration has been dominated by economIC 
explanations until recently. Neo-classical economic models, linking migration to wage 
and employment levels have been main-stream for decades. They have focused on the 
equilibrium in factor markets (e.g. labour markets) of liberal economies. The need for 
labour in labour-scarce economies with high wages would attract migrant workers from 
nlarkets with excess labour supply where wages are low until the equilibrium of wages 
is set (e.g. Lewis 1954: Harris and Todaro 1970; Todaro 1976). The micro-economic 
model, for eXaInple, has focused on cost-benefit analyses for individuals (Sjaastad 
1962; Todaro 1976). Sjaastad understood nligration as a problem of resource allocation. 
as an investment to increase the productivity of human resources (1962: 83). In this 
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regard, Sjaastad was one of the earliest to use a human capital model (Stillwell and 
Congdon 1991: 138). For the study of Turkish Kurds these models are potentially of 
relevance as they choose to migrate to Germany and other developed countries 
although the political context may have shadowed their individual or group preferences 
for mobility. 
By the 1980s, the group aspect of migration had been introduced into the 
conceptualisation of international migration. It has been discovered that the 
economically oriented migration decision was not made by isolated individuals but 
larger units like families or households in order to minimise risks while maximising 
profits (e.g. Stark 1984). For example Hugo (1998) draws attention to the family 
dimensions by delineating migration as a survival strategy in the context of migration 
networks, which are discussed in the next section. According to Hugo, "most migration 
occurs as a result of decisions taken by families rather than individuals acting on their 
own and it is common for families to allocate family members to different labour 
markets" (Hugo 1998: 142). Re-allocation of family labour must achieve two goals: 
income maximisation and risk minimisation. 
Another strand of the economic approaches to international migration has highlighted 
the role of political economy. For example, the dual labour market theory argues 
international migration is a result of a permanent demand for immigrant labour that is 
inherent to the economic structure of developed societies (Piore 1979). Thus, the 
creation of a permanent reserve army of labour is facilitated by international migration. 
There is often a structural demand for migrant labour as there is a need to fill vacancies 
in low status jobs which provided little opportunity for upward mobility and which are 
not wanted by local-native labourers (Gordon 1972; Piore 1979). The secondary sector 
therefore appeared, characterised generally by insecure and low paid jobs, low cost and 
less-skilled labour, and by workers lacking political consciousness (Gitmez 1983). In 
this approach, the migration process is seen as a function of the recruitment process and 
"is largely demand-based and is initiated by recruitment on the part of employers in 
developed societies, or by governments acting on their behalf' (Massey et al. 
1993:444). However, this has not been proved empirically (Cain 1976) and the 
5 This is not the first time that the family has been introduced into migration analyses as earlier \\Titings 
on migration also paid attention on the importance of family in migration decision-making along \\ith 
indi\idual behaviour (e.g. Beshers 1967). 
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distinction between these two sectors of economy in "advanced societies is arbitrary, 
leading to great instability in empirical estimates" (Massey et at. 1993 :458). 
From a similar ideological point of view, Frank sees migration as an expected result of 
the inherent tension between the core and periphery, arising from the process of 
capitalist development (1969). This neo-Marxist view is well known from the works of 
Wallerstein (i.e. World Systems Theory) and has been developed by researchers 
including Castells (1989) and Sassen (1991). Massey et at. (1993 :447) identify six 
distinct hypotheses in this strand of migration theory. These refer to migration as part 
of the inevitable flows of raw materials, labour and capital between the core and the 
periphery in the course of capitalist development penetrating into the periphery. In this 
model, migration has little to do with wage and employment differentials between 
countries but more with market creation and the global economy, and is also affected 
by colonial links (Massey et at. 1993 :448). 
In brief, there are two schools of thought, broadly related to the economic school, more 
or less defining the tendencies among migration scholars: the Neo-classical Economic 
School and the Conflict School. The former adopts a functional view that understands 
migration as a voluntary and rational self-calculation by individual agents who 
eventually move abroad to better their economic conditions on the basis of wage 
differentials. The latter principally rejects such a perception of migration as a result of 
self-interested individuals' conceiving it instead in terms of class structure and conflict 
(Papademetriou 1989:8). 
Within both schools, international migration has been considered against the context of 
different development levels. For instance Stark and Yitzhaki (1988) underlined 
relative economic deprivation as a key function that was more important than wage 
differentials. Appleyard (1992) emphasised the different features of the interrelation 
between the development processes and international migration. He argued "internal 
and international migrations are prompted by the same basic processes of socio-
econon1ic transformation and development" (Appleyard 1992: 256). Through 
investigating migration in relation to development levels, a partial explanation was 
posited to the question as to why there had not been more migration from the South 
despite ongoing poverty in comparison with the wealth of the North. 
There is no a priori rule that poverty n1ust breed migration but there are certain le\'els 
of dc\'clopment that must be achic\'cd for migration (i<;:duygu et al. 2001). Portes and 
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Bach analysed labour migration from Central and Latin America to the US and point 
out that the bulk of immigrants have come from relatively developed regions (1985 :-+_ 
5). They summarise the mobility regimes in which emigration occurs; the migratory 
flow tends to go from regions with mid-level socio-economic development towards 
relatively developed regions (Portes and Bach 1985). Piore (1979) also implies that 
although middle-class migration eventually generates a migration stage in which lower 
and upper sectors of the population also become mobilised towards the developed 
countries, middle-class migration often remains dominant. In a similar vein, Tomas 
Hammar argues that "emigration may be expected to grow when poverty becomes less 
extreme, when literacy, basic education, and professional skills are more widespread, 
and when young women and men are ready to think not only about the next few days or 
weeks but about their own future and their children's" (1995:176)6. 
However relative development levels are not sufficient in themselves to explain 
massive migrations from Turkey to Germany, which started in 1961 despite similar 
economic conditions prevailing before in terms, for instance, of wage differentials or 
class structure (Faist 2000: 38). In the case of the movement of Turkish Kurds to 
Germany, this migration started rather later than their Turkish fellow citizens and went 
against the rule, challenging the relationship between migration and development levels 
mainly due to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Turkey. Thus many very poor Kurds have 
left for Germany as part of massive asylum-seeker flows since the mid-1980s. Thus the 
economic side of the coin needs to be considered with the political one with regard to 
asylum-seeker dominance in Turkish Kurdish migration. 
The concept of the EOI refers to material and non-material components of relative 
insecurity. Most of the material components can be explained in terms of economic 
status (such as lower income, lack of infrastructure facilities) as the approaches 
reviewed above have proposed. Such economic deprivation on its own may even be 
considered as a sufficient reason for Turkish Kurds to migrate. However, the EOI 
places emphasis on the political aspects of migration in relation to ethnic conflict 
giving migration a political character. The following section examines the intersections 
between politics and economics in explaining international migration. 
(1 More about this literature can be found in Hammar et al. (1997) and Faist (2000). 
19 
Conceptualising international migration, ethnicity and COl~flic[ 
2.5. Political Deprivation and International Migration 
" ... present-day internal conflicts generate much more sizeable WQl'es of external 
refugees than in the past, involving the refugees who do not necessari(r seek' asylum in 
the nearest safe country but - with an increasing intensity - head for destinations H'ith 
well established migrant networks or those offering the most favourable terms of 
protection, no matter how far away they are located. " (Okolski 1999: 149). 
The above statement from the Preliminary session of the European Population 
Conference (1999) indicates the transformation of international migration movements 
in terms of politically oriented flows. It can be argued that refugee or asylum seeker 
flows have become an integral part of general migratory regimes in as far as they draw 
on the same infrastructure: "well established migrant networks." 
At another level, political economy approaches have established the directionality of 
international migration flows between the core and the periphery by referring to uneven 
development and underlying colonial ties. There are no colonial ties in the Turkish 
Kurdish case, but one may refer to a core-periphery relationship between Germany and 
Turkey since the end of the 19th Century. For the current state of Turkish Kurdish 
migration to Germany and Europe established migration ties since 1960 must be a quite 
relevant factor. 
Refugee flows are often excluded from international migration studies and appeared as 
a separate (even isolated) discipline of study. The politically forced mobilisation of 
people has been recognised as a contingent type of "population movement". For 
instance, Woods (1982), in his Theoretical Population Geography, did not even refer to 
refugees while there was no mention in Stillwell and Congdon's Migration Models 
(1991) as well. Similarly, Cadwallader (1992) also overlooked the issue. However at 
the time these texts came out the total number of refugees in the world was about 14 
million, almost outnumbering the entire immigrant stock in mainland Europe (UNHCR 
2000), notwithstanding internal displacement which is currently roughly over 40 
million (Hampton 1998). 
World systems theory can be used to fill the political 'gap' in migration theory, \\'ith 
regard to its reference to historical links between the regions of the capitalist world 
economy incorporating colonial ties. Migration is a process of uneyen exchange 
between geographical regions that are defined in terms of core, semi-periphel),. and 
periphel:1'. The system works through a complex network of tlO\YS of capitaL labour. 
and con1n10dities bet\\'ccn these three regions in the context of unc\'cn capital i~t 
dcyelopn1ent (Wallcr~tein 1974; Petras 1981: Papademetriou and ~ lar1in 1991). The 
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strong relations between ex-colonial powers and their fonner colonies are significant to 
the direction and size of labour flows, facilitated by cultural, linguistic, administrati\'e. 
communication and other institutions between sending and receiving areas. These links 
could, and should, be understood in broader tenns as historically established networks 
in order to understand cases like migration from Turkey to Gennany where there had 
been no colonial affiliation but strong historical links.7 So in the course of history, 
"each segment of the core developed a special relationship with a segment of the 
periphery" (Zolberg 1992:326). 
Zolberg (1981 and Zolberg et aZ. 1986 and 1989) underlines the political forces 
regulating international migration and draws attention to the role of the state as decisive 
in international migration beyond the motives arising from the uneven distribution of 
opportunities. Drawing upon a neo-Marxist discourse, which perceives the world as 
comprising rich and poor countries, he predicts a future south-north tension in 
migratory regimes. The tension arises from the growth of the pool of potential migrants 
in the periphery and in response, the rise of protective walls in the core. He also puts 
forth the issue of refugees as a significant component of international migration to be 
considered theoretically (Zolberg 1989). 
The systems approach to migration first applied by Mabogunje (1970) perceIves 
migration "as a circular, interdependent and self modifying system" (Ogden 1984:23). 
This model stands on three components: the stimuli from the environment; institutional 
control sub-systems; and adjustment mechanisms, as all have an influence on the 
decision of the individual. Here 'the stimuli from the environment' might be considered 
as a reference to an EOr involving ethno-political tension. 
A further development (at a different scale) of the migration systems approach 
uncovers the considerable interdependence between the migration experience of 
various countries of origin or certain countries of destination. Migration systems have 
been established between countries of origin and destination on the bases of historical, 
cultural, political or economic linkages, which shape the flows. The role of the state in 
initiating and shaping migration flows is essential but is accompanied by other 
processes such as migration networks. labour recruiters. educational recruiters and the 
like (Kritz et al. 1992). The state level of analysis dominates in this approach to pro\'ide 
a description of the context in \\'hich intell1ational migration occurs. 
7 Ottoman Turkey'S participation \\ith the :\Iliance forces in \\'\\'1 and Republican Turkey's admission of 
Je\\'s sutTering from Na/i policies in the 19-10s are examples of such a close historical relationship. 
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Massey et al. (1993 :454) identified the three main hypotheses of the migration systems 
approach: a) geographical proximity is not a necessary condition but economic and 
political proximity are; b) multipolar systems are possible based on overlapping 
sending countries for a set of receiving core countries and presumably, overlapping 
receiving countries for a set of sending countries; c) entry into and dismissal from the 
system is responsive to political and economic changes (see also Bilsborrow and 
Zlotnik 1995 :61). The systems framework considers individuals and households as 
active migration decision-makers who develop strategies accordingly (Kulu-Glasgow 
1992). Systems approaches take both destination and origin into account; attempt to 
explain stability and mobility; examine elements of the system in combination as 
interconnected parts, not in isolation; and perceive migration as a sequential event 
changing over time (Fawcett and Arnold 1987). Therefore they represent a milestone in 
conceptualisation. 
Cumulative causation theory and network theory also briefly touch upon some political 
structural influences (e.g. political regulations, historical economic and political links) 
but their main concern is to explain the perpetuation of international migration (Massey 
et al. 1993; Taylor 1992). Cumulative causation theory tries to incorporate network and 
institutional approaches and also refers to structural changes that affect the migration 
process gradually. According to this approach international migration continues 
progressively in ways that make additional movement more likely over time. In the 
meantime, six socio-economic factors affect migration cumulatively. These are; income 
distribution, land allocation, agricultural organisation, culture, regional distribution of 
human capital and the social meaning of work (Massey et al. 1993 :451, see also Taylor 
1992 and Faist 1997b). According to this view, once the migration process is 
underway, it changes circumstances both at the origin and at the destination and thus 
the likelihood of future migration may increase. Similarly, regulations restricting 
inflows clearly decrease further migration. However, these approaches lack an 
understanding of ethnic conflict situations, for example, Kurds in Turkey or Berbers in 
Morocco because they focus on state level dynamics overlooking internal ethnic 
dilnensions. 
With an inherent political focus, refugee studies, a neglected area of migration 
literature, can provide some explanation, as it is necessary to incorporate involuntary 
political and economic movements into the migration literature. Richmond's (1995) 
study of migrations proposed a frame\\"ork locating movements on a continuous sl'ale. 
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ranging from migration under conditions of free decision making and rational choice 
(e.g. labour migration, guest workers) to movements characterised by intimidation, 
crisis and conflict (e.g. refugees, displaced people). He distinguishes underlying factors 
(e.g. extreme economic inequalities between countries and political instability) and 
structural limitations (such as legal frameworks) along with immediate precipitating 
conditions (e.g. the outbreak of war, ethnic conflict, and human rights violations) and 
enabling contexts (e.g. individual availability of resources) (Richmond 1995). The 
world systems perspective would place Richmond's model into an international 
structure which influences social conflicts that for instance trigger refugee flows in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America (Zolberg et al. 1986). 
"Although there is a literature dating back to World War II, in 1981, Stein and Tomasi 
could still note that 'traditionally viewed as localised, nonrecurring and isolated flows, 
refugees and refugee movements stand singularly undefined and notably 
undocumented'" (in Shami 1996:5). Refugee studies primarily propose typologies to 
distinguish refugee flows from labour flows; while the latter have economic causes, the 
former are rather explained in political terms (Suhrke 1995). However, successors have 
abandoned that simplistic view and incorporated many more variables into their models 
such as identity, ideology, political and economic causes at the roots and ethnic 
conflict, war, natural hazards as primary variables resulting in death, displacement, 
resettlement, refugee flows (i.e. Zolberg et al. 1989; Joly 1992; Richmond 1995; 
Suhrke 1995, 1998; Rogge 1998). 
In reality, it is not easy to distinguish refugees from other migrants. European countries 
increasingly have been struggling with large asylum applications year by year. The 
problem for governments is whether they are "genuine" refugees or not. With the 
exception of the extreme cases such as sudden natural hazards or outbreak of wars, 
asylum seeker flows are mixed with clandestine migration as in the case of Turkish 
Kurdish migration to Europe (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Koser (1997b) has found the 
distinction between labour migration and asylum migration vague in his study of 
Iranian asylum seekers in the Netherlands using a networks approach. He argues the 
validity of the distinction changes according to the networks, which facilitate and shape 
the direction of flows. Probably due to the same reason "the traditional countries of 
immigration haye also been major receiYers of refugees ... " (UN 1998a: 30). 
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A genuine refugee is described in International Law as one who "has well-founded fear 
of being persecuted ... for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social or political opinion" in the 1951 Geneva Convention (UN 1998a: 109). 
There must be a real threat and the person must be unable to survive in the country 
which he or she left behind (Suhrke 1998: 284). Within the framework of 
conceptualisations assessed, this definition could be reworded as the 'political migrant'. 
The category of political migrant comprises both "genuine" refugees and asylum 
seekers but it may also include illegal migrants who have no political cause but are 
economically deprived. 
Geddes (1995) has explored the 'democratic deficit' in his study of minorities' and 
immigrants' rights in the EU. He refers to the lack of political participation for 
immigrants in the EU policy-making structures. No doubt such a democratic deficit for 
ethnic minorities would be much more evident in countries like Turkey with a well-
known record of human rights violations and armed ethnic clashes. This 'democratic or 
political deprivation' prevalent in the home country can facilitate migration abroad 
mainly in clandestine ways towards areas promising less political deprivation. This 
conceptualisation is helpful to understand the Turkish Kurdish case, as they are 
concerned with overcoming both political and economic deprivation by fleeing to 
Europe. 
Established international migration networks have paved the way for novel paths of 
international migration. These networks have created a deterritorialised destination [a 
unique and single imagined territory across all countries of destination which may 
constitute for instance a sphere including North America and Western Europe together 
for the Kurds] as well as encompassing deterritorialised ethnicities [ethnic groups that 
are not attached to a single territory]. Migration is not a process only combining 
departure, destination and journey phases but a state of being. Many people living in 
border areas earn their living by trading on the other side [of the border], commuting 
short distances. Similarly professionals of multinational corporations have been moving 
fro111 country to country in order to get promoted (Salt 1992). For them, migration is the 
essential paIi of their lives and there is a quite enduring circulation. This situation is not 
111uch different for other migrants as well. They do not settle but live in a migrant state 
of being. An illustration tells more about this transformation via the help of net\\orks: 
" ... a Sri Lankan n01\' {rm'e/ling to Germany, having neither legal papers nor money does 
not feel lost and helpless in Belarus or almost anYH'here else if he is equipped with a 
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magnetic telephone card with which he may instantly request cash from a nearby cOllsin 
or friend, or get instructions from a (migrant) trafficker. " (Okolski 1999: 148) 
The following section explores the literature on migration networks with regard to the 
increasingly transnational nature of these networks. Unlike the past, today migrant liyes 
are spread across the borders of multiple states through transnational social spaces 
which are combinations of ties, positions in networks and organisations, and networks 
reaching across the borders. These spaces denote not static notions of ties but dynamic 
social processes (Faist 1999:4). 
2.6. Networks and Transnationalism 
Networks were always important in international migration but they have been 
transformed through the influence of globalisation, which can be defined as a "social 
process in which the constraints of geography on the social and cultural arrangements 
recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding" (Waters 
1995:3). With this challenge, new ways of conceptualising migration have come into 
existence such as transnationalism. The role of networks and transnationalism in 
international migration has gained a central place in recent accounts of international 
migration (Hammar et al. 1997; Portes 1997; Massey 1999; Faist 2000). Technological 
improvements helped international migration and the operation of transnational 
corporations. Thereby, transnational networks appeared and paved the way for 
deterritorialised social relations through networks leading towards transnational 
communities. Before the discussion of transnational communities in the context of 
Turkish Kurdish migration it is necessary to understand networks. 
Tilly argued people do not migrate but networks do (1990:75). These networks can 
comprise a complex web of relations comprising economic and political networks of 
interaction, as well as involve collectives such as groups and associations (Faist 
1997a: 193), for instance networks of transnational corporations, state-level agreements 
and affairs, and NGOs such as Greenpeace. Massey et al (1993 :4.+8) define migrant 
networks as "sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-
migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared 
con1n1unity origin." These links increase the possibility of migration because they 
lower the cost and risks of international migration and also increase the likelihood of 
net returns. Networks are mutually beneficial for non-migrants and migrants because 
they both decrease risks for current migrants while increasing opportunities for 
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newcomers. Thus they are inclined to expand, although there is a decreasing tendency 
in marginal net-gains (i.e. support for newcomers and potential migrants provided by 
those who have already migrated) from networks because of the increasing burden of 
potential migrants on residents. Thus, in the long run, residents' capacity to offer 
opportunities for newcomers will be decreased (Bocker 1995). 
The concept of the "relatives and friends multiplier" used by Nelson (1959:49) can be 
considered as the earliest use of a network approach in migration studies (see also 
Woods 1982: 147).8 Another important concept related to the discussion of networks is 
social capital, which is essential to operate networks, since it allows individuals to co-
operate in networks and collectives and to pursue their goals. It "links individuals to 
social structures ... serves to mobilise financial, human, cultural and political capital" 
(Faist 1997a: 199). 
According to Putnam, social capital may be defined as "the features of social 
organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions ... [it is] productive like other forms of 
capital, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in 
its absence" (1993: 167). One could discuss these ends as the betterment of life in 
economic, cultural and political terms which social capital makes possible by 
facilitating co-ordinated action, such as migration. 9 
Migration networks can also institutionalise themselves. "Once international migration 
has begun, private institutions and voluntary organisations arise to satisfy the demand 
created by imbalance between large numbers of people who seek entry into capital-rich 
countries and the limited number of immigrant visas these countries typically offer" 
(Massey et al. 1993 :450). This creation implies human trafficking as well. Migration 
"networks operate largely outside the sphere of policy makers' influence" therefore 
ahnost all attempts to prevent this type of migration based on networks have failed" 
(Hugo 1998:146). 
Networks are decisive in the perpetuation of international migration but go beyond it. 
When we think of their institutionalisation or the structures upon which they are based 
S Similarly, Douglas Massey mentions the 'family and friends effect' while recalling social capital 
perspecti \es in his recent account of international migration (1999:306). 
l) Portes and Mooney (2000:..+) identify three general definitions of the term social capital: 1) as a source 
of social control; 2) as a source of family-mediated benefits; and 3) as a source of resources mediated by 
non-famih networks. DitTerent definitions of social capital and identified shortcomings in different 
approach~s can be found in Portes and \ looney, 2000 (see also Bourdieu 1980). 
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then transnational processes arise. Through the spread of networks, social capital has 
been transferred and transformed into a new dimension, where new communities and 
ethnicities established themselves as transnational communities. One might call it a 
'post-migration phase', which generates more mobility. However, this does not 
necessarily mean an increase in the migrant population but more circulation. 10 
The aphorism, 'capital is global, labour is local' is challenged by the availability of 
long-distance mobility networks and the contribution of communication technologies 
leading to transnationalism (Portes 1997:814). Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc-
Szanton define transnationalism as a process leading to multi-stranded lives bridging 
home and host societies in their account of migrants from the Caribbean and the 
Philippines living in the USA (1994:6).11 
Transnational communities can be defined as dense networks across political borders 
created by migrants in their search for the betterment of socio-economic and political 
status. These networks enable an increasing number of people to lead dual lives (Portes 
1997: 812). According to Portes (1998) transnationalism is a reaction of common 
people against globalisation: "what common people have done in response to the 
process of globalisation is to create communities that sit astride political borders and 
that, in a very real sense, are "neither here nor there" but in both places simultaneously" 
(p.3).12 
Faist (1999) identifies three different types of transnational 'social spaces': kinship 
groups, circuits, and communities, which have been ranked according to the breadth of 
ties among members varying from reciprocity to solidarity. Accordingly "transnational 
communities characterise situations in which international movers and stayers are 
connected by dense and strong social and symbolic ties over time and across space to 
patterns of networks and circuits in two countries - based upon solidarity": the Kurds 
are a typical example (Faist 1999:8-9).13 He further postulates a line of demarcation 
10 This caution about the volume of migration reflects studies that show the vast majority of people are 
not involved in migration (Faist, 2000). 
11 The authors' earlier work was the first account of transnationalism in relation to international 
migration (Glick-Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992). 
12 Considering transnationalism as a grass-roots response to globalisation is quite common among 
scholars and the common explanation relates to improvement of communication technologies (Kearney, 
1986: Glick-Schiller et al., 1992; Wah1beck, 1999). 
13 Hassanpour also conceiyes the Kurdish case as a transnational community attempting to establish a 
deterritorialized nation-state (1999). "The concept of deterritorialisation proposed by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari (1975) ... is understood as describing the displacement and dislocation of identities, 
persons and meanings, with the moment of alienation and exile located in language and literature" (Brah, 
1996::20:2). 
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between a transnational community and a diaspora community based on ties to the 
receiving countries: "Diasporas can only be called transnational communities if the 
members also develop some social and symbolic ties to the receiving country. If they 
don't we can speak of exile" (Faist 1999:10). 
Due to strong communication links, local tensions have the chance to evolve within 
transnational communities. For example, ethnic conflict can be transferred to the 
countries of immigration as in the case of Kurds in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Sweden (Falk 1998; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2000). 
Rex (1996) discussed this issue in the context of the ethnic mobilisation of immigrant 
minorities and underlined some features of transnationalism discussing how 
transnational communities should be conceptualised: 
So far as the homeland is concerned, these migrants will maintain contact with relatives 
who are there, will visit it and send children there for a part of their education, will send 
remittances and may seek to acquire property there, and, not least, will continue to take 
an active interest in homeland politics, often using the relative freedom of the land of 
settlement to further political causes which are repressed at home. [According to} these 
homeland concerns ... they are indeed diasporas or at least that homeland interest ... 
constitutes its main raison d 'etre . ... Within the land of settlement the main purpose is to 
gain as much as possible from participation in its institutions. (1996:5) 
This conceptualisation is acceptable, with certain provisions, in relation to asylum 
seeker flows, since they may have a 'myth' of a homeland but no chance to "send their 
children there for education", for instance. Nevertheless, as Rex stated, these 
communities still have three points of reference: one is to the homeland, the second is 
to the land of settlement and the third is to the possible countries of onward settlement 
(1996:5). 
The network-based nature of transnational communities is common either in the form 
of extended families, ethno-political organisations (Rex 1996), ethnic entrepreneurship 
(Portes 1997), or solidarity among members (Faist 1999). Therefore it is possible to 
discuss 'transnational immigrant communities' instead of immigrant communities since 
social relations emerging from these developments (telecommunication, TNCs, etc.) 
are not easily confined within the borders of nation-states (Wahlbeck 1999:25). Once 
social capital is transferred to a transnational space, then its nature defines the basics of 
a transnational community denying territoriality but keeping its connections with origin 
and destination. Schierup (1985: 153) calls this connection to both origin and country of 
destination a social field comprising a double existential frame of reference. \\' ahlbcck 
reiterates the issue as "it is more fruitful to understand this as something transnational. 
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SInce the social relations of a refugee are largely unrelated to his or her actual 
geographical location" (1999:27). 
The functions and operation of transnational social networks in the process of 
international migration need to be elaborated. Crisp (1999:6) identifies four basic 
functions. First, those networks are an important source of information to prospective 
migrants. Second, migrant networks act as means of mobilising financial resources. For 
example, potential migrants increasingly are provided for financially not from domestic 
sources but from sources abroad. Third, they provide the organisational infrastructure, 
which is necessary for people to move from one place of the world to another, 
especially in illegal migration. Fourth, these networks provide employment or financial 
support after arrival at the final destination. They may also erase the distinction 
between migrants and refugees that has been common in the literature until very 
recently. These networks link together people from the same family, ethnicity or 
country and "are far more likely to incorporate a variety of different migrant 
categories"(Crisp 1999:4). Ethnicity becomes important within these transnational 
social networks. Ethnic belongings can dominate within some of them and then these 
relations become crucial for the maintenance of ethnic identity as well. When there is 
an ethno-political concern as in the Turkish Kurdish case, then the expression of 
ethnicity may become more substantial. Following the brief introduction of the gender 
dimension, the final section reviews the literature on ethnicity with a particular focus 
on the expression of ethnicity in relation to international migration. 
2.7. The Gender Dimension in International Migration 
Although a vast area of investigation, within the scope of this research, the gender 
dimension is explored briefly. Scholars increasingly refer to the importance of gender 
in migration processes (Hugo 1995; Brah 1996; Portes 1997). Gender issues are 
reflected in relation to the selectivity of migration and decision making processes 
(Curran and Saguy 1998:4). Female participation in international migration constitutes 
about half of all flows (UN 1998) although it has not been paid as much attention as it 
has deserved and is still often unresolved in international migration conceptualisations 
(Pessar 1999). In forced migration cases such as refugee flows, characterised by a high 
level of political tension, the decisiveness of selectivity in migration may be 
dilninished, as these moves are often characterised by a total displacement of the 
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population neglecting gender differences. At the same time, contemporary migration 
flows are proved to involve more female participation along with the rise of female 
participation in the labour force than it did in the past (Castles and Miller 1993: Massey 
et al. 1993; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Curran and Saguy 1998). 
In a recent account of future prospects for international migration study, gender is 
highlighted among five themes: "the socially patterned relationship between sexes as 
they influence and, in tum, are influenced by the process of immigration" (Portes 
1997:816). Despite the great emphasis on the paucity of literature on the role of gender 
in migration processes, writings in this field are growing rapidly as it is realised 
"women comprise a growing segment of migrations" (Brah 1996: 179; see chapters 5 
and 7 in Ackers 1998). With regard to the neglected role of gender in migration studies, 
Pessar admits the increasing volume of research on female migrants but underlines the 
need for gender-inflected research on both men and women (1999). 
Recent studies also elaborated the gender dimension in migration by focusing on, for 
instance, women as domestic workers and the place of women in forced migration 
flows (e.g. El-Bushara 2000; Turner 2000; Sweetman 1998; UNOaV 1998). Evidently, 
there is a need for more research with a gender perspective in order to provide a gender 
balance in the theory of international migration (Mahler 1999; Grieco and Boyd 1998; 
Hagan 1998; Bailey and Cooke 1998). The only statement to be made here is this 
research considers the possible effects of gender differences in Turkish Kurdish 
migration as social differences based on gender might have influenced the migratory 
movement. For instance, in Turkey, lack of antenatal care makes the EOr very different 
for Turkish Kurdish women compared to their male companions (Cindoglu and Sirkeci 
2001). 
2.8. The Expression of Ethnicity on the Move 
The definition of ethnicity is disputed although it has been a popular term in the social 
sciences since the 1950s. Modem scholars simply defined an ethnic group as a segment 
of a country's population, which comes from a specific culture and shares common 
social institutions (Marshall 1994: 157 _58).1.+ Nevertheless, this study focuses on the 
14 "Ethnicity" first appeared in Oxford English Dictional:\,. in 1953. It means the essence of an ethnic 
group or the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or a group .. -\ detailed account of the different 
definitions of ethnicity can be found in Hutchinson and Smith (l99J). 
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expression of ethnicity in the course of migration hence the discussion here is limited to 
that aim and the detailed discussions of defining ethnicity are omitted. This research 
approached the expression of ethnicity as a distinguishing marker in migration 
behaviour. 
Globalisation and transnationalism have not diminished the importance of ethnicity but 
renewed it (Featherstone 1990; Waters 1995). Ethnicity has become a global force 
floating through the cracks of state borders (Appadurai 1990). The four main points of 
the discussion for the expression of ethnicity in migration are as follows. First, the 
expression of ethnicity is a dynamic phenomenon. 15 Secondly, it is an integrated 
symbolic structure with a time and space dimension. Thirdly, it is individual but with a 
collective association generated by shared activities. Finally, it is both ascribed by the 
subject and described by others (Jacobs and Meier 1998; Yinger 1994; Balibar and 
Wallerstein 1991). 
Ethnicity is probably one of the most complex areas of social investigation since it 
occurs as a result of interactions of several symbolic properties of people. It seems 
almost impossible to give certain definitions. According to Balibar and Wallerstein, 
every interviewer knows that when you ask people about their memberships to a 
"collection-of-people" (nation, ethnicity, tribe, minority, etc.), with a question like 
"who are you?" there would be so many different answers but the answers would be 
more definite if the question was rephrased as "who are you if they [another 
"collection-of-people"] were that?" (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991 :91). Ethnic identity, 
therefore, is relational, but this relationality is not confined to state boundaries as in the 
case of minorities although some scholars have used it in this way (e.g. Barth 1969). 
Identities are rather imagined when they become the identity of a nation-state since 
geographical spaces created by political borders usually comprise more than one 
hOll1ogeneous ethnic population (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991: 121). These different 
ethnic populations of a nation may have to live together but with conflicting interests. 
The definition of nation by Anderson has become very famous in the literature: " ... an 
imagined political con1munity and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" 
(1983: 15). Gellner also shares a similar approach by stressing "Nationalism is not the 
15 There han: been primordialist. static approaches but these haye been rejected for lacking explanator: 
po\\er in fa\our of instmmentalist approaches that treat ethnicity as a social. political and cultural 
phenomenon (sec Hutchinson and Smith 1993). 
31 
Conceptualising international migration, ethnicit)' and conflict 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist" 
(1964:169, emphasis is mine). 
With respect to the relational and imagined nature of ethnic identity, Kurdish ethno-
nationalism also expresses itself in relation to the "other", namely the Turks. As many 
scholars emphasise there is another underlying process, that of self-definition or 
ascription of ethnic identity. "Ethnic identities are neither ascribed nor achieved; they 
are both ... " (Eriksen 1993:57) and "determining factors of ethnicity are the 
characteristics of self-ascription and ascription by others" (Barth 1969: 13). 
Almost all approaches to ethnicity itemise its components: Nash also adopts this view 
and calls them the "building blocs of ethnicity" (Nash 1989:5). The most commonly 
referred to components are language, shared history, religion and a territory. But they 
are not necessarily exclusive or compulsory for each case. Among these, language 
seems the most referred to, probably due to practical reasons. It is relatively easy to 
identify and in many cases there are available records of distributions of populations 
according to languages. 16 However scholars generally approach ethnicity with caution 
and adopt a flexible consideration through focusing on different aspects of ethnicity. 
For instance, in his pioneering essay, Weber underlined the distinguishing power of 
having a different language and a belief of being different [from the 'other'] 
(1961 :305). Territorial attachment seems abandoned in defining ethnicity. "Although 
much of the theoretical writing about ethnicity has been concerned with the attachment 
of an ethnic group to a territory, in fact ethnic communities are often concerned 
precisely with their detachment from a territory" (Rex 1996: 103). Territorial 
attachment has not been central in ethnicity debates but boundaries have been 
important. For Barth (1969) it was based on boundaries but these boundaries were 
basically psychological in nature, not territorial (Romanucci-Ross and De Vos 1995). 
Synlbols are also "important factors for action as they are objects, acts, concepts or 
linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of disparate meanings, 
evoke sentiments and emotions and impel men to action" (Mach 1993 :39). For Turkish 
Kurds, the celebration of Newroz 17 is one such symbol (Aksoy 1991:13 and Mihatuli 
1992: 168). There are undoubtedly lots of other elements in the definition of ethnicity. 
16 Scc Chapter .f for the issues of data a\'ailability on ethnicity. 
17 Newroz is a festi\'al celebrated on ~ 1 st of March each year among Kurds, but similar festivals are 
celebrated by many other Middle Eastern societies around the same period of the year as celebrations of 
Ncw Year and spring. The \\ord Ne\\Toz also means "New Year [day]" in Kurdish and Persian languages 
(Sce Chapter 7 for more details). 
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An ethnic group is a group within a larger society having real or commonly accepted 
ancestry with a historical memory and cultural focus on symbolic elements defined as 
the characteristic of their ethnicity. These symbolic elements may include kinship 
patterns, physical proximity or being in contact, religious affiliation, language or 
dialect forms, tribal affiliation, a common belief in a future project, and nationality 
along with a consciousness of kind among members of the group. However, the 
essential element in measuring ethnicity remains self-ascription and description by 
others. 
Depending on the situations, people assume multiple identities, which they use inter-
changeably. These options are almost infinite; an individual can underline his political 
identity in one situation while he declares a religious or political identity in another. 
Similarly, other cross cutting identities could be preferred. However having stated these 
features of ethnic identity, ethnicity is socially constructed rather than being essential or 
natural (see Jackson and Penrose 1993). Therefore identity may be subjected to changes 
or shifts through processes including migration and transnationalisation. 
In the process of migration, ethnic or national identities become more visible beside 
other identities. International migration breeds more ethnic confrontation possibly 
because it involves 'foreigners' in other 'national' spheres (e.g. Lever-Tracy and 
Quinlan 1988; Massey 1993 and Cohen 1997).18 The expression of ethnicity is 
considered with respect to White's (1995) conceptualisation of migration and identity 
shift. His approach illustrates the dynamic use of multiple identities and their moves in 
time and space. "A person who initially leaves his or her country as one type of migrant 
may, depending on the situation and/or the passing of time, becomes another type of 
migrant" (Wahlbeck, 1999:29). 
White (1995) underlines the changes occurring in structures, geographies and people 
due to migration. He mentions the transformations that occur in the lives of all people 
involved in migration. "Migration therefore changes people and mentalities" (White 
1995: 1). People have multiple identities, and migration may influence self-images of 
these n1ultiple identities which are not stable and migrants may have identity shifts in 
the san1e day (White 1995:3). White's argument on changes resulting from migration 
may be read as changes during the migration process by drawing it into a continuous 
18 This argument also finds support from the literature \yhich proposes globalisation may nacerbate. 
forms of s:Kial c\.clusion including nationalism and ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, racism, sc\.ism 
and localism (l\Jasscy 199]:2):2 and Cohen 1997:169). 
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life event with more emphasis on its dynamic nature. Thus we can talk about the 
attempts of migrants to re-create their former life stories, (which possibly evolve and 
mature during the illegal migration adventure of an asylum seeker, for instance). 
Another impact can be integration or assimilation as White (1995) proposes. 
Alternatively, it can be a stand-still alongside the host society which means they just 
integrate into the immigrant enclave such as Turkish communities in Germany. It 
should be noted here that these identity shifts are not confined to individuals but can 
affect the whole society as well. 
The shift in identity is a major component of the migration-ethnicity interaction and is 
reflected in almost all spheres because it alters almost all activities of an individual 
migrant: employment, income, wealth, patterns of consumption, secularisation or 
religiosity, plans, wishes and so on (White 1995:3). Migration creates new hybridised 
styles of life. "Many migrants may not have held a particularly strong view of their 
own ethnicity prior to movement" (White 1995:3), they may then develop a new 
ethnicity or strengthen the previous one when they are confronted by "others" in the 
destination country. Such a multiplicity and the interchangeable use of identities may 
also lead to syncretism and already some scholars have indicated an engagement in 
transnational syncretism among second generation Turks in Germany (aglar 1995). 
The ethno-nationalist nature of identity may cause a stronger loyalty to the emergent 
ethnic identity rather than assimilation by the host society. In the case of Turkish 
Kurds, one should also note that Kurdish ethnic identity has recently been re-awakened 
- and reconstructed - in response to experiences of conflict in Turkey and Iraq and to a 
worldwide resurgence of ethno-nationalism (Van Bruinessen, 1998:39). In this regard, 
there has been a rise of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in both the country of origin, 
Turkey, and in immigration countries of Western Europe. In this case, the movement 
might appear as a strategy to avoid assimilation in the country of origin: preserving and 
reconstructing ethnic identity abroad (Findlay and Li, 1999:55). 
Multiple identities and identity shifts in relation to the migratory movement "are 
frequently con1posite and transnational" (Alund 1999: 113). They are heavily bounded 
by processes of settlement, integration, adaptation, exclusion and so forth. The 
emergence of ne\v ethnicities along the lines of new solidarities and new alliances in 
in1n1igration societies is "the fruit of cultural diffusion and social exclusion" (Alund 
1999: 11-.+), and the ethnic identities created in a multi-cultural society are "not pure. 
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original or connected with a fixed past; rather they relate to the dilemmas and conflicts 
of the present" (Alund 1999: 114). 
In terms of the maintenance of ethnic identity, networks are also important as they are 
important for migration and will deserve a special attention in this research. Turkish 
Kurds "have a well organized and well established network of contacts through 
committees and information offices all over the world" (Wahlbeck, 1996b: 7). Through 
contacts with Turkey and with Kurdish communities in other countries, in many ways 
including television, information bureau, newspapers, bulletins, etc., the ethnic identity 
of Turkish Kurds may be maintained abroad. A strengthening of their identity might 
also be expected. These networks can also serve as sources to cope with problems in 
the destination countries while reproducing and maintaining ethnic identity. 
2.9. Concluding remarks 
As a comprehensive study of the international migration of Turkish Kurds in response 
to an ethnic conflict, this study has carefully reviewed the literatures of international 
migration and ethnicity. Such a vast subject area forces the researcher to consider 
different approaches from different disciplines such as political science, sociology, 
anthropology, and geography. This interdisciplinary nature of the research inevitably -
and fortunately - requires a hybrid conceptualisation leading also to a mixed 
methodology which is discussed in chapter four. While migration patterns and 
processes stand in the territory of international migration conceptualisations, the role of 
the expression of ethnicity leads the investigation towards the approaches on definition 
and measurement of ethnic identity. Thereby aims and objectives of the study as 
defined in Chapter 1 require an eclectic conceptual approach benefiting from different 
strands and disciplines in order to analyse complex international migration cases which 
involve ethnic conflict. The conceptual framework employs as building blocks the 
background concept of the EOI, economic and political approaches to international 
n1igration, transnationalism, and a dynamic understanding of ethnicity. First, the 
conceptualisation of the EOI helps to understand relative conditions, which facilitates 
intel11ational migration given the existence of an ethnic conflict situation. It also hints 
at the relative environment of (in)security in the country of destination. The EO I 
provides an insight into the conditions in the area of origin. especially the options and 
possible strategies leading to migration or staying. 
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Second, this framework draws on economic and political perspectives on international 
migration particularly to migration systems and network approaches. These general 
approaches to international migration help to understand the root causes and the 
perpetuation of the migration experience. For instance wage and employment 
differentials or wealth differentials are still evident determinants of migration. However 
one has to incorporate political and conflict oriented views within these models. 
Third, the transnationalism perspective is the glue for the theoretical framework, which 
helps to understand the mechanisms and patterns of migration as a whole and goes 
beyond migration by providing explanations about the maintenance of ethnic migration 
networks, communities and ethnic identities. Active communication links between 
ethnic immigrant communities in different countries, their connection with their fellows 
in the country of origin, and their unique recruitment mechanisms are very difficult to 
understand without this transnational social network approach. Turkish Kurds learn and 
develop their own (but often unknown until migration) distinct ethnic identity, often for 
the first time, through a variety of media, such as MED-TV 19 or Kurdish language 
classes in German schools. None of this can be properly understood without reference 
to transnational ethnic networks. 
Fourth, along with the transnationalism approach, understanding the expreSSIOn of 
ethnicity on the move has to be focused on the relationship between ethnic identity and 
ethnic conflict in the case of Turkish Kurds. An armed ethnic conflict prior to 
international migration can lead to a conflict based expression of ethnicity and may 
breed more use of transnational communication networks in order to rebuild a strong 
ethnic affiliation as in the Turkish Kurdish case. 
The most significant element of conceptualisation in such complex studies is theoretical 
pluralism, as now more commonplace in literature on international migration. A mixed 
conceptual approach may enable the researcher to have a better understanding of 
international migration and ethnicity. Reality flows outside the grey borders of 
theorisation and involves macro-micro structures, perceptions, choices, voluntary and 
involuntary action all together. 
Consequently, this study adopts a mixed conceptual framework based on theoretical 
pluralisn1. It attempts to combine different perspectiYes stemming from different 
19 Kurdish satellite T\' station \\hich broadcasts nc\\s. culture and education programs based in England 
and Belgium \\ith production studios all around Europe. 
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schools of thought and different disciplines in order to provide a useful set of 
conceptual references incorporate the processes of ethnic conflict and international 
migration. 
37 
Context of international migration: ethnic cO/~flict and deprivation 
Chapter III 
The Context of International Migration: ethnic conflict and 
deprivation at home and abroad 
3.1. Introduction 
"It is suicide to be abroad 
But ,\'hat is to be at home", 
What is to beat home?" 
(Samuel Beckett, All that fall, 1957, p,l 0) 
In order to understand the international migration of a particular population and the role 
of the expression of ethnicity in relation to this movement, an understanding of these 
movements' context is necessary, comprising their background and reasons for 
migration, their journeys and their destinations. Thus in this chapter, Turkey's ethnic 
social fabric and the Kurdish question is introduced and linked to the German context 
of immigration. 
To date, the international migration of Turkish Kurds has been overlooked in the 
literature although they have always constituted a significant component of flows from 
Turkey since the 1960s. Moreover none of the prevalent ethnic diversities within these 
flows have been discussed within the literature. Although one can find a voluminous 
literature on migration flows from Turkey to Europe and Turkish immigrant 
communities in Europe, there are only a few studies exploring its ethnic and religious 
diversities (e.g. Giirbey 1995; Franz 1986). Given the dearth of studies on Turkish 
Kurdish migration, this research is one of the first to explore this particular and largest 
minority component of both Turkish society and the Turkish migratory regime, This 
chapter draws on the literature to locate Turkish Kurdish migration within the broader 
Turkish lnigration context. However, based on the conceptual framework developed in 
the previous chapter, three essential areas are examined: 1) Turkey's socio-economic 
and ethnic fabric in relation to conflict and migration. 2) The Kurdish population and 
ethno-nationalism, 3) Gernlany as a destination country with regard to Turkish Kurdish 
migration fron1 Turkey. 
This review of the context in which Turkish Kurdish international migration has been 
shaped reflects upon the conceptual premises dra\\'n in the prT\'ious chapter. Therefore, 
along \\'ith the socio-economic and political aspects \\'hich ha\e been the core concenl 
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for migration studies, ethnic aspects in relation to the conflict between the Turkish and 
Turkish Kurdish elements are also discussed in relation to the environment of 
insecurity (EOr) framework which relates material and non-material deprivation to 
ethnic conflict and migration in Turkey. The EOr is relational and therefore also has a 
utility in understanding the expression of ethnicity, which may differ throughout the 
stages of migration process. 
The first section of this chapter examines Turkish migration with specific reference to 
ethnicity. It examines ethnic conflict and its implications, in the case of the Turkish 
Kurdish population, in a historical context in which the EOr has contributed to 
international migration. However this interacting nature of migration and ethnic 
conflict is intertwined with global and regional changes, which also need to be 
addressed here. 
The second section focuses on Turkish Kurdish involvement in migration flows from 
Turkey in which the role of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement is examined as an 
institution that may affect international migration and the constitution of transnational 
networks. 
The third section of the context focuses on Germany as a destination for Turkish 
Kurdish migration. It examines the characteristics of the destination by outlining 
German migration history, the guest worker system, and ethnic (migrant) enclaves in 
relation to the relative environment of security with specific reference to Turkish 
migration. The penultimate context is the city of Cologne where one of the largest 
Turkish and Turkish Kurdish immigrant groups in Germany lives along with a 
population a quarter of whom are foreign born. 
3.2. The Turkish Context; The ethnic question, the Kurds, and international 
migration 
As a developing country on the periphery of the European Union, Turkey has been one 
of the main contributors of migration streams into Europe since the early 1960s 
following several bilateral agreements with Western European governments. It is 
described as a bridge between the continents as well as civilisations and recently this 
functional geography of the country made it a transit country for thousands of people 
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from the Middle East, Asia and Africa heading towards Western Europe.2o The count! 
has borders with Greece (and hence the European Union) , to the West and Iran Iraq, 
and Syria to the East (see Figure 3.1). The Kurds from Iraq and Iran ha e also used 
Turkey as a transit country although the ethno-political conditions in Turkey have 
forced many of its own Kurds to leave the country. However, the country's significance 
in the international migration nlarket of Europe comes from its dorninant position as a 
sending country with more than three million immigrants with Turkish citizenship 
resident in Western Europe (Abadan-Unat 1995). 
ions and rovinces in Turke 
A.egean 
Sea 
- : Borden of TDHS regions 
Black Sea 
West: Names of regions in TDHS ISanliurfa I : Provinces included in the TThiIS 
Migration flows from Turkey have been transformed according to the changing needs 
of receiving countries. However, as previous studies have shown, some basic structural 
factors are important for the perpetuation of emigration from Turkey (i9duygu 1991; 
Gitmez 1991; Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz 1986). Economic instability and the 
problems of development have created persistent migration pressure in tenns of for 
instance, Income and enlployment differentials. For example, the average 
unemploYInent rate in Turkey during the 1990s was around 14% along with inflation 
rates ranging between 60% and 100% (SPO 1999) and a Gross Domestic Product per 
capita of $2,900 in 1999 (World Bank 2000). At the same tinle, the mean 
unenlployment rate for the European Union was 8%, average GDP per capita \: a 
above $20,000, and inflation rates were around 1-2 percent (CIA 2000). Turki h 
denlographic trend have al 0 compounded the e economic pre ure by adding mor 
20 For e.xampl in 199 mor than 600 ill gal migrant \ r detained in nkara according t police 
re ord (per onal mmunication from F. Ian 0 pu hief Poli Officer in the Foreign 1" Bureau. 
199 ). 
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people into a limited employment market. Turkey's population growth rate was 
estimated at 1.50/0 per annum during the 1990s, slightly higher than the \\"orld average 
while at least 8 times higher than the European Union (World Bank 2000; Council of 
Europe 1999). 
Migration from Turkey has hitherto been studied from an economic perspective with 
political aspects often overlooked in the literature.21 However it is crucial to consider 
both socio-economic factors and "nationalistic and Islamic-religious aspects too" 
(Franz 1994:34). Turkey has been a multi-ethnic society since the establishment of the 
Republic in the 1920s when it inherited the Anatolian territory from the Ottoman 
Empire where a heterogeneous population of Kurds, Arabs and Armenians were living 
along with Turks. Turkey's religious structure had divided society into sections 
comprising Sunni-Islam and Alevi-Islam as well as Christian minorities. 
Turkey, as a successor to the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, has faced problems in its 
transformation to a nation-state. Simultaneous with the upswing of nationalism in 
Europe, nations under Ottoman rule started their nation-building adventures, and Turks 
were not an exception taking advantage of being the ruling ethnic group. The last 
century of the Ottoman Empire was therefore a period of Turkish nationalism (Mardin 
1989; Ahmad 1993). This ambitious nationalism was conducive to the development of 
Turkish nationalism during the early years of the new Turkish Republic, from the 
1920s to the 1940s. Throughout the earlier decades of the twentieth century, Turkey 
witnessed a silent ethnic cleansing; most of its minorities were obliged to leave the 
country, including Greeks, Jews, and Armenians (see Rodrigue 1997; Augustinos 1997; 
iyduygu and Sirkeci 1999a; Bora 1995).22 As the second largest ethnic group after 
Turks, Kurds were the most problematic for the state, partly because they were also 
Muslim while almost all other minorities were non-Muslims. They were difficult to 
elin1inate because attacking a Muslim population would cause unrest among Muslim 
Turks too. They were also difficult to absorb, as they were so many. 
The multi-ethnic fabric of Turkish society is based on two axes cross cutting each 
21 This is both due to the impossibility of researching such issues, considered to be "very sensiti\'e" by 
Turkish governments and due to the unavailability of data and research opportunities. Thus. the 
economic dimension has dominated the research and overshadowed ethnic aspects although a few ha\e 
also focused on ethno-political factors (i.e. Franz 1986: van Bruinessen 1992a; Yal\lI1-Heckman 1991; 
Barkey 1993). 
~2 It n~ust be noted here that the period until the end of the 1920s \\as characterised by forced population 
1110\el11ent5 between the former Ottoman territories and its last stronghold in Anatolia. For instance. 
many Muslim and Turkic populations fled to Turkey after invasions of Russians and Bulgarians 
(1\\CCarthy 2001). 
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other. On the one hand, two religious denominations, namely Alevi and Sunni, di\'ide 
almost all ethnic groups into two major camps. About 70 per cent of the population is 
estimated to be Sunni and the Alevi population is about 25 per cent of the whole, \\'ith 
other minor denominations and Christian communities constituting the remaining 5 
percent of the total (Ozsoy et al. 1992; Ko<; and HanclOglu 1999; Sirkeci 2000). It is 
possible to identify Alevi population concentrations in the north and western areas of 
the East region although they have spread all around the country. The Christian 
popUlations are mainly the non-Muslim minorities of Istanbul privileged by the 
Lausanne Treaty of 1923. 
Two major ethnic groups, the Turks and the Kurds, today dominate Turkey's 
population. All other minor groups account for only four percent of the entire 
population. According to some estimates, the Turks constitute about 78 percent of the 
population and the Kurds are about 18 percent followed by Arabs making the 
remaining two percent of the total (Sirkeci 2000, Ozsoy et al. 1992; Ko<; and HanclOglu 
1999). 
The Turkish people mainly live in the West, Central and Northern parts of the country 
whereas the majority of the Kurds live in the East. However, rural urban migration and 
clashes between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerrilla movement during the last 
two decades have caused a dispersal of the Kurds towards the western urban centres of 
Turkey (Mutlu 1996; i<;duygu et al., 1999; Sirkeci 2000). Therefore, all major cities of 
the country's west currently have a Kurdish population of at least ten percent. Most 
Arabs can be found in the border areas of Southeast Turkey neighbouring Syria and 
Iraq. 
Apart from the Turks and the Kurds there are many other ethnic groups in modem 
Turkey including for example Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Circassians, Lazs, and 
Georgians. However, their numbers have diminished as many have left the country 
because of attacks and persecutions targeted at them since the 1920s after the 
establishnlent of the Turkish Republic (Franz 1986; Bora 1995). The first and the 
largest of these flights was the compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey 
and Greece in the early 1920s; about 2.5 million people were forced to lea\'e the 
country (An 1995: Sirkeci and i<;duygu 2001). As a result, there are no\\ very small 
conlmunities of these minorities with negligible representations in nation wide survcys 
duc to their size. The TIMS (Turkish InteIl1ational Migration Survey, 1996) also 
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includes very few cases from these groups, unfortunately preventing statistical analysis. 
An examination of Turkish Kurdish migration and the expression of ethnicity on the 
move requires further elaboration of the ethnic dissimilarity between the Turks and the 
Kurds. In particular, regional differences and their ethnic implications are important. 
The following section, therefore, focuses on aspects of socio-economic development in 
Turkey, which is followed by an examination of the Kurdish question and history of 
international migration from Turkey. 
3.2.1. Socio-economic unevenness and implications for migration and ethnicity in 
Turkey 
Regional socio-economic differences and their repercussions on the ethnic segregation 
of Turkish society may provide some explanations for the international migration of the 
Turkish Kurds. A recent study examined the relationship between socio-economic 
underdevelopment and the ethnic question and found a sound relationship between the 
two in the case of Turkey's Kurds (iyduygu et al. 1999). This section examines 
Turkey's socio-economic development history by referring to differences throughout 
the country and questions possible underlying ethnic aspects. 
A particular literature has emerged on the interactions between international migration 
and socio-economic development levels (Hammar 1995; iyduygu 1995; Massey 1988; 
Portes and Bach 1985; Portes 1978). Gedik (1996) underlined that migration is more 
likely among upwardly mobile middle-class people from middle-level developed areas 
in Turkey. Some other studies have also endorsed similar findings in other contexts 
(e.g. Massey et al. 1994; Portes and Borocz 1989; Piore 1979). Therefore it is 
significant to examine different development levels in Turkey to understand the 
patterns of international migration and the EOr. 
Although there have been no empirical studies in Turkey on the relationship between 
regional developn1ent differences and possible ethnic causes behind it, certain questions 
are raised. 23 Have successive Turkish governments intentionally let the Kurdish 
~J Franz ( 1 994) presents a detailed account of dispersal policies in Turkey and claims some of them were 
ethnically driven. His analysis provides evidence supporting this view (Franz 1994:228-235). For 
instance, a Turkish law enacted in 1934 (Law nO.2510 of 14.6.1934) reads: "Persons without aU/hut/oil 
to Turkish culturL' and fJasons \I'ifh an affiliation but another mother tongue may be resettled at any time 
lipan orders of the ,\fil1isf1~\' of II/taiorfor cIIltliral, militG/~\', political, social or secur/ty related reasolls" 
(Fran/ 1994:229). 
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populated region remain underdeveloped; or was it just the simple outcome of har h 
natural conditions as the area is very mountainous though rich in natural resources 
including oil? Whatever the political measures behind the circumstances, the outcome 
has been a migration pressure affecting the people in these economically disadvantaged 
regions. This pressure plays an important role in out-migration flows, both towards the 
industrial centres of Turkey and Europe. 
Figure 3.2. 
Socio-economic 
development levels 
in Turkey by 
province, 1995 
_ 1st (hi ghest) !ttttt::13rd 
_2nd § 4th 111 6th 
Source: Dinc;er J 996 
As Figure 3.2 shows, the west of the country is the most developed part while the 
eastern part lying below the dotted line drawn by myself is the least developed region 
according to Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) data with the notable 
exception of Batman province which has the largest oil reserves in the country. As the 
SPO index24 on which this map was based indicates, less development may mean lack 
of educational opportunities and health facilities along with a shortage of employment 
opportunities as a result of very limited investment in industrial, agricultural, and 
communication sectors. This unevenness expresses itself in the figures of, for instance, 
per capita Gross National Product, which, in 1997, was $1000 in Hakkari in the East 
while it was $ 8,000 in izmit in the West (SIS 2000)25. Similarly, possibly due to lack 
of facilities compounded with lower education levels among the female population of 
the East, the infant n10rtality rate was 90 per thousand in the East whereas it was 50 per 
thousand in the West. Similarly, while there are high literacy rates in the West; literacy 
is strikingly low in the East. For example, it was 90 percent in izmit but only 55 percent 
in Hakkari (SIS 2000). 
The explanation of regional differences 111 development levels lies in the hi tory of 
24 Data u ed in this map come from the Turki h State Planning Organi ation Oi trict level ocio-
economic D velopment Index. The inde i a compo ite of indicator of population, emplo ment, 
education, haith, manufacturing indu try con truction , agriculture, communication and finance. The 
inde, va lue range betw n -l.35 and 7.74 the former indicate the lowe t and the latt r the high t. 
complete de cription of thi illd x can be found in Din<;: r (1996). 
25 For location plea ' e e Figure 3.1. 
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Turkish industrialisation. The period following the World War II was a break-through 
for Turkey due to the integration of capitalism into the pre-capitalist social formation of 
Turkey that was accompanied by a large-scale rural to urban exodus CiC;duygu 
1991 :41). The mechanisation of agriculture from the 1950s onwards had a side effect. 
because it accelerated rural migration to cities and towns as each tractor replaced ten to 
fifty peasants or rural labourers (Karpat 1973:58).26 A supporting factor was the official 
ideology of "industrialisation" and "Westernisation" central to the policies of the new 
Turkish Republic since the 1920s. Eventually it created strong differences between 
regional socio-economic development levels, which accounted for the perpetuation of 
internal migration towards western cities (Gitmez 1983; iC;duygu and Sirkeci 1999a). 
Since the 1960s Turkey has aimed for "balanced development" in its five-year-plans to 
eliminate unevenness. These plans, however, have lacked consistency with 
contradictory objectives following each other from plan to plan mainly due to political 
instability. For instance, there were six different governments during the third five-year 
plan from 1973 to 1978.27 
Regional inequalities in Turkey explain most of its internal migration patterns. Sharp 
socio-economic development differences created in the course of industrialisation have 
contributed to rural to urban migration in Turkey (iC;duygu and Sirkeci 1999a; Franz 
1994). International labour recruitment procedures of the 1960s and 1970s could be 
cited as another facilitating factor toO.28 Thus, istanbul and neighbouring provinces 
along with the western coastal area around izmir have increasingly attracted most 
emigrants from these less developed regions since the 1950s. 
Accompanied by post-war pronatalist policies, these developments rapidly created an 
agricultural labour surplus, which exceeded the expansion of employment opportunities 
created by industrialisation (iC;duygu and Sirkeci 1999b). By 1960, the impacts of high 
unen1ployment levels in urban areas forced the government to take measures to solve 
the problem in the form of labour export policies which were built into development 
26 The most important factor here was the effects of Turkey's incorporation into the capitalist West, 
which brought hard currency into the country. Starting with Marshall Aid in 1947, Turkey had welcomed 
foreign capital and channelled it into the mechanisation of agriculture and construction of highways 
(i<;duygu 1991 :45). 
~7 A detailed account of opposing goals in consecutive plans and their impacts on Turkish urbanisation 
can be found in Franz (1994), pp.203-225. 
2~ Due to the fact that recruitment agencies and offices were in big cities, many \illagers moved to these 
cities durinL! the 1960s and 1970s. For this reason, early patterns of Turkish labour migration are 
dominated l;y migration from Istanbul and Ankara, \\·hich were central places for labour recruitment 
abroad (SCl' kduygu cl al. 1998). 
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plans (Abadan-Unat 1995; Franz 1994; Gitmez 1983; Gbkdere 1978). 
Table 3.1. Population change in major provinces of Turkey, 1960-2000 
Population Change 
1960 1980 2000 1960-80 1980-2000 1960-2000 
Adana 760803 778383 1849478 2.3% 137.61% 143.10% 
Ankara 1321380 2854689 4007860 116.0% 40.40% 203.31 % 
Antalya 416130 748706 1719751 79.9% 129.70% 313.27% 
Bursa 693894 1148492 2125140 65.5% 85.04% 206.26% 
G.Antep 434579 808697 1285249 86.1% 58.93% 195.75% 
istanbul 1882092 4741890 10018735 151.9% 111.28% 432.32% 
izmir 1063490 1976763 3370866 85.9% 70.52% 216.96% 
iyel 444523 843931 1651400 89.9% 95.68% 271.50% 
Turkey 27700000 44700000 67803927 61.4% 51.69% 144.78% 
Source: 1960 Census and 1980 Census summarisedfrom SIS (1989a) and (1989b); ]000 Censusfrom 
SIS (2002). 
According to the summary statistics based on the census data provided by SIS (Turkish 
State Institute of Statistics) Turkey's population has grown by around 145 percent since 
1960 (Table 3.1). However, due to internal migration, some provinces such as istanbul, 
Ankara, izmir, Bursa, and i<;el have doubled or tripled their populations during the last 
forty years. izmir's population, for example, rose from one million in 1960 to 3.4 
million by 2000. Meanwhile istanbul's population reached ten million in 2000 from l.9 
million in 1960 (SIS 1989b, 1993, and 2002). 
Table 3.2. Provinces with highest annual urban population growth rate, per 1000, 
1990-2000 
Rank Name Rate Rank Name Rate Rank Name Rate 
1 Hakkari 66.76 6 Batman 44.62 11 ~anhurfa 42.30 
2 Van 53.19 7 Antalya 44.13 12 Adlyaman 42.26 
3 ~lmak 52.28 8 Mu~ 43.64 13 Bitlis 42.13 
4 Agn 46.31 9 Rize 42.56 14 Yozgat 40.61 
5 Mardin 45.16 10 Tekirdag 42.51 15 Igdlr 38.43 
Turkey 26.81 Source: 2000 Population Census from SIS (2002). 
Population decreased in 15 provinces from 1985 to 1990 all of which were located in 
the East (i<;duygu and Sirkeci 1999a), despite the fact that 13 of the 15 city centres with 
the highest urban population growth rates were in the East region (SIS 2002). The 2000 
Turkish Census (SIS 2002) found that South-eastern provinces topped the list of fastest 
growing city centres. Population growth rates in Kurdish populated urban areas had 
growth rates exceeding those of the most attractive urban destinations in the past such 
as istanbul (29 per thousand) and izmir (2-+ per thousand); for example, in the cities and 
towns Hakkari province gn)\yth rate for urban populations were 67 per thousand, \\'hile 
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it was 53 per thousand in Van, and 52 per thousand in $lrnak (SIS 2002, see Table 3.2). 
The most recent factor causing migration has been clashes between the Turkish anny 
and PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). These migration figures should be interpreted in 
the knowledge that most of the least developed areas of the country stand within the 
region, which is mostly inhabited by Turkish Kurds. It would not be wrong to interpret 
unevenness in development and differences in migration rates as a reflection of ethnic 
factors. These record population growth levels in the cities of the South East region are 
also a direct result of the conflict, which has taken place between the Turkish anny and 
Kurdish guerrilla movement since the mid-1980s. People moved from rural areas to 
urban centres. The government evacuated more than 3000 villages in the region for 
"security reasons" in the mid-1990s. Many other villages also were emptied as their 
residents left because of ongoing clashes and bombings in the rural areas. 
3.2.2. The Kurdish question and the Turkish response 
"0 yLllarda iilkemizde 
C;eJitli hiikiimlerle 
YetmiJ iki dilden 
ikisi yasaklanmlJtl 
ikincisi Tiirkc;e ,,}lJ 
(Cemal Siireya, 1988, p.25) 
The Kurdish Question in Turkey has been on the political agenda for almost a century 
(Barkey 1993; McDowall 1996; Robins 1993; Entessar 1989; Van Bruinessen 1992a). 
The main features of the Kurdish question as a threat to the "national unity of Turkey" 
arose from the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s following the Treaty 
of Sevres of 10 August 1920, which prescribed a possible Kurdish state in the region 
comprising the Southeast of Turkey and some territories of Iran and Iraq (Robins 
1993 :659). With regard to this, the primary historical causes of the Kurdish question in 
Turkey can be elaborated as state- and nation-building deficiencies in the early 
Republican period of the 1920s. However, the solidification of Kurdish ethno-
nationalism was a product of the 1980s and 1990s Ci9duygu et at 1999). ConculTent 
with the \vorld wide upswing in ethnic nationalism over the last thirty years, there has 
~,) "In those years in our country! two of SC\Cllty-t\\0 languages/ \\ere banned by \arious decrees the 
second \\'<lS Turkish" [translation by Ibrahim Sirkeci]. 
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been an upsurge in Kurdish nationalism in Turkey since the late 1970s~ although. there 
were many previous influential Kurdish movements or rebels before (McDowall 1996). 
This particular ethnic group, constituting no less than one fifth of the population, has 
been a major challenge to pan-Turkish currents since the late Ottoman period. In its 
many forms~ Turkish nationalism, ranging from racism to residency-based fellowship 
ties, placed emphasis on being Turkish or admitting to be Turkish. Obviously such 
nationhood based on self-ascription (i.e. accepting being Turkish) is open to ethnic 
challenges when there are people from different ethnic backgrounds. The reactions of 
Turkish Kurds should be considered within this context since they have revolted 
several times during the history of the Turkish Republic (Franz 1994). 
Although Kurds enjoyed a tribal autonomy under the Ottoman rule, "the new republic 
was solely based on Turkish culture and identity, and hence did not permit the 
expression of Kurdish identity and language within its borders" (iyduygu et al. 
1999:993). However, the Kurdish presence outside its borders has always been a threat 
for the Turkish state because such existence (i.e. Kurdish autonomy in Iran or Iraq) 
may constitute some sort of encouragement for the Kurds. Turkey, like Iran and Iraq, 
had launched policies aimed to transform her multi-ethnic population into a 'cohesive 
civic nation~ but the Kurds were the most difficult ethnic group to integrate because of 
their large numbers and the tribal structures they preserve (van Bruinessen 1998:39). 
The most cited total figures for the Kurdish population are about 25 to 30 million, 
although there are different estimates ranging from 16 million (McDowall 1996) to 
over 30 million (Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996). Most of the Kurds live in the upper 
area of the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East marked by the Tigris and the Euphrates 
rivers within the territories of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria (Figure 3.3). There are also 
Kurdish populations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan. The 
geographic distribution of the Kurdish population consists of approximately: 8-15 
million in Turkey, 3-9 million in Iran, 3-7 million in Iraq, 1-1.5 million in Syria~ 1 
million in fOlmer Soviet Republics, and 1 million in the Kurdish diaspora (White 2000; 
Sirkeci 2000; Izady 1999; Schmidt 1998: Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996; LOC 1995; 
Franz 1994; Chailand 1980). 
Roughly half of all Kurds live in Turkey. Estimates of the Turkish Kurdish population 
are all based on the 1965 Censlls, which was the last time statistics based on n10ther 
tongue \\,CIT re\'ca1cd in Turkey. Since then only a few sur\'eys ha\'e collected ethnic 
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information. Projections based on growth rate and migration rate trends indicate a 
Turkish Kurdish population of 7.5 to 11 million, the majority of whom reside in the 
Eastern provinces of Turkey (Sirkeci 2000). 
The Turkish Kurdish people form part of a Middle Eastern ethno-national community 
mainly living in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. They speak four different dialects of Kurdish: 
Northwest Kurdish called Kurmanji (Turkey), Central Kurdish called Sorani (Iraq) and 
Mukri or Gorani (Iran), and in Central Eastern Anatolia, Zazaki or Dimili (Turkey) 
(McDowall 1996; van Bruinessen 1998; Hassanpour 1999).30 The Kurds have been 
divided religiously as well: 95 percent of them are Muslim; 25 to 30 percent of who are 
Alevi and Shia, about 60 percent are Sunni and a small minority is Yezidi (McDowall 
1996; Kiri~9i and Winrow 1997) (Figure 3.3). 
Fi ure 3.3. Kurdish 0 ulated areas in the Middle East 
* Ar..kara 
--. ----
Source: UTexas Map Library. 
- ~ ! r. 6kb1 iHi',n 
') " '; . --) • 't • • 
F.lil!J!!.~~~~ 
. ". \ ... , 
I R A 0 :\:--'. ".,-,.~ .-( 
,-. 
" _ "';: 1 ,~ ; ~ ; : ' ..-; 
* Capital city 
• !vI aj or city 
Ivl ainly' 
populated 
bvKurds 
, . 
' 1,.-, ,' 
, . 
.' . 
. ~  
* -TclutJII 
I RAN 
1,1 :,<' h.1rl • 
The Turkish government has declared itself "the Government of both Turks and Kurds 
and the real representatives of the Kurds who sit alongside the Turks in the Assembly" 
and has also stated in the Lausanne Treaty, which set up today 's borders in the Middle 
East, that "Turks and Kurds are equal partners in the Government of Turkey" (Ismet 
Pasha's speech at the Lausanne Conference, in Kendal 1980:104). However, 
inlmediately after the Treaty, the Turkish government changed their ideas and up until 
the mid-1980s, it was taboo in Turkey to admit the existence of the Kurdish people. 
Kurds have rebelled several tinles against the Turkish Republic , which banned the 
Kurdish language in 1924 (Wahlbeck 1999:44). These revolts were accu ed of being 
.:10 Throughout the qualitative fie ld res arch th author had an under tanding that Kurdi h diale t dif~ r 
from each other due to the influence of dominant language in difD rent politi al geographie . Thu , 
Kirmanci Kurdi h poken in Turke invol e a large Turki h vocabu lar \ h rea orani and orani 
poken in Traqi and Iranian Kurdi tan are influ n ed by rabic and Per ian language . 
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foreign-led because Turkish governments thought foreign governments initiated them 
(Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996; McDowall 1996). Significant among the many revolts 
during the early decades of the new Republic were the insurrections of Sheikh Said in 
1925, of Mount Ararat in 1927-30, and of Dersim in 1936-39. All resulted in tens of 
thousands of deaths as they were harshly suppressed by the Turkish army (McDowall 
1996; van Bruinessen 1992b; Kendal 1980). 
These revolts brought harsher oppressIOn of Turkish Kurds and the Government 
implemented more restrictions during the following years. The terms Kurd and 
Kurdistan were removed from all documents, place names were changed and more 
importantly continuous arrests and police repression were put into force. 31 From 1950 
until the mid-1980s, as a result, there was a relatively quiet environment, with no 
Kurdish revolts (McDowall 1996). 
Throughout the Republican period, Turkish governments denied the Kurds' existence 
by using slightly differing euphemisms. They were categorised as "Mountain Turks" in 
the 1930s and 1940s (White 2000; van Bruinessen 1992). With the military intervention 
of 12 September 1980, Turkish Kurds gained another identity called "Eastern Turks" 
('dogulu' in Turkish), a euphemism backed by the scholarly activities of a cadre of 
academics who invented Kurdish as a dialect of Turkish (LOC 1995; van Bruinessen 
1998). In fact it was an Indo-European language related to Persian and has nothing in 
common with Turkish except some exchanged words (White 2000; McDowall 1996). 
The repression of the Turkish Kurdish people was embodied in a denial policy, which 
was expressed frequently in public. Cemal Gursel, when declaring himself president 
after the military intervention in 1960, in Diyarbaklr, capital of the Southeast region 
stated "There are no Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his 
face" (Muller 1996: 177). At another speech, he stated "There was never immigration 
into our country. Therefore there cannot be any other race in our country other than 
Turkish. Moreover there is no independent race called 'Kurd' on the earth" (Ba~kaya 
1991: 59). This was an explicit expression of the denial that had taken place for decades 
until 1991 when for the first time, the Kurdish "reality" was recognised in the speeches 
of son1e political leaders such as President Ozal (1991-93) and later President Demirel 
(1993-2000) (Barkey 1993 :55: Muller 1996: 181). 
31 A similar attitude \\as c\ident towards thc name of the Kurdish populated provinces. \\'hich \\ ere 
called Kurdistan in Ottoman times. This region \\ClS generally under a state of emergency rule and since 
1980 has been called "OHAL" that stands for "Stat(' of Emergency' Region's Governor's Office", 
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The Kurdistan Workers Party (hereafter PKK) appeared in 1978. Its armed struggle 
against the Turkish government began in 198432 as a response to the massiye repression 
after the military intervention of 1980 (Kreyenbroek and Allison 1998: 15). The 1980 
coup d'etat also needs to be explained in relation to the Kurdish question because the 
Turkish generals' decision was influenced by the Kurdish question that posed a threat 
of secession (Robins 1993 :662). Along with the general repression in the following 
period, the military-led Turkish government followed two pursuits in particular that 
were targeted at the Turkish Kurdish population: First, a new official ideology was 
imposed: 'the Turk-Islam Synthesis' which aimed at further 'Turkification' and 
'Islamisation'. Secondly, a state of emergency was imposed all over the country during 
the intervention and the three following years. However, this never ended in the 
Kurdish populated provinces although it was eventually halted in other parts of the 
country. Thus the region became known as 'the state of emergency region' 
accompanied by the permanent deployment of two of Turkey's four armies in the 
region. The number of troops (excluding police and special troops) in the region was 
200,000 by 1990 (McDowall 1996:425). 
Unlike his predecessors, President Turgut Ozal (1989-93) admitted the existence of a 
distinct population, the Kurds, who live mainly in the Eastern provinces but 
increasingly spread into the Western cities of the country as well (Sirkeci 2000; LOC 
1995). However neither this admission nor development projects in the region could 
stop clashes, which ended with the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya 
in 1999 by the Turkish intelligence service (See Appendix 3.1 for protests following 
the arrest). Between 1985 and 1999, the guerrilla war in the Eastern provinces of the 
country resulted in a death toll of about 40,000, at least one third of them civilians. 
As explained in the previous section, uneven development (or underdevelopment) in 
Turkey mainly affects the Turkish Kurdish population as they live in the least 
developed part of the country. By the same token, many scholars viewed the Kurdish 
question as a result of that underdevelopment Cicrduygu et at. 1999: TOBB 1995). 
Along with many small-scale projects, a grand regional development plan called GAP33 
32 The PKK \\as founded as National Liberation Army aiming at armed struggle as its basic tool to 
establish an independent Kurdistan. Further discussion of the PKK can be found in McDowall (1996). 
Wahlbeck (1999:39-60) and White (2000: 134-227). 
-'3 GAP (Cilincydogu Anadolu Projesi) was initially a coordination of few local projects in Southeast 
:\natolia. Later, a rcgion called GAP \\3S created including the provinces of Adlyaman, Batman, 
Divarbaklr, Gaziantep, Kilis, i\ lardin, Siirt, SanhurL1 and Slmak. It basically aimed at regulating the 
\\,;ter reSl)urces in the region for irrigation and hydro electrical energy purposes (G;\P idaresi 1997). 
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was launched in 1977 in order to develop the society and economy of the Southeast 
region (Franz 1994; see also Appendix 5.1). This project has provided some 
improvements in the region but it has not yet achieved its objectives. Some optimistic 
estimates expect its completion no earlier than the 2020s, but belief in its failure is 
more common (Ak9ay and Ak~it 1999: 192). Possible benefits of GAP for the region 
are also doubtful although its usefulness for the further modernisation of the west of 
Turkey is clear (White 2000: 110-112; Kafaoglu 1991 :43-46). 
Thus the Turkish official understanding of the Kurdish question has always focused on 
the idea that it was a threat to national unity. The reasons behind this were argued to be 
either a foreign-backed act to destroy the Turkish state or internal malpractice leading 
illiterate masses into a brutal, meaningless conflict. Therefore government responses 
were always harsh military measures, which brought a long lasting military state of 
emergency over the areas where Turkish Kurds constitute the majority of the 
population. Although with the halt of clashes with the PKK, the state of emergency 
ceased in the majority of Eastern provinces, the state of emergency decree was later 
renewed in Diyarbaklr, Hakkari, $lrnak, and Tunceli provinces (USDS 2001). 
Following these conflicts in the region, individually or officially initiated migrations 
took place towards the urban centres in the region, and to other parts of Turkey or 
abroad. However there is no register of these movements. Since the mid-1980s the 
region became a major source of emigration. About 3,000 villages were evacuated for 
security reasons by the Turkish army, which caused the internal displacement of about 
3,000,000 people according to official and unofficial sources (White 2000; Wahlbeck 
1999; Kiri~9i 1998; Radikal, 16 July 1998). For instance, by 1990, according to some 
estimates, Istanbul became the largest Kurdish city hosting about 2.5 million Kurds 
(Kreyenbroek and Allison 1998:8). Another estimate shows that there must have been 
Kurdish minorities (of no less than five percent) in almost all the western cities of 
Turkey according to internal migration trends and population growth since the 1930s 
(Sirkeci 2000; Mutlu 1996). Given the paucity of data on the ethnic breakdown of the 
population in Turkey, Kurdish involvement in Turkish international migration is also 
difficult to assess but this study aims to shed some light on it. The following section 
investigates the literature with regard to this issue. 
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3.3. Turkish international migration and Turkish Kurds 
Since the early 1960s, Turkish migration to Europe has attracted researchers and today 
there is a voluminous literature covering different aspects of the phenomenon. 
However, the ethnic aspects of this particular migratory regime have been overlooked 
until very recently (Schmidt 1998; Blaschke 1991; Franz 1986). In this section, Turkish 
Kurds' involvement in migration flows from Turkey is discussed. 
Figure 3.4. Turkish out-migration per annum by destination, 1960-199534 
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Commonly Turkey has been cited as a latecomer to the international migration market 
in the post-World War II period (Abadan-Unat 1995:279; iyduygu et al. 2001:41).36 
However this lateness was also due to legal restrictions on exit from Turkey as it was 
possible for Turkish citizens to go abroad only after the 1961 constitution (Abadan-
Unat 1995 :279). In terms of the total stock of Turkish citizens abroad, it can be 
regarded as primarily migration to Europe because the volume of migrations towards 
other parts of the world is pretty small. By 1 January 1996, 2,724,000 Turkish citizens 
34 Collinson comments on the peak in 1973: the "recruitment stop signalled a sudden upsurge in 
emigration as migrants hurried to bring their families to Europe before any further restrictions were 
imposed" (1993 :73). 
~5 This graph is borrowed from an earlier published research paper of ibrahim Sirkeci and Ahmet 
iyduygll. In that study the annual numbers of out-migration were intuitive guesses of expert judgment 
based on a range of figures provided by different previous studies of Gitmez (1983), G6kdere (1978). 
and iyduygu (1991). Howc\,er, these earlier studies mainly referred to the information provided by 
Turkish Employment Scr\'ice. Turkish Employment Ser\'ice reports annual number of labourers sent 
abroad by country of destination. 
36 Out-migration from Turkey can be dated back as to the 1920s if the massi\'e exchange of populations 
of the 1920s and 1930s and forceful deportations during the following decades an: considered. i~dllygU 
and Sirkeci (1999a) present a detailed account of these movements along with a brief Turkish migration 
history. 
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were resident in European Union countries (European Commission 1999:36-37). They 
constituted about 90 percent of Turkish migrants abroad. By the mid-1 990s about 3 
percent of the remainder were in Arab countries while another 2 percent were in the 
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and the rest in other countries (iyduygu 
and Sirkeci 1998: 14). 
Massive guest worker migrations from Turkey in the 1960s marked the second phase . 
This coincided with Turkey's development planning during the 1960s and 1970s 
which stressed rapid industrialisation on the basis of large-scale capital-intensive 
industries. Within the scope of this programme extensive job-creation (at least in the 
short term) was not possible. Out-migration of workers was considered as an immediate 
solution to Turkey's growing unemployment problem and worsening balance-of-
payments position (Gitmez 1983 ; Gokdere 1978; Abadan-Unat 1976). Promotion of 
out-migration was stated as an explicit policy objective in Turkey 's first three five-year 
plans (Franz 1994; Collinson 1993:65).37 
Another policy preference for Turkey had been expressed as the priority for out-
Inigration from underdeveloped regions but this remained a gesture rather than an 
influential policy orientation, reflecting a general negligence of the phenomenon of 
uneven regional development in governmental planning (Pennix 1982:793). This 
negligence is evident in very low out-migration rates from the least developed Eastern 
provinces (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). 
Figure 3.5. 
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Source: kduygu et at. 
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37 The main goal of the e policies were maximi ing the outflow of indi idual and increa ing the inflow 
of hard currency (Penninx 1982) . There \ a al 0 an expectation that tho e migrant labourer \\ ou ld b 
learning some kill in highly de eloped Germ~n ind~ try and retum back Wit~l m?re o~ial capital a 
skilled \ orker . However, thi aim \ a not achIeved \I1ce ther \ ere no receptive mdu tne t mplo} 
tho "ho r turned and al 0 tho who r tumed \V re not inter ted in 10\\ paid, relative to the \\ age 111 
German , indu tri al job but in t ad launched mall trade enterpri e (Gitmez 19 3). 
3' E ti1l1ati n of ic;:du gu el al. (1997) i ba d on the 19 0 Cen u . 
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Figure 3.6. 
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The second period was marked by bilateral labour recruitment agreements. The first 
was signed with Germany in 1961 and then similar agreements were made with 
Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium (1964), France (1965), Sweden, Australia (1967), 
Switzerland (1971), Denmark (1973), Libya (1975) and Norway (1981) (Franz 
1994:307). Although these agreements shaped the initial stages of migratory flows 
significantly, they did not make a substantial impact on the later stages of flows. 
"Migratory n10vements have gained their own dynamics and mechanisms which are 
quite independent from the previously structured measures of the bilateral migration 
agreements" Ci9duygu and Sirkeci 1998:5). 
Related to the world wide economic stagnation of the early 1970s, the massive labour 
recruitment halted in 1972 marking the beginning of the third phase Ci9duygu and 
Sirkeci 1998:6; Abadan-Unat 1995:279). Migration did not stop but continued in the 
form of tourist migration (or illegal migration) and family reunification until the early 
1980s (BlOtevogel et al. 1989; Rogers 1985; Hale 1978). Another significant shift in 
European migration was that receiving countries realised those immigrants were not 
returning but settling down in destination countries as family reunifications and the 
education of immigrant children become important (Abadan-Unat 1995:279).40 This 
period was also characterised by Turkish migration to other destinations such as Arab 
countries and Australia Ci9duygu and Sirkeci 1998; Gokdere 1994) (Figure 3.4). 
The fourth phase was characterised by refugee flows following the military inter ention 
of 1980 (Martin 1994:211). This n10vement was mainly based on the patte1l1 
established by earlier labour and fan1ily Inigrations. Most asylum eeker had ome 
relatives or friend in destination areas (Faist 2000:83). After the mid-19 0 Turki h 
Y) Ih qu tion u ed in th 1990 Iurki h Cen u wa: "How many hOll ehold member are ab ent n \\; 
are the in th country or abroad'?" (I 1993: 194). 
40 minor but important featur of thi pha e wa the fir t influx of political migrant from Turke)- dul.: 
to th military inter nti n of 197_. The pe pie 1 d the initial immigrant political and 0 ial 
organi ation in untri of d tination . 
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Kurdish asylum-seeker migration marked the era (Faist 2000; Sirkeci 2000; \'an 
Bruinessen 1998). Concomitant with the ethnic uprising in Turkey, which also caused a 
political mobilisation among Kurds already abroad, Turkish Kurds became more yisible 
within international migration flows. 
This period can be considered as one of transition. Since the initial arrivals of refugees 
in large numbers during the early 1980s, European countries introduced yisa 
requirements. For instance, the UK began asking for visas from Turkish citizens from 
1989 after the earlier groups of Turkish Kurdish refugees arrived. This also marked the 
beginning of illegal migration of large numbers: an individual level challenge to the 
supranational fortress Europe. This period was marked by the rise of "xenophobia 
against foreigners in Europe. For example, latent anti-semitism was transformed into 
open anti-Turkism" in Germany (Abadan-Unat 1995:281). 
Table 3.3. Turkish migration to Western Europe 
Turkish citizens41 Immigration Asylum seekers 
1998 1997 1990-99 
Number 0/0 Number 0/0 Number 0/0 
Germany 2,080,000 74.1 74,344 78.2 224,750 66.7 
France 197,700 7.0 3,426 3.6 33,230 9.9 
Austria 138,860 4.9 2,234 2.4 7,940 2.4 
Netherlands 127,032 4.5 6,952 7.3 8,920 2.6 
Switzerland 79,932 2.8 2,472 2.6 22,580 6.7 
Belgium 73,818 2.6 945 1.0 7,730 2.3 
Britain 42,000 1.5 1,400 1.5 18,640 5.5 
Denmark 37,519 1.3 1,153 1.2 640 0.2 
Sweden 18,404 0.7 1,197 1.3 3,500 1.0 
Others 13,605 0.5 914 1.0 9,070 2.7 
Total 2,808,870 100 95,037 100 336,990 100 
Source: European COlllmission 1999; Council of Europe 1998; Eurostat 1996a,b,c. 
The networks of migration, national-ethnic networks, and family networks played a 
crucial role in this period. For instance, in 1995, about 90,000 Turkish migrants to 
Europe were moving for the purposes of family reunion and marriages; about 30,000 of 
them were asylum seekers (Eurostat 1996a: 7; i9duygu and Sirkeci 1999b: 257-8). 
Turkey has been a major source country of asylum seekers in Europe since 1985 
(Eurostat 1996a:4-5) (Table 3.3.). Briefly, since the mid-1980s, Turkish emigration has 
tun1ed into a mass migration of family reunions, refugees, asylum seekers and also 
illegal migrants. (Bocker 1995:55; i9duygu and Sirkeci 1999b: 257-8: UNHCR 1998b; 
Eurostat 1996a:4-5). Another recent change in the Turkish international migratory 
-II These numbers exclude those who acquired citizenship in the host country. For instance. naturalised 
Germans who had Turkish citilenship were o\,er 250,000 by 1999 (Ostergaard-\: iclsen 2000:7). 
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regime is an increase in transit migrations. Although there are no certain figures about 
the numbers involved, thousands of people originating from the Middle East. Africa 
and Near East have been arriving in Turkey intending to find ways to enter Westerl1 
European countries every year Ci<;duygu 1996). 
Some researchers have cited figures for Turkish Kurdish migration based on 
speculation (White 2000; van Bruinessen 1998; McDowall 1996; Robins 1993: 
Blaschke 1991). According to these researchers, the total number of Turkish Kurds 
abroad was about 650,000 by the mid-1990s, most of them (about 450,000) in Germany 
(Migration News 1999; van Bruinessen 1998; Gurbey 1995; Franz 1994).42 According 
to Gunter, the repressive policies of successive Turkish governments had prompted 
Turkish Kurds to seek employment in Europe starting from the early 1960s (1990:103). 
Intensification of repression after the coup d'etat of 1980, in the form of armed conflict 
between Turkish troops and the PKK, forced these Kurds under oppression to seek not 
only employment, but refuge in Europe by the late 1980s (Griffiths 2000; Wahlbeck 
1999). The number of asylum seekers from Turkey was 365,000 between 1985 and 
1995 and another 200,000 were added during the 1990s (Eurostat 1996b and 1996c). 
Human rights violations observed in Turkey during the last twenty five years have been 
mainly targeting its Kurdish citizens and most of the cases were related to the practices 
after the military intervention of 1980 and the armed conflict in the Eastern provinces 
between the PKK and the Turkish Army. Hence, there is enough evidence to suggest 
most of these asylum applications were of Turkish Kurds. 
With regard to the ethnic problems Turkish Kurds faced at home, it is expected many 
of them would have wanted to go abroad during this period. However, in a recruitment 
system under the control of the Turkish government how many of them could realise 
this desire is another question. Also, as proposed by migration studies (e.g. Hammar 
1995), extremely low socio-economic development levels mean lower likelihoods for 
nligration. As the Eastern provinces of Turkey constitute the least developed part of the 
country, they had lower emigrant proportions; generally less then 1 percent by 1970 
(see Table 3.4). An analysis of the origins of Turkish emigrant workers in Europe also 
indicates a similar picture; until 1980, only ..j. percent of about a million were from the 
Eastern region (Atahk and Beeley 1993: 165). After the 1980 military intervention, this 
-12 Some pro-Kurdish and pro-PKK sources cite figures far beyond these moderate estimates. For 
instance, the Kurdish Institute favourably estimates a Kurdish population of 900.000 to 1,100,000 in 
Europe (Institute Kurde 1999) as opposed to moderak figure of 690,000 by Rigoni (1998) and the 100\esl 
figure of 360,000 by GUrbcy (1995) for all Kurds in Westem Europe. 
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picture reversed as emigrants from the East doubled their proportion within emigration 
flows (Table 3.4). On the basis of such a regional distribution, one could expect a 
remarkable Turkish Kurdish population among the total Turkish migrant stock in 
Europe. However, it is not possible to estimate due to lack of data on ethnicity of 
migrants. Therefore, estimates of Kurdish immigrant stock in Europe range between 
half a million to over a million. 
Table 3.4. Geographical distribution of emigrants from Turkey, 1965-1984 (%) 
Region 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1982 1984 
West 54.5 54.6 50.1 47.4 4l.6 23.0 22.2 
North 12.3 10.8 16.1 13.8 24.6 24.6 26.0 
Central 17.7 16.0 23.8 23.3 21.4 21.4 24.2 
South 8.3 8.6 8.0 7.8 9.5 12.3 1l.9 
East 7.2 10.0 8.0 7.8 8.0 18.7 15.7 
Source: Atalzk and Beeley 1993; Gitmez 1983. 
There has been no research conducted on the international migration of Turkish Kurds 
although there have been some studies on their internal migration (see Ak~it and Ak<;ay 
1999; CHP 1999; TMMOB 1999). We have no means of measuring Kurdish 
involvement in international migration flows from Turkey although they probably 
constitute the majority of refugee and asylum-seeker flows from Turkey to Europe 
during the last two decades (Van Bruinessen 1998:44-45 and UNHCR 1997). 
Germany is the major destination for migrants originating from Turkey irrespective of 
their ethnic origins. After the mass labour migrations of the 1960s and 1970s following 
governmental bilateral agreements, Germany became the most attractive country for 
potential migrants because these initial flows established necessary networks for further 
migration. Today about 75 percent of Turkish citizens in Europe live there, as shown in 
Table 3.3 above. The next section focuses on migration to Germany. 
3.4. Migration to Germany: from guest workers to asylum seekers 
Germany was an en1igration country until the mid-1950s. Between 1820 and 1960, 15 
per cent of the 45 million immigrants arriving in the United States were from Gern1any 
(Martin 1994: 196). Gern1any started to import some foreign labour by the beginning of 
the twentieth century, prin1arily from Poland and Austria (B16teyogel et al. 1993:83). 
There were 950,000 foreign \yorkers in 1907 (Castles and Miller 1993:57) and 
1.259,880 foreigners according to the 1910 Census (Reimann and Reimann 1979:65). 
Follo\\'ing the crisis in 1929, their yolume decreased to 100,000 (Castlc~ and \ 1 iller 
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1993:61). However, the Nazis introduced a new type of imported labour; 7,~ million 
prisoners of war and forced labourers from occupied territories were brought to work in 
factories, mainly to serve the war industry, in Germany in 1944 (Castles and YIiller 
1993:62; Martin 1994:197).43 
When the war ended, the reconstruction of central Europe began. As in other Western 
European countries, Germany achieved extremely high economic growth rates after 
World War II, and eventually reached full employment by 1960 (Zlotnik 1998). The 
erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 cut off West German industry from one 
potential labour supply, the agrarian periphery of East Germany and Poland (Bade 
1987). The only solution for the labour shortfall was the recruitment of foreign labour 
from other areas (Gastarbeiter system) (Rist 1978).44 The recruitment treaties Germany 
made with countries including Italy (1955) Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey and 
Portugal (1961), and Yugoslavia (1968) aimed to solve this problem (Martin 1994: 198-
9). The idea underlying the guest worker system was to recruit seasonal workers, lower 
paid workers on short-term contracts (Korte 1987:163). However, by the end of the 
1970s, it was clear the guest worker system had failed because millions of guest 
workers had stayed in Germany for more than 20 years despite the fact that they were 
not needed in the labour market. Table 3.5 shows that the foreign population in 
Germany grew to 7.5 million by the end of the 1990s: only one third of them were 
employed (GI-NY 1999; BlOtevogel et al. 1993; Korte 1978). 
German policy makers considered immigrants as guests and therefore assimilation has 
not been a major policy despite many local programmes aimed at the integration of 
immigrant families and children. In the space of ten years, guest workers became 
foreign residents, and in 1973, recruitment stopped but it couldn't stop the rise of the 
number of foreigners45 (Martin 1994:205). Furthermore, Germany granted citizenship 
to about 15,000 foreigners per year during the 1980s and 1990s (Castles and Miller 
1993:115). Between 1991 to 1993,22,414 foreigners were naturalised in Berlin and 
.j~ In the meantime, more than 500,000 Jews fled Nazi Germany by the outbreak of the Second World 
War (Bade 1987: 140). Bade calls it a momentous loss for German cultural life as many of those 
emigrants belonged to the intelligentsia and oyer 7 percent had held academic positions (1987: 1.+ 1), 
Many of these academics arrived in Turkey by invitation and they played a crucial role in the 
e~tablishment of Turkish universities at that time (Iyduygu and Sirkeci 1999a) . 
.j.j The guest worker system was a yery \\'ell organised recruitment system gi\'ing a positiye response to 
any employee request from a, German in\'~stor in three or, four days" Workers \\e:e gr .. ~n\ed one-~ear 
residence permits by the recnlltment office 111 Istanbul (;\ tartm 199.+: \ hiler and \tartm 19~2), 
.j5 In the text. foreigner, foreign born, foreign nationals are llsed interchangeably and they all rct~r to 
people born ollbide Cil'rIll<lny, 
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almost half were Turkish (Haussermann 1998:144). During the 1990s, Germany \\'as 
targeted by four major migration currents: refugees and asylum-seekers from all around 
the world; migrations from Eastern Europe; mass migrations from East Germany to 
West Germany; and the migration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe (BlOte\'ogel 
et al. 1993; Castles and Miller 1993; Martin 1994). 
Table 3.5. Immigration to Germany, 1950s to 1990s 
Foreign Population Asylum Applications 
(OOOs) % of total Total Total to Turkev to 
.' 
Turkish Total Turkish Total From Turkey Germany Germany 
1955 484.8 1.0 '80-85 105,480 249,675 45,640 
1960 686.2 1.2 '85-90 192,939 648,318 90,500 
1970 469.2 2,976.5 0.8 4.9 '91-93 100,909 1,016,902 68,891 
1975 1,077.1 4,089.6 1.8 6.7 '94 25,909 127,210 19.118 
1980 1,462.4 4,453.3 2.4 7.2 '95 41,370 166,950 33,750 
1985 1,400.4 4,378.9 2.3 7.1 '96 38,260 149,160 31,730 
1990 1,694.6 5,342.5 2.7 8.4 '97 32,830 151,690 25,940 
1997 2,107.4 7,419.0 2.4 8.5 '98 21,027 98,644 11,754 
1998 2,110.2 7,308.5 2.6 8.9 '99 19,610 95,100 9,094 
1999 2,053,6 7,336.1 2.5 8.9 '00 19,000 78,995 8,970 
Sources: UNHCR 1998a; 1998b; 1999 and 2001; FSOG 2000; European Commission 1999; 
Council of Europe 1998; IGC 1998; Eurostat 1996a, b, c; Martin 1994; Blotevogel et al. 1993, 
There is an ironic similarity between German migration policy in the late 19th century 
and the Turkish one in the 1960s. By the late 19th century German governments 
considered labour migration abroad as the exportation of social problems as it served to 
relieve widespread tensions in Germany (Bade 1987: 135). By 1960, Turkish officials 
considered the same option to relieve unemployment pressure arising from rapid 
urbanisation and slow industrial job creation (iyduygu 1991; Gitmez 1983; Abadan-
Unat 1976). There were no colonial or hegemonic linkages between Turkey and 
Germany but the two countries historically had entertained over a hundred years of 
cordial governmental and military relations since the times of the German Reich and 
the Ottoman Empire. They fought side by side against other European powers in the 
First World War.46 Republican Turkey also developed friendly relations with Germany. 
As early as the 1950s, Germany became the most important trade partner of Turkey. 
Both countries benefited from the US development scheme, the Marshall Plan, in the 
aftermath of the World War II. Thus, Germany and Turkey signed a bilateral 
4(1 German officers assisted the reformation and modernisation of the Turkish army in the 18
th 
century 
and they were engag~d in the construction of the Baghdad railway, a crucial rail route in the Ottoman 
Empire,· There \\'ere German command~rs among the war heroes of Turkey aft.er t~e First \\'orld :\'ar, 
For instance. German commander Llman von Sanders commanded the \lctonous troops ot the 
Dardane I \cs, The same commander \\as later granted the Pasha title, the highest rank in th~ Ottoman 
army. 
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recruitment agreement in 1961, which paved the way for more than 500,000 Turkish 
citizens' entry into Germany over the following ten years (ZIT 1997b: 1: Gitmez 
1983:19). 
As mentioned before, migration to Germany comprises the vast majority of Turkish 
international migration (Table 3.3) Therefore the periodisation of migration flo\\'s from 
Turkey reflects the patterns of migration flows to Germany. Early migrants, guest 
workers, arrived in the industrial centres of the Federal Republic of Germany, namely, 
Dusseldorf, Cologne, Stuttgart, and Munich. Ford, Mercedes, and Opel were the main 
recruiters, and so the main residential areas of these pioneer immigrants became 
neighbourhoods near to factories, such as Mtilheim in Cologne where the qualitative 
field research of this study was undertaken. 
Currently, Turkish and Kurdish residents In Germany account for one third of all 
foreigners and similarly, they comprise about 30 percent of all asylum stock in 
Germany. As Martin (1991) argued, Turkish migration to Germany is "an unfinished 
story" and possibly will never end because the established migration networks are very 
likely to carry it forward. These networks facilitate all forms of migration towards this 
country. Similarly, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Austria have also been 
popular destinations for Turkish migrants. Although there is a net gain, flows between 
Turkey and Germany are not one-way. For instance, between 1994 and 1997, nearly 80 
thousand immigrants from Turkey entered Germany whereas about 60 thousand of 
them were leaving per annum.47 Almost 20 thousand newcomers were added to the 
immigrant population in Germany from Turkey (Council of Europe 1998:188). 
Today, the Turks and the Turkish Kurds in Germany compose a considerable portion of 
the population (Figure 3.7). For example, Turks constitute about five per cent of 
population in Bremen State, and seven percent in the city of Cologne. The majority of 
Turkish immigrants live in North Rhine Westphalia and other states of the former 
"West" Germany although very few reside in the states of the former "East" Germany 
(Figure 3.7). As their volume increased, Turkish immigrant enclaves appeared in 
alnl0st all the major cities of Germany, as they constituted 2.5 percent of the total 
population (Table 3.2). Keup Street in Cologne is a typical example of these segregated 
47 Gitmez (1983) and G6kdere (1978) underline that there is no certain information about retum 
migration figures but they suggest an annual yolume of 30,000 until 19-:'-1- ,and after the~ thi,s annual 
figure rose up )O-)).()OO, Therefore as ?pposed to \ (T), \\ell known massive labour migration from 
Turkcy to Germany thcre has been a maSSI\C return 1111gratlon too, 
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Turkish-Kurdish city-quarters (Yavuzcan 1997; Suddeutsche Zeitung 1997). 
Figure 3.7. Turkish citizens in Germany, by state, 1997 
•
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Turkish citizens 
Total (1997): 2,051,500 
~-===-~'"' 
Proportion of 
Turks in Total (% ) 
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Source: Foreign Ministry [Germany] 1999. 
Although it is argued that Turkish immigrants face problems of integration into 
German society, newcomer Turks are well integrated into their own isolated 
communities of fellow Turks. 48 Turkish immigrants are confined to their own ethnic 
labour n1arket and have very limited connections with the host society (Friedrichs 
1998; Abadan-Unat 1997). However, this isolation is the result of a set of restrictions 
they face in Germany, for example, language and training limitations are compounded 
by legal limitations (C;igekli 1998). Most of them are not competent in German and also 
do not possess the qualifications gained through formal training or education. Thu 
there remain two options: to live within a Turkish ethnic enclave or to retun1 home. 
Return migration to Turkey is a significant phenomenon, as more than half a million 
have retun1ed since the mid-1970s, but it is still a n1yth for many (Gitmez 19 3: 
Abadan-Unat 1997; Gokdere 1994). During the 1970 , Turki h imn1igrant ent about a 
4, H rc] prefer to u tb t rm integration, a it doe not n e arily imply integration to th ho t ociet). 
Tran national ocial pa e provide nOllgh room for llch unCOI1\ entional ~ rm f integrali n ( -ec 
Chapter 7 in Fai t _000). 
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quarter of their earnings to Turkey and invested in land, estates and some launched 
small businesses (Gitmez 1983). However, from 1980 onwards, in response to further 
restrictions on labour migration, the duration of stay among immigrants increased and 
more families joined workers in Germany. This cut off remittances sharply as Turks 
began to invest in Germany. By the end of 1997, for example, almost one in every ten 
Turkish families in Germany owned the house they lived in (ZIT 1997a). Although 
unemployment among Turks was much higher than that for native Germans and other 
foreigners in the late 1990s, there were about 50,000 Turkish run businesses which 
employed about 200,000 people in total, the majority of which appeared in the last 15 
years. Therefore a more settled community picture appears. As a result of this, they are 
also interested in politics in Germany and in the EU (ZIT 1997a: 14). Many Turkish 
candidates have stood for seats in local assemblies and national parliament in the 
elections. For example, the PDS (Democratic Socialist Party) candidate for mayor in 
Cologne in 1999 was the Turkish Kurdish teacher, Sengtil Senol: she won less than 10 
percent of the vote. After the election of the first Turkish MP (Cern Ozdemir, in 
September 1998) to the German Bundestag, the 1999 elections sent Feleknas Uca49 to 
the European Parliament. 
Turkey exported not only its unemployment problems via labour migration, but also 
other internal tensions through asylum flows from the 1980 onwards. First Turkish and 
Kurdish immigrant organisations appeared after the arrival of political migrants 
escaping from the Turkish military intervention of 1971 (Ogelman 1998:16).50 Expelled 
left-wing organisations found new blood in Germany after the 1980 coup d'etat whilst 
Islan1ic fundamentalists discovered a suitable ground for their political organisations, 
which were not allowed in Turkey. Many of these organisations maintained an 
orientation towards Turkey rather than Germany (Ogelman 1998:7). Kurdish 
organisations appeared relatively later than Turkish ones but eventually, the end results 
of the exportation of tension from Turkey were visible in Western Europe. At the end 
of the last century, when the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan was detained, tens of 
thousands of Turkish Kurds poured onto the streets, occupied embassies, and tens of 
then1 even burnt themselves to protest at the arrest (White 2000: 187; see also Appendix 
3.1 ). 
4') Feleknas Uca is also a Turkish Kurd. 
:"0 The first Turkish Kurdish organisation in Germany \\'as HEVRA (Association of Revolutionary Kurds 
in Europe) founded in 1965, \\'hich \\<15 a small propaganda group. Later in 1979 the first intluential 
Kurdish organisation, KOl\ lKAR (\\'orkers Federation of Kurds in Germany) was founded. 
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Initially, many Kurds had participated in the activities of Turkish left wing 
organisations in Germany. However, as the conflict between the Turkish army and the 
PKK intensified and the PKK gained more power, radical and pure Kurdish 
organisations appeared all around Germany. In response to a sharp increase in \'iolent 
protests, the PKK was outlawed in Germany in November 1993.51 Cologne, as one of 
the key destination cities in the Turkish migration to Germany, was the base for many 
of these activities. 52 The following section explores the population of Cologne with 
regard to its Turkish residents. 
3.4.1. A Key Destination; Cologne 
In Germany, the Nord Rhein Westphalia (NRW) is the state with the largest stock of 
foreigners. Cologne is one of the major cities in the NRW and Germany. One in every 
five residents living in the city is an immigrant. It has the third largest foreigner 
population after Berlin and Munich (ZfT 1997b: 5; Friedrichs 1998:1754). Although 
statistical records do not help to delineate the Turkish Kurdish population, it is worth 
mentioning the breakdown of the city's residents by nationality. 
Table 3.6. Foreigners in Cologne by nationality, 1970-1999 
N ationaliry 1970 1980 1990 1999 % in total 
Turkish 22,147 60,212 70,847 77,965 7.6 
30.4% 43.8% 43.4% 40.6% 
Italian 16,646 23,232 19,900 21 682 2.1 
22.8% 16.9% 12.2% 11.3% 
Yugoslav 5,937 9,045 10,561 16,567 1.7 
8.1% 6.5% 6.4% 8.6% 
Greek 6,456 7,763 7,638 7,469 0.7 
8.8% 5.6% 4.6% 3.8% 
Other European 12,912 16,250 18,109 20,495 2.0 
20.0% 11.6% 11.1 % 10.5% 
Other 7,397 20,819 35,868 47,669 4.8 
9.9% 15.1% 22.0% 24.8% 
Total 72,950 137,321 163,013 191,847 
(Yo in total 7.3 13.5 16.3 18.9 1,014,837 
.. Source: Stadt Koln 2001; Fnednchs 1998: 1755; Stadt Koln 1998:20 . 
51 Although there is no official reference to it, the Turkish government might have had an influence.on 
the decision to ban the PKK since it was continuously criticising European governments for supportll1g 
the PKK in Europe. 
<;] Although it had local offices in Cologne, the PKK was banned in G.ermany !n Nove~be~ 1993 ~nd 
these offices \\crc transformed into Workers Clubs. Some of these Turkish Kurdish orgal11satlOns \\'hlch 
ha\'c their headquarters in the Cologne region are as fo11O\vs: Federation of Patriotic Workers and 
Cultural Organisations (FEYKA-Kurdistan), Federation of Kurdish Workers Organi~ations (KO~IKAR), 
Alc\'i Union of Kurdistan (FEK). Kurdistan Red Cross (in Dusseldorf) (HSK). Kurdish :\rt Centre, Legal 
Solidarity Ass(Kiation for Kurds in Germany (AZADI), Kurdish Information and Documentation Centre 
(N:\ VEND), Kurdistan Islam Party (PIK). 
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Cologne has had a reasonably stable population since the 1960s with a zero growth rate 
(Stadt Kaln 2001) and a population size of around one million. 53 The city has been host 
to a relatively large migrant community, increasing from 7 percent in the late 1960s to 
13.5 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 1999 (Stadt Kaln 2001). During the last t\\"o 
decades the migrant population has increased by almost fifty percent in the city. 
Although different ethnic groups have added to the city's social fabric, the major 
minorities of Cologne remain the Turks, Italians and Yugoslavs. In the meantime, the 
proportion of European immigrants including Greeks, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese 
has been decreasing while other foreigners' increased (Table 3.6). 
Turkish nationals have constituted the largest group of foreigners in the city since 1970 
(Table 3.6). Although Cologne's German population has a negative growth rate, their 
Turkish and Kurdish fellows (7.6% of total population54) were responsible for 160/0 of 
live births between 1998 and 2000. The birth rate of Turkish nationals was 56.6 per 
thousand as opposed to 24.4 among Germans between 1997 and 1999 (Stadt Kaln 
2001). Generally Turks display high birth rates in Germany resembling demographic 
trends in Turkey (HUIPS 1994). Thus we may assume even larger demographic 
differences between Germans and Turkish Kurdish immigrants as recent studies on 
Turkish Kurdish demography have shown Kurdish people to have higher fertility and 
growth rates than the Turks in Turkey (Cindoglu and Sirkeci 2001; Sirkeci 2000; 
Dundar 1998). 
According to Andreas Goldberg, the head of the Migration Research Department of the 
Centre for Studies on Turkey (Essen, Germany), a recent survey found that Turkish 
migrants are generally living in "ghettos" near the industrial centres of the big cities in 
the Ruhr region (Hurriyet, 12 August 1999). The same survey revealed that Turks live 
within tight-knit communities of people from the same cultural and ethnic 
backgrounds. Similar findings came out of a Cologne study by Kecskes (1999) who 
found that within these exclusive neighbourhoods, more than 80%) of networks of 
youngsters were of Turkish descent (Kecskes 1999:5).55 Another Cologne study by 
Friedrichs also highlighted the highest segregation indices were for Turkish immigrants 
(around 34) compared to other minorities (around 24) (1998: 1756). 
5) For example, it was 1.017,000 in 1977,983,453 in 1985, and 1,01.f,837 in 20~0 (Stadt ~6!n. 2001). 
5-1 It needs to be underlined that the distribution of populations by age groups displays stnklI1g contrash. 
The proportion of Turks \\'ithin the younger age cohorts (0-25) \\'as 16.5% \\hile it \\'as _L.fll 0 in the old 
agc groups (35 and o\'l~r) (Stadt K6ln 2001):. ., _ 
" Within this Colognc study only a \ cry fe\\ Turkish Kurds \\ere mtervlc\\ed among ,'Il)h respondents 
and thcy wcre considered as Turkish in the analysis. 
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Table 3.7. The Turkish and foreign population in Cologne by district, 1997 (%) 
Turkish Foreigners Foreigners' % of all Population 
Districts share foreigners l\umber 0/0 
Innenstadt 9,298 31,309 22.7 16.6 137,850 13.6 
Rodenkirchen 3,808 14,155 14.7 7.5 95,977 9.5 
Lindenthal 2,027 15,984 11.6 8.5 137.228 13.5 
Ehrenfeld 9,663 20,810 21.6 11.0 96,202 9.5 
Nippes 12,026 22,115 20.2 11.7 109,559 10.8 
Chorweiler 9,024 15,708 19.5 8.3 80A13 7.9 
Porz 5,372 16,244 15.2 8.6 107,217 10.6 
Kalk 13,024 25,310 23.5 13.4 107,574 10.6 
Miilheim 14,719 27,148 19.0 14.4 142,890 14.0 
Total Cologne 78,961 188,783 18.6 188,783 1,014,910 100 
Source: Stadt Koln (1998). 
The foreign populations of Cologne live in their own ethnic enclaves, which have been 
developing for the last forty years. The spatial distribution of the foreign population 
indicates that some nationalities settled in certain city regions but not in others (Table 
3.7). Most foreigners in the city have concentrated in three of the city's nine districts: 
the Innenstadt (downtown) (16.6%), Millheim (14.4%) and Kalk (13.4%). These areas 
also have the highest rates of foreigners among total residents (Table 3.7 and Figure 
3.8).56 Different foreign groups are also segregated from each other. For instance, the 
largest Italian and Greek groups were in Innenstadt where they run restaurants, 
pizzerias and imbisses serving the general public whereas the Turkish and Kurdish 
populations were mostly concentrated in Mi.ilheim with authentic markets serving their 
own enclave and occasionally visitors from around the Cologne region.57 Kalk was the 
second most concentrated residential area for Turks and Italians while it was the least 
targeted by Greeks (Stadt Kaln 1998:22). 
According to Goldberg (Hilrriyet, 12 August 1999), the residential distribution of 
Turkish immigrant communities in German cities shows that the Turkish concentration 
areas are often located in neighbourhoods surrounding the industrial areas or in the city 
centre. Turkish immigrants in Cologne also display a quite similar pattern as they 
mainly live in areas near to the Ford factories in the North towards the coalfields of 
Leverkusen. Almost one fifth of the Turkish population lives in a northeast district \\'ith 
an ironic name pointing to the relative deprivation of foreigners: Mi.llheim. a literal 
translation of which is, "garbage home" (see Figure 3.8). A quarier of them li\'e on the 
56 In some district centres, the proportion of foreign-born population rises up to 40 percent such a~ Kalk. 
Chorwcikr. and Ostheim (Friedrichs 1998: 1760). 
57 The Cologne region is namcd "Bezirkregierung K61n" in German and it comprises many ~mall towns 
neighbouring the city of Colognc. 
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western bank of the river Rhine in Nippes and Chorweiler. In the southern district of 
Lindenthal, Rodenkirchen, and Porz the share of foreigners is lower than the average 
(Table 3.7). These southern quarters of the city are known as the wealthiest. Thi 
explains why there are hardly any Turkish residents (Figure 3.8). 
Figure 3.8. Distribution of the foreign population in Cologne, 1997 
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The housing market is one of the most important factors leading to segregation of this 
kind according to Friedrichs and is directly related to restrictions including economic 
linlitations (1998: 1757). Turkish migrants' financial bidding capacity is not good 
enough to nlove into better districts where mostly Germans live. According to 
household income data for Cologne, 1998, 42 percent of the foreign born had a 
monthly net household income under DM 2,000 as opposed to 26 percent of German . 
Diverse unemployment rates in the City also reflect the same deprivation experience 
for foreigners: unemployment was 19.3 percent among the foreign born compared to 
13.3 an10ng Gem1ans by 1995 (Friedrichs 1998:1757). These indicator are of 
significance to discussions of Turkish Kurds ' migration to an en ironment of r lative 
securi ty from an EO 1. 
Difficult-to-prove everyday-di crinlination again t Turki h inlmigrant probabl pta ' 
a role leading toward fmiher egregation . A a non-Chri tian populati n \\ith vet) 
little in C0J11I110n \ ith th G 1111an , th Turk' apa it for int grati n int th h t 
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society is very limited. Besides, their general distance in cultural terms and limited 
educational qualifications keep them away from high-paid jobs and social mobility 
opportunities. As non-EU citizens, they are also subject to legal restrictions (Kecskes 
1999:2). 
Among other factors, risk management and the friends and relatives effect can be seen 
as factors determining ethnic segregation. It is very likely that newly arrived 
immigrants with very little or no knowledge of the opportunities in the city would go to 
the areas where their fellow citizens live. This is probably the most important factor for 
illegal migrants who need an immediate shelter upon arrival. The combined effect of 
these factors has been to create ethnic enclaves in all immigrant countries and Germany 
is not an exception. Although not as famous as China towns, in major German cities, 
one can find a "Turkish town". Cologne accommodates at least two of them: 
Weidengasse in Innenstadt and Keup Strasse in Mulheim. 
3.4.2. "Istanbul auf 200 Metern": Keup Strasse in Cologne 
Weidengasse and Keup Strasse are the centres of "Turkish Cologne". Weidengasse is 
just around the comer from Kaln Haupt Bahnhof (Cologne Main Train Station), where 
many Turkish restaurants, bakeries, cafes and pubs can be found along with specialist 
travel agencies mostly arranging flights to remote towns of Turkey rather than popular 
destinations of Spain or Greece. Visitors can get a taste of Turkey in Weidengasse, but 
in Mulheim, they can experience what it is like to be in Turkey. 
Keup Street in Miilheim has been referred to as "Istanbul in 200 meters" (Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, 1997:3). It is a "high street" for the Turkish people of the city with boutiques, 
jewellery stores, grocers, kiosks, bakeries, tailors, accountants, travel agencies. music 
stores, and so on. It is very rare to hear the words "Deutsche Mark" or "Pfennig" in the 
interactions, rather they prefer to call it "Lira" and "Kuru~", Turkish currency terms. 
Only Turkish newspapers are available in cafes and bars, which completes the' feeling 
of hon1e abroad.' 
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It is also a place where socialisation takes place and local politics took shape in Turkish 
cafe houses and Turkish pubs. The "Cengizhan58 cafe" with its Turkish flag in the 
window is a meeting place for Turkish nationalists whereas "Cafe FIrat" 59 is a centre 
for Kurdish nationalists. Nearby at the south end of the Street is located the pro-PKK 
community centre while ten yards away from the north end, is the locale of Turkish 
nationalists, known as "grey wolves". To some extent, other cafes and bars in the Street 
are also affiliated to different interest groups who range from their ethnic membership 
to religious or political membership. In the surrounding area, Turkish leftwing 
organisations also have social clubs serving younger members of the community and 
hosting frequent seminars on topics that include politics in Turkey and discrimination 
in Germany. 
The domination of Islam in the area is clear for all to see. Along the 200 yards of Keup 
Street there are five mosques as well as offices of religious associations reflecting 
different sub-denominations of Islam. Veiled girls hang around in groups. The public 
swimming pool nearby has specific times allocated for use by men or women only in 
accordance with Islamic rules, which separate women from men in the public sphere. 
Further down in the street, there is an Islamic Institute run by a major Turkish Sunni-
Islam denomination called Siileymanczlar. Alevi-Muslims also have a centre, which 
was dominated by Turkish Kurdish Alevis when this research took place. The centre 
organises seminars about the role of Alevism and the tenets of Alevism, and also runs 
courses to learn to play Baglama (a Turkish string instrument), and courses in 
Anatolian folk dance. 
Despite this obvious polarisation among different groups of Turkish immigrants, it is 
not possible to state that Turkish and Turkish Kurdish immigrants are living in entirely 
separate realms. Regardless of the strong tension and polarisation on ethno-political 
grounds, it is still a common scene for Turkish and Kurdish fanatics to cheer together 
for the success of Galatasaray60 in these local pubs of Keup Strasse. 
3.5. Conclusion 
To date there has not been a study of the international migration of Turkish Kurds 
58 Cen!!izhan refers to Genghis Khan, the ancient Turko-Mongolid emperor of Central Asia. 
59 Firat refers to the Ri,er Euphrates, the largest river in the Kurdish populated areas of the \liddle last. 
60 Galatasara\'. one of the most t~1molls Turkish football teams, \\on the UEFA Cup in :2000, 
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except for a few partial accounts which were basically political analyses. Moreover, as 
a stateless ethnic population they are not visible in official registers which usually 
collect infonnation on citizenship or birthplace. Due to the ethnic tension in Turkey. 
Turkish Kurds have been made totally invisible in Turkish official statistics since the 
1965 Census. Therefore, almost all the figures of Kurdish migration in this chapter 
refer to the available literature and are estimates. This chapter reviewed the literature 
and discussed the wider context in which Turkish Kurdish international migration took 
place. This was important because migration is an interacting process which affects and 
is affected by other environmental factors. These factors comprise the socio-economic 
situation, political environment, and individuals' own circumstances at different levels 
such as the global, regional, local, and individual levels. A further analysis of this 
context with regard to the building blocks of the EOr follows in Chapter 5. 
Along with the conceptual framework drawn in Chapter 2, this chapter has described 
the broader economic, political and demographic aspects of the contexts of Turkish 
Kurdish international migration. The Turkish context is elaborated in order to highlight 
the existence of a distinct Kurdish segment in its ethnically diverse structure, which 
may reflect the EOr as discussed in Chapter 5. The historical account of migration 
flows from Turkey was revisited for the purpose of highlighting the role of Turkish 
Kurds within the broader Turkish migratory regime. 
Ethnic conflict in Turkey might have contributed to Turkish Kurdish migration and 
politicised the migration. Turkish Kurdish migration seems effectively related to ethno-
politics in Turkey. Therefore the weak literature on Kurdish migration, once again, 
underlines the importance of this research as a pioneer study of Kurdish international 
migration. 
The following chapters, following the description of research methodology, analyse 
Kurdish emigration and the role of the expression of ethnicity in relation to the 
migration process by focusing on their migratory and ethnic experiences spreading 
from ren10te villages and towns of Eastern Turkey to the urban centres of Germany. 
The emigration analysis in the following chapters should be considered in relation to 
the context described here. 
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The Research Jfethodolo'Z\' 0_ 
"The individuals and their time- alld 
place-specific lives disappear in the statistics_ 
Narratives give the numbers a human face" 
(Vandsemb,1995:4]]) 
4.1. Introduction: the research strategy and multi-method approach 
The adoption of appropriate research methodologies ideally should be shaped by the 
question under investigation and not by the availability of certain methods or data. 
Nevertheless, social research is often data led due to difficulties such as paucity of data 
as is the case in ethnicity research (Courbage 1998). Therefore, it is necessary to 
remember the main objectives of the study (Chapter 1) in order to reveal the underlying 
rationale for the particular research strategy developed to investigate Turkish Kurdish 
international migration in response to an EOI resulting from an ongoing ethnic conflict 
in Turkey. The objectives of this study are to reveal the migration patterns of Turkish 
Kurds, the mechanisms of their migration, and the role of ethnic conflict in this 
migratory movement. Given the problems outlined in the previous chapter (i.e. lack of 
ethnic data and lack of past studies on Turkish Kurdish international migration), the 
analysis of migratory movement in relation to an EOI requires information on the 
overall process and history of Turkish Kurdish international migration and also needs 
detailed accounts of the involvement of ethnicity and the expression of ethnicity 
throughout this migration process. 
F or the investigation of the migration patterns and process, a specialised migration 
survey is the most appropriate method for gathering data. Therefore, the Turkish 
Intell1ational Migration Survey 1996 (TIMS) data along with the Turkish Demographic 
Health Survey 1993 (TDHS) data are used. From a conceptual point of view, analysing 
contextual factors that shape migration movements (e.g. decision to move or stay) was 
also in1portant. For this aim, some census data from the Turkish State Institute of 
Statistics (SIS) and socio-econon1ic development data from the Turkish State Planning 
Organisation (SPO) are utilised. However, t\VO characteristics of this study require an 
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intensive method as well. First of all, this is the first-ever comprehensi\'e study of 
Turkish Kurdish international migration requiring an in-depth understanding. Gi\'en the 
lack of ethnic data, there was also a need to undertake primary data collection. 
However, as there are no available population frames to draw a sample of an ethnic 
group, a qualitative in-depth investigation remained as a suitable method. Secondly, 
investigation of the relevance of the expression of ethnicity and the ethnic conflict 
within the context of migration is a complicated task and is not easy to carry out 
without detailed accounts of events and personal histories. With this regard, the semi-
structured in-depth interview is one of the most appropriate methods of data collection 
since it allows the researcher to gather the accounts of a specific aspect of respondents' 
life histories (Parfitt 1997:99). 
The research has therefore sought to combine both the investigation of the 
generalisable aspects of Turkish Kurdish international migration such as the 
background characteristics of immigrants and the conflict oriented aspects such as the 
expression of ethnicity in relation to international migration. This, inevitably, forced 
the researcher to employ various techniques in the same research. Luckily, the literature 
also underlines the advantages of employing mixed methods for an understanding of 
migration (e.g. Graham 1995; Erman 1998; Gutting 1996b; White and Jackson 1995). 
For the first part of the investigation, it was necessary to explore the international 
migration patterns of Turkish Kurds. As migration from Turkey has not been 
investigated in relation to its various ethnic components up until very recently, the first 
task was, using extensive sources and methodologies, to distinguish Turkish Kurdish 
migration patterns from broader Turkish migration. However, an in-depth investigation 
was needed to analyse the processes through which Turkish Kurds have realised their 
migratory adventures, since the expression of ethnicity within Turkish Kurdish 
international migration has not been investigated yet and the phenomenon has not been 
previously well described. 
The next section discusses the rationale of employing mixed methods while later 
sections outline the use of qualitative and quantitative methods and the main practical 
and conceptual considerations. The third section depicts the data sources, and analysis 
of the data in the extensi\'e research. In section ..t . ..t, the qualitatiYe research is described 
focusing on the design of in-depth interyie\\'s, interyie\y schedules, field\\'ork, the 
intcryic\\' process, and the analysis of the qualitati\'e material. 
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4.2. Mixed methods in geographic investigation 
As qualitative methodologies have become more favourable and widely used in human 
geography, mixed methods have come to the fore in research. Recent debates among 
human, and more recently, population geographers about the epistemology of 
geographic research also show that the discipline is quite receptive to a multi-method 
perspective, especially in the field of migration studies (see Graham 1999; McKendrick 
1999; Findlay and Li 1999; Halfacree and Boyle 1993). 
The multi-method approach may be described as a practical solution of the qualitative 
/quantitative dichotomy. It is 'practical' because of the growth of research using both 
methodologies, which undermined that dualism that has been accompanied by the 
intensification of philosophical positions rejecting quantitative knowledge 
(McKendrick 1999:41). The quantitative/qualitative divide should be (or must be) 
considered as a continuum rather than a dichotomy (Graham 1999:77). Choosing this or 
that method reflects an epistemological strand but it has been argued that it also reflects 
the structure of power relations as "the dualistic nature of thought positions the 
quantitative with work, science, objectivity, reason and masculinity, while the 
qualitative is aligned with home, nature, subjectivity, passion and femininity" 
(Winchester 1999:61). Such dualistic understanding also assumes a hierarchy in favour 
of quantitative within the sphere of scientific knowledge. However, in practice, it is not 
rigidly divided. Qualitative methods can also be used as a complementary adjunct 
method in quantitative studies (and vice versa). 
Apart from the difficulties (of using a single method) raised by the research objectives, 
the epistemological capabilities and advantages of a mixed method approach 
underlined in the literature have directed this research to employ a multi-method 
approach. It is thought that simultaneous use of intensive and extensive techniques may 
mcrease the explanatory power of the research as it allows different methods to 
mcrease the capacity of understanding (Sayer 1992; Walby 1991; Dex 1991: Berg 
1989; Karpati 1981). The literature also highlights subject (migration) specific 
advantages of using n1ulti-methods. Chapman (1975) claimed that it is not possible to 
understand migration without in-depth ethnographic research, and Buttimer (1985) 
underlined the potential of qualitative methods to understand migration in relation to 
identity processes. Although qualitatin? methodologies hmc become more common 
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and widely used recently, it is now (and also for a long time in population geography) 
almost a convention for contemporary researchers to employ both methodologies 
together for better understanding of the processes questioned (Findlay and Li, 1999:51). 
The use of specific research techniques depends on the objects of study and the 
purposes, which are embedded in wider theoretical contexts (Findlay and Li, 1999:50 
and Graham, 1999:81). Thus, theoretical preferences could also lead to extremely 
different strategies ranging from structured interviews to in-depth interviews and 
narratives as McKendrick exemplifies from migration studies (1999:45). 
McKendrick (1999:40) proposes two advantages of using multi-method research In 
general: First, it is preferred because it deals with weaknesses in existing data sources. 
Secondly, the breadth of understanding provided by multi-method research is attractive 
in terms of the academic ideals of scholarship. These advantages are also valid for this 
particular study due to data problems and the need to understand a phenomenon for the 
first time. 
Mixing methods can also be supported by the logic of triangulation, which may provide 
completeness, abductive inspiration, and confirmation. The methods complement each 
other, providing richness or detail that would be unavailable from one method alone 
(Risjord et al. 2001; Dunbar et al. 1999). Qualitative research is especially helpful and 
often used when a phenomenon is poorly understood (Knafl and Breitmayer 1991). 
Another rationale for triangulation is confirmation, since qualitative methods can 
clarify or support the results of quantitative research (or vice versa). Therefore, this 
study has also employed mixed methods triangulating quantitative analysis of survey 
data with a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews to describe the patterns of 
Turkish Kurdish international migration in relation to the ethnic conflict. 
4.3. Extensive research: the data and analysis 
The research aims and objectives require analysis of the interaction between the EOt 
ethnicity, and the international migration of Turkish Kurds. Therefore it requires 
reference to different data sources. Three different data sources used in the analyses of 
this research are: a) TIMS (Turkish International Migration Survey 1996) data. b) semi 
structured in-depth interyie\\'s conducted in Germany in 1999, c) the TDHS (Turkish 
Demographic Health Sur\'t~y 1993) data. In addition, other official information sources 
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are also referred to including the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS) and the 
Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) and some legal documents including the 
Turkish Constitution. 
The TDHS was used for the analysis of the EOI while the TIMS 61 was used in the 
migration analysis. Both sets of survey data use language as a surrogate for ethnicity. 
These data provide the first reliable and accurate source enabling the estimation of the 
demographic and some socio-economic characteristics of Kurds in Turkey (iyduygu et 
al. 1999). The two main purposes of using the TDHS were to analyse the Turkish 
Kurdish population in Turkey and to examine the EOI for Turkish Kurds in Turkey in 
terms of housing conditions and educational status. 
The TDHS is based on a nationally representative sample of 8619 households and 6519 
ever-married women aged 15-49 years old. The information was collected through two 
sets of questions that focused on the household and individual. From these two 
questionnaires three data sets were constructed representing households, individuals 
and children, the first two of which are used in this study. 
The TDHS reveals information about the living conditions of the population by 
ethnicity although it does not contrast migrants with non-migrants. Variables indicating 
educational attainment levels and literacy, household size and overcrowding, 
possession of some basic consumer goods and availability of facilities in the household 
were used in the analysis of the socio-economic EOI for the Kurds in Turkey. The 
ethnicity information is collected through a set of mother tongue questions in the 
TDHS: the mother tongue of the respondent, respondent's husband's mother tongue, 
respondent's mother's mother tongue, respondent's father's mother tongue, 
respondent's husband's mother's mother tongue and respondent's husband's father's 
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mother tongue. 
To overcome the problem of the lack of information on economic conditions in the 
TDHS data, an index of socio-economic development levels in Turkey provided by 
SPO was also referred to for the analysis of the EOI (see Dinyer 1996; and HUIPS 
1994). 
61 A note is necessary here about the use of these data. The TIMS is still the only survey data on 
international migration from Turkey. The TDHS 1993 \\US the latest available data at the time when this 
research started. In 2000, the TDHS 1998 became available but there are compatibility problems. The 
TDHS 1993 is more rele\ant to timing of migrations which were recorded in the TI\IS. Therefore, the 
I· 'c' "lrchcr used the 1993 TDHS instead of the later \ersion. c"c, 
6~ For the breakdO\vn of the population in Turkey according to these questions see Chapter :;, section 4. 
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The TIMS data are used to describe and interpret the individual and household 
backgrounds that underlie decisions to migrate or to stay. This survey \\"as a part of an 
international survey of push-pull factors of international migration to the European 
Union (Schoorl et al. 2000). It is basically focused on migration flows from the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region (Turkey, Morocco and Egypt) and from 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana and Senegal) to the EU during the ten year period from 
1986 to 1996. For primary data collection in immigrant receiving countries Spain and 
Italy were selected since these have been recently having sizeable migrant populations 
from Morocco and Senegal (Spain) and Ghana and Egypt (Italy) (Schoorl et al. 2000). 
Thus eight country teams (one organising team based in NIDI, the Netherlands) worked 
on each country survey and the author of this thesis was also a part of the Turkish team 
consisting 11 members from Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies and Bilkent 
University (TIMS 2000). 
The TIMS, Turkish survey, provides the first comprehensive account of international 
migration from Turkey. It was conducted in 28 selected districts in 8 provinces of 
Turkey in 1996. The TIMS aimed to investigate international migration from Turkey by 
focusing on two categories of populations: those from less developed regions and those 
from developed regions. Each group was also divided into two further categories: 
places with more established migration flows; and places with more recent migration 
flows. The West region is composed of Denizli and U ~ak provinces, developed areas 
with more established migration flows. The Central region contains Yozgat and 
Aksaray provinces, less developed areas but with more established migration flows. 
The developed provinces of Gaziantep and Kahramanmara~ with more recent migration 
flows form the region East 1. Finally, Adlyaman and $anhurfa provinces stand for the 
less developed region in the East with more recent migration flows (see Figure 1.1 on 
page 8). The TIMS researched migration during a ten-year period between 1986 and 
1996 in these regions. Therefore, it excludes most of the information about earlier 
migration flows. Despite all these shortcomings, it is the only survey data on 
international nligration from Turkey gathered until now at this scale. 
Four sets of questionnaires were used in the TIMS, which were administered 
respectively to households, migrants, return migrants. and non-migrants inten"iewed in 
Turkey. The target population in the survey \vere households and their individual 
ll1ell1bers aged 18-65 years. The data comprise t\VO sets: at the household !evel (1 T'9 
cases) and at the !eve 1 of individuals (-+775 cases) in selected regions representing 
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different development levels and different migration histories. The TIMS data \yere 
analysed here in order to describe general patterns of Turkish Kurdish emigration in 
comparison with the patterns of the Turkish migratory regime. Thus the composition of 
emigrating populations, their household conditions, employment and educational levels 
are outlined. The intentions of current migrants and of potential migrants are examined 
for any future predictions of trends in international migration originating from Turkey. 
The topics presented in Table 4.1 were covered in the survey questionnaires as 
individual sections. 
Table 4.1 Topics covered in the TIMS questionnaires 
Household modules: 
A Household roster 
B Information about living quarters and housing conditions 
C Economic conditions of the household 
D Remittances 
Individual modules: 
E Social and demographic characteristics and social interaction (and integration) 
F Information about work 
G Migration history 
H Household composition in country of origin, before the last migration 
J Economic situation before the last migration 
K Motives for move(s) abroad 
L Information about the last/current destination 
M Migration networks and assistance 
N Experiences at destination 
P Intentions for future migration 
l 
The shortcomings of these two data sets need to be addressed before going into a 
description of the procedures of analysis. As mentioned above, the TDHS data was 
weak in terms of socio-economic indicators but was the only recent source (since the 
1965 Turkish Census), which included information about the ethnic diversity of the 
entire population in Turkey. As they reflect socio-economic conditions to some extent, 
variables including educational attainment levels, crowding and size of households, and 
housing conditions were used in this study. The TDHS is also the primary source for 
the estimation of the Turkish Kurdish population in Turkey and has been described in 
detail elsewhere (Sirkeci 2000; iyduygu et al. 1999; Koy and HanclOglu 1999; 6zsoy et 
al. 1996). 
For the TIMS, the general problem was the high non-response rate for many yariables. 
Although the questionnaires used in the suryey are extremely rich, the data collected do 
not reflect this richness. Questions pro\"iding background information \\erc fully 
answered by all respondents but in inycstigations of the details of migration proccsses 
missing cases often outnumbered yalid cases. This has led to smaller numbers in the 
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analysis of patterns referring to ethnic differentiation. Missing information \yas also 
related to another structural shortcoming of the survey: the TIMS conducted intervie\Ys 
with proxy persons in some cases. Proxies were allowed for current migrants, but not 
for return migrants, who should always be interviewed in person. In the cases where 
proxies had to be used, questions on attitudes and opinions, as well as certain questions 
on migrant experience abroad were eliminated (TIMS 2000). 
For 46% of all individual interviews a proxy respondent, who was assumed to be 
capable of answering the questionnaire on behalf of the eligible respondent, answered 
the questions (TIMS 2000). It was obviously difficult to find current and/or recent 
migrants for interview at their households in Turkey. Therefore, use of proxy persons 
was very high in interviews with such migrants (87 and 72 per cent respectively). Use 
of proxy persons caused a considerable proportion of missing cases ('missing' or 'don't 
know' answers). For example, "If the group who refused to answer or said they don't 
know (probably by proxy respondents) is included, the percentage of undocumented 
migration increases to 28 per cent. " (TIMS 2000:98). 
The TIMS has also a distinct rural bias. It contains a sample population, 60%) of which 
is rural and 400/0 is urban compared to Turkey's broader pattern of 700/0 urban 
population. To make the data representative, a weight variable is estimated and applied 
to the data to account for the regional selection of the sample, size and selection of 
clusters, and migrant statuses of the households (See TIMS 2000, section 13.3). This 
study therefore has avoided rural-urban differences in the analysis, as TIMS might be 
misleading on this dimension. Possibly for this very reason, the survey report itself also 
refrained from using urban-rural comparisons in the analysis (See TIMS 2000). 
In the analyses of the survey data (both the TIMS and TDHS), language (mother tongue 
in the TDHS and language at home when a child in the TIMS) was used as the only 
l11arker of ethnicity. These definitions were adopted in this research for practical 
purposes. Although there is voluminous debate on the measurement and analysis of 
ethnicity in the literature, language seems one of the most commonly used signifiers of 
ethnicity (e.g. Barth 1969; Cohen 1978; Hutchinson and Smith 1993; Hirschman 1993), 
There are sonle limitations due to the quality and content of survey data. Ne\'erthe\css. 
analyses of both data sets still provide imp0l1ant contextual information with regard to 
the EOI and insights for intel11ational migration patterns. These are \'aluable for the 
examination of Turkish Kurdish international migration in response to an EO I. and they 
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are complemented by the qualitative interviews, which are described in detail in the 
following section. 
Both the TIMS and the TDHS data were analysed using SPSS. Thus, on a descriptiYe 
level, some generalisations were reached such as the relationships between ethnicity 
and motives for migration, wealth and education. The main purpose of using 
quantitative surveys (i.e. the TIMS and the TDHS) was to obtain necessary information 
to outline patterns of migration and to indicate associations between individual 
variables (Ackroyd and Hughes 1983; Oppenheim 1992). Regression analyses were 
also run to examine causal relationships between the components of the Eor and 
migration. These analyses revealed some patterns of Turkish Kurdish migration on the 
basis of the TIMS data but also pointed to the limitations of generalising from it whilst 
the intensive research based on in-depth interviews are used to investigate possible 
contrasts between what the quantitative data present and what immigrants express. 
4.4. Intensive research: the interviews and analysis 
The intensive component of the research took place over SIX months In Cologne 
incorporating semi-structured in-depth interviews combined with participant 
observation within the Kurdish immigrant community. 
The in-depth interview, as a data collection technique, was adopted in this research to 
collect information about Turkish Kurdish international migration and the expression of 
ethnicity through this migratory move. Semi-structured in-depth interviewing was 
chosen as a suitable method to examine different aspects of Turkish Kurdish migration. 
It was suitable both because this study is the first research on the phenomenon and the 
semi-structured style would save research time and enable the researcher to focus on 
certain issues and stories. Thus, in-depth interviews have been the appropriate method 
in this research to gain insights about the expression of ethnicity on the move. 
The key stage of information gathering involved semi-structured in-depth intcryie\\'s 
with Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Cologne in order to examine their migration 
patte111S in relation to the ethnic conflict in Turkey and an EO!. Thus, it is possible to 
say that both parts of the research strategy critically complemented each other and 
served different purposes. The intcryiews \\ere conducted at homes or \\orkplace~ of 
inlmigrants and in some cases at local coffeehouses. The intervie\\'s lasted about t\\'O 
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hours on average and most of the conversations were recorded as long as the 
respondents allowed the researcher to do so. The details of the inten"ie\Ys and the 
fieldwork are described in the following sections. 
4.4.1. Research site 
The core information of this study was collected through in-depth interviews conducted 
in Cologne, Germany. The choice of Cologne in Germany was not an arbitrary one as it 
was described in detail in the previous chapter. First of all, Germany is the country with 
the largest Turkish immigrant population in Europe hosting about 70 percent of all 
Turkish emigrants (see Chapter 3; and also i9duygu and Sirkeci 1999b; Abadan-Unat 
1995). The city of Cologne is located at the heart of North Rhine Westphalia State, with 
the second largest immigrant community in Germany, among whom Turkish 
immigrants constitute the largest portion (almost half). At the same time, such a large 
Turkish immigrant community also comprises a large Turkish Kurdish immigrant 
community (see Chapter 3). 
Secondly, Cologne is an important centre for Kurdish social and political organisations 
in Germany. Many Turkish Kurdish associations' headquarters such as KOMKAR 
(Immigrant Organisation of the Kurdistan Socialist Party), FEYKA (Kurdish Women's 
Association), and FEK (Federation of Kurdish Alevi Associations) are located there. 
Cultural centres including the Kurdish Art House (in Neuss, a northern district) have 
also chosen Cologne as their base. The existence of these institutions is also an 
indicator of a significant concentration of Kurds in the area providing more public 
activities than anywhere else. These activities were important for observation purposes 
and provided access to Kurdish respondents. 
Thirdly, a group of practical concerns led to the choice of Cologne as a research site. 
Personal contacts available in Cologne were also decisive. The researcher had stayed in 
the city for a period of six months in 1992, knew the area and had friends living there. 
The researcher's two brothers and their families had lived in Cologne since the mid-
1980s, and were part of the Turkish immigrant community in the city. The~(' 
connections were helpful in the fieldwork, especially at the stage of settling \\ithin the 
community for the fieldwork. Thus. the researcher gained a position closer to that or an 
insider rather than being a complete stranger and these pr('\iously established networks 
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were extremely helpful in providing contacts with Turkish Kurdish immigrants and 
immigrant associations. 
During the field research, the researcher stayed in Keup Stra~e, a street called "Istanbul 
in 200 meters" (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 1997:3) in MUlheim, a Northeast suburb of 
Cologne. This area was the main base of the research. It was full of Turkish shops, 
restaurants, kebab shops, barbers, travel agents, pub-like coffee houses, grocers. and 
mosques (see Chapter 3 for details). This suburb was heavily populated by foreigners 
(30 %), most of whom were Turkish or Turkish Kurdish (Table 3.4 and Figure 3.7). 
4.4.2. Reflexivity: the researcher in research 
The researcher took a reflexive approach to data, which is informed by the perspective 
considering the researcher as an inevitable part of the social world that is being studied 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1991; Holland 1999:465). Thereby reflexivity involves a 
process of being critical about the possible assumptions and biases of the researcher 
(Payne 2000:312). It also allows the reader to be involved in the process of 
understanding and interpretation. Thus, the reader may develop his or her own 
understanding of the issues analysed. 
The author's position as the researcher reflects several aspects starting from the very 
beginning of the research process as a whole such as formulating a research question, 
the search for an appropriate environment for realising the project, which involves 
funding as well as supervision, then tailoring the project according to the resources 
available (i.e. time and funding). In the meantime, the researcher's own set of identities 
interacted with this whole process. This was especially important in the field research 
due to the subject under investigation: Turkish Kurdish international migration and the 
role of the EOI due to the ethnic conflict. 
Being ethnically Turkish, the researcher's position must have affected the research 
because being Turkish is sufficient for many Turkish Kurds to determine their attitudes. 
They n1ay have considered tailoring their stories accordingly and withholding 
inforn1ation given the conflict between the Turkish government and the Turkish 
Kurdish rebels in Turkey. 
The status of respondents and \vould-be respondents was also important. For example. 
asylum-seekers n1ight have serious reservations about telling their stories since they arc 
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involved in an ongoing process of decision-making on their application and may have 
been unwilling to undermine their chances of being granted refugee status by telling 
detailed stories to a 'stranger'. 
Gender reflexivity was also important. As a male researcher, the author had difficulty 
gaining access to female respondents among the Sunni-Muslim Turkish Kurdish 
community. The cultural characteristics and customs of that particular community often 
prevented the researcher from interviewing its female members. 
Finally, it must be noted that these different contexts associated with different identities 
and situations are not exclusive but overlap. The important point to underline here is 
that according to such an approach, the interview data is a product of a particular 
interacting context in which the researcher and respondents have participated. 
Therefore, it is important to highlight that, as in any other research text, this research 
was also merely one representation among many possible representations (Hardy et al. 
2001 :535). 
4.4.3. Respondents 
A snowball technique was used for the selection of respondents. This was the most 
convenient method because there was no sampling frame for Turkish Kurdish 
immigrants in Cologne. Hence a snowball method was employed to generate networks 
of initial contacts. 
Initially, a friend of the researcher's brother helped him to get in touch with the Turkish 
Kurdish community in Cologne. She was a Turkish Kurdish refugee who arrived in the 
early 1990s and she was also an activist in the Turkish left-wing immigrant movement 
in the city. Initial contacts were very important for the development of the research. 
She introduced the researcher to some local associations and to public centres such as 
the Kurdish Workers Union and the Alevi Dergahl, a religious community centre, 
which the researcher frequently visited and established a familiarity. After the first t\\O 
weeks, n1en1bers had begun to recognise him as a friend rather than a stranger. From 
this point, the researcher had the chance to recruit respondents from this community as 
well. People who work for or visit these community centres in\'ited the re~earcher to 
their political and public activities where he had the chance to see Kurdish \\'cddings. 
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Kurdistan festivals, exhibitions, and discussion circles involving political youth groups 
as well as decision-making meetings of some organisations. 
A bias is associated with the snowball as a technique for recruiting respondents because 
there is always a risk of being stuck with a group of people and thereby losing the 
diversity of the broader population under investigation. To overcome this risk, the 
researcher did not interview the initial contacts but began recruiting from the second 
cycle of contacts that he reached with the help of initial contacts. Thus a larger 
population frame was reached and the researcher followed different snowballs to avoid 
bias. By doing so it was hoped to gain access to a more diverse groups within the 
Turkish Kurdish immigrant community. 
The first group of informants were asked to put the researcher in touch with their 
friends who might be subsequently interviewed, who then introduced him to their 
friends. The process of recruiting respondents continued until 34 completed interviews 
with Turkish Kurdish immigrants had been conducted. During visits to associations and 
community centres, the author attended numerous meetings with officers, politicians, 
facilitators, and local community leaders. These meetings were helpful as they provided 
some insights into the Turkish Kurdish immigrant population and their activities. 
Through these meetings and initial visits, publicity about the research was ensured 
throughout May 1999. 
In the meantime, the researcher tried to have as much personal contact with ordinary 
Turkish Kurdish immigrants as possible. For this purpose, coffee houses, shops, and 
restaurants in some quarters of the city where Turkish immigrants are concentrated 
were regularly visited. These visits and contacts were the beginning of a process of 
participant observation, which was an integral part of the research during the fieldwork. 
These relations could help the researcher to become a part of the community 
investigated. Thus he could find a chance to find out more about the lives and 
experiences of immigrants. These observations were recorded in a research diary in the 
fornl of notes. 
Although it was hinted in the previous section, refusals in the process of inter\'ie\\ing 
due to reflexivity are worth underlining here. Due to the ethnic identity of the 
researcher and the nature of the population (consisting of many asylum seekers and 
illegal 111igrants), the researcher experienced numerous refusals. In particular, those 
people who \\"(re reached after t\\'o or three refenals often refused to gi\'e interv\e\\'s. 
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They were suspicious about the researcher and in some cases this was impossible to 
overcome. Due to such suspicion, it was impossible to conduct interviews with some 
illegal immigrants and asylum seekers whose asylum process was not yet finalised. 
Even in cases where the researcher had strong, trustworthy references, respondents 
were quite cautious at the beginning of the interview although after a while intimate 
and detailed stories were told. As a Turkish researcher investigating the Turkish 
Kurdish population, which was largely opposed to the Turkish state, accessmg 
respondents was even more difficult than expected before the fieldwork. 
In selecting respondents, people from different backgrounds were contacted in order to 
enlarge the potential sample to avoid interviewing people with a particular perspective. 
It had been intended to recruit a balanced sample of immigrants distinguished 
according to different background categories such as sex, age, arrival year, socio-
economIC status, and residential origin (i.e. urban-rural or easterner-westerner). 
However, because of the size of the sample it was not possible to include all these 
different categories in this study. Although the aim was to include as many people with 
different characteristics as possible, the final sample was not necessarily representative. 
In short, the sample comprised emigrants who arrived before and after 1985, the date 
that marked the outbreak of clashes between the Turkish Army and the PKK and also 
marks a turning point in the history of Turkish emigration. After 198063 more refugees 
and asylum seekers from Turkey fled to Europe than other migrants (EUROST A T 
1996b). Because of the difficulties in accessing women, the proportion of female 
respondents remained less than males. Women often stay at home and due to customs 
(see Durakba~a and ilyasoglu 2001; KadlOglu 1997) they are not allowed to participate 
in conversations with men. Men are more visible and easily accessible in public 
spheres. 
As shown in Table 4.2, the respondent profiles reflect general background categories, 
which are also similar to those of the entire population in Turkey (see SIS 2000). Two 
thirds are from urban areas of Turkey. The age structure seems typical for an immigrant 
population, as they often comprise individuals of working ages (roughly corresponding 
to the n1iddle age group in Table 4.2). The educational distribution also reflects some 
diversity and the high proportion of educated people complies with the assertion that 
(,.1 It must be noted here again that 1980 is the year \\hel1 the last military coup took place in Turkey. 
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international migration often requires additional skills (Hammar 1995). Appendix --1-.2 
can be referred to see brief profiles of the respondents. 
Table 4.2. Characteristics of respondents, 1999 
Type of migration 
Asylum Workers Family Others* Total 
Seekers Reunion 
Women 8 4 1 13 
Men 14 3 1 3 21 
Secondary school and higher 12 2 3 3 20 
No education and primary school 10 1 2 1 14 
Urban origin 15 2 2 ') 21 
Rural origin 7 1 3 2 13 
Old age group (40 +) 3 3 2 2 10 
Middle age group (25-40) 13 3 1 17 
Young age group (up to 25) 6 1 7 
Total 22 3 5 4 34 
* Students and professlOnals. 
4.4.4. In-depth interviews 
In the field research, semi-structured in-depth interviews were employed. In-depth 
interviews were conducted in Cologne, Germany during the period between May and 
September 1999. Interviews mostly took place in the homes and workplaces of 
immigrants but in some cases meetings at coffee houses and cafes were also arranged 
for practical reasons. Apart from a few exceptions, all interviews took place after an 
initial meeting. Whenever the researcher met a potential respondent, he used the first 
Ineeting to introduce himself and to discuss the respondent's broader story (i.e. 
background). These first meetings were as short as 10-20 minutes. Then a convenient 
tin1e and place for the interview were arranged at these initial meetings. This was quite 
helpful because the initial meeting was usually in public places such as meetings, 
coffeehouses, and restaurants where they were reluctant to talk about their migration 
stories. Thus, the researcher had the chance to get a glimpse of immigrants' experiences 
in public places including coffee houses and their workplaces prior to in-depth 
interviews. These meetings also provided an opportunity for valuable observations. 
which were helpful for the analyses of interviews. 
The interview agenda was set to cover the whole process of migration exploring the 
whole experience of migration and the expression of ethnicity within. The in\estigation 
put a special elnphasis on the ethnic conflict and EOI in Turkey. Therefore, a semi-
structured agenda was prepared. The first part of the agenda covered basic background 
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information including age, sex, marital status, highest educational achievement, and 
migrant status (e.g. refugee, asylum seeker, or guest worker). The later sections of the 
interview agenda aimed at gathering the story of migration in a chronological order (see 
Appendix 4.1). 
The second part of the interview focused on previous migration experiences. It was 
followed by another section on living conditions in Turkey prior to migration to 
Germany. It also examined ethnic aspects such as relations between the Turks and the 
Kurds in Turkey and motivations and networks of migration available prior to the 
migration. Then another section bridged the process of moving to Germany with the 
experiences of being abroad and the changes due to that movement. The last section 
aimed at getting information about experiences of discrimination, ethnic conflict, 
Kurdishness, ethnic rituals, ceremonies, values, and norms. All the sections of the 
interview agenda were designed to prompt the respondents to make comparisons 
between the experiences before and after migration and between Turkey and Germany 
with regard to ethnic experiences (see Appendix 4.1). Nevertheless not all the 
interviews fitted to the interview schedule planned prior to the fieldwork. They rather 
followed their own schedule but still covering the basic themes of investigation. 
Interviews were conducted in Turkish although initially the researcher was prepared to 
use Kurdish interpreters during the interviews. However, when the field research 
started, the researcher realised that most Turkish Kurds spoke Turkish. In fact, many 
did not know Kurdish but Turkish. Therefore, there was no need to use interpretation 
because it was manageable in Turkish. 
Whilst applying structure to the interview agenda, the principle of qualitative research 
was not ignored, which states "the enquiry should be as open as possible, not 
circumscribed by preconceived ideas on the part of the researchers, not inhibited by a 
tight, structured schedule" (SCPR 1972: 11). By using a conversational approach 
described by Valentine (1998) as "Tell me about..." the aim was to encourage 
respondents to talk about themselves freely. The process of interview analysis is 
explained and discussed in the section following participant observation, belo\v. All 
these conversations were n1ade more meaningful through participant observation in the 
research site. 
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4.4.5. Participant observation 
Participant observation is a naturalistic research method that allows researchers to place 
themselves in the community being studied and establish relationships with members of 
it, whilst observing inner workings and the feelings that accompany them (Cook 1997: 
Cohen 2000). Participant observation was also employed in this research as a method to 
compliment in-depth interviews. Therefore a field diary was kept during the field 
research. 
Adler and Adler (1987) identify three different types of participant observation based 
on membership: peripheral, active and complete. The peripheral membership role is the 
most marginal and least committed to the social world studied (Adler and Adler, 
1987:37). The researcher seeks an insider perspective on people, activities and 
structures by interacting with the members of the group closely but avoiding 
involvement in central, functional roles. Active membership requires the researcher to 
participate in a group's core social activities actively. They interact as members of the 
group rather than being an observing researcher. This role attains more reliability, trust 
and acceptance for the researcher among group members. Complete membership means 
the greatest participation in group's activities and the researcher immerses him or 
herself as a "native" member, which can result in a misleading understanding as they 
became involved too much in the group (Adler and Adler, 1987). 
According to these definitions, peripheral membership was adopted In the field 
research. First of all, it was not possible for the researcher to involve himself in the 
Turkish Kurdish immigrant community for two reasons. Firstly, the period for field 
research was too short (i.e. five months) for complete membership. The time limitation 
of my research would not allow me to establish insider relations with the group. 
Secondly, as was mentioned earlier, there was also an ethnicity issue, which prevents 
active and full membership models of participant observation. Because of being 
Turkish, it was not possible for the researcher to participate in the activities of the 
community as if he was a native member. More active participation could cause 
suspicion among the group members, which was evident because of the researcher's 
ethnic origin. Finally, he also did not want to be involved in all acti\'ities of the group. 
which could cause a danger for him in relation to the political context affiliated with the 
Turkish Kurds' struggle against the Turkish gO\'ell1ment. 
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4.4.6. Problems in the field 
Telling a life story is something contextual and interpersonal as well as individual. It is 
a snapshot of a moment in the reality of an individual. Thus in any case, any story 
could be different essentially if told to somebody else, or if told in another context. For 
instance, the arrest of the Turkish Kurdish rebel leader (i.e. Abdullah Ocalan) is a factor 
that entails a rise in political consciousness among Turkish Kurds abroad and thus it is 
possible to assume that this fact might have changed the narratives in a more politically 
oriented manner. 
Thus, the limitations mentioned in participant observation were prevalent throughout 
the fieldwork in Germany in 1999. Three major problems arose in the field research. 
First of all, the time period in which the research was undertaken was characterised by 
turmoil due to a striking development in the Turkish Kurdish ethnic movement; the 
arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK. This arrest resulted in demonstrations 
by Kurdish immigrant communities all around Europe. Following his arrest, there was 
the trial of Abdullah Ocalan, which influenced people's perceptions day by day. The 
importance of these changes for my research was reflected in two ways: many people 
became undecided about the Kurdish cause due to the general uncertainty after the 
arrest and explanations of Abdullah Ocalan during the trial. 64 In most cases, they were 
reluctant to talk about Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdish ethnic revival. They seemed 
confused about what was happening. During the arrest and trial period there was an 
increase in nationalism among Turkish Kurdish immigrants. 
Being Turkish was both helpful and restrictive during the field research. First of all, it 
made many things easy in the field. For example, there was no problem of translation 
or interpretation because Turkish Kurds speak Turkish. Although the researcher was 
not Kurdish, being from Turkey, he gained some sort of insider position. It was easy to 
understand attitudes to certain norms and values, as most of them were common 
throughout Turkey such as the status of women. On the other hand, being Turkish 
caused difficulties too. Within the context of an ongoing ethnic conflict in Turkey 
between the Turkish army and Kurdish guerrillas, the Turks and the Kurds haye been 
rival, contesting ethnicities. At the same time, the Turks are the ruling ethnicity and 
therefore they are responsible for the Kurds suffering. Within this context, the first 
reactions the researcher experienced from Turkish Kurds in Cologne \\ere ncgati\e. 
(,-1 He made statements quite contrary to the Kurdish cause e.g. he declared that he was ready to serve the 
Turkish state. These statements \\ere televised for days before the trial. 
The Research .\Jerhodofogy 
They were suspicious of a Turkish researcher from the UK. In most cases, they thought 
that the researcher was affiliated to the Turkish government. While ordinary people 
tended to be suspicious about his connection to the Turkish government, left \\'ing 
people also questioned his connection with the UK, as a leading capitalist country. This 
caused a high refusal rate. The researcher could eventually interview only a small 
fraction of the people whom he met. Thus the fieldwork became more demanding. 
Thereby, the time spent trying to persuade immigrants to participate was longer than 
expected. 
Thirdly, the time limitation of this research was a problem. A longer period of field 
research such as one year or more would have generated better outcomes. The 
researcher found it difficult to establish himself in an immigrant community. For 
example, involvement in community activities as a volunteer for a period of one year or 
so could have provided more insights and more intimate interviews. 
4.4.7. Interview Analysis 
Analysis of the interviews started with a classification of interviewees according to 
type of migration: guest workers, family reunifications, asylum seekers and refugees. 
The interviewees were asked to choose a pseudonym before starting each interview and 
all interviews were given these names instead of real names. The question was "what is 
the name that you most like? " The pseudonyms chosen have been used to refer to their 
stories throughout the dissertation. Often these chosen names were immigrants' 
favourite names. For example, they preferred names, which they would like to name 
their children. Therefore, it was also interesting as they may reflect some sort of ethnic 
preference. 
Following that classification, interviews were transcribed. As mentioned above they 
were conducted in Turkish. It was a difficult task to decide where to use translation. An 
interpreter or translator could have been used in the field research and all interviews 
could have been recorded in English instead of Turkish. Alternatively, intervie\\'s could 
be conducted in Turkish, analysed in Turkish and then the findings could be presented 
in English. First of all, it was not possible to conduct interviews in English because 
most of the respondents did not speak any language other than Turkish (and sometimes 
Kurdish). Secondly', if the intervie\\'s \\'ere conducted in English (\\ith the help of 
interpretation), there \\'ould be a loss of meaning. Then in the analysis pha~e, the 
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researcher would be forced to analyse a changed (due to loss of original meaning) set of 
texts in English, his second language. Thereby there was a risk of losing understanding 
at all. Given the discussions in the literature, the second strategy seemed more feasible 
than the first one. 
Derrida (1991:250) says that translation can omit the 'original' multiplicity of meaning 
and understanding, but it is a necessity despite the disadvantages (Smith 1996:262). 
Others have also referred to translation in terms of losing meaning and understanding 
as a common problem in cross-cultural research (Twyman et al. 2000; Western 1996; 
Gutting 1996a). Smith (1996) gives examples of translation problems from his 
research, which required translation from German to English. As Derrida stated above, 
cross-cultural researchers have to use translation when it is necessary although it is 
impossible to translate in full. There need to be strategies to minimise interpretation 
problems. 
As a native Turkish speaker, it was the best strategy for the researcher to conduct 
interviews in his mother tongue with a population who spoke Turkish as their first 
language although their mother tongue was Kurdish; then analyse these in his mixed 
language (Turkish and English), and present the findings in his second language, 
English. Thus, he translated some extracts from the interviews from Turkish to English. 
These are used in the final dissertation. By doing so, at least some of the linguistic 
problems, which might occur in the translation process apart from the problems of 
presentation of findings in a second language, were solved. Thereby, the original 
meaning could be retained. As Smith (1996) emphasised "any translation seems 
always to be a reduced and distorted representation of other social texts and 
practices. "(p.162). 
Analysing in-depth interviews has been one of the most challenging tasks in this 
research because it is a quite subjective process and the investigator has been 
confronted with a series of interpretive decisions (Riessman, 1993). 
After the process of transcription had been completed, full transcripts of the interviews 
were ready. They were not constructed in dialog form but as continuous texts because 
there was very little question and answer type dialog during the interyiews. The "tell 
111C about ..... (Valentine 1997) form was used successfully. Crang (1997:184) suggests 
that each research project develops its own unique qualitative analysis approach. He 
also adds that analysis should be included in early research plans by emphasi:-;ing the 
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importance of creating the research instruments. Here the importance of the interview 
schedule increases (see Appendix 4.1). It was developed on the basis of issues studied 
in previous migration research and needs and novelties of this research. Eventually, the 
analysis of the material gathered in the fieldwork in Cologne was also developed 
according to the major thematic lines of the interview schedule. 
The second step following transcription was incorporating the notes taken in the 
fieldwork into interview texts. Actually both processes were simultaneous. The tapes 
were listened to again after the transcription and the field diary was checked to 
remember the research environment and to recall some ideas and memories of the field 
research. 
The transcribed texts were then coded according to the thematic structure of the 
interview agenda and the emerging themes of the collected data. Thus the following 
areas were identified in coding process: a) previous migration experiences prior to 
international migration, b) ethnic experiences (i.e. festivities, rituals, discrimination, 
relations), c) changes through migration, experiences in the country of destination and 
future plans, d) mechanisms of migration, e) considerations and perceptions about 
migration. 
Figure 4.1. Mr. Ali Haydar's migration moves 
IT· Temp orary short stay 
1S9:l Year of anival 
,-' Ille gal ground travel 
. • '"0 F eny travel 
At this stage, simple route maps of immigrants were drawn. These were drawn from the 
interviews indicating what kind of journeys had taken place. These route map 
provided a chronological account of the migration movement departing from the 
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birthplace in Turkey to the place of residence in Germany but also showing the places 
the migrant had stopped at or passed through during his or her journey to the final 
destination (e.g. Figure 4.1). This was helpful for further analysis as these maps 
allowed the researcher to see the overall migration experience of individual 
respondents. In the route maps, illegal and legal moves or entries, type of migration, 
area of origin, migration experiences before and after the first international migration 
were shown (see also Appendix 4.2). For example, Figure 4.1 above outlines the 
migration moves of Mr. Ali Haydar. He was born in Dersim in 1972 and migrated to 
Mersin while he was a child. From Mersin, he moved to Ankara and to Izmir for work. 
In Izmir, he started working for an international shipping company and thus he had the 
chance to go abroad. After visiting several countries including Russia and Italy, he 
landed in France, illegally escaping from the ship he was working on. Then, he ended 
up in Cologne via Bielefeld and filed an asylum application in 1993. In the analysis, 
these route maps were important tools for me to make comparisons and to see some 
broader patterns of migration mechanisms. 
Along with the third round of reading, open coding for exploratory purposes and axial 
coding for further in-depth investigation of certain aspects are followed (Strauss 1987; 
Charmaz 1983). The main themes in the interviews were outlined in the side codes. 
These notes formed a summary of each interview. This kind of summarising allowed 
me to see general process of migration and its variation for each immigration form. 
Axial coding involved an analysis of one aspect at a time with a focus on relationships 
between different categories. For example, migration decisions were also analysed in 
relation to the role of ethnicity and ethnic tension, or in relation to previous migration 
experiences, education and employment opportunities and so on. However the issue of 
subjectivity was still there as categories were reflections of the conceptual framework 
applied. In tum, the interviews were also products of the questions of this particular 
research. Therefore, the researcher admits that "we see what we have reason of seeing" 
(Kaplan 1964: 133). Qualitative interview analysis is a representation of an experience. 
It starts from the primary experience under investigation, and goes through by the 
researcher attending the experience, recording and transcribing the story and the 
interpretation (Riessman 1993: 10). 
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At this stage, by combining the quantitative analysis of the survey data (i.e. the TI~lS) 
and qualitative analysis within the conceptual framework (see Chapter 3) the structure 
of the chapters were shaped and a rough outline of this dissertation appeared. 
The transcriptions and route maps are referred to throughout the analysis In each 
chapter. Excerpts from interviews are used to substantiate findings. It was a repetiti\-e 
round of reading during the course of a long period of analysis. All the interviews were 
read again at least once for each section to elucidate the findings. 
4.5. Presentation of the findings 
The data-collection strategy employed in this research has also shaped the presentation 
of the findings. Two main types of data set formed the basis of the analysis in the 
present study: first, quantitative data which was based on two nationwide surveys (the 
TIMS and the TDHS) in Turkey, and secondly, qualitative data which was obtained 
through the in-depth interviews of immigrants and participant observation in Cologne, 
Germany. Hence, while the survey data were analysed quantitatively using SPSS 
(Statistical Package for Social Sciences 10.1.), used in the quantitative type of analyses, 
the in-depth interviews, containing the oral, autobiographical accounts of migration 
experiences were analysed qualitatively. 
Throughout the study, the most important task was to combine and communicate the 
analyses of these two bodies of data and to eliminate shortcomings in both. In the 
presentation of the findings, it was attempted to achieve this task by relating the case 
studies to some 50 statistical tables and 30 figures drawn from survey data (mainly 
frequency and percentage distributions). The presentation of results in the form of 
cross-tabulations was an attempt to quantify the possible answers to the questions of 
who n1igrated, why they migrated and in what ways this movement took place. Given 
the lack of any comprehensive quantitative information about Turkish Kurdish 
intell1ational n1igration and the need for a better understanding of the whole migratory 
process from Turkey to Germany, the necessity to evaluate the experiences and 
characteristics of Turkish Kurdish migrants in a quantitative framework was e\-ident. 
This quantitative presentation of findings reflects a descripti\-e account. Thus. the 
results presented in the form of cross-tabulations could not be considered as the 
findings of a probability-based statistical examination; they could be seen only as a 
descriptively quantified account of the vanous characteristics and experiences of 
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Turkish Kurds. However, statistical tests (e.g. Chi Square) were performed for each 
relationship shown in the cross tabulations and the hypotheses were found to be 
statistically significant unless otherwise indicated in the text or in any particular table. 
The wealth and detail of the descriptions given in the in-depth interviews made them 
very useful for understanding the international migration of the Kurds. The basic aim of 
using interview materials in the form of extracts was to give a self-description of the 
respondents' migration experiences in the context of an Eor and international 
migration. This also provided an opportunity to compare the survey data and qualitative 
material with regard to the patterns and processes of Turkish Kurdish international 
migration. 
The combined presentation of both the case studies which were represented in the form 
of extracts (which were representative of codes) and the cross-tabulations summarising 
the findings of quantitative analysis enabled the findings from the two main bodies of 
data, namely quantitative and qualitative ones, to talk to each other. Thus, they 
complemented each other in exploring the complex structures and processes of 
migration. This type of presentation of the findings, and the combination of the 
qualitative material with the quantitative analysis of migration, determined the general 
formation of this text. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This study provides an example of the use of mixed methodologies in population 
geography research. There have been three basic motivations for the researcher to adopt 
a mixed method approach. First, it was a necessary to examine broader patterns and 
insights at the same time. Secondly, it was important to combine the findings of 
different levels of analysis. Thirdly, a qualitative investigation was crucial to examine 
the role of the expression of ethnicity because it is often hard to quantify. Thereby, 
analysis of the survey data and in-depth interviews have been used and connected to 
different levels of understanding and producing interrelated findings. A multiplicity of 
lnethods is preferred instead of relying on a single method despite some inevitable 
problems encountered at different stages of the research process (McKendrick 1999). 
Each method \vas helpful in generating findings at different levels and about different 
aspects of the research question. 
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Two problems arose during the course of this research. One is the fact that there is a 
crucial need for ethnically categorised migration data either in censuses or in the fom1 
of well designed surveys. Second is the implementation of qualitative field research: a) 
the length of fieldwork could be longer and thus the researcher could be better absorbed 
in the population researched, b) the ethnic identity of the researcher proved to be 
important. A researcher with a "neutral" (neither Turkish nor Kurdish) background 
could have gained more insight in research focusing on ethnic conflict oriented social 
phenomena. 
Environment of insecurity and in ternational migration 
Chapter V 
The Environment of Insecurity and International Migration 
5.1. Introduction 
"All happy families resemble 
one another, but evel), unhappy fami~v 
is unhappy in its oml H'a)" " 
(Anna Karenina, Tolstoi, 1969, p, 1) 
In Chapter 2, the environment of insecurity (EOI) was defined as a background context 
for international migration. This chapter examines the details of the EOI for the Turkish 
Kurdish migratory regime. International migration and its relation to the EOI are 
analysed here in terms of push factors and the maintenance of international migration 
networks. Material and non-material environments of insecurity, which facilitate 
Turkish Kurdish international migration, are examined here in three sub-sections: 
socio-economic, political, and demographic EOIs. 
As the conceptual perspectives of international migration emphasise the significance of 
socio-economic differences between the sending and receiving regions, the first section 
focuses on Turkey's economic position within the global economy. As briefly 
explained in Chapter 3, regional inequalities within Turkey also require particular 
attention. Beside the macro level presentation, the socio-economic EOI is analysed at 
the household level on the basis of housing conditions, education, and possession of 
durable goods as indicators of welfare status. Levels of socio-economic deprivation are 
linked to political aspects of the EOI in Turkey in the second section. 
Political deprivation, a part of the EOI, in the Turkish Kurdish case can also be 
considered as democratic deprivation, with regard to Turkey's record of human rights 
violations resulting in the erasure of political rights for other ethnic groups in the 
country. The second section discusses Turkish politics with particular reference to the 
treatn1ent of Kurdish political movements and their existence. 
The third part of the chapter looks into the details of Kurdish social demography 
con1pared to the general population structure and patterns of Turkey where the 
differences in tern1S of household compositions and other demographic indicators are 
revealed. 
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The main information source for this chapter is the household data set of the TDHS 
(Turkish Demographic Health Survey), which was conducted as a part of the 
worldwide Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program (For details, see BUIPS 
1994). The household data include information on the living conditions and 
demography of household members. To illustrate global and regional differences, data 
from the Turkish State Institute of Statistics, the Turkish State Planning Organisation, 
and World Bank sources are exploited. For the political EOI, some legislati\'e 
documents, general literature, and media sources are referred to. 
5.2. The Socio-economic Environment of Insecurity 
The socio-economic EOI is analysed here as part of the background context facilitating 
migration which has been considered together with political and demographic EOIs. 
The first section below introduces the general framework of economic differentials 
between Turkey and more developed countries, which may help to understand 
international migration from Turkey to Western Europe. The second part deals with the 
regional socio-economic unevenness within Turkey with particular reference to 
Kurdish populated areas. Thirdly, Turkish and Turkish Kurdish households are 
compared in order to understand the implications of the EOI for the Kurdish population 
in Turkey. The TDHS data do not allow much detailed analysis of the socio-economic 
conditions of households but there is nevertheless some valuable information to exploit 
on housing conditions, households' durable goods, and educational attainment. 
Through comparisons between Turkish and Kurdish households and individuals, this 
chapter reveals the relative deprivation of the Kurds in Turkey, which may influence 
the likelihood of Kurdish international migration. 
5.2.1. Turkey versus destination countries 
Socio-economic differences between countries are important to understand 
inten1ational Inigration flows. It is not a mystery that people from Turkey have 
migrated to Europe, Australia, and some oil-rich Arab countries but not to the 
struggling countries of Africa, for instance. The direction of migration flows is \'ery 
sensitive to geographical and political proximities but more importantly to socio-
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economic prosperity differentials (Massey et al. 1993; Castles and Miller 1993: Todaro 
1976; Portes and Borocz 1989). 
Turkey has made great efforts to liberalise and integrate its economy with the global 
economy since the early 1980s. After securing currency convertibility in the early 
1980s, it entered into a customs union agreement with the EU in 1996. In the 
meantime, the country gained a pivotal role in developing economic cooperation with 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (World Bank 2000). These changes obviously 
redirected some migration from Turkey to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. 
By the mid-1990s, these flows were nearly a quarter of total Turkish emigration 
(Gokdere 1994; iyduygu and Sirkeci 1998). 
The Turkish economy has undergone gradual economIC reforms SInce its early 
integration within international monetary organisations such as the World Bank in 
1947. Currently, its economy is still quite volatile as was seen in the economic crisis of 
February 2001 (Milliyet-Almanak 2001). This volatility also triggers income 
inequalities within the country, which in tum breeds more internal and international 
migration pressures. For instance, 2.5% of the population live in absolute poverty 
(which means they have less than $l(US) per day per person) (World Bank 2000). This 
proportion rises up to 10% in some regions. At the same time, 36% of Turkey's 
population is unable to purchase their basic needs. 
Although Turkey is among the top 30 most industrialised countries, it is ranked after 85 
upper and middle-income countries in terms of human development indicators (World 
Bank 2000). This is mainly due to a poor record of socio-economic indicators including 
the availability of educational and health facilities. 
In comparison with the major destination countries like Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands, which all have a large intake of Turkish immigrants; Turkey clearly stands 
far behind on the development ladder. World Bank (2000) figures indicate a huge 
incon1e gap between Turkey and the EU. For example, its $2,900(US) GNP per capita 
puts Turkey alTIong the upper middle income countries but still keeps it far behind the 
n1ain destination countries of Europe, whose average GNP per capita is S25,000(US). 
Con1n1ercial use of energy is slightly lower than the lower middle-income countries and 
equal to only 300 0 of the level of use in countries such as Germany. Australia, and the 
UK. More or less the san1e disparities are seen in electric power consumption and direct 
foreign in\'estment. High inflation is another factor contributing to inequality bet\\ccn 
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Turkey and the destination countries. In 1999, annual inflation by GDP was 52% in 
Turkey65 while it ranged between 0.50/0 and 2.3% in Western Europe. 
5.2.2. The uneven development of Turkey's regions 
Anomalies of economic development in Turkey have contributed to rapid urbanisation 
throughout the second half of the 20th Century (iC;duygu et al. 1998). Regional 
differences in Turkey have facilitated a rural to urban exodus. The share of the urban 
population in Turkey increased from 19% in 1950 to 74% in 1997 (SIS 2000). 
However, the significance of regional unevenness in Turkey for this particular study 
comes from the possible ethnic aspects related to this diversity in tenns of socio-
economic indicators, since the Eastern provinces of the country are mainly populated 
by Turkish Kurds (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.2). According to Turkish State Planning 
Office data (Dinc;er 1996), all the south-eastern and eastern provinces of the country 
have only achieved the tenth level (the lowest) on the development ladder whereas no 
province in the central, northern and western parts of Turkey were on the two lowest 
classes of the development ladder. Not surprisingly, all the least developed provinces' 
populations are made up of Kurdish speaking majorities. As a result, some of the least 
developed provinces in the Kurdish populated region have the highest emigration rates 
in Turkey (see Map 3.5). 
A growing awareness of these regional economic differences has resulted in efforts to 
formulate the Kurdish question into a regional economic development problem (see 
Yegen 1999; CHP n.d.; Van Bruinessen 1992a). Aydm (1986) has rejected ethno-
political views from a neo-Marxist standpoint. The Kurdish question for him is not an 
issue of racism or ethnicity but an outcome of the uneven development66 of Turkish 
capitalism (Aydin 1986:45, 24, 28). Based on such economic fonnulations, the large-
scale development project called the GAP (South-eastern Anatolian Project) has been 
considered as the solution to the problems of the region. Nevertheless, up until the 
present. there has been no sign of any amelioration. Franz (1994:207) underlines "the 
idea behind the GAP is to dilute the socio-economic urgency of the Kurdish problem 
through economic de)'eiopment. "(See Appendix 5.1 for details of the GAP). 
65 Inflation had exceeded 1 000 0 during the crisis of early 2000. 
66 Further details of neo-Marxist arguments about uneven development that :\ydm follows can be found 
in Frank (197:'), \\'alkrstein (l9l)2). and Rama/~l1wgll1 (198:'). 
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Recent official statistics indicate an increasing gap between the regions of Turkey: the 
wealthier provinces in the western parts are getting richer while the poor provinces, 
most of them in the East, are getting poorer (World Bank 2000). Education and 
employment opportunities are the most important factors explaining 
inequalities and vulnerability in Turkey and half of the total variation in 
economIc 
economIC 
inequality is explained in terms of education and employment status while rural/urban 
and regional factors explain 20% each (World Bank 2000). 
The most recent socio-economic development index of the Turkish State Planning 
Office also displays the increasing gap between the regions (Dinyer 1996). The socio-
economIC development index is created on the basis of 15 variables including 
indicators such as quality of health services provided, literacy rates, schooling and 
enrolment rates, employment levels, and industrialisation levels. 
The development index for the Marmara region, the home of all the major industrial 
agglomerations in the country, is estimated as high as 1.27, which is followed by 0.45 
in the Aegean region and 0.25 in the Central region. However, the other regions have 
minus scores reaching the bottom level in the East region with a score of -1.4667 
Ciyduygu et at. 2001). More striking figures are available at the province and district 
level analysis. For example, the six most deprived provinces are Kurdish populated 
provinces among 80 provinces of the country. All of the least developed 30 
67 The DSDI is constructed through 32 variables which are grouped into nine categories. The first 
category is population which covers total population, annual growth rate, urbanization ratio, and 
dependency ratio. The second is based on employment in various industries such as manufacturing, 
services, financial sector, communications, transportation, and construction. Other measures related to 
employment such as total number of employers, average number of employees per employer, ratio of 
wage earners, and ratio of women in total employment are also used in this category. The third category 
is education which consists of the total literacy rate, the female literacy rate, and the rate of people with 
higher education. The fourth relates to health in regard to the number of doctors per ten thousand 
population, and the number of assistant health care providers per ten thousand population. Industrial 
production is the fifth category with 4 sub-titles which are number of enterprises, annual average number 
of employees, value added per capita, and total energy. The sixth category is financial/fiscal indicators 
which are the number of bank offices, proportion of bank credits to total credits in Turkey, saving 
deposits per capita, and tax payments per capita. Indicators about construction are the seventh category 
including variables of number of residences per urbanized person, and area of residence per urbanized 
person. The eighth category is the agricultural indicators including production value of the agricultural 
products per rural person and production value of the agricultural products for industry o\er the total 
production \alue of the agricultural products for industry in Turkey. The last category, other indicators, 
includes the \'ariables of \alue of the unit of a telephone call, number of faxes per ten thousands 
population, and number of in\'estment subsidies issued between 1990 and 1994. Dincer (1996). who 
constructed the DSDI index, states that this index, based on principal component analysis, is tested 
through a Kaiser-l\ !eyer-Oklin sampling test, and gets the excellent score of 0.91. According to this 
KMO index the \'alues between 0.5 - 0.6 are bad; 0.6 - 0.7 are fair, 0.7 - 0.8 are good, and 0.8 - O. 9 an~ 
\'cry good, and 0.9 + is excellent. For a fuller description of the DSDL sec Din<;er (1996) and Gitmez 
(1983). 
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administrative districts are Kurdish populated South East towns while the region is 
totally absent among the most developed provinces (Din<;er 1996). 
The underdevelopment of the eastern provinces is not a recent phenomenon. The region 
has always been the least favoured area of Turkey. The west has always been the most 
developed region of the country, and the East and South East regions the least 
developed areas. According to the 1970 socio-economic development index compiled 
by the Turkish State Planning Office, eight of the least developed ten provinces were 
Van, Mardin, Bitlis, Mu~, Adlyaman, Hakkari, Agn, and Bing61; all are in East and 
South-east Turkey (See Figure 3.1, and see also Gitmez 1983: 141). 
Another indicator used in the indices mentioned above is the distribution of 
employment, which also reflects a similar asymmetry: in 1995, almost 75% of workers 
in the East and South East were employed in agriculture, 5% in industry, and about 
20% in services, whilst average corresponding figures for Turkey were 47%, 15% and 
38% respectively (SIS 1996). 
The unequal distribution of farmland has resulted in more poverty for the majority of 
people in the East. Only 10% of all households in the region own 600/0 of all the land, 
whilst 8% of the total land area is owned by about 56% of households (Aydm 1986: 
50), about 350/0 owns no land (DPT 1989). White (1998) also argues that one third of 
the population in the East are landless and work as labourers while the rest are farmers, 
mostly sharecroppers68 . The ratio of landless families in the East is double that of 
Turkey as a whole (White 1998:141). This is possibly worsened by the fact that 
Kurdish households are larger than Turkish ones which forces larger populations to rely 
on fewer resources. 
Some details of the land ownership patterns in the region by households are displayed 
in Table 5.1. Except in Adlyaman and Gaziantep, about half of all households possess 
no land. They work as yanel on other people's land. Most of those who have some land 
for farming have only a small plot, which might not be adequate to provide for large 
households. 69 Given the low level of industrialisation, these areas may suffer from 
acute unemployment and low income, which in tum may create more pressure for 
migration. 
6R Sharecroppers are those \\"ho do not own the land but cultivate it and pay a certain proportion of the 
crops ranging from 10 to 80 per cent to the landowner. It is called y~nCl in Turkish., 
69 For example, there are households as large as ~3 members accordll1g to the TDHS data. 
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Table 5.1. Landownership structure in some South East provinces, 1989 (% of 
households) 
Size of the owned land per household (in Hectares) 
Provinces No land 1-5 H. 5-20 H. 20-50 H. 50-100 H. 100-H. 
Adlyaman 21.2 58.3 16.7 2.8 0.7 0.3 
Diyarbaklr 45.1 41.3 10.3 2.1 0.7 0.5 
Gaziantep 28.6 37.4 27.1 6.5 0.1 0.3 
Mardin 41.3 46.7 9.6 1.6 0.5 0.3 
Siirt 44.6 46.6 7.2 1.0 0.5 0.1 
Sanh Urfa 48.1 26.8 23.4 5.1 1.9 0.7 
Source: DPT 1989 
Socio-economic factors playa significant role in determining migration. Differences in 
socio-economic profiles may cause flows from one area to another. This explains rural 
to urban migration in Turkey to a large extent Ci9duygu and Sirkeci 1999b). Indicators 
of regional differentials are various. For example, in 1990, 240/0 of men and 550/0 of 
women in South East Turkey were illiterate. These figures were 19% and 450/0 in 
Eastern Turkey respectively. But in the same period, they were above the Turkish 
averages: 11 010 for males and 28% for females (SIS 1990). Different modernisation and 
development levels also confirm the disadvantaged conditions of people who live in the 
Eastern parts of the country. The number of doctors per thousand in the South East and 
the East was 0.5 and hospital beds per thousand was just 1 according to the 1990 
Census whilst these figures for Turkey as a whole were 0.9 and 2.14 respectively (SIS 
1996a). 
Housing conditions are another set of helpful indicators to explore the EO!. In the 
South East region, according to the 1990 Census, the proportion of households with 
piped water was 53%, and 90% of homes had electricity whilst the corresponding 
figures for the whole of Turkey were 63% and 99.9% respectively (SIS 1993). 
Households with telephones in the region were about 400 per thousand and 750 
televisions were available per thousand. Moreover a large portion of people had neither 
of these basic communication facilities. At the same time, these figures were 576 and 
867 per thousand households for the whole of Turkey in 1993 (SIS 1996b). 
Therefore the Kurdish populated regions of the East and South East Turkey are the 
least developed regions in Turkey. This explicit underdevelopment is very likely to 
facilitate out-migration fron1 these areas. However, what makes the Kurds different 
from other inhabitants of these t\\'O regions is a question which is dealt \\'ith in the 
following sections. The ans\\'er lies in the ethno-political conte:\t, \\'hich is intcriwined 
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with the economic environment of insecurity. The following section focuses on the 
inequalities within these less favoured areas by comparing Turkish Kurds with their 
non-Kurdish neighbours living together in these areas but experiencing the po\'erty in 
their own way. 
5.2.3. The socio-economics of Turkish Kurdish households 
As mentioned earlier this section is based on an analysis of the TDHS data (Turkish 
Demographic Health Survey 1993), which provides a chance for an ethnicity-based 
analysis of Turkey's population. Although it is not a comprehensive tool to examine 
socio-economic development levels in Turkey, it still contains valuable information to 
be exploited. These include data on education and literacy, housing characteristics, and 
consumption of household durable goods. The analysis demonstrates that the material 
environment of insecurity affects Turkish Kurds more harshly than their non-Kurdish 
neighbours. The contrast is presented below as comparisons between the Kurdish 
speaking population and the others. 
Education is one of the best indicators of socio-economic development and is often 
used for large comparative indices (Dinyer, 1996). It gives a rough idea about the 
education opportunities and a good idea of the exploitation of these opportunities. 
There is an increasing trend of school enrolment for the whole of the population as 
educational levels are higher for younger ages. However, illiteracy is still a big problem 
for most of the Kurds, especially women. For example, no Kurdish woman aged over 
64 had any formal education (Table 5.2). It sharply drops to a level of 600/0 among 
younger generations indicating a trend of improvement. The difference between the 
Kurds and the others is striking: while only 130/0 and 18% of all women in age groups 
6-19 and 20-34 have no education respectively, the corresponding figures for the Kurds 
are 350/0 and 61 %. Similarly, whilst 840/0 of Kurdish women aged between 35 and 49 
have no education, the corresponding figure is just 38% for the entire female 
population in these ages. Within the 20-34 age group only 4% of Turkish Kurdish 
WOll1en have completed their secondary school education compared to 24% of all 
won1en aged between 20 and 34. More than two thirds of all middle aged women 
(between 20 and '+9) haye graduated from primary school whilst only 21 % of Turkish 
Kurdish women \vere educated to this leyel (Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2. Educational attainment by sex, region and residence, 1993 (0/0)70 
Primary Primary 
No education incomplete graduate 
Kurds All Kurds All Kurds All 
A ,ge groups (M I a es) 
6-19 19 10 36 34 20 22 
20-34 13 3 2 1 52 45 
35-49 28 9 4 4 50 54 
50-64 65 30 4 9 25 44 
65+ 78 51 3 10 17 28 
eglOns a es R (M I ) 
West 29 9 12 14 35 39 
South 34 11 16 16 33 41 
Central 38 12 14 16 32 36 
North * 13 * 17 * 36 
East 40 23 17 19 24 30 
Type of place of reSIdence (Males) 
Urban 34 10 16 14 24 33 
Rural 43 18 16 18 29 42 
Age groups (Females) 
6-19 35 13 28 30 27 33 
20-34 61 18 8 4 23 51 
35-49 84 38 7 9 8 39 
50-64 92 62 3 11 3 21 
65+ 100 77 0 8 0 11 
Regions (Females) 
West 48 20 19 14 19 40 
South 51 27 17 16 23 38 
Central 56 26 17 18 19 37 
North * 33 * 15 * 37 
East 66 48 13 16 16 26 
Type of place of residence (Females) 
Urban 57 24 15 15 19 34 
Rural 68 37 14 17 15 39 
Secondary 
Secondary graduate 
incomplete and more 
Kurds All Kurds All 
21 16 3 19 
17 8 17 43 
8 5 9 28 
4 2 1 15 
0 1 1 8 
14 9 10 29 
12 10 5 23 
13 9 3 27 
* 9 * 24 
13 8 6 20 
16 10 9 33 
9 7 3 13 
9 10 2 14 
3 3 4 24 
1 2 1 12 
1 1 0 5 
0 0 0 4 
10 6 4 20 
7 5 3 15 
5 4 2 15 
* 4 * 11 
3 3 2 7 
7 6 3 21 
2 3 1 4 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data *less than 7 cases. 
Total 
number of 
~Iissing respondents 
Kurds All Kurds All 
1 0 1193 6381 
0 0 588 4173 
0 0 332 2908 
0 0 167 2049 
1 1 71 1039 
1 0 267 5620 
1 1 283 2591 
0 0 310 3628 
* 1 * 1360 
0 0 2041 3358 
0 0 1591 10201 
1 1 1315 6356 
0 0 1150 6481 
0 0 639 4742 
0 0 310 2878 
1 1 150 2303 
0 1 62 1119 
0 0 222 5776 
0 0 284 2697 
0 0 330 4048 
* 0 * 1614 
0 0 1968 3393 
0 0 1530 10449 
1 0 1280 7079 
A breakdown of the findings based on region and type of place of residence provides 
n10re detail on the educational attainment levels among Turkish Kurdish women (Table 
5.2). It may be assumed that Turkish Kurds have been offered similar, if not the same. 
educational opportunities to other people in the same regions. However, in smaller 
localities, such as towns and villages, the availability and the quality of services might 
be different fron1 that available in cities. Therefore, the interpretation must be \'ery 
cautious here to take into account the fact that it is based on the assumption of equal 
chances for everybody within the same categories of region and residence. 
70 Please note the TDHS household data provides information about the all members of the households of 
primary respondents which \\ere \\omen aged 1 )---+9. 
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Not surprisingly, the least favoured region, the East has the highest proportion of non-
educated people and also has the smallest groups of primary and secondary graduates 
for both ethnic groups. The Kurds, in general, seem to have a lower educational 
attainment in comparison with the others. More than half of Kurdish women have no 
education. It peaks at 660/0 in Eastern Turkey. Even in the East, more than half of non-
Kurdish and other women have some educational qualifications. Not more than 4% of 
Kurdish women had a secondary school diploma whilst 20% of their non-Kurdish 
neighbours enjoyed this privilege. The contrast seems unchanged with regard to the 
type of place of residence. Although more educational opportunities are available in 
urban areas than rural areas, only 3% of urban Kurdish women have a secondary school 
diploma as opposed to 21 % of their non-Kurdish neighbours. 
It is necessary here to underline a social aspect of the Kurdish population to understand 
educational inequalities imposed upon Kurdish women. Both the literature and the 
qualitative research in Germany suggest that the education of women is not welcomed 
among the Kurds (see CHP n.d.; Yalc;m-Heckman 1991). Only very few of the Kurdish 
women interviewed in Cologne have had the chance to attain formal education. For this 
very reason, only one of the female respondents had attended university, six of them 
had earned a secondary school diploma, two of them had completed primary education 
and the last two had no education. The importance of such cultural attitudes becomes 
clear with regard to a commonly accepted pattern that international migration often 
requires some qualifications including education (see Faist 2000; iC;duygu et al. 2001; 
Hammar 1995). Therefore migration has been selective of educated women. Related to 
the social roles, males as expected had more educational qualifications but the contrast 
between Kurdish men and the others was still there (Table 5.2). 
Only 17% of Kurdish men between ages 20 and 34 have completed secondary 
education cOlnpared to more than two thirds of others. Likewise, in the group between 
ages 35 to 64, only 6% of Kurdish men had a secondary school diploma while more 
than a quarter of others managed to do so. Throughout all the regions, more than one 
third of Kurdish nlales have no education and, except for those living in WesteI11 
Turkey, no more than 50/0 had a secondary school diplon1a in any region. In contrast. 
only about one in ten of their non-Kurdish fellows had no education \\'hile more than a 
quarter of them enjoyed secondary school graduation. The same contrasting picture can 
be seen for urban-rural comparisons of both ethnic groups. Although urban Kurds han:-
better qualifications, these are still lower than their non-Kurdish fello\\'s, 
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A second group of variables defining the EOI for the Kurds are housing characteristics. 
The analysis reveals the inequalities in terms of the sources of water for the houses, the 
availability and quality of sanitation facilities and the physical characteristics of the 
houses. Finally it details the durable goods that households possess. 
Table 5.3. Source of drinking water in the house by ethnicity, 1993 (%) 
Kurdish Turkish 
Source of drinking water Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
Piped into residence 78 25 57 76 47 66 
Public tap 10 20 14 3 16 7 
Well in residence 1 10 5 1 3 
Public well 0 15 6 0 2 
Spring, river, stream 7 27 15 6 28 13 
Rainwater 0 2 1 0 0 0 
Tanker/stationary tank 2 1 2 2 2 
Bottled water 2 0 1 12 1 8 
Other 0 0 0 0 
Total number of households 495 328 823 3374 1655 5029 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
Table 5.3 highlights four main sources of drinking water: piped water, well, shared 
sources and natural sources including rainwater. While 66% of Turkish-speaking 
households have drinking water piped into their residence, only 570/0 of the Kurdish-
speaking population have piped water. The difference is clearer in rural households: 
25% for the Kurds as opposed to 470/0 for Turkish households. Of Kurdish households, 
20% use water from public sources (public tap and public well) and 16% of them use 
natural sources including rainwater. In villages, these figures go up to 350/0 and 29%). 
Wells are also one of the primary sources especially among rural Kurdish houses 
(Table 5.3). 
Most Turkish households enjoy piped water in their homes. In urban areas, only 3% of 
them have to use a public tap or go to a well to get their drinking water, which is also 
about 18% in rural areas. The second source of drinking water in Turkish households is 
springs (13%), but the third source is bottled water (8%), which is almost unknown in 
Kurdish households (see Table 5.3). The analysis of the source of drinking water is 
in1portant because it may indicate two facets of the material environment of insecurity: 
the availability of healthy water sources and the socio-economic ability of households 
to get access to these sources. 
Analysis of sanitation amenities also retlects the material environment of insecurity 
from another angle. Lack of access to these facilities may cause many diseases 
106 
Environment of insecurity and international migration 
particularly affecting children. Modem sanitation facilities are not widely ayailable in 
Kurdish households. Pit toilets (43%) are often used instead of modem toilets and 3% 
of urban Kurdish households and 16% of rural ones have no toilet facility at all. About 
3% of them have to share their toilet facility with other households. Nevertheless, many 
Turkish households (86% of urban and 13% of rural) use flush toilets, whilst only 10/0 
of them have to share this facility. Only few Turkish rural households have no toilet 
facility (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4. Sanitation facility in the households by ethnicity, 1993 (%) 
Kurdish Turkish 
Type of toilet facility Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
Own flush toilet 73 6 46 85 12 62 
Shared flush toilet 4 1 3 0 1 
Closed pit 16 49 30 12 62 28 
Open pit 4 28 13 2 25 9 
No facility 3 16 8 0 1 0 
Total number of households 495 328 823 3374 1655 5029 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
Rural-urban migration patterns III Turkey are important III understanding the 
unevenness of socio-economic development. During the massive exodus of rural 
populations, large gecekondu areas (shanty towns) appeared around the big cities 
(SenyapIll 1996). Turkish Kurdish people who have migrated to the big cities of 
western Turkey also often settled in these less favoured gecekondu areas which have 
very limited infrastructure (see Baydar 1999; iC;duygu et al. 1998b). The non-existence 
of infrastructure in the gecekondu might be the major cause of urban Kurdish 
households' lack of sanitation facilities. However, it is also highly related to the 
availability of sufficient economic resources to enable them to reach better housing 
conditions. Kurdish households do not seem to have adequate economic resources in 
this regard. 
Some more aspects of the physical environment can be referred to such as the flooring 
and roofing of houses but such detail would be repeating the above pattern although 
flooring and roofing are two key elements in the house determining comfort. For 
fmnilies who are better off, the quality of the floor would be better. In this regard, 
Turkish Kurdish people are again suffering from low quality li\'ing conditions 
con1pared to their non-Kurdish neighbours (See for details iC;duygu and Sirkeci 1999c). 
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Table S.S.a. The mean number of durable goods in possession of household by 
ethnicity and type of place of residence, 1993 
Average number of durable goods per household 
Urban 
Rural 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
Turkish 
6.2 
4.1 
Kurdish 
4.6 
3.3 
Table S.S.a presents a summary of access to consumption goods by ethnic groups and 
type of place of residence. The average number of items in possession of the household 
is shown by type of place of residence and ethnicity. On average, while urban Turkish 
households have 6.2 items in possession, their Kurdish counterparts have 4.6 of them. 
Similarly, the Kurds in rural areas have 3.3 items whereas the Turks have 4.1. This was 
estimated using TDHS variables indicating ownership of thirteen specific items: a 
refrigerator; oven; washing machine; dishwasher; vacuum cleaner; television; radio; 
video recorder; music set; radio; telephone; more than 30 books and car (detailed in 
Table S.S.b). In general, fewer Kurdish homes have devices such as a refrigerator, 
oven, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, and dishwasher compared to Turkish 
households both in urban and rural areas. At the same time, rural-urban differences are 
smaller for the Kurds than for the Turks. This contrast is further revealed in Table S.S.b 
and Table S.6 below. 
Table S.S.b. Durable goods in possession of household by ethnicity, 1993 (%) 
Kurdish Turkish 
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
Refrigerator 88.4 72.5 81.5 96.2 79.3 90.7 
Oven 49.7 36.2 43.9 81.8 45.1 69.8 
Washing machine 37.3 8.8 25.0 76.1 24.5 59.2 
Dishwasher 1.1 0.0 0.6 11.0 0.6 7.6 
Vacuum cleaner 26.3 10.6 19.5 74.8 22.8 57.8 
Television 83.6 66.1 76.1 95.7 83.7 91.8 
Video recorder 4.4 3.5 4.0 17.1 4.2 12.9 
Radio cassette player 68.7 76.8 72.2 83.0 75.9 80.7 
Music set 8.5 2.8 6.0 24.8 6.7 18.9 
Telephone 47.6 29.3 39.7 70.2 41.2 60.7 
Car 8.1 11.9 9.7 26.8 15.8 
23.2 
Computer 0.3 0.0 0.2 3.4 0.3 2.4 
More than 30 books 10.7 2.1 7.0 34.5 7.7 25.8 
Total number of households 495 328 823 3525 1714 
5239 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
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Among the Kurds, 630/0 of urban and 91 % of rural homes have no washing machine 
whilst among the Turks, only 24% of urban and 75% of rural homes suffer from not 
having one. Similar disparities are also seen with respect to telecommunication devices. 
F or example, more than half of urban Kurdish homes and more than 70% of rural 
homes have no telephone while the majority of Turkish homes have one (Table 5.5.b). 
The availability of particular goods at home has some specific implications. For 
instance, not having a radio, or television, or a phone, limits the access of household 
members to the outside world; having a refrigerator prolongs the wholesomeness of 
foods; having more than 30 books exposes the household members to new ideas; and 
having a car allows greater access to many services outside the local area. 
Electrical appliances such as a refrigerator, television, or radio cassette player, are the 
most common household durable goods: 91 % of Turkish households and 81 % of 
Kurdish households own a refrigerator, and again 81 % of Turkish households and 720/0 
of Kurdish households have a radio cassette player. Three in five Turkish households 
own a telephone line whilst less than 400/0 of Kurdish households have this utility. Two 
thirds of Turkish households have a vacuum cleaner compared with less than one fifth 
of Kurdish households. Cars are almost three times more common in Turkish than 
Kurdish households. 
These findings suggest that a considerable number of Kurdish households experience a 
lower socio-economic status compared with their Turkish counterparts. In other words, 
Kurdish households are less likely to have the comfort of various durable goods than 
Turkish households. 
Table 5.6. Summary of durable goods possessed in homes, 1993 (%) 
Kurdish Turkish 
N umber of items owned Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
None 3.5 4.9 4.0 0.3 2.6 l.1 
1 to 4 items 47.6 70.5 56.9 17.0 58.8 30.8 
5 to 9 items 46.4 24.7 37.3 67.4 37.3 57.-t 
10 to 13 items 2.4 0.9 l.8 15.3 l.3 10.8 
Total number of households 495 328 823 3525 1714 5239 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
A count of the nun1ber of consumer durables possessed in each household summarises 
the entire picture (Table 5.6). For example, no rural or urban Kurdish household had all 
of the 13 aliic les 111entioned above \vhereas one in en?r), ten Turkish homes had 10 to 
13 articles together. At the other cxtreme, whilst only about one pcr cent of Turkish 
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homes had none of the goods, 4% of Kurdish homes had none of these durable goods 
~ 
(Table 5.6). Although it is very difficult to infer a households' economic condition 
from the items they possess, it may still give an idea about the relatiye position of 
Turkish Kurdish households compared to their non-Kurdish fellow citizens. 
Socio-economic deprivation combines with political deprivation in the Turkish Kurdish 
environment of insecurity, which is characterised by a long-term armed conflict that 
has resulted in thousands of deaths, hundreds of disappearances, 'actor unknown 
murders' 71, and assassinations. 
5.3. Political Environment of Insecurity 
The result of 15 years of armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Army can be 
summarised as follows: 34,795 deaths; about 300,000 Turkish troops in South East 
Turkey; 21,000 PKK militants; 95,000 Village guards; $96,000,000,000 (US) military 
expenditure; 908 "actor unknown murders" (including suspicious murders in police 
custody); 520 disappearances (mostly in police detention); 3428 evacuated villages 
(due to 'security reasons '); 2,200 Court appeals against Turkey at the European Court 
of Justice72; 31 murdered Kurdish journalists; and hundreds of court decisions in 
Turkey ruling closure of newspapers and journals related to their publications about the 
Kurdish question (HRW 1999; Mater 1999; Ozgtir Politika, 1 June 1999; CRP n.d.). 
Three outlawed Kurdish political parties (HEP, DEP, and OZDEP) also need to be 
remembered. The background to these figures is discussed below. 
The political environment of insecurity is analysed with regard to its three realms: the 
general political atmosphere; elections and party politics; and the military character of 
democracy in Turkey. First of all, the general political environment needs to be 
described. Secondly, elections and party politics display the existence of unfair ethnic 
competition and fragmentation, which also express themselves in geographical terms. 
Thirdly, military aspects are discussed, since military operations in the Kurdish 
populated areas are under a special administration called "Olagantistti Hal Bolge 
71 'Actor unknown murders' is a literal translation ofa Turkish phrase "faili mechul cinayet". , 
72 ~58 of them wcrc about \'illage evacuations and arsons in South East Turkey and another 11.+ of them 
\\;rc about missing people under arrest. torture and unresol\'ed murders in the same region (Ha(~doglu 
2000). 
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Valiligi", literally meaning "State of Emergency Region's Governor's Office" under 
the rule of a governor with extraordinary authority over the region73 . 
One practical issue needs to be mentioned here: the timing of this analysis corresponds 
to an unstable period during which time lots of changes occurred in Turkey's Kurdish 
question. The cultural and political rights of the Kurds are on the agenda since Turkey 
has become an associate member of the European Union (EU). Turkey's admission to 
the EU is still conditional on improvements in its human rights record (e.g. despite the 
legislation abolished the death penalty and freed expression in mother languages and 
also allowed education in mother languages in the last months of 2002). Therefore 
more improvements in the cultural and political rights of Turkish Kurds are necessary 
prior to any full integration of Turkey into the EU. In response to this condition 
imposed by the EU, the issues relating to Turkish Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights 
have been central to the recent political debates in Turkey. Party leaders, 
parliamentarians, column writers and some former government officials have joined 
discussions in favour of lifting the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language. For 
instance, the chairman of the Turkish National Intelligence Service (MiT) said that 
there must be free Kurdish television broadcasts in Turkey although he got an 
immediate objection from the high commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces (Turkish 
daily newspapers, 1 Dec. 2000). As a result, it is possible to state that there is an 
optimistic climate for better conditions for Turkey's Kurdish population. There is 
almost an agreement among different segments of general society on free Kurdish 
broadcasts, or education in Kurdish although each party has its own justifications, 
which are not necessarily in favour of the free development of Kurdish ethnicity or 
culture. For instance, some parties defend it to prevent anti-Turkish propaganda in 
Kurdish by foreign or pro-PKK institutions like MED-TV. Examples of such 
approaches were published in daily newspapers of every political stance in Turkey 
during December 2000. However, Kurdish political issues are still subject to long 
debates and do not seem likely to be realised in the near future. Therefore the present 
situation still constitutes an EOI facilitating international migration. 
D The OHAL region \\as composed of six pro\'inces, Diyarbaklr, Hakkari. ~iirt, )l~a~, Tunc~li, and 
\'an and fi\e secondary control areas including the prO\iIlce~ ?f Batman, Bll1gejl, Bitlis, >lardll1, and 
Mu~ (DPT-BGYU 2000). HO\Ye\er. by May 2002, the adnllI1lstratlon ended Il1 all prO\lIKCS except 
!)i\,~lrbaklr and ~Imak (HUrriyet, 2S f\lay 2002). 
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5.3.1. General political atmosphere and the legal framework 
The political environment of insecurity from which the Kurds suffer is characterised by 
two basic problems: the military character of the Turkish democracy and a lack of 
recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities. During the last two decades, almost all 
human rights violations in Turkey have been committed against the Turkish Kurdish 
people and the organisations they formed or actively supported. These violations haye 
been reiterated in consecutive reports of international human rights agencies (i.e. HR W 
1999). 
The only promising aspect for the improvements of human rights and democracy in 
Turkey has been European pressures to improve democracy in the course of Turkey's 
integration into the European Union. The debates on education in the mother language 
and Kurdish broadcasts following the partnership declaration between the EU and 
Turkey have been recent examples of this feature. 74 Turkish Kurds are also aware of 
this EU factor and therefore, for example, there were many PKK led rallies of Turkish 
Kurds around Europe backing Turkey's application for full EU membership prior to the 
EU Summit in Tampere, Finland, in 1999 (Hurriyet, 11 December 1999; Milliyet, 10 
December 1999; Ozgur Politika, 9 December 1999). However, the Turkish Army 
responds immediately to such attempts at relaxing the political environment even 
though it is triggered by the EU suggestions. Such 'balancing' characterises the 
transcendental nature of Turkish 'military democracy'. 
Cengiz <;andar, a political journalist, has called Turkey a "military democracy" 
(1999: 130) emphasising the role of the military in Turkish politics and discussing the 
imperfections of Turkish democracy as an example of 'illiberal democracies' in the 
Third World. The Turkish military constitutes a core element of the Turkish political 
system through apparatuses such as the National Security CounciL whose decrees are 
generally considered more powerful than any Act of Parliament. It often implicitly 
accuses the civilian parliamentarian system of being full of "careerism, populism, 
lacking prudence, corruption, and irresponsibility" (SakalllOglu 1997: 153). Therefore, 
the n1ilitary put itself in a privileged position as the guarantor of the \\'hole system. 
Thus, politics lacks effectiveness and is subjected to the tutelage of the military, 
because it is often not possible to challenge the Chief Commanders of the Army. For 
7 .. Noycmber 2000 issues can be found in the archiyes of Turkish daily newspapers (i.e. Hurriyet. 
I\lilIiyet, and Cumhuriyet) providing details of these discllssions. 
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instance, when the president of the Motherland Party, a coalition partner in the current 
government, attempted to discuss the concept of national security in Turkey in a recent 
party congress, he had to 'correct' his comments after heavy criticism from high-rank 
commanders of the armed forces (Milliyet, 5 and 6 August 2001). 
The general political atmosphere in Turkey also involves the denial of the existence of 
the Kurds in the country. Yegen (1999: 110-128) has examined this denial policy 
throughout the Republican era and found no sign of admission of the existence of 
Kurdish (ethnicity) within the borders of Turkey. The 1924 Turkish Constitution 
explicitly states the impossibility of a Kurdish political existence in the country: 
"Article 11: Every Turkish man and woman at the age of 30 or over can be elected to 
the parliament. 
Article 12: Those who cannot read and write in Turkish cannot be elected to the 
parliament. " (Yegen 1999: 121) 
The doors of politics were totally closed to the Kurds in the early years of the Republic. 
At that time, the only political party was the Republican People's Party (CHP), founded 
by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Article 8 of the CHP program clearly prevented Kurdish 
membership: "Every Turkish citizen can become a member of the Party, only if he or 
she can speak Turkish and has accepted Turkish culture and all the goals of the party. " 
(Yegen 1999: 123). There must be no doubt about the inappropriateness of the political 
environment for Turkish Kurds within such a framework. 
Thus the existence of a fundamental opposition questioning the ethnic bases of the 
Republic seems almost impossible within the context of Turkish 'military' democracy. 
Although a number of pro-Kurdish political parties have been founded since 1991, all 
of them have been outlawed by Turkish Constitutional Court rulings, except the 
HADEP (People's Democracy Party).75 These parties have to be extremely careful 
because anything associated with being pro-Kurdish or pro-PKK may cause the closure 
of the party. Similar rules apply to all other opposition political parties. For example, a 
short play about the liberation of Palestine staged in one of the local branches of the 
Islan1ist Welfare Party in Sincan, a small town near Ankara, had been referred among 
other reasons when the Constitutional Court nlled to shut it down (Sabah. 5 February 
and 22 May 1997). Similarly. HADEP \Vas also accused for its ignorance about the 
Turkish flag at its party congress (Sabah, 19 June 1998). Briefly, the Turkish political 
75 There is also an ongoing trial to shut dO\\11 HADEP. 
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system by nature is opposed to a political environment of security for ethnic groups 
other than for the Turks and for opposition groups like Islamists (i.e. the Welfare Party 
and the Virtue Party). 
The political EOI experienced by the Turkish Kurds also has a legal background in 
Turkish legislation. Turkey's record of human rights violations is not a secret yet still 
there are many laws violating basic human rights including freedom of expression 
(HRW 1999). Some Turkish laws exclusively target ethnic minority rights (which 
usually apply to the Kurds) such as the Anti-Terror Law (ATL), in operation since 1991 
(See Appendix 5.3). The ATL is often used to punish free expression dealing with the 
Kurdish question along with other laws preventing broadcasting in Kurdish, teaching 
Kurdish in schools, and using Kurdish in political campaigns (HRW 1999). These laws 
have been the basis for arresting journalists and politicians, confiscating books and 
publications and closing the newspapers and other media throughout the 1990s in 
Turkey. The first and foremost of the legal regulations putting Turkish Kurds into 
danger is article 3 of the current Turkish Constitution: "The Turkish state, with its 
territory and people, is an indivisible whole. The language is Turkish. These facts may 
not be changed, nor may any changes be proposed. " This paranoid-sounding article at 
the very beginning of the constitution aims to stop any possible threat to the Turkish 
state. The threat is very likely to be Kurdish because they revolted several times in the 
course of Republican history. 
The legal framework denying the existence of the Kurds starts with restricting the use 
of non-Turkish names. The Civil Code (no.1587) states " ... Names may not be given 
which are illegal or which offend or do not represent the nation's culture, moral 
values, traditions, or customs" (Art. 16) [Emphasis added]. 'The nation' is not clear in 
this article, so it was made explicit in the Regulation on Family Names, passed on 24 
Decen1ber 1931 (No.211759): "New family names which are permissible are to be 
drawn from the Turkish language. Names from foreign races and nations may not be 
used as fami~1' names. (Art.5) [Emphasis added]. Within the context discussed thus far. 
these 'foreign races and nations' practically refer to the Kurds. A similar la\\" \\"as also 
instituted for place names. The Provincial Administration La\\" (~o. 5442) \\"hich \\cnt 
into effect on 10 June 1949 states: "r'illage names which are not Turkish and which 
should be changed arc to be brought before the provincial cOllncil and changed hy the 
interior minister lI'ithin the shortest possible time" (Art.l). 
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The Turkish Constitution is very cautious about the use of the 'other language'. Article 
26 forbids its people to use "any language, which is prohibited by law". To be sure. it 
emphasised: "Printed matter, records, audio and video tapes, or any other publications 
can be confiscated ... if they violate this regulation" (Art.26). The law prohibiting the 
Kurdish language was repealed in 1991 but other laws (No.2559 and Art.8 of the Police 
Code) still allow confiscation (See Appendix 5.3.). 
As use of the Kurdish language was strictly banned for many years, learning Kurdish 
was almost impossible. Article 42 of the Turkish Constitution clearly states: "in 
educational institutions, Turkish citizens may not use any language other than Turkish 
as their native language. " It was also forbidden to learn Kurdish as a foreign language 
(Law No.2923, Art.2a). "Radio and TV stations are required to broadcast their 
programmes in Turkish" (Law No.2954, Art.5f). 
Associations and political parties have also equally been warned not to use 'the other 
language' in their programs, charters, and propaganda materials (See Law of 
Associations, No.2908, Art.5 and 6). Political parties are even prevented from 
mentioning 'the other': "Political parties may not claim that there are minorities of 
religion, culture, sect, race, or language in the Turkish Republic. Political parties may 
not engage in activities to promote languages or cultures other than Turkish, thereby 
seeking to create minorities that threaten the unity of the nation. (Law of Political 
Parties, No.2820, Art.81) [Emphasis added]. 
These excerpts from the Turkish Constitution and Laws are only a few examples of the 
legal EOI. 76 Many public figures including Turkish and Kurdish journalists, scientists. 
and artists have suffered from them. It is necessary to remember here that although 
many of these laws are dated before the changes in 1991, which allowed a relati\'ely 
lenient environment for Turkish Kurds, there are still many court rulings that came into 
force on the basis of these restrictions mentioned above. For example. a local T\' 
station in Diyarbakir was suspended for one year from broadcasting because of 
broadcasting a Kurdish folk song in 2000 (Hilrriyet, 20 September 2001). 
d' -.., 
71> Details and rcfcrcncc~ of these laws are included in .\ppen IX :".-. 
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5.3.2. Elections and Kurdish Politics in Turkey 
Even if they could cope with the legal framework mentioned above. Turkish Kurds 
may still suffer from the manipulation of legal and structural restrictions. The Turkish 
election system prevents small parties' entry into the Parliament via a national 
threshold: parties receiving less than 10% of the vote are not entitled to MPs. There are 
also organisational requirements. For instance, any political party must have offices 
opened in more than half of all administrative districts all around the country. which 
simply ends the chance of success for local and ethnic group oriented political 
movements. Although the underlying reason for this requirement is to prevent 
instability and extreme political fragmentation (Evin and Ozbudun 198,,),), it definitely 
works against the pro-Kurdish parties because they are dependent on a regional 
population, which constitutes only about 20% of the total population. This means any 
Kurdish party is very unlikely to achieve the threshold. The following passages give 
examples from the 1999 elections, which might be described as 'an electoral EO I' . 
Throughout the period of armed conflict, people in some localities were not even able 
to vote. Many observers reported that there was no ballot box in many villages and vote 
counts were fabricated (Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1999). Again in some villages, the 
electorate have had to register and vote within military centres, which is not very 
convenient for 'free' voters in the context of an armed conflict. Many people were not 
registered therefore they couldn't vote (Serbesti 1999; Ozgiir Politika, April Issues, 
1999). 
The campaign against Kurdish parties and candidates was not limited to such alleged 
ballot tricks. There also have been physical obstructions. Many offices of the pro-
Kurdish party, HADEP (People's Democracy Party) were raided in the few weeks prior 
to voting day in the 1999 elections, for instance. Another 'coincidence' was the arrest 
of a considerable number of HADEP candidates just before the elections (Ozglir 
Politika, 17 April 1999). Several attempts to ban HADEP, from taking part in the 1999 
local and general elections were made but did not succeed. For example, just five days 
prior to the election, the Prosecutor General, Vural Sava~, had sought to impose a ban 
on HADEP on the grounds that the party had close links with an outlawed secessionist 
moven1ent the PKK. The Turkish Constitutional Court rejected his application. On the 
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same day, more than a thousand HADEP supporters77 were arrested by the police to 
prevent them staging rallies in South-eastern Turkey, where most of the Kurdish 
population live. Election rallies and meetings were banned by the police. As a result. 
HADEP was blocked from campaigning properly in the 1999 election. During the same 
'-
election campaign, its entire cadre of leaders had been detained on treason charges and 
u 
successive raids had been made on party offices across the country (Morgan 1999; 
BBC News, 14 April 1999; Ozgur Politika, 16 April 1999). 
However, whether there is a conspiracy against Turkish Kurds or not, clearly the free 
will of some people were violated and these people were most likely to be Kurdish. 
While legal and military institutions were trying to stop Kurdish parties, the other 
political parties ironically were trying to appeal to the Kurdish speaking voters of the 
eastern provinces with a motto: "there are no second class citizens in Turkey" (Tanyol 
1999:110). 
Despite the barriers, Kurdish representatives were elected, at least at the local level, in 
the last local elections in Turkey on 18 April 1999; HADEP won 39 of 3079 
municipalities. Almost all of these were in the Kurdish populated Eastern region. In the 
general elections of the same year, HADEP received one and a half million of 31 
million valid votes (4.7 0/0) throughout the country. It could not achieve the national 
threshold of 10%, which is needed to send representatives to the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, but it heavily defeated all of its rival parties in Kurdish provinces 
including Diyarbaklr, Van, Agn, Hakkari, Bingol, Bitlis, Igdlr, Kars, Mardin, Mu~, 
Siirt, $lrnak. The party won about 500/0 of votes cast in these cities and became the first 
party in the region (NTV 2000). 
Before the military intervention of 12 September 1980, these areas had always voted 
for the opposition parties. After the intervention, they voted for Kurdish candidates on 
the Social Democratic People's Party's lists as there were no Kurdish parties. and after 
1991 they generally voted for the Kurdish parties, namely, HEP (People' s Labour 
PaIiy), DEP (Den10cracy Party), and HADEP (People's Democracy Party) (Olmez 
1995). 
A political environn1ent of insecurity, beyond these barriers of the election system, also 
inyolves illegitin1ate fom1s of politics. Among these, paramilitary organisations. 'actor 
77 ()/l!lir Politika. pro-Kurdish newspaper published in Clermany, stated that 15,000 H.\DI:P·s supporters 
\\ere :m'ested prior to this meeting (1.+ April 1999). 
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unknown murders', disappearances and other sorts of legal and illegal precautions 
taken against Kurdish political parties in Turkey are worth counting. 
5.3.3. Military aspects 
Whether we call it "military" or "illiberal", Turkish democracy is heavily influenced by 
the Army (Sakalhoglu 1999). The Army, traditionally, has been involved in the politics 
of Turkey. Such army involvement makes the Eor for Turkish Kurds even harsher. The 
OHAL (State of Emergency Region's Governor's Office)78 government should be the 
most significant symbol of that as it was set up and essentially run by the decrees of the 
National Security Council79 . The OHAL is a semi-military form of government 
specifically created for the Kurdish populated region in Southeast Turkey. Besides its 
role in Turkish politics, the military is also significant because of its involvement in the 
Kurdish question due to the IS-year old armed conflict (<;andar 1999 and KadlOglu 
1999). 
The role of the Turkish military in the maintenance of an EOr in the Kurdish populated 
areas is difficult to estimate. However, the armed conflict brought the deployment of 
more than 300,000 troops in the region along with other security forces including 
Police, Gendarmerie, Special Teams and village guards (numbering over 100,000) 
against nearly 20,000 Kurdish guerrilla forces. For ordinary people living there, the 
existing armed conflict posed a genuine reason to leave their homes for secure areas. 
The story of one respondent interviewed in Cologne, E~ref Oztlirk (22) from Slmak, 
describes the situation of people at risk: 
"My elder brother had been kidnapped by village guards. Then, he was released after 
few weeks. He left home to join the guerrillas in 1994; a month after the guards released 
him. Once you helped or joined the guerrillas you have no chance: all the family is to be 
blamed. It is the same for families whose members are soldier in the [Turkish} ,·lrm.1'. 
Because when I was younger it was clear that there were the PKK at night and soldiers 
in the day. YOIi have to deal with both. It \I'as not even possible to rccogl1i~c who is \rho 
sometimes. Lots of police officers were not llll((ormed. rOll cannot ask them for their 
78 The State of Emergency Region's Govemor's Office (OHAL) is the re?ional go\~mme.nt heade~ by a. 
mayor appointed by the Ministry of Interior, \\hich ha~ been created after the military 1l1teryentlon nt 
1980 to control the South East Anatolian Region. _. . 
79 The National Security Council (MGK in Turkish) is an effective cabinet compose~ o! Prc:ldent, Pnm~ 
Minister, I\linister of Defence and chief commanders of the Turkish :\r~l1Y. The maJorJt) ot the Council 
members arc soldiers and it generally \yorks through consultancy meet1l1gs \\here the Army acts as the 
absolute loells of power. 
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identity when they ask for your papers or wanted to investigate your house. YOli call be 
brutally beaten, picked up, even killed. Everything can happen to you. There are also 
gangsters farming money; not for the PKK, not for the government. It is to be said thar 
we would prefer soldiers and guerrillas, because they were better. They gathered aI/the 
villagers at the village square and questioning and beating was the common place. They 
were in large groups but when the village guards and Specialist Teams appeared, 
changes came. These were small groups, without uniform, but H'ith machine gUllS. n 'hat 
could we do? Should we ask their proof ofidentity? [Laughing!]" 
Mr. Oztilrk was one of those people who had to leave their homes and fled to Europe 
seeking a safe haven, far away from the fear of persecution. The lives of many Kurdish 
politicians, journalists, and writers were shattered along with many shepherds, and 
villagers who lost their lives during the clashes. The first half of the 1990s was the peak 
period, when most of these incidents happened, 96 prominent members of HEP 
(People's Labour Party), DEP (Democracy Party), and HADEP (People's Democracy 
Party), including many Kurdish intellectuals, were murdered between 1990 and 1995 
and these murders are still unresolved. Most of these crimes were filed in courts as 
'actor unknown murders', and possibly never to be resolved (HADEP 2000; Olmez 
1995: 465). 
The Police have very often been accused as the cause of the murders due to 
disappearances under police detention. For instance, the chairperson of the Diyarbakir 
branch of HEp8o, Vedat Aydin, was arrested by the police from his home in 1991. His 
corpse was found days after on the outskirts of the city. It is believed that he was 
tortured and murdered by the police. Mehmet Sincar, the Member of Parliament from 
Mardin, was also murdered by, possibly, the same unknown agents in 1993, and police 
investigations have not since found even a single suspect. Similarly, many HADEP 
candidates and party administrators were kidnapped, tortured, and killed either by the 
police, the Specialist Teams, or 'unknown murderers' (HADEP 2000). 
In brief, the military involvement in the political EOI was twofold. On the one hand, 
the existence of a massive standing army force in the region \\'here most Kurds li\c 
creates an environment of invasion, as felt by Turkish Kurds. On the other hand, the 
involvement of military and paramilitary agents in unresoh'ed murders. in and out of 
80 HEP \\'as the first e\er pro-Kurdish political party formed in the history ~f Republi~a~. Turkey at~cr the 
October 1991 elections. The Constitutional Court outlawed the party on 1:- July 199_, (011110 199~: I he 
Independent, 1 S June 199"+). 
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the Kurdish region, posed an immediate fear of persecution or torture for those people 
living there. 
5.4. The Socio-demographic Environment of Insecurity 
The socio-demographic EOI discussed here is related to economIC and political 
deprivation to a degree, as the latent or explicit economic and political restrictions 
discussed above have driven Turkish Kurds into a situation characterised by higher 
unemployment, limited health and educational opportunities, and higher risk of 
persecution. The TDHS household data has been analysed to identify the main 
characteristics of the Turkish Kurdish population, which may generate an EOI and in 
turn may create a demographic pressure for international migration. 
The size of the Kurdish population in the country and its distribution has always been a 
controversial issue but at least there seems an agreed range: above 10 million but less 
than 20 million (Sirkeci 2000: 155; Mutlu 1996:517). The lack of straightforward and 
reliable information is well founded. Existing sources are inadequate and do not 
provide a satisfactory account of the size and distribution of the Kurdish population. 
Apart from the paucity and inadequacy of data on ethnicity, there is also a general 
difficulty in defining the ethnicity of people at both theoretical and practical levels, so 
that the question of who is considered Kurdish remains controversial (see Chapter 2). 
TDHS data allow us to estimate the Turkish Kurdish population in Turkey on the basis 
of mother tongue information. 
Table 5.7 displays some estimates of the Kurdish population in Turkey that are based 
on Census data and estimates. The accounts of Buckley (1994), Minority Rights Group 
(1991), and van Bruinessen (1998) are based on intuitive guesses without citing any 
register or census. Mutlu (1996) and Ozsoy et al. (1992) based their figures on the 
projections of earlier censuses. While Mutlu (1996) projecting the 1965 Census reached 
a higher estimate of the Kurdish population, Ozsoy et al. (1992) took the 1935 Census 
as a reference point and estimated a lower figure (Table 5.7). The difference between 
the two is due to a possible underestimation, which indicates a decrease in the Kurdish 
population between 1935 and 1965. It is an underestimation because the Demographic 
Health Surveys prove that in the Eastern proyinces \yhere most Kurds liyc population 
growth rates haye been higher than the rest of the country (Dlindar 1998). 
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Table 5.7. Estimates of the Turkish Kurdish population as percentages of the total 
population, 1965-1993. 
Buckley (1994) 
Minority Rights Group (1991) 
Mutlu (1996) 
Ozsoy et aI, (1992) 
Van Bruinessen (1998) 
Estimations from this study 
1935 Census 
9.2 
9.2 
1965 Census 
1O.0 a 
7.6 
1990s 
19 
12.6 
6.2 
20 
TDHS (by ethnicity variable) 15.i' 
Mean of mother tongue questions in TDHS 15.8c 
Combination of 6 questions 17.8d 
a) Projection based on the population growth rate. b) For 5972 households with 31868 individuals. c) 
Rang~s between 1~.2 and 16.3. d) For 5970 households who provided information on mother tongue 
guestlOns and conSIst 32,130 people. The total size of individuals covered in TDHS is 38,284. 
This research estimated three similar figures on the basis of six mother tongue 
questions available from the TDHS, which are presented in Table 5.8. 15.20/0 of 
women
81 
interviewed in the survey are Kurdish speaking. Each of the mother tongue 
questions also gives us an average of 15.80/0 Kurdish speaking within Turkey's entire 
population. The interviewees in the TDHS were asked to indicate their mother tongue 
from a list that included 'Turkish', 'Kurdish', 'Arabic', and 'other, with a 
specification'. They were also asked about the mother tongue of their husband, their 
husband's parents, and their parents. The answers were operationalised as follows: if 
the answer to any of these questions was 'Kurdish', the respondent and her household 
were considered Kurdish. 82 Accordingly, this gives an estimate of 17.8% Kurds in the 
national population. 
Table 5.8. The Kurdish population by mother tongue questions, 1993 (%) 
Mother Tongue Answers 
Language Respondent's Her Her Her Her husband's Her husband's 
mother's father's husband's mother's father's 
Turkish 8l.58 79.48 79.22 80.56 78.81 -
Kurdish 15.21 15.94 16.32 15.40 16.03 15.97 
Arabic l.91 2.18 2.17 2.39 2.49 2.58 
Other* 1.30 2.40 2.29 1.66 2.67 2.83 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 31,908 31,911 31,899 31,899 31,924 31,904 
* Includes other sizeable ethnic groups such as Circassians, Georgians, Greeks, Amlenians and Jews. 
Source: TDHS J 993 household data 
81 Estimates are based on information given by women because the reference persons inteniewed in. the 
TDHS were women as the basic aim of the suney is to get an account of fertility pattems and behavIOur 
(HUIPS 1994). . . 
~2 Altholll',h here the principal marker of ethnicity has been language. one mllst bear 111 Illll1d that. due. h) 
ethnic co\;f1ict and assimilationist policies pursued in Turkey: many people may no. longer .speak Ku:dlsh 
but still consider themselyes Kurdish. Therefore Illy estimations presented here \\'111 pOSSibly remam an 
underestimation of Kurdish population. 
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The proportions of Kurds according to each mother tongue question ranged from 15._° ° 
to 16.30/0 (Table 5.8), and the overall estimate is 17.8% (Table 5.7). The anal i in thi 
chapter has used the highest estimate of 17.80/0 referring to 5716 indi idual in _3 
Turkish Kurdish households (Table 5.9). Among total population of Turkey 17. ° '0 
means a Kurdish minority of roughly about 11 million in the country.83 
Table 5.9. The Distribution of the Kurdish population by region, 1993 (%) 
Region 
West 
South 
Central 
North 
East 
N 
Households 
10.8 
11.6 
12.5 
0.1 
64.8 
823 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
Individuals 
8.5 
9.9 
1l.2 
0.2 
70.1 
5,716 
Despite internal migration towards the western urban centres, Turkish Kurds are till 
associated with a region as they are amassed in the South East part of the country as in 
the past (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). This is evident in the findings of this study and in the 
detailed estimations of Mutlu (1996), which take in- and out-migration rates into 
account as well as death and birth rates. The proportion of the Kurds within the total 
population ranges from 25% to 90% in the Eastern provinces according to the TDHS. 
700/0 of Kurds live in the East, and 64% of Kurdish households are in the East (Table 
5.9 and Figure 5.3). The difference between the individual and the household 
percentages is due to large household sizes in the Eastern region. 
Figure 5.1. 
The Kurdish 
population as 
percentage of 
the total 
population by 
province, 1965 
o les s than 1% 
~ 1.01 - 5 ~ 1001-25 
Source: 1965 Cen u 
~2501-50 _ 6501-80 
§ 5001-65 _ rnorethan 0% 
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Environment of insecurity and internatiolIal miararioll 
Figure 5.2. 
The Kurdish 
population as 
percentage of the 
total population 
by province, 1990 
Figure 5.3. 
The Kurdish 
population as 
percentage of the 
total population 
1993, by sub-
regions 
c::Jle~~ than 1% 
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Source: Mutlu (J 996) and 1990 Census 
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It is to be noted that the Kurdish population has experienced a dramatic dispersal 
throughout the second half of the century in terms of internal and international 
nligration. The share of the Kurdish population seems to have increased in the western 
regions of Turkey since 1965 if Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 are compared. In 1965 , the 
Kurdish share of the total population was less than one percent in almost all Western, 
Southern and Northern provinces of Turkey but it ranged from 25% to 90% in the 
South East region, the traditional Kurdish speaking areas (Figure 5.1). In the 1990 , 
their share of the total population rose to 5% in metropolitan areas and wa 0 er 1 % in 
all other provinces in Western Turkey, whilst their high share remained almo t th 
same in the East (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). The increase in the we tern pro ince ma b 
explained by the effect of migration from the East to the We t of Turk y. Ho\ e\' r 
these maps have displayed, a substantial increase in the Kurdi h hare of th t tal 
population is clear and which " nUl t be due to hia/7 fertility, a )\' 1I a d /iniJla 
mortalif) rates 11 (Koy and HanclOglu 1999:4). 
Another considerable feature of the Kurdi h po ulati n i it on ntrati n 111 rum I 
area as the low 111ean urbani ation rate (5 -0/0) indi ate ( ur : T HIe). 
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household data). The urban population amounts to 61 % for Turkey as a whole. 
However, in the West, urban dwellers among Kurds (850/0) are higher than their 
Turkish fellows (750/0). A similar pattern is also obvious in the South; 75% of Kurds 
live in urban areas whereas the corresponding figure for Turks is 65%). This might be 
explained by massive rural-to-urban migration from the East to the urban centres of 
Turkey, which are mainly located in the West and South. Some of these attractiye 
metropolitan areas include Istanbul, Izmir, and Bursa in the West and Antalya, Mersin, 
and Adana in the South. In the Central region, 75% of Kurds lived in rural areas, 
whereas this figure was only 450/0 in the East in 1993. On the other hand, these 
percentages might have also changed over the last decade because of massiyc 
evacuations (of villages and hamlets) in the eastern region, which pushed hundreds of 
thousands to the urban centres within the region as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Diyarbakir was one such city, and its population boomed during the 1990s from around 
373,000 in 1990 to 545,000 in 2000 (Table 5.10). Between 1985 and 1990. net 
migration rate for the eastern region was 60 per thousand and the region also lost over 
570,000 of its over 10 million total population (DPT -BGYU 1999). 
Table 5.10. Urban populations and annual growth rate in selected cities in the 
East, per 1000, 1990-200084 
Population in the Province Center Annual Growth rate 
Name of Province Centre 1990 2000 1990-2000 
Batman 
Bingol 
DiyarbakIr 
Hakkari 
K.Mara~ 
Mu~ 
Slrnak 
SanlIurfa 
100045 178538 
147347 246678 
41 590 68876 
373 810 545983 
30407 58 145 
228 129 326 198 
44019 67927 
25059 52743 
276528 385 588 
Van 155 623 284464 
Turkey total 22,776,700 29,833,129 
Source: The 1990 Census/rom SIS (1993) The 2002 CensusJronz SIS (2002). 
57.90 
51.52 
50.43 
37.87 
64.81 
35.75 
43.37 
74.40 
33.24 
60.30 
26.98 
Table 5.10 sunlnlarizes recent growth rates in selected cities in the Eastenl Turkcy, 
which may reflect flows from rural to city centres of provinces since 1990 when grO\\th 
rates increased drastically. Annual growth rates for many Kurdish populated city 
. . ces have doubled the '}yerane nro\yth rate of cit\" ccntrc~ of all centres 111 eastenl provlll < t:' t:' • 
. d' I 'f - f rovin' '"' han! ",line name"' s .. The reader should be careful here since the prov1I1ces an ca~Jta CI le~ ~ . p Lt:. , . , . 
d 'f~ J:: th se \Tj\en 1I1 Tlble' 1I1 Chapter .' in Turkey therefore these figures are 1 lerent lrom 0:= ,- .-
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provinces in Turkey during the 1990s. Relatively well off cities of the region uch a 
$lmak, Hakkari and Adlyaman have doubled their populations since 1990 (Table 5.10). 
As Figure 5.4 displays the proportion of young people between the ages 0 to 14 (2-1- .600 
of males and 22.5% of females) was larger among the Kurds than the Turk (16. 00 and 
16.2%, respectively). The economically active age group (of 15 to 64) among the 
Kurds was relatively smaller (25.1 % of males and 25.6% of females) than the Turk 
(29.4% and 32.4% respectively), while the older age group (65 and over l.2% male 
and l.1 % females) was also smaller than for their Turkish fellow citizens (2.7% and 
30/0 for males and females respectively). 
Figure. 5.4. Population Pyramids by ethnicity, 1993 
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Age dependency ratios are 97.3 for Kurds reflecting the 92.7 child dependency and 4.6 
old-age-dependency ratios separately. These figures deviate substantially from tho e of 
Turks. Corresponding figures for the whole population in Turkey are 62.6, 53.4 and 
9.2, respectively. Thus the Kurds seem less likely to have a chance of reaching later 
ages. Longer life expectancy is closely related to mortality rates and improvement 111 
health care facilities in Turkey. 
Table 5.11. Age specific fertility rates by ethnicity, 1993 
Age Groups 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
Kurds 
0.126 
0.284 
0.319 
0.262 
0.167 
0.076 
TFR 6.2 
Fertility rates 
SOllrce: Kor; and HonclOglli 1999: Diindal' 199 
Turks 
0.067 
0.196 
0.145 
0.075 
0.045 
O.OL 
Turkey 
. 
0.07 
0._07 
0.16 
0.100 
0.0 
.01 
During recent decades, fertility ha teadil d cl in d in Turk and h<. the 
population growth rate , \ hich \ a e timat d at 1.4) 00 at th la t p pulati 11 unt in 
'd . \ n~ r r b th Turki h 1997 (HUIP 2000). The ba e of th population p ramI I nan \ I --
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and Kurdish populations, which indicates declining fertility (Figure 5,.+). Dlindar 
(1998) also found a general declining trend in fertility and estimates a faster decline 
among the Kurds. However, even declining fertility rates for the Kurds are double those 
for the whole of Turkey (Table 5.11). The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for the Kurds \\'as 
6.2 whereas the corresponding figure was only 2.7 for the Turks and 3.1 for Turkey as a 
whole. Another point to note here is the gradual decrease of fertility by age among 
Kurdish women compared to the steep decline observed among their Turkish 
counterparts after the age of 25 (Table 5.11). Simply, Kurdish women seem to haye 3 
more children than Turkish women as their age specific fertility is higher for all age 
cohorts (Table 5.11). 
Reproductive health parameters also indicate disadvantaged conditions for the Kurds. 
Only one quarter of Kurdish women gave birth in medical centres while almost three-
quarters of Turkish women used these facilities according to the TDHS 1993 data. In 
terms of prenatal care visits, slightly more Turks had visits (320/0) as opposed to the 
Kurds (29%) (Cindoglu and Sirkeci 2001). Accompanied by the lack of health-care 
facilities in the areas where the majority of the Kurds live, the differences in child and 
maternal health are understandable. Child and infant mortality rates also differ between 
the Kurds and the Turks; for the Kurds, the infant mortality rate is about 74, and the 
child mortality rate is 11, whereas corresponding figures for the Turks are 46 and 8 
respectively. The under-five mortality rate is 84 for the Kurds and 54 for the Turks 
(Koy and HanclOglu, 1999:8). 
Differences in socio-demographic indicators may also influence migration flows from 
Turkey to Western Europe. For instance, for the whole of Turkey. life expectancy at 
birth is about 9 years less than that in countries of Western Europe where it is 78 on 
average. The infant mortality rate is 8 to 10 times higher than that in European 
countries. For instance, it is 3.6 in Sweden. The population growth rate proyides a 
strong pressure for migration. It is 1.2% for Turkey \vhilst the corresponding figure is 
very close to zero growth leyel all around Western Europe. Gi\L~n the differences 
between Turkey's Kurdish and non-Kurdish populations. we may expect more 
den10graphic pressures for migration among the Kurdish segment of the population. 
Since the population growth rate for the Kurds is almost doubk that of Turkey (sec 
Mutlu 1996:520 and Koy and HanclOglu 1999:'+). 
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Kurdish families lived in relatively large households. One quarter had 9 or more 
members, and 80% had 5 or more members (Table 5 12) Corres d' fi i' 
.. pon mg 19ures lor the 
whole of Turkey were 6% and 43% respectively. In urban areas, only 280/0 of Kurdish 
households had less than five members and 28% of them had 8 r I 
, or more. n rura areas 
corresponding figures were 13 % and 470/0. Turkey's averages showed that 610;() in 
urban areas and 45% in rural areas had less than five members; and only 5% in urban 
and 170/0 in rural areas had more than 8 members. The mean household size was -+.55 
for Turkey and 6.8 for the Kurds. The average size of urban households was -+.2 for 
Turkey and 6.2 for the Kurds. It was 5.1 among all rural households and 7.8 for 
Kurdish households (Table 5.12). 
Table 5.12. Household size by ethnicity, 1993 
Number of member of household ;\Iean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+ Total size 
Turkish Urban 0.2 6.5 17.9 29.1 21.8 12.6 6.1 3.0 2.8 3,525 4.66 
rural 0.0 3.6 8.2 19.5 19.6 16.7 9.8 9.6 12.9 1,714 5.92 
Kurdish urban 3.7 8.8 12.6 12.9 13.4 16.1 10.7 2l.7 .+95 6.31 
rural 1.6 4.0 5.5 11.7 10.8 15.6 14.2 37.6 328 7.90 
Arabic urban 5.1 11.9 15.9 14.5 14.0 14.0 8.7 16.0 46 6 . .+ 7 
rural 7.9 2.0 11.8 9.8 11.8 17.3 13.0 26 . .+ 39 7.71 
Other urban -- 25.2 6.9 27.9 27.9 11.7 14.0 7.0 16.3 43 5.39 
rural 12.0 8.0 20.0 4.0 12.0 20.0 22.0 25 7.19 
Total urban 6.2 16.8 27.3 20.9 12.7 7.3 3.9 4.9 5,563 4.4 
rural 0.0 3.3 7.5 17.2 18.3 15.6 10.8 10.4 16.8 3,056 5.3 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
Two main reasons for the larger Kurdish household size are a higher number of 
children and the formation of traditional extended families. Household composition 
often determines the allocation of resources (both material and non-material) a\'ailable 
to household members, and the size of the household affects the well-being of its 
members. 
Another socio-demographic indicator related to the EOr is the level of crowding 
lneasured in terms of the number of persons per sleeping room. The mean number of 
people per sleeping room was 3.9 for the Kurds \\'hile it \\as 2.6 for the Turks (Table 
5.13). More than 820/0 of Turkish households accommodated less than thrce people in 
one roon1 whereas only 46% of Turkish Kurds had sllch comfort. For them, ha\ ing 
n10re than one sleeping room per person \\'as unknown but 2.;0 () of Turkish hOllsehold~ 
enjoyed this. Kurds lived in more crmHied houses. \lore than half of Kllrdi"h 
bedrooms accommodated more than,) people, llP to 12 slept in onc room while this 
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proportion was less than 20% among Turkish households (5 and more per sleeping 
room). 
Table 5.13. Crowding in households by ethnicity, 1993 
Kurdish Turkish 
Persons per sleeping room 
Less than 1 person 0.4 2.7 
1 to 3 people 46.1 79.7 
3 to 5 people 36.2 14.8 
5 to 7 people 10.1 2.0 
7 to 12 people 7.2 0.7 
Mean persons per room 3.9 2.6 
Number of households 823 5.279 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
5.4. Conclusion 
Chapter three has already reviewed the literature to depict an outline of the context in 
which Turkish Kurds' emigration to Germany took place. Closely related to that 
context, this chapter has explored the EOr for Turkish Kurds. Socio-economic. legaL 
political and demographic aspects were highlighted as building blocks of the E01. 
Deprivation, restrictions and prohibitions reflecting the Eor through the party system, 
the constitution, and overall socio-economic conditions were discussed. 
The socio-economic EOr was discussed at three levels. Firstly, Turkey's relative socio-
economic position was compared to that of the destination countries including 
Germany to highlight a possible broader pattern that may facilitate migration. Then. 
disparities between Turkey's regions were analysed to understand the relati\'c 
deprivation of Kurdish populated areas. To be certain about the Kurds' relati\'c 
deprivation compared to non-Kurdish people (i.e. Turkish), socio-economic conditions 
were examined at household and individual levels. The findings from this analysis 
suggest that the socio-economic EOr is present at all three lcvels and therefore thc 
likelihood of international migration for the Kurds is expected to be high. 
Secondly, the political EOI has been discussed on the basis of cvidence from legal 
docun1ents and examples from actual politics. The e\idence prcscnted in this l'haptcr 
has explained the background story to the largc asylum-sccking migration flows 
\vitnessed over the last t\\'o decades. The political aspects of the EO! in terms uj' the 
role of the military. restrictive legal frame\\orks. targeting particularly the Kurdish 
population, are complementary to the socio-economic depri\ation of the Kurds. 
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Finally, Kurdish demographic trends were compared with those of the Turks and 
highlighted that the two populations followed different demographic regimes (Ko<; and 
HanclOglu 1999:9). Kurds' fertility rates are higher than the others. Kurdish homes are 
overcrowded and households are very large, which may create a demographic pressure 
for international migration. The overrepresentation of younger ages may also contribute 
to this. When these demographic trends are compounded with socio-economic 
disadvantage including lack of employment opportunities, migration outflows seem 
inevitable from Kurdish populated areas. 
The following chapters analyse the implications of this Eor for the international 
migration of Turkish Kurds to Cologne, Germany. Material and non-material 
components of the Eor are discussed in relation to the Kurd's emigration. Causes, 
n10tivations, and mechanisms of migration, and potentials for future migration are also 
discussed. The final chapter concludes with the examination of the expression of 
ethnicity through migration process in order to reveal the role of ethnicity within. 
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Chapter VI 
Migration Patterns and Motivations 
6.1. Introduction 
"Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, 
But neither arrest nor mO\'emenl. " 
(TS. Eliot, Burnt Norton, 194{ pt.:;.) 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Turkish Kurdish migration to Germany in 
terms of migration patterns, determinants of migration, choice of destination, and 
migration motives. The data used in this chapter come from two sources: the TIMS 
(Turkish International Migration Survey, 1996) and qualitative field research in 
Cologne (See Chapter 4). 
The previous chapter presented an analysis of the environment of insecurity (EOI) as a 
background context facilitating the migration of Turkish Kurds. On the basis of the 
TDHS data and other information sources, detailed comparisons of the Kurdish 
population with others have been displayed. This chapter focuses on the migration 
patterns and causes of migration on the basis of findings from the TIMS data and in-
depth interviews. Migrant and non-migrant populations are compared throughout the 
analysis as well as Turkish and Kurdish populations. 
The following section describes the general patterns of migration on the basis of an 
analysis of the household and individual data sets from the TIMS. In other words, it 
describes who moves and who stays. A later part of the chapter focuses on migration 
motives and choice of destination by combining both the TIMS data and the intervie\\s 
conducted in Germany, in 1999. 
6.2. Migration Patterns 
This section examines the characteristics of those who migrated and those \\ho stayed. 
The analysis is divided into t\\'o parts. The first part describes household charact~ristics 
based on con1parisons by migration status and ethnicity \\'hile the second part !IXLlses 
on individuals' characteristics in tenns of educational attainment lcn~L empluyment 
status, age and sex differences. Following the discLlssion of the EOI as an impo11ant 
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push factor in the previous chapter, the appearance of return migrants in the follO\ying 
discussions may seem unexpected. However, first of all, the EOI has not necessarily 
created unbearable conditions for all the Kurds in terms of ethnic oppression and 
deprivation. Secondly, return migration cases recorded in the TIMS survey \yere mainly 
outside the core conflict area in Eastern Turkey (see Chapters 1 and 4). 
6.2.1. Characteristics of Households 
A quarter of the 1,564 households interviewed in the TIMS had at least one migrant 
member. About half of them had members who were current migrants and the others 
had return migrants. The regional breakdown of migration shows some diversity for 
Turkish households but no distinctive pattern for the Kurds because Kurdish migration 
I 
patterns are pretty similar for all regions (Table 6.1). In all regions the distribution of 
Kurdish recent and return migrants are similar. 
The West and Central regions, composed of the provinces Deniz1i-U~ak and Yozgat-
Aksaray, have established international migration flows (Abadan-Unat 1976; Gitmez 
1983; EC 2000). In contrast, the Eastern region, composed of the provinces 
Kahramanmara~-Gaziantep, Adlyaman-Sanhurfa, is a region bordering the Kurdish 
populated area and characterised by more recent migration flows (EC 2000). The 
proportions of Turkish migrant households in the West and Central regions (31 % and 
34%) were higher than the East 1 (9%) and East 2 (19%). This was probably due to the 
former's longer migration history. The earlier years of international migration from 
Turkey were dominated by the Turks and migrants were mainly drawn from the 
western and central regions. This historical effect is visible today in terms of the high 
proportions of non-recent and return migrants in the West and Central regions. 
compared to the small proportions in the East (Table 6.1. See also Chapter 3. figures 
3.5 and 3.6). 
Very few Turkish Kurdish households living in the West \n~re intcn'ic\\'ed in the TI\lS 
because of the sampling methodology. \\'hich \\'as not claimed to be nationally 
representative. Since rural households dominated the TI\1 S. \'Cry fe\\ Kurdish fami! ies 
were contacted because most had already migrated to the \\'est of Turkey. preferring to 
0-0 to biQ cities rather than remote yillages in Denizli or U~ak proyinee\ for e\amp\c 
2 '--
I 
' 1 ' pled I'n tIle TI'lS Thus althoutTh Turkish Kurds are e\pectcd to \\' lIe 1 \\'el e sam [\. c. ::-
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constitute around five to ten percent of the popUlation in the west of Turkey (sec 
Chapter 3 and 5; also Mutlu 1996), the TIMS includes only 1 % of Kurds in the \\'cst. 
Table 6.1. Distribution of households by migration status and region. 1996 (0/0) 
Region of household 
Kurdish West Central East 1 East 2 Total 
Recent current migration household 0* 19 17 28 21 
Recent return migration household 0* 5** 1** 2** -, 
-
Non-recent migration household 40** 11 9 5 9 
Non-migration household 60** 65 73 65 68 
N 5 109 130 91 335 
Turkish 
Recent current migration household 5 18 3 7 9 
Recent return migration household 2 6 1** 3 3 
Non-recent migration household 24 10 5 9 12 
Non-migration household 69 66 91 81 76 
N 275 403 332 212 1,222 
* No cases; **Less than 5 cases. Chi Square [Turkish}: 141. 981 df 9 (Sig:O.OOO) 
Source: TIMS 1996 household data Chi Square [Kurdish}: 1 5.541 df 9 (Sig:O.077) 
Regional comparisons for the Kurds therefore need to exclude the West region since 
there were very few Kurdish respondents in the TIMS sample (Table 6.1). In the region 
East 2, including Adiyaman and Sanliurfa, almost one in three Kurdish households 
have members living abroad who had migrated in the last ten years. In this regard, East 
2 may be distinguished from the Central and East 1 regions which have lower recent 
migration rates but high past migration rates because of their earlier engagement in 
migration flows from Turkey dating back to 1960. However, Kurdish migration rates 
are well ahead of the Turks in all three regions. 
It is clear from Table 6.1 that a larger proportion of Turkish Kurdish households (320/0) 
have sent their members abroad than their Turkish neighbours (240/0). For 72 0 0 of 
Kurdish migrant households, migration began after the mid-1980s while half of Turkish 
Inigrant households sent their members abroad earlier. Neveliheless, the coincidence 
between the intensification of Kurdish migration and the Kurdish ethnic H?\"i\"al mu-;t 
be taken into account. Kurdish households are more likely to participate in international 
nligration than are Turkish households in the Eastern regions
85 (Table 6.2). 
In the eastern region, between 25° 0 and 40° ° of the population i-; e-;timated to be 
Kurdish (Sirkeci 2000; Mutlu 1996). Ho\\'c\'er. Table 6.2 shows they constitute alnw-;t 
two third of recent Inigration flo\\"s although they are merely one third (221) of the 
S~ TI E .' I des East 1 al1d L'ast 1 r~lTion" of the carlier analvsi" for the purpl)"l' of an easier 
, . 1C ast regIOn mc u l - b . . "" -
presentation of the distinct pattel11s of thc Kurdish populatIOn \\llhm Turkey. 
Migration patterns alld morimriolls 
sample population (764). Turkish Kurds' rt'· . . pa lClpatlOn m migration flows is greater 
than that of their Turkish neighbours. An explanation may lie in either the different 
effects of the ethnic conflict on each ethnic group in the surrou d' . . n mg regIOn or 111 the 
opportunity framework created by the EOI discussed in the previous chapter. Such an 
opportunity framework could have led the Kurds to emigrate because they, as members 
of an oppressed (or disadvantaged) ethnic minority, have a better chance to be admitted 
as refugees by Western European countries. Thus, the Kurds could be more likely to 
migrate than the Turks. 
Table 6.2. Migration status of households in the East region, 1996 (%) 
Kurdish Turkish Total 
Recent migration household 21.3 4.8 9.6 
Recent return migration household 1.8 1.3 1..+ 
Non-recent migration household 7.2 6.8 6.9 
Non-migration household 69.7 87.1 82.1 
N 221 543 764 
Source: TIMS 1996 household data 
An individual's immediate environment influences her or his migration behaviour. In 
terms of the relationship between migration and networks, this means families, friends, 
and the characteristics of the community are important. The highest emigration rates for 
both ethnic groups were observed in the Central region (see Table 6.1), which can 
partly be explained by such an effect. This region is composed of two provinces 
(Aksaray and Yozgat) with long-established migration flows dating back to the 
beginning of Turkish international migration in the early 1960s (Abadan-Unat et al. 
1976b). This long migration history means individuals in the region ha\'t~ more 
information and easier access to resources to facilitate international migration than 
individuals living elsewhere. In this regard, it is important to analyse whether there are 
more migrations from households with a history of past migrations. 
Household size reflects migration patterns in relation to the relationship between the 
number of household members and migration behaviour. Table 6.3 displays the an~rage 
household size by household migration status for both ethnic groups in all regions and 
also specifically in the East. The TIl\lS uses t\VO definitions. The first. (,\) includes all 
111e111bers of the household \\'ho \\'ere declared to be part of the household. irrespe,-·ti\'t~ 
of where they currently live: it, therefore, includes houschold mcmbers whu li\ c 
abroad. The second definition (B) includes only those members whl) l'ulTently li\"\.~ in 
Turkey. This provides an indication of absent household members. ,\n l'\amination of 
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households, according to definition A, finds that the overall average household size is 
5.5 (Table 6.3). The difference between the two definitions gives an idea of the number 
of household members who live abroad. When migrant households \\'ith recent CUITent 
migrants are examined, the average number of members abroad is 3.1 for Turkish 
Kurds while it is 1.7 for Turkish households. This also indicates a stronger tendency 
towards international migration among Turkish Kurdish households than Turkish 
households (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3. The average household size (pre-migration or five years before the 
survey) by migration status, 1996 
All regions The East 
Kurdish Turkish Kurdish Turkish 
A B A B A B .\ B 
Rec. current migrant household 8.2 5.1 8.2 6.5 7.2 5.5 7.0 5.0 
Recent return migrant household 12.4* 11.7* 5.9 5.7 7.3* 7.0* 6 . ..t* 6.3* 
Non-recent migrant household 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.5 4.5 -+'3 ..t . ..t ..t.O 
Non-migration household 5.9 5.9 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.5 
Mean 6.4 5.8 5.3 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.5 5.4 
N 335 335 1,222 1,222 220 220 544 544 
Source: TIMS 1996 household data *Less than 8 cases 
The household sizes for recent migrant households prior to migration were larger than 
for past migrant and non-migrant households five years prior to the survey. The size 
difference is even larger in households with at least one recent migrant (6.2). Kurdish 
households in the East regions are almost the same size as their Turkish neighbours but 
in other regions, the overall average household size for the Kurds is larger than for the 
Turks: 5.8 according to definition Band 6.4 by definition A compared to 5.1 and 5.3 
respectively for the Turks (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.4. The average number of household members abroad and in Germany by 
household migration status, 1996 (%) 
Kurdish Turkish Total 
Germanl: Abroad Germanl: Abroad Germany :\hroad 
Recent migration household 0.84 2.90 1.07 2.16 
0.99 2,42 
Recent return migration h.hold 0.69 2.29 0.06 1.31 
0.17 1.49 
Non-recent migration household 0.29 \.57 0.14 
1.21 0.J5 \.44 
Non-migration household 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.23 0.75 0.10 0,)'""' 0.12 044 Total 335 335 1.2 " 1.22'" 1.56..t 1.5h~ N 
Source: TlMS 1996 household data ----~---- ----
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As Table 6.4 demonstrates, the average number of members abroad i 0.44 for all 
households, which shows the high involvement of communities in international 
migration within the survey regions. This figure is 2.42 for household with l' en! 
migrants. The average number of members in Germany for all recent miuration 
households is 1. Corresponding figures for Turkish Kurdish househo lds are a follow : 
the mean number of members abroad is 0. 75 (0 .37 for the Turks) 2.9 for tho with 
recent migrants (2 .1 for the Turks), and the mean number of member in Gemlan i 
0.84 (1.07 for the Turks: Table 6.4). Therefore, on average, Kurds are more likel to b 
abroad than Turks but fewer Kurds than Turks preferred Germany. High a erage 
numbers may indicate a migration pattern involving more than one individual from th 
same household moving simultaneously. It can also be an indication of chain migration 
from households, with one individual moving, to be followed at later dates by other 
from the same household. 
Figure 6.1. The financial situation of households by migration status, 1996 
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Economic deprivation plays an important role in international migration (See Chapter 
2). Therefore, to depict the patterns of who moves who sta)'s. it is \\"orth comparing 
households' economic situation. Figure 6.1 compares households in tenl1S of their 
financial and comparative economic conditions. Financial adequacy is measured in 
terms of ability to afford all the basic needs for the household. 
The literature suggests that migration is conditional on having certain leyel of sociaL 
cultural, and economic capital and hence many people want to but only a fe\\ migrate 
(e.g. Hammar 1995; i<;duygu et al. 2001). It also suggests that migration is more likely 
for those people from middle-income groups whereas it is less likely for those from the 
poorest and richest portions of society (e.g. Hammar et al. 1997: i<;duygu et al. 2001). 
According to this view, we may expect that migrant Kurds were relatiycly better off 
compared to their non-migrant neighbours. The distribution of migrant and non-migrant 
households between different financial status categories is yery similar in both ethnic 
groups (Figure 6.1, A.l and A.2). 
One fifth of Turkish Kurdish migrant households were better off than their neighbours 
and only one third of them were reported financially sufficient prior to emigration. For 
Turkish households, the picture is almost the same: almost a quarter of migrant 
households were reported as financially sufficient or better (Figure 6.1). Therefore the 
above mentioned hypothesis (i.e. Hammar et al. 1997) seems supported by the Turkish 
Kurdish case. The differences between different financial categories \\'ere found 
statistically significant in the analysis. About half of migrants in both ethnic groups 
reported that their financial situation were the same as their neighbours. Only less than 
a quarter of Turkish Kurdish migrants were better off than their neighbours prior to 
migration. 
However data on economIC well-being is problematic because obtaining actual 
, 
information is often difficult due to culture specific perceptions and codes of practice. 
For instance, most people do not want to disclose their actual eanlings to either proted 
h I ~ 'e lousy or because of legal or tax cot1cems, .\Iso in some culture--. t enlse ves lrom J a 
1 I I d ty about 
economic matters is essential. Therefore it is yery hard to 
sue 1 as sam, mo es 
1
· bl " .... t a question askin o \\'hether one's household is better than the get a re la e ans\\ eI 0 t:-
. I . I bid from 'lI1other J10int of \iew. peuple ma~ abu be rclu('tant 
others 111 t le nelg 1 our 100 . t 
. . tsider So these findin~s should be interpreted with carl'. 
to adnlit thclr poycrty to an ou . . ~ 
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6.2.2. Individuals: who stays, who moves 
"But you surely know that not just the Kurds, half the Middle East H'oliid emigrate i(the\' 
could. We can't physically stop them, " (Mr, Sami Abdul Rahman) . . 
These are the words of the deputy prime minister of the Kurdish Regional GO\"enlment 
of Northem Iraq (Guardian, August 2,2001). However half of the :\liddle East has not. 
in fact, migrated. Regardless of environmental conditions, only a relatiyely small 
fraction of individuals have actually moved abroad: migration also depends strongly on 
individual characteristics and capacities. The characteristics of individuals haye a 
decisive role in migration. The following analyses focus on some basic contrasts 
between migrant and non-migrant individuals to answer the question of who stays and 
who moves. 
A voluminous literature on selection of migrants has been built since the laws of 
Ravenstein (1889). Age and gender were referred to as two of the strongest 
characteristics for selectivity in migration (Salt and Clout 1976; Lc\\is 1982). 
Accordingly Lee (1970) suggested that young adults are the most mobile segment of 
the population and men are more likely to migrate than women (p.438; see also Chant 
1992). The literature has also considered unemployed people and professionals to be 
the most mobile elements of the population. Many more examples can be found in this 
regard such as retirement migration (e.g. Rogers 1992). This study has also investigated 
another area of selectivity: ethnicity. 
In order to outline gender and age selectivity patterns in Turkish Kurdish migration. 
Figure 6.2 presents age and sex distributions for migrants and non-migrants of both 
ethnicities. It shows among both ethnic groups lesser women in\'olved in migration 
compared with men. The limited representation of women in migration can be related 
to cultural characteristics. Migration of single or unaccompanied women is usually not 
favoured in Muslim societies (KadlOglu 1994 and 1997). Therefore, it can be assumed 
that Turkish Kurdish women also often migrated for family reasons including 
't- t' d mat·rl·age Mrs cirin Onsal who \\as born in Gaziantep and mi~ratcd 
reUl1l lca Ion an .' y , ~ 
to Genl1any in 1967, briefly explained this: 
" ... For girls, it was lIot possible to go to the school, ('\'el1 ill Ga:iallfep [all industrialised 
b 
,7 I' 'll' 'Illel" IIIC!....,· Thi\' has challf;ed recclltl" bllt still most \\"0 111 ell ill 
lIr an centre). l\ as ('.\ ( ) ,.,., LC • 
. d' "II" . t E"cent fiJI' a (£:\1' political \\'Ol11cn who arri\'t:c/ rccent/y, the Oll/Y 1\.1Ir [stan arc I ltela c... .\ r. . 
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way for Kurdish women to come here is marriage. Can you imagine a society that does 
not let its girls learn would let them to move abroad alone? I never rnet sllch H'Omell here 
since I arrived. .. " 
Despite the restrictions mentioned by Mrs. Unsal , Turkish Kurdish women are more 
likely to migrate than the Turks according to the TIMS (Figure 6.2) . The rea on 
Turkish Kurdish migration involves more women than the Turks may be due to the 
type of migration. According to in-depth interviews, Kurds are likely to migrate 
clandestinely as asylum seekers (see Appendix 4.2 for migrant profiles). Therefore 
most of the respondents interviewed in Cologne were asylum seekers and they had 
either managed to bring their families or were still trying to do so. Within such an 
asylum seeking scenario, the pioneer migrant, or key migrant, was often male as it was 
among the respondents of this study and these n1ales had brought their families 
partners and children. Thus, a higher participation of Kurdish W01nen compared to the 
Turks seems to be related to such 'chain-family-asylum migration'. 
Figure 6.2. Age at last migration for migrants and five years ago for non-migrants, 
by sex, 1996 
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Again related to that asylum-seeking scenano, there may also be an ethnic conflict 
related motivation. Due to ethnic conflict, the first member of the family to migrate 
often tries to bring others left behind in order to rescue them from the threat of 
persecution. Obviously this motivation is less valid for the Turks in here. The conflict 
may cause a general intention among the Kurds to resettle abroad whenever the 
possibility occurs, whereas their Turkish neighbours could leave their wives at home 
when they migrated, intending to return home later, with no fear of persecution. 
According to these two scenarios, more female participation in Kurdish migration 
compared to Turkish migration can be a result of the EOI, which forces (and also 
enables) the Kurds to migrate abroad as small units (i.e. families , couples) instead of 
individuals. Both the TIMS data and the in-depth interviews have provided evidence 
supporting such a tendency. 
Figure 6.3. Age structure by migration status, 1996 (%) 
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Figure 6.3 compares the age structure of both ethnic groups with respect to migration 
status on the basis of information about their age when they last migrated. Ages used 
here are either migrants' ages at their last migration or non-migrants' ages fi\'e years 
ago. 86 Most Turkish Kurds had migrated at a young age, between 18 and 24 (30% of 
current and 43 % of return migrants). The second largest migrant age cohort for them is 
25-34. Their Turkish counterparts are concentrated in the age cohort of 25-34. The 
majority of Turkish current and return migrants migrated in their late twenties and early 
thirties (380/0 for current and 460/0 for return migrants). Few Turks were older than 44 
when they last migrated (8% of current and 5% of return migrants). However, for the 
Kurds, migration continued in these older ages as well. The proportions of Turkish 
Kurdish migrants in the age cohorts of 45-54 and 55+ are 16% for current and 40/0 for 
return migrants (Figure 6.3). 
Turkish Kurdish current migration seems to be starting at earlier ages than for the 
Turks. However, unlike the Turks, there are also quite large proportions of current 
Kurdish migrants among the older age groups as well (Figure 6.3). 
The picture drawn so far shows a spread of migration through all age groups in Turkish 
Kurdish society although there is evidence confirming the age and sex selectivity 
hypothesis of the literature on migration. However, the differences between the two 
ethnic groups (i.e. the Turks and the Kurds) may still find an explanation in the EOI 
they have experienced differently in Turkey, since many Turkish Kurds fled Turkey in 
all age groups. As mentioned earlier Kurdish migrants called for their parents and their 
siblings when they settled in the destination country. For example, Mr. Zivo, one of the 
Cologne respondents who arrived in Germany as an asylum seeker, had brought all of 
his family to Germany in the few years after he became a refugee (see Appendix 4.2 for 
his migration pathway). Similarly, Mr. E~ref Oztilrk also arrived as an asylum seeker 
and was granted refugee status after a few weeks and then brought his wife and parents 
to Gern1any (Appendix 4.2). It took 6 months to reunite his family. 
Ethnic conflict and its repercussions are felt differently among the Turkish and Kurdish 
populations as has already been discussed in Chapter 5. There may be some evidence to 
suggest that Turkish n1igration appears to be a movement for economic betten11ent and 
attracts people who are in the early stages of their lives but not older people. However. 
S(l Thc TlI\IS adopted the strategy of obtaining age five years ago for non-migrants in order tn ~ave a t~ir 
al'Count of comparability bet\\'een migrants and non-migrants, Fin? years corres~onds to thc middle POlllt 
as the SLIr\,cy' s targeted migrations in the ten year period bet\\'een 19~.5 and 199::-, 
1.+0 
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Kurdish migration reflects an escape rather than a move-abroad for earning or avmg. 
Relatively high participation of older people in migration flows then seems 
understandable. Therefore, according to the TIMS data, the average age at firs t 
emigration among Turkish Kurds was 34, and average age at last emigration was 39 
whereas corresponding figures for the Turks were 30 and 31 respectively87. 
Figure 6.4. Country of last destination for recent international migrants, 1996 (%) 
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The choice of destination could also indicate motivations for migration because country 
related characteristics (e.g. large migrant stock, established migration networks, 
infonnation) may appeal to potential migrants. For example, Germany leads the list of 
destination countries for both ethnicities although fewer Kurdish than Turkish migrants 
went there (50% versus 66% respectively) (Figure 6.4). This pattern may be explained 
by two aspects of the Turkish international migratory regime. First, there has been an 
established migration system between Turkey and Germany since the early 1960s. This 
perhaps detennined the picture drawn in Figure 6.4 showing migration trends in the ten 
years between 1986 and 1996. A second reason can be migration networks which are 
more developed with Germany than with other destinations, since Germany has been 
the major destination in Turkish international migration since the 1960s (see Chapter 
3). 
The second n10st preferred destination country for Turki h Kurd i Au tria. 15% of 
Kurdish recent Inigrants Inigrated to this country wherea only 6% of Turk did. Fran 
and Switzerland were the two other major de tination to here about 200/0 of Turki h 
7 The dif~ rence between mean for the two ethnic population ar al 0 te t d by O\"-\, nd p \ aluc 
for mean calculation are found a fo llow: age at fir t migration: 0.049 and age at \a t migrati 11 : . O. 
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Kurds headed. Other European countries including the UK, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands also attracted about 8% of Turkish Kurds. A contrasting picture appear 
here in that fewer Turks preferred these other European countries compared to the 
Kurds. On the other hand, Arab countries including Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan 
were targeted by just 2% of Turkish Kurds while 6% of Turks migrated to these 
countries. 88 
Better economic opportunities in Europe compared to other destination countries have 
perhaps appealed to all migrants from Turkey who were motivated by possibilities for 
economic betterment. For the Turkish Kurds, better political circumstances in tem1S of 
ethnic relations could have also played a role in deciding the destination but there is no 
data for a detailed investigation of this issue. 
Figure 6.5. Educational level before migration, 1996 (%) 
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Education has been one of the factors most often referred to in international migration 
studies as an indicator of migration possibilities (e.g. van der Erf and Heering 1995: 
Massey et al. 1993; Lewis 1982; Shryock and Nam 1965; Bogue 1959; Hofstee 1952). 
Most literature suggests that the better educated are more likely to migrate. The 
analysis of this study should probably formulate it as "the relatively better educated" 
because most Turkish Kurds have had very limited formal education (See Chapter 5). 
The TIMS data imply that migrants have some basic education but any further 
education is not a prerequisite (Figure 6.5). When the Kurds are compared with the 
Turks, it is possible to say that the most educated individuals among Turkish Kurds are 
attracted by international migration compared to the Turks. Of Turkish Kurdish 
migrants, 600/0 had primary education and 20% had secondary education prior to 
migration. They were clearly more educated than their non-migrant fellows, but there is 
no statistically significant difference between migrants and non-migrants among the 
Turkish population (Figure 6.5). 
Socio-economic selectivity has also been underlined in the literature referred to above. 
The socio-economic status of migrants in terms of their relative status compared to 
their neighbours has been discussed earlier in this chapter (see Figure 6.1, also Chapter 
5). Employment differentials may facilitate migration from areas with high 
unemployment to areas with more employment opportunities. The applicability of this 
rule to the Turkish Kurdish population is questionable although differences between job 
opportunities in Turkey and Western Europe are beyond doubt. Findings of both parts 
of this research (i.e. the TIMS and in-depth interviews) suggest that migrants are likely 
to be better off compared to their non-migrating neighbours prior to migration. Most 
respondents interviewed in Cologne reported that they were better off than their non-
migrant neighbours when they left for Germany. For many of them, there was also 
disappointment after migration, because they had to work for wages that were smaller 
than they had expected before moving. Thereby, relatively affluent Turkish Kurds 
migrated but they were not able to satisfy their expectations in the destination. Mr. 
E~ref Ozttirk who was a refugee originally from Slmak province (Appendix -+.2) 
reported such a mismatch of his expectations with the reality in terms of working hard 
while expecting an easy, wealthy life abroad: 
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"We were farmers there [Turkey). We had 300 sheep and 100,000 donum89 of land ... ! 
completed primary school then stopped studying ... We were very well off. ! never lt10rked 
there [Turkey J .. .1 swear to God, ! am working very hard here,' harder than I could e1'er 
imagine. " 
Religion plays a part (which is often overlooked in the literature) in migration from 
Turkey. Turkey harbours a religious tension dividing its popUlation into two opposing 
camps: Alevi Muslims and Sunni Muslims. This tension has lasted longer than any 
other conflicts in the country if we count frequent raids by Ottoman Sultans claiming a 
link between the Alevi population in Turkey and the Shia state of Persia (Sener 1993). 
This religious tension often overlaps with the ethnic conflict because of the fact that 
most Alevis are Kurdish while one third of the Kurds are Alevi (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5. Migration status by ethnicity and religion, 1996 (%) 
Total 
Sunni 
Alevi 
Migrant status of individual 
Migrant Non-Migrant 
Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish 
Kurdish Kurdish 
82.2 93.9 81.5 94.8 
17.8 6.1 18.5 5.2 
30.4 69.6 23.7 76.3 
Source: TIMS 1996 individual data 
Total 
91.5 
8.5 
100.0 
The representation of Alevis within the Turkish Kurdish migratory regime is important 
with regard to women's participation. Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in 
Germany very often reported the differences in status of women in Sunni and Alevi 
communities. There is more room for women in the public life of Alevis than Sunnis. 
For instance, Mrs. Hazal Dinler, who came to Germany by marriage (Appendix 4.2), 
stated "men-women relations were very relaxed in our jamily, because we were 
A levis ". At the same time, another respondent, Mrs. Ay~e Gtizel who was an asylum 
seeker from Slmak (Appendix 4.2), was very rarely allowed to go outside the house 
because of religious attitudes, because she was a Sunni and married to a Sunni man. 
Probably because of these different attitudes, almost all of the female respondents 
interviewed were Alevis and most of those women who refused an interview \\'ere 
Sunnis.90 Kurdish Alevi won1en were not just passive joiners of their husbands but also 
active participants ofn1igration in search of betterment of their lives. For example, Mrs. 
Kardelen n1igrated to Gem1any alone as an asylum seeker in the early 1980s (Appendi\. 
89 Dd11l111/ is an area measurement. 1 donlim is equal to 500 square meters. 
90 Social relations in terms of religious differences are also discussed in Chapter 9, 
1-+-+ 
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4.2). She took a long route via Iraq, Syria, Greece, and East Gennany. In another case, 
Mrs. $ilan first moved to Gennany in the late 1970s as a possible bride for her uncle's 
son (Appendix 4.2). Then she decided not to marry and returned home, from where she 
moved to Istanbul, working there for a few years before deciding to migrate again. She 
arrived in Gennany for a second time in the early 1980s as a worker in a textile factory 
and settled for good. 
Throughout this section, we have discussed the possible influence of the ethnic conflict 
on international migration status. It has been clear that the Kurds (especially males but 
also females) are more likely to migrate. The next section investigates the reasons for 
this migration likelihood expressed by the respondents of the TIMS and in the 
qualitative field research in Gennany. 
6.3. Motivations for migration 
The patterns discussed so far generally match the previous literature (Chapter 2). For 
example, the likelihood of migration is higher for males than for females. Past 
migration experiences of individuals and those close to them in their immediate 
environment (e.g. relatives, fellow citizens) also increase the possibility of potential 
migration. Children and the elderly are generally absent from migration flows. 
However, in the specific case of Turkey, comparisons between Turkish Kurdish and 
Turkish groups suggest another factor to be important: ethnic conflict, which has been 
described in earlier chapters as the central component of the broader Eor for the 
Turkish Kurdish population. Thus, in order to understand the detenninants of Turkish 
Kurdish migration in the context of the EOI, socio-economic conditions and expressed 
causes of migration are analysed here using the TIMS data, supported by the findings 
of qualitative field research in Gennany. 
6.3.1. Correlation between migration and the background variables 
To understand the relative influence of the factors we have discussed so far in the first 
half of the chapter, a logistic regression n10del has been developed to analyse the 
comparative influence of these factors. The independent variables in the regression 
model are region, religion, educational attainn1ent, age, sex, household size, financial 
situation, con1parative household welfare situation, and ethnicity. Migration status 
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(coded into two groups: 1 = migrant; 0 = non-migrant) is the dependent variable (Table 
6.6). In the equation all variables except age and household size are defined as 
categorical variables. Categories for these variables were as follows: the regions were 
West (the comparison group), Central, East 1 and East 2; for financial situation, more 
than sufficient was the comparison group, and the other categories were sufficient, 
barely sufficient, and insufficient; the comparison group for comparative financial 
situation was better off as opposed to the same and worse off, ethnicity is coded as 
Kurdish (the comparison group) and Turkish; sex is coded as male (the comparison 
group) and female; the comparison group for religion was Sunni against Alevi and JlO 
religion; finally, education is coded as no education (comparison group), primary 
school, secondary school, higher education. 
According to the logistic regression equation, gender difference, regional variation, age 
difference, and financial situation are the most important factors affecting migration 
(Table 6.6). Gender difference is the strongest variable affecting migration status 
(Wald91 = 180.6). Compared to Westerners, people from the Central region (Exp (B)92 
= 0.948) and Easterners have a lower chance of migration. Migration is very responsive 
to the financial situation of the household of the individual. People who are from 
financially adequate households are the most likely group to migrate compared to those 
from more than sufficient or from inadequate households. It is possible to say the 
likelihood of migration for the middle category of people is 9 times higher than for 
richer people (Exp (B) = 9.318). The comparative financial situation of individuals' 
households indicates that when they are better off their likelihood of migration is lower 
(Table 6.6). 
Alevis (Exp (B) = 1.780) are also more likely to migrate than Sunni Muslims. The 
exponential (B) for non-religious group (2.575) indicates that they are also more likely 
to migrate than Sunnis, although this was not statistically significant (p = 0.184). The 
Turks are less likely to migrate, other things being equal, than are the Kurds (Exp (B) = 
0.638), which can easily be connected to the overall EOI as a facilitating factor for their 
migration. The results for educational attainment are also not surprising as those with 
91 Wald scores are used to indicate comparative significance of each variable in the model. The statistical 
si~nificance of each of the coefficients used in logistic regression is evaluated using the Wald test where 
th~ coefficient is di\'ided by its standard error (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996:59S-599). 
()2 Exp (8) values arc odds ratios used for easy interpretation ?f coeffi~ie~ts, 8 Yalues, ge~erated by 
lo~istic rc~rcssioll. The odds ratio is the increase (or decrease If the ratio IS less than one) 111 odds of 
being in 0~1e outcome category \\hen the \alue of the predictor increases by one unit. Odds ratio = ell 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 1996:2S2 and 607). 
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minimum educational qualifications (primary school (Exp (B) = 1.812) or secondary 
school (Exp (B) = 2.414)) are twice more likely to migrate than their non-educated 
fellows. Those with higher education are half as likely to migrate (Exp (B) = 0.545) but 
this was not statistically significant (p = 0.189) (Table 6.6). However, it still supports 
the idea that migration is more likely to attract middle category people rather than those 
in the lowest or the highest ranks. 
Table 6.6. The relevance of some background variables to migration status, 1996 
Migration (B) Wald S!g. 
Region (comgarison = West) 87.069 .000 
Central region 
-.054 .128 .721 
East 1 region 
-1.325 54.234 .000 
East 2 region 
-.669 14.762 .000 
Household size .052 9.224 .002 
Sex (comparison = Male) 
Female -1.744 180.579 .000 
Age .035 72.175 .000 
Financial situation (comparison = more than sufficient) 59.714 .000 
Sufficient 2.232 47.376 .000 
Barely sufficient 1.711 27.307 .000 
Insufficient 1.544 21.582 .000 
Coml2ared financial situation (com2arison = better off) 14.825 .001 
Same -.523 13.531 .000 
Worse off -.562 10.203 .001 
Religion (comparison = Sunni) 12.226 .002 
Alevi .577 10.374 .001 
No religion .946 1.766 .184 
Education (comparison = no education) 28.364 .000 
Primary .595 18.267 .000 
Secondary .881 16.224 .000 
Higher -.607 1.724 .189 
Ethnicity (comparison = Kurdish) 
Turkish -.449 l3.307 .000 
Constant -3.963 l33.346 .000 
Initial -2 log likelihood: 2797.632 
Model improvement: 589.76 
Significance: 0.00 
% Correctly classified: 87.8 
Number of cases: 4589 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.231 
Source: TIMS 1996 individual data 
Migration is quite responsive to the age of individual and the size of household he or 
she is fron1; more mature people are more likely to migrate than are the young (Exp 
(8) = 1.036). In addition, individuals from larger households are more likely to migrate 
than those [ron1 s111aller households: larger household size also means greater chance of 
migration (Exp (8) = 1.053: Table 6.6). This may be explained by added ability to 
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migrate for those who were from larger households because of larger social and 
economic capital provided by a large number of people in the household. It simply 
means more people to support one's migration but it also means more pressures of 
expectations by those left behind on this single individual's migration. However, there 
is no direct finding of this study to support such a hypothesis which remains a 
speculation. 
The individual effect of each variable in the equation can be seen by examining the 
Wald scores (Table 6.6). Gender and region have the highest Wald scores (180.6 and 
87.1 respectively) indicating they have the largest effects on migration. They are 
followed by age (Wald = 72.2) and by the financial situation of household (Wald = 
59.7). Religion, ethnicity, and comparative financial situation are the weakest three of 
the nine variable groups according to their lower Wald scores (Table 6.6). Education 
also does not seem very effective with a relatively low Wald score (28.4). Nevertheless, 
all the variables tested here were significant in explaining individual respondents' 
migration statuses. 
The overall model fit is 23% (Nagelkerke R2) in predicting the variation in migration of 
individuals. The model represents a significant improvement over the null model, 
which does not take any variables into account (Table 6.6). The equation correctly 
classified 880/0 of all cases. However it was better at predicting who stays (99% of these 
cases were correct) than who moves (only 60/0 of these cases were correctly predicted). 
Although the statistical model presented above has a very good prediction with a high 
level of significance, it is still important to see how individual migrants formulate their 
rationales for migration. Beside, the qualitative material can provide some insights for a 
better understanding of their migration, since the model could explain only 23% of the 
variation in individual migration. To understand the rest of the variation of the Turkish 
Kurds' international migration, their migration experiences need to be analysed. The 
following section focuses on how immigrants have expressed their causes for migration 
on the basis of the findings of qualitative research and the TIMS data. 
6.3.2. Expressed reasons for migration 
The reasons for migration are not easy to identify and even more difficult to measure. 
Although there are son1e attempts to make generalisations on migration, they are still 
Migration patterns and motimtiolls 
controversial (see Chapter 2). All we could do is to have an approximate understanding 
of them. As has already been discussed in earlier chapters, economic and political 
factors are important determinants of migration. Structural differences between the 
sending and receiving areas such as wage differentials, uneven distribution of 
employment opportunities, and wealth differences determine the broader patterns of 
international migration. However, it is equally important to understand how individuals 
negotiate these macro structural factors. 
Individual level analysis helps to understand the Turkish Kurds' perceptions of socio-
economic and political unevenness and their implications at the micro level. This 
section combines the TIMS findings with those from the qualitative research on the 
causes of migration as the respondents expressed them. The TIMS gathered 
information about economic, family related and other reasons. Job improvement, 
employment opportunities, and betterment of income were the most common reasons 
given for migration by TIMS respondents while family related reasons such as family 
reunification and marriage were also often referred to. Very few other reasons were 
encountered, but among those which did feature were education, fear of war or 
persecution, adventure, and so on. In the qualitative research, the interview schedule 
focused on reasons for migration, but usually interviewees have hidden their reasons 
within their broader story. The reasons were often nested in a political narrative 
revolving around Kurdish ethnic rivalry. Nevertheless, the motivations for migration 
reported in the interviews were broadly similar to those recorded in the TIMS. 
According to the TIMS, most of the current and return migrants were worried about 
employment prior to their migration. They often reported they could not find a job in 
Turkey and therefore migrated. A large proportion revealed that in migrating they were 
looking for a job and a better income while a small fraction reported their migration 
was for family reasons. Women are an exception as the majority of them migrated to 
join their spouses or to accompany them. Figure 6.6 presents the most important 
reasons for migration by ethnicity and gender, according to the TIMS. Findings are 
presented in two graphs to compare migrants who went to Germany with other 
migrants. The 'other' category for males mostly refers to mo\'es made to a\'oid 
1.+9 
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compulsory military service. Within the other category, only one won1an went abroad 
for education but others were unknown.93 
Figure 6.6. Main motives for the first migration, 1996 (%) 
Migration to other countries 
90% 
80% /' 
1  
I 
= 
C 
"""'" - 1-1 70% 
j 
-"" 
-60% 
oj 1 
DEconomic I 50% 
40% -"" o Family 
/I I ~ DOther F ~ 30% 
/I 1- - 1- -F= P 
20% 
-"" 
- rr ,- - 1- ----1 it r 10% 0% 
Male Female Male Female 
Kurdish Turkish 
N: Kurdish male:50, female: 11, Turkish male: 128, 
female: 13. 
Source: TIMS 1996 individual data 
Migration to Germany 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
Male Femal e Male 
Kurdish 
OEconomic 
o Family 
OOther 
Female 
Turkish 
N: Kurdish male:51, f emale:ll ,Turkish male:182, 
female:34. 
Economic motivations such as looking for better jobs and improvement of income were 
major reasons for men from both ethnic groups but these economic causes constituted a 
very small fraction of the reasons for women's migration (Figure 6.6). For women, 
family reasons were dominant in both ethnic groups. Migration to Germany seems 
more economic oriented than migration to other destinations. About a quarter of both 
Kurdish and Turkish women reported migrating to Germany for economic betterment. 
The category of other reasons constituted nearly 30% of answers given by Turkish 
Kurdish migrants to destinations other than Germany compared to less than 20% for the 
Turkish migrants. Examining the reasons within the other reasons category may be 
helpful to analyse the contribution of ethnic conflict. Although the TIMS individual 
questionnaire included an answer option to report terror and security reasons, only two 
respondents chose this and puzzlingly enough both of these cases were Turki h! 
Avoiding compulsory military service was another category related to the EOI in the 
'other reasons' category. It wa a n10re frequent reason for migration among Turki h 
9"\ Th UnlulO\ n rea on in th other ategory among th main motive for th fir t migration could be 
the re ult of u ing prox re pond nt in the un' y. in e all que tionnair D r \\ am n re ord d 111 
' other ' were compl t d b prox I re p ndent . 
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Kurds than the Turks. This is understandable with regard to the meaning of military 
service in the Turkish Army for a Kurdish man in the context of an ongoing ethnic 
conflict. However, because compulsory military service in Turkey means all men are 
drafted when they reach the age of twenty regardless of ethnicity, many Turkish men, 
as well as the Kurds, try to escape from it by migrating abroad. Most of the other 
reasons for migration given by Turkish Kurds were education related while a few of 
them stated they had escaped from political oppression and persecution. 
The differences between the other destinations and Germany with respect to the other 
category are noticeable. While other reasons constituted just 100/0 of male migration to 
Germany, they amounted to almost 30% of reasons for migration to other countries. 
When we consider these proportions along with the discussion above about avoiding 
military service and security reasons due to terror activities in Turkey, the difference 
makes the researcher think of a specific type of migration. Migration to other 
destinations could involve more asylum migration than to Germany. However, TIMS 
data do not allow us to distinguish migration types in this regard. 
In the TIMS, family related reasons for migration are defined as accompanying the 
spouse, joining the spouse later, or marriage. Almost no Turkish Kurdish men had 
moved abroad to marry or to join a spouse compared to 5% of Turkish men. Women's 
migration, by contrast, was dominated by marriage moves. 50% of Turkish migrant 
women went to Germany as brides or to accompany their husbands compared to 250/0 
who went for work. The remaining 250/0 were born in Germany. For Kurdish migrant 
women, the movement did not mean more than accompanying a husband, except for a 
few who migrated to seek employment or for better income.94 
Economic reasons were often reported in the qualitative research as well. However, the 
stories recorded in the qualitative interviews do not suggest an employment crisis for 
migrants in Turkey prior to their move although they provide further evidence on the 
predominantly family related migration of women. Most of the Turkish Kurdish 
immigrants interviewed in Germany said they had a job at home before migration, 
which provided a pretty good living. In addition, they frequently argued that prior to 
migration: they had a false impression of living in Germany. They were expecting to 
earn a lot more in Germany than they did in Turkey prior to migration. Mr. Hasan 
l)-l The number of Kurdish women \\'ho migrated to Germany for economic reasons \\ere just 3 in TI\ 1S. 
The conesponding figure for Turkish \\omen \\as 8. 
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Uzmez, a guest worker who came to Germany in 1972 (Appendix 4.2), clearly stated 
that he was not living in poverty in Turkey: 
" .. .1 was born in a peasant family with five children. We were a farmer family wizen 1 left 
for Germany. We were not very wealthy but we never suffered from poverty in terms of 
basic needs and expenditures there. We were even better off than many of Ollr 
neighbours in our town ... " 
Mrs. Saliha Deniz, an asylum seeker since 1995 (Appendix 4.2), emphasises she was 
well off in Istanbul prior to migration. She escaped from police pressure due to her 
activities in HADEP (a pro-Kurdish political party): 
" ... My family was running a big retail store in Istanbul. We all [sisters and brothers} 
studied at university level. There were no financial problems at home in any period of my 
life there. We owned a few flats in Istanbul and all my uncles and aunts were 
economically well off, and of course my elder brother and many relatives have lived here 
in Germany. Therefore our economic situation was never a reason for migration ... but 
when my family fled to Istanbul from Elazzg it was for work mainly as they told us 
I " ater ... 
Mr. Sefer Demir came to Germany by marrying a Dutch woman. He also had no 
financial difficulties in Turkey before migration, but the underlying reason for 
migration was still economic. He met his German citizen, Dutch ex-wife, in Antalya, a 
holiday resort in southern coast of Turkey, and arranged a contract marriage to last for 
five years. The project was to benefit from a contract marriage until getting a residence 
permit as a spouse of a German citizen. For him, this was the easiest way of migrating 
to Europe. Within the framework of such a contract marriage, he aimed to improve his 
social and economic conditions, and for him, this was only possible by migration; 
migration by any means. He developed this idea via his observations from fellow 
migrants' visits to his hometown in Turkey when he was a teenager. It can be called as 
imagined security in relation to the EOI conceptualisation developed in Chapter 2. He 
says that people in Turkey were misled by the vision of those earlier immigrants who 
visited Turkey every year and projected themselves as living in great wealth: 
" ... If'hcll 1 \\'OS 0 child, mon)' of our felloH's lI'tT(' immigrants in Germany, /\'erherlands, 
etc, Thcy \'isited the tmvn (,\'CIT year, summer time, These people [migrants) were liar 
telling the truth. Thcy nen'r spoke about their real life here ill Germany but always 
talked about all "imagined" life. It was a paradise ... They were always wearing good 
clothes, suits. caring bealtt(ful food. They "'ere \vealthy looking ... . ~ II of us, youngsters. 
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envied them. We wished for the same good life for ourselves too. In those days, all my 
friends and 1 thought about coming to Germany whenever we got a chance to move ... Blll 
now, 1 know what is happening. It was all a show. They were getting loans before going 
to Turkey on holiday; loans to buy gifts, clothes etc. Just to give a wealthy impressioll. 
Their relatives and friends in Turkey, like me, believed in them and wanted to migrate to 
here... Deciding to migrate was so simple. They showed off and we admired and 
eventually came here ... After coming here 1 realised that most of these immigrants .('ere 
working even harder to pay the price of these parading short stays in Turkey ... " 
And of course it was not expected that migration to Germany would mean working too 
hard to earn only a small wage. Needing to work very hard was quite a common 
complaint among Turkish Kurdish men in Cologne, Germany. As they stated clearly, 
when they were in Turkey, women did the heavy work. Mr. E~ref Ozttirk, a refugee 
originally from $lrnak province, also revealed the same point: life was more difficult in 
Germany than it was in Turkey (see quote in page 147). 
Only 40/0 of TIMS respondents refer to the war and conflict situation as their reason for 
leaving. However, this is still significant as the sample population was not from the 
region where armed conflicts have taken place.95 The impact of the ethnic conflict was 
more obvious in the interviews. They underlined that many Turkish Kurdish parents 
wanted to send their sons abroad to save them from the clashes between the PKK and 
the Turkish Army. For many young asylum-seekers, the reason was to escape from 
persecution. If they stayed in their hometowns or villages they would face two choices: 
to join the PKK or the Turkish Army. There was no third option unless you were very 
rich. Mr. E~ref Oztlirk says that the rich people were able to pay both parties and so 
they were safe: 
" '" My uncle is still there [in $zrnakj, but he is the rich man of the town. Nobody can 
touch the rich. He is the richest man of the town. Neither the PKK nor the Arm)' call 
touch him. Since rich men feed both sides. They are never faced .vith what I have faced. 
because both parties, the soldiers and the PKK, have an interest ill them. What happens 
happens to the poor, but nobody else. " 
The answers given in the TIMS to the questions about the reasons of migration may 
hide son1e other possibilities. For example, Mr. Serbilind came to Gern1any for 
95 It is also to be noted here that Hacettepe Uni\"t~rsity (a state university) undertook the T!~I~ with the 
help of official authorities including provincial administra~ions. A lthou~h it \\~s. not all otfIclal s~:vey, 
people, l'specially those of Kurdish origin, could have reframed from statmg poittlcal causes, even It they 
\\ere important, as a precaution. 
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university education in 1980 but there was an implicit plan to stay because he was also 
escaping from the ethnic pressure of the Turkish Army: 
" ... on paper, I came to the university, but actually I came to stay here. What could I do 
in Turkey? A few months after my arrival, the Army took power and declared emergency 
rule there. " 
Many people just searched for a way to migrate to Europe. This may be through 
education channels, business channels, or with the help of traffickers. Thus increasing 
Turkish Kurdish asylum migration from Turkey in recent decades should be considered 
along with this idea of escape. Such a search for security is also the reason for choosing 
Western Europe as a destination. Although both Iran and Russia are geographically 
much closer to the Kurdish populated region, they are less likely to provide expected 
security. The reasons given by migrants for choosing their destination country also 
highlighted another motivation for migration. In the TIMS, respondents were asked 
what was their main reason for moving to the specific country of destination where 
they used to live at the time of the survey. The answers indirectly refer to the 
significance of migration networks. About half of all migrants moved to a particular 
country of destination possibly because their relatives or friends were already there. 
However, the EOI in the form of an ethnic conflict did not constitute the main group of 
motivations for Turkish Kurdish migrants but it also served as an opportunity 
framework. Some of the immigrants interviewed in the Cologne research revealed that 
they had emphasised the role of the ethnic conflict to increase their chances of 
obtaining a residence permit. They applied for asylum because they predicted through 
asylum seeking channel they could stay in Germany. Some of them even made up 
stories to convince the German authorities and pretended that they suffered from ethnic 
and political discrimination in Turkey when in fact they did not. For example, Mr. 
Bayrak utilised the EOI as an opportunity framework. He was living in a Kurdish and 
Alevi dominated neighbourhood in Istanbul, which was raided by the police several 
times in the early 1990s. He had two uncles who were guest workers who had anivcd 
in Gern1any in 1969 and 1973 and they helped his clandestine asylun1 migration to be 
successful: 
.. ... 111 0111' neighbourhood, eveJTbody lI'a1lts their children to escape. The police killed 
mall)' people tilcl'c. It is also a \'c}:r poor part of Istanbul. Nobody could jind a job there. 
Nothing to do ... (flcw on a fake passport and visa ... ... went to my L1ncle 's place ill Berlin 
and appliedfor asylum ... ! claimed that I \faS tortured and so became 1I1clltal(r 1I1lstahle. 
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But I wasn't tortured although it was a possibility because I was taken into custody a {eH' 
times. They sent me for psychiatric examination. I pretended I am mad. Then I got the 
pass! But I had to attend a psychiatric clinic for eight months, twice a week [laughing] . 
.. .1 am sending money to my siblings and mother in Turkey ... " 
Mr. Kuzucu had heard that through the PKK people could get refugee status easily in 
the UK and decided to go. However, instead, he ended up in Gennany, with the help of 
traffickers. His only concern was to make money but nothing else: 
" ... there were few people who migrated from our village. I thought H'e had the chance 
[for residence} because we are Kurdish. Everybody was coming here so I decided to try 
my chance, I could find a job and earn a lot I thought ... they did not give me a \t'ork 
permit. I am staying in a detention centre and not allowed to go further than 30 km. But 1 
am working illegally in restaurants. I am earning about 600 DM (£200) but it is poor ... 
Everybody in Turkey is expecting me to send money to them. So I also considered 
entering into the drug business. They say there is a lot more money ... " 
When the overall findings of analyses of the TIMS and the interviews are examined, 
three groups of motives were decisive for international migration: economic 
betterment, escape from the insecurity created by the ethnic conflict, and family 
reasons. Economic and family reasons were very clearly expressed compared to 
cautious statements about ethno-political insecurity as a reason for migration. However, 
some other small scale local surveys96 conducted in Turkey also suggest that fear of 
persecution or insecurity due to ethnic conflict has been the major cause of migration 
from the South East Turkey where most Turkish Kurds live. 
Nevertheless, the cases of Turkish Kurdish migrants interviewed in Germany reveals 
another aspect: the ethnic conflict or broader ethnic oriented Eor in Turkey has also 
served as an opportunity framework for international migration and thus a reasonable 
number of Turkish Kurds emigrated. Despite many Turkish Kurdish immigrants 
interviewed in Cologne had fled Turkey because of either the fear of persecution or 
actual persecution they suffered, there was also a group of respondents who had a clear 
intention for migration and benefited from the context of the ethnic conflict. The 
CUlTent state of affairs in international migration in Europe was not allo\\"ing people to 
96 According to a sur\'e)' conducted among migrant women in Istanbul (the lar~est metropolitan ~entre of 
Turkey with a population above 10 million), 35 per cent of migrant wO,men n~lgr~ted bccause_ ot the lack, 
of security (ilkkaracan and ilkkaracan 1999: ] 11). In the same suncy. It \\as 1l1dl~ated th,a~ 6:.-- percent ot 
those who migrated for security reasons had no education and their socio-economlc COn?lt\o~1S g~t worse 
atter migration (1999: 317). Sewral other surveys also present similar results about migration trom the 
region (:\k~it and Ak~ay 1999; CHP 1999; T~ ti\ lOB 1999). 
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migrate freely. Thus asylum migration appeared as the most suitable strategy for 
migration. Therefore, some have followed this pathway to gain access to the job 
markets of Western Europe. However, in the last instance, the EOI described in the 
earlier chapters is expected to have an influence on the life strategies of a1l Turkish 
Kurdish people directly or indirectly. 
6.4. Conclusion 
Migration patterns of Turkish Kurds are not so different from the patterns common in 
the international migration literature: migrants are better qualified than their non-
migrant fellows in terms of education; are mainly dominated by young males; and 
cultural characteristics such as religion and perceptions of gender affect composition of 
migration. 
Household characteristics indicate that migrant households belong to poor sectors of 
their communities in general. Perhaps in response to the ethnic armed conflict in the 
eastern region, the proportion of migrants was larger in that region than other parts of 
Turkey. Again due to the very same conflict, the Kurds are more likely to emigrate than 
the Turks. Compared to Turkish emigration, Turkish Kurdish emigration involved more 
individuals per household. 
Concerning individual characteristics, the TIMS data and interviews indicate an 
emigrant population dominated by young people with a minimum level of education 
and who were often working prior to their emigration. However, the Turkish Kurdish 
average age at emigration was higher than that of the Turks possibly because the 
ongoing ethnic conflict might have caused unrest (or push for emigration) among them 
regardless of age and sex. Despite limited representation of women in general among 
migrants from Turkey, Turkish Kurdish Alevi women were also active emigrants not 
only joining their partners or families but also migrating in their own right. 
Nevertheless, for the Turks migration was almost exclusively a male business and 
won1en stayed behind to wait for the end of this temporary movement. 
In tem1S of destination preferences, Turkish Kurds are more likely to migrate to \Vest 
European den10cratic countries than other popular destinations for Turkish migration 
flo\\'s because they are also concerned \\'ith their ethnic freedoms along \\ith economic 
bettern1ent. For the Turks, migration motiYes are gon~n1ed by economic concerns and 
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therefore a large variety of countries is among the destination countries. However. 
regardless of ethnicity, international migration from Turkey is largely directed towards 
Germany. It is related to the history of this migration route and the volume of Turkish 
immigrant stock in this country. 
Reasons for migration are various but the analysis of both the TIMS and the interyiews 
suggest that a vast majority of male migrants were motivated economically, while 
female migration was dominated by family migrations in the form of accompanying or 
joining the husband or marrying somebody who already lived abroad. There were 
differences in terms of other reasons. Turkish Kurdish migrants have been motivated by 
the ethnic conflict but also with a view of economic betterment. This impact has been 
formulated as escape from persecution or avoidance of compulsory military service in 
the Turkish Army. Although it never appeared as the most important reason for 
migration in the TIMS, some immigrants interviewed in Cologne, Germany explicitly 
reported that they left Turkey for security reasons. However, regardless of expressed 
reasons, networks have been one of the most significant factors determining migration. 
The next chapter focuses on this particular influence of migration networks. 
Overall, the analysis of Turkish Kurdish international migration up until here shows 
that the ethnic conflict in the eastern part of Turkey has triggered migration but it also 
played a role as an opportunity framework for those who either had the chance to 
migrate (i.e. qualifications, resources) or had a project of moving abroad (i.e. they had 
wanted to move abroad for a long time). It is hard to consider the ethnic conflict as an 
immediate reason for international migration because only a small fraction of people at 
risk seem to have migrated but it operates as a mega narrative in which other migration 
motives are also placed. However, both qualitative and quantitative analyses indicated 
that the Kurds are more likely to migrate than their Turkish fellow citizens. Many 
Turkish Kurdish fled Turkey to find a secure environment. Therefore their migration in 
recent years is dominated by asylum seeking flows. Although the analysis of the TIMS 
data did not provide evidence for people escaping from persecution due to their 
ethnicity, the Cologne interviews included many accounts of persecuted and threatened 
people. At the same time, the EOI described in Chapter 5 together \\"ith the conte~t 
defined in Chapter 3 alone is strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
en1igration of Turkish Kurds was largely due to an ethnic environment of insecllrit) . 
1.:'7 
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At the end of this chapter, one point needs to be explained. Although the EOI has been 
defined as a very strong push factor forcing many Turkish Kurds to flee Turkey, in the 
analysis return migrants have appeared. There, a distinction between the TIMS data and 
the qualitative data should be made. The analysis of return migrants are based on the 
TIMS data which do not include asylum and clandestine migration due to the nature of 
the survey as explained earlier (i.e. it was a survey conducted by a state institute). At 
the same time, with an understanding of the EOI as an opportunity framework, it would 
not be impossible to return. Therefore the reader should not be confused with the 
analysis of return migrants in the following chapters. 
Chapter VII 
Migration Mechanisms 
7.1. Introduction 
"\figration mechanisms 
"Kiirtler yalan soylemek zorunda: 
Arnavutlar, dogru . .. 
(Cemal Siireya, 1989, p.1/r 
Following the exploration of Turkish Kurdish migration patterns in the previous 
chapter, this chapter focuses on the mechanisms of migration in terms of the role of 
information, the role of migration networks and migration strategies. Information and 
migration networks are indivisible components of the migration process. Alongside 
background characteristics (i.e. sex, age, education, and welfare status), type, amount 
and source of information are also important in the migration decision (De long and 
Gardner 1981). Information that facilitates migration is channelled through migration 
networks. Migration strategies are also shaped by the availability and the characteristics 
of migration network. Therefore personal networks (i.e. familial ties, friendship and 
community ties) in destination countries appear as a key factor in determining and 
maintaining international migration (Massey et al. 1987; Boyd 1989; Hugo 1981; Faist 
2000). 
In Faist's work (2000: 123), networks are explained in relation to social capital and 
discussed as a factor influencing "differential rates of migration out of various 
communities within the countries of origin". They are also important in transmitting 
remittances and in job and accommodation arrangements before the move. Thus 
networks minimise the risks of migration. The influence of networks are important in 
migration decision making in societies in which strong family obligation and reciprocal 
exchange are dominant and supported by strong ties between migrants and the 
community of origin (Esveldt et al. 1995). This feature also applies to Turkish Kurdish 
n1igration, which is largely dominated by chain migration of family members (Boeker 
1995). 
The following section examines the role of inforn1ation in the process of migration. It 
elaborates the nature of infon11ation in terms of sources and type. The second part of 
97 "The Kurds hayc to lie; Albanians hayc to tdl the truth," [A literal transbtion by the rescarcher). 
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this chapter focuses on the role of migration networks. The size of networks and 
differentiation (by gender and throughout the destination countries) are also examined. 
The final part of the chapter elaborates the migration strategies observed among 
Turkish Kurdish immigrants with reference to admission strategies, organisation of the 
journey, and the costs. 
7.2. The Role of Information 
Information on the country of destination is considered to be vital in migration 
decisions, and it is important for success in adaptation to new circumstances 
(HanclOglu and Ergo9men, 2000:94). Having information prior to migration can also 
influence the plan of the journey. For instance, information on admission rules may 
direct potential migrants either to entry with legal documents or to illegal entry. Being 
informed about job opportunities in a certain destination country may create an 
intention to migrate to that country, a decision possibly facilitated by labour 
recruitment agencies. Similarly, people under the threat of persecution for ethnic or 
political reasons may try to migrate to countries with a better democratic environment 
for their ethno-political existence than their home countries if they have such 
information about democracy in different countries. In this respect, information is 
decisive in choosing the destination country. 
Although the quality of information that migrants had prior to their migratory move is 
not known, the TIMS data shows that majority of them had information on their last 
country of destination before the commencement of their journey (Table 7.1.).98 
Table 7.1. Proportion of Turkish Kurdish migrants who had information about 
the country of destination prior to their last emigration, 1996 
According to sex 
By gender: Male Female "\ 
67 100 185 
By migration status: Recent current Recent return Past current Past return "\ 
72 45 48 -.+5 185 
Source: rIMS 1996 individual data 
98 It t b t d i1ere that the number of missing cases is quite high in the TI\IS data, This is basically 
mus e no e ' ' I' 'd :l due to the fact that proxy respondents were used in TIi\lS' i~tenlc\\s, Theref~re, t elr re atl\'~s_pro\,1 ,Cl 
f th 'C' tl'on about ClllTent migrants Hence II1 most cases, With respect to II1fOrmatlon 1110St 0 e 11110nna ,-," , 
, 'I bl t tl 'e nll'grants their relatiws who were proxy respondents could haw prOVided vcry poor a\ al a e 0 lOs c, , , , , 
. ,t tl questions in the survey, In some of the tables of thiS chapter. 111lSSll1g cases are lesponscs 0 lese -, , h' I ' ',' I d d ' 
I d d ,'d' d da 1C\' \\'h~n the proportion of mISSllH! cases was extremely I~ 1 It Is mc u e IJ1 (,Xl' U e to a\ 01 Ie un I .' " ~ 
tables. 
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Overall, about two thirds of Turkish Kurdish emigrants had some sort of information 
about their destination countries prior to their last migration. More women had 
information prior to migration than men. This may be due to the fact that women 
moved to accompany or join their spouses in most cases. Thus they knew at least the 
conditions of their spouses in the country of destination. 
Distinguishing recent migrants from the pioneers is important. In the Turkish case, 
most early migrants were job seekers who were selected by the national employment 
service and sent to Germany on the basis of contracts made with German employers 
such as the Ford car factories in Cologne. Therefore the only information necessary to 
know in the early 1960s was, via the Turkish Employment Service, that there were 
employment opportunities in Germany. For the people who lived in remote areas of 
eastern Turkey, this information perhaps became available later than to people in the 
urban centres (i.e. Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara) of the western regions. Mr. Huseyin Aksu 
(53) (Appendix 4.2) heard about labour migration to Germany while he was in military 
service in 1966 and decided to apply: 
" .. .1 thought about coming to Germany while I was ill the army in Tltllceli. J heard that 
they were recruiting in Istanbul. After military service, I worked in the Turkish Forest;:,· 
Administration and saved some money. After the completion of the Keban Dam, the 
government gave priority to migrate abroad for the people of our region. 99 Then J came 
to Istanbul, passed health checks and came here ... It was an unknown place to liS. " 
This information about labour recruitment provided by German companies III 
collaboration with the Turkish government in Istanbul was the only initiator for Mr. 
Huseyin Aksu. He had heard of Germany only in history classes when he was in 
primary school. Most of those migrants who arrived in Germany during the earlier 
stages of Turkish migration history (i.e. 1960s and 1970s) had very little information 
about the country of destination but the key factor here was bilateral labour recruitment 
agreelnents between Turkey and European countries. This legal framc\\ork made 
people feel secure although they knew little about where they \\'ere going. People \vho 
n10ved later had the advantage of information channels established by those earlier 
99 Kcban Dam created a huge lake in the territories o1't\\o pro\inccs (i,c. ElaZlg and Tuncl'li) and forced 
inhabitants of man)' towns and \'illages to e\'acuatc their hOI~1es, ,\ccord1l1g to ~1Y rcs?onde~1h. the 
t t't'· d t\\'l) Optl'011S cor those people' thev could eIther ha\'e a small pIece ot land 111 other !2,o\crnmcn 0 Cl e I' ..;,. . . ~ fit. or could 1111' Pl"lt·, abroad as they \\ere gl\ en prIOrIty 10 a \..!o\emment-cnntrol1ed parts 0 t 1e coun I Y ~ , ... . ~ ~ 
labour migration program. 
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migrants. Therefore, recent migrants who migrated after 1985 had more infonnation 
prior to their last emigration than those who went earlier (Table 7.1). The launch of 
Turkish state television broadcasts (i.e. TRT) in the late 1960s and later improyements 
in telecommunications also played an increasingly important role in regard to the 
availability of information on the countries of destination. However, it was still the 
earlier migrants who were the most important source of infonnation (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2. Sources of information about the country of destination, 1996 (%) 
Turkish Kurdish Turkish 
Male Female Male Female 
School 3 1 
Newspapers, etc. 6 12 1 4 
Television 8 12 5 
Family in Turkey 12 1 5 2 
Family in destination 19 23 10 5 
Has been there before 2 1 
Agencies and other sources 4 23 1 4 
Missing and don't know1OO 46 27 76 85 
N 134 52 358 70 
Source: TIMS 1996 individual data 
Although they did not give a comparative account of different sources of infonnation, 
respondents in Cologne mostly referred to their relatives and friends as the main source 
of information. Mr. Sefer Demir (38), born in K.Mara~ province (Appendix 4.2), was 
inspired by the migrants who regularly visited his hometown while he was young. 
Expectations from migration were high among those in sending areas. Given the 
economic standstill in rural communities, migration attracted many young people as the 
best option for economic bettennent (Senyapili 1996). Hence, Mr. Demir also 
underlined that he was misinformed by the impressions given by the stories of earlier 
migrants and as they were just showing off101 (see quote in page 156). 
The TIMS data also provide some evidence that family members in the country of 
destination were the most common source of infonnation (Table 7.2). The reliance on 
information from relatives in the country of destination was the same for both the 
Turkish Kurds and Turks. 
The types of infonnation in1migrants had prior to their last emigration mainly concerns 
welfare issues such as cost of living, employment opportunities. income Icyc1s, and 
100 See footnote 98. Despite such a high percentage of missing cases. this table still gi\cs an idea about 
the sources of information. ' .' .... 
101 With regard to migrant remittances. Appleyard (1 :89) rdcrs to .thls lllt1u~Jlce as rcnl1ttance 
I 
. I' j't' tOO' rder to 'll'PU'> tilat remittances rccel\"llll! households III the sendmg areas may creak 
mu tiP ler c ec 111 0 ' :=- " ~ • 
a demonstration (.!.tJ'ce! on other households. 
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health care (Table 7.3). Although the TIMS data do not provide information about the 
quality of information, it nevertheless played a role in migration as is revealed in Table 
7.3. 
Table 7.3. Issues on which migrants had information prior to migration and their 
role, 1996 (0/0)102 
Had Information Information played a role 
Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish 
Kurdish Kurdish 
M F M F M F M F 
Level of income/wage 14 12 10 1 9 12 9 
Job opportunities 20 12 13 1 18 12 9 
Cost of living 14 2 6 3 9 2 5 1 
Unemployment/disability benefits 10 0 5 1 5 4 0 
Child allowances 12 0 5 1 8 1 0 
Health care system 8 21 8 1 2 10 3 0 
Admission rules 12 12 6 3 10 12 4 
Schools / School System 6 20 2 0 6 10 2 
Attitude towards foreigners 11 22 4 1 3 10 0 
Taxes 3 0 2 0 3 0 
N 134 51 357 71 134 51 357 71 
Source: TIMS 1996 individual data 
There is a remarkable difference which relates to gender. Both Turkish Kurdish and 
Turkish women were more interested in having information on health care, education 
and attitudes towards foreigners than any other items compared to their male 
counterparts who were more focused on job and income opportunities (Table 7.3). This 
might be due to childcare responsibilities of women. 
According to the TIMS, information on admission regulations and procedures are only 
of marginal interest to Turkish Kurdish migrants but the qualitative research findings 
suggested the opposite. Almost all respondents in Cologne were aware of the 
procedures and regulations about entry into Germany prior to their journey. Some of 
them were even able to use this to wait for the "perfect time" for their entry. For 
example, Mr. Ali Haydar was born in Tunceli province (Appendix ...J..2) and moved to 
the coastal city of Mersin (along with his parents) in Southern Turkey when he was 
young. When he completed secondary school he was determined to migrate abroad: 
102 The question used in the TIMS individual questionnaire needs to be mentioned here. The following 
t\\O part question \\as .asked to the respondents: "b~fore hes/~e lrellt fO ~clil.,.ell~?c~lIIlf1}.· .o..f de.~(illa(ioll). 
did //('siIc know all\'th/llg abollt that cOllntry on the ISSlies I lVlll read to .t all 110\\. and If the n.:spondent 
says yes to any iteI~1 then the second part of the question was asked: "Did this i'~t(mllatioll play d role ill 
Iris/lrer decision to go?" (TI\lS 2000) 
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" ... Everybody told me that it is not possible to stay in German\' with legal do t I 
_ cumen s ... 
got a job on a ship, first. We were sailing between ports in Turkey, Russia, Italy alld 
France. The ship went to Russian ports several times. But it was useless to jump oif ill 
Russia. They were poorer than Turkey... Once, I decided to jump off ill Italy, but 
couldn't. A year later, in 1993 the ship went to Marseilles, France. This time, I managed 
to escape and got on the train to Paris, where my aunt was living ... From there, her 
[aunt] husband took me to Bielefeld, by car. I waited for about a month there. I had 
friends and relatives there ... In March [J993], 33 Turkish soldiers were killed [allegedly 
by the PKK] in Bingol [Turkey] and then I applied for asylum. It H'as the best time to 
apply. I said I was there [in Bingol} when they were killed. Then I was granted refugee 
status in few days. " 
Obviously, Mr. Ali Haydar was aware of tough admission procedures in Germany and 
he even knew about specific conditions, which may accelerate the process. Therefore 
he waited for a while, and when a big incident took place in South East Turkey (i.e. 
killing of 33 Turkish soldiers in Bingen province in 1993) he applied for asylum. Such 
a scenario may be relevant in broader terms as well. Rather than specific incidents, the 
Turkish Kurdish armed conflict as a whole may have had a similar effect. That means 
many Turkish Kurdish people would have travelled to Europe and filed asylum 
applications on the grounds that the current ethnic conflict in Turkey was posing a 
threat to their lives. As many migrants were aware of the dominant European sentiment 
on protecting human rights, this would be a winning strategy for migration. When 
human rights violations were evident as in the case of the Turkish military presence in 
the Kurdish populated areas resulting in numerous torture incidents and village 
evacuations, then people who intended to migrate abroad might have tried their chances 
at this specific time period on these grounds. Thus, it is possible to say that having 
information about admission policies and procedures in Europe is an important factor 
detern1ining type and strategy of migration. 
The importance of having information on admission rules, in another context \\'as also 
exemplified by two other cases investigated in this research. Mrs. Kardelen had also 
utilised such information about the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) and Den10cratic Republic of Germany (DRG) during the late Cold \\'ar era. She 
had travelled through East Berlin kno\\'ing that it was not possible to be sent back to the 
DRG due to the political context. Similarly. I\lr. \1urat Mete entered the FRG via East 
Berlin and filed an asylun1 application in Le\'erkusen. (See Appendix 4.2 for case 
profiles). In both cases, they \vcre members of Turkish political orgal1lSatlol1S with 
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contacts in Germany. When suitable conditions appeared, with the help of infonnation 
on the destination country (i.e. economic opportunities and admission rules) networks 
are utilised and migration strategies developed. 
7.3. The Role of Networks 
The "family and friends effect" explained by Massey (1999:306) emphasises the role of 
networks in international migration. They are functional in both decision-making and in 
the operation of migration. Migration networks help to reduce the risks and costs of 
migration and thus facilitate migration (e.g. Wilpert 1992; Faist 2000; Boeker 1995). 
Their function is not limited to giving assistance before migration but these networks 
are also important during and after migration by providing information and financial 
support to migrants. Financing the travel, helping to find accommodation or job are 
examples of this kind of network support. 
The TIMS simply defined migration networks as the presence of family and relatives or 
friends in the country of destination before migration (TIMS 2000). However, a slightly 
broader definition may be drawn referring to more than one destination country 
because of the increasing transnationalisation of migration networks. For example, Mr. 
Ali Haydar (27) quoted above, got support from his relatives in Paris, France but 
migrated to Bielefeld, Germany and later settled in Cologne, Germany (See Appendix 
4.2). Networks have been initiated by early migrants and established through time. 
Therefore, later migrants, such as Mr. Ali Haydar, were in a better position to move 
through these transnational networks of migration. They could locate themselves within 
these networks and even, if necessary (i.e. in cases of illegal entry) could hide 
themselves until a good chance appeared to begin legalisation of their status abroad. 
Mr. Ali Haydar went to Germany because there was a large community of immigrants 
frOlTI Dersim (his hometown in Eastern Turkey) including some of his friends. He 
preferred to stay in the larger immigrant community in Gennany instead of staying \\·ith 
his aunt in Paris. Therefore this case is also an example of the ways in \\·hich multiple 
networks coexist among Turkish Kurds. Although most hayc some friends in the 
country of destination, they usually receiyed crucial help from their relatin?s at the 
early stages of their migration but usually not from friends. 
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Figure 7.1 shows that the vast majority of immigrants have either a famil member. 
relative or friend in the country of destination before migration. Along with policie 
aimed at tightening borders in Europe, further restrictions and strict control are 
imposed upon entry and residence permits for foreigners. Therefore, the importance of 
networks has increased. Family members in the country of destination constitute mo t 
of the migration networks. According to the TIMS data, 42% of Turkish Kurds reported 
they had relatives in the destination country prior to migration, compared to 660/0 of 
Turks. These figures were 30% and 35% among return migrants who had migrated in 
the last two decades for Turkish Kurds and Turks respectively. A lesser proportion of 
people having networks among return migrants might be due to the fact that when they 
migrated there were a limited number of migrants abroad to provide networks for 
newcomers. However in due time, the migrant stock has enlarged and provided more 
networks for later migrants. 
Figure 7.1. Network status before migration to the country of destination by sex, 
1996 (%) 
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As shown in Figure 7.1 , the high percentage of women with a network in the country of 
destination is mainly due to the type of migration. Most women migrated abroad for 
family reasons as n1entioned earlier. Thus the presence of a parent or patiner in th 
network is often the reason for women's Inigration. 
According to the TIMS data , network of Turki h Kurdi h migrant \-ver omp d f 
spouses (270/0), brothers and ister (30%), relati e (40%) and fri nd ( 0°0).103 Turk 
1 i d . 'lar connection in the country of de tinati n too : 10° ° of them h, d 1ave repm e SImI 
pou e in the de tination before th ir migration _0° ° had br th r and i t~r , ~ o 
mun) n.:: p ndents referred t m r~ than on~ p'r on in th~ 
IOJ Percentage do not add up to 1 0.0 b~ au' 
f tl Tratl n nen\ rk.. country of d tinati n a part 0 1elr mig c 
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had other relatives, and 150/0 had friends. These findings suggest that the most 
important connections for Turkish Kurdish migrants before migration \yere their 
families and relatives. 
As Schood and her colleagues (2000:94) have suggested, the number and nature of 
linkages are important rather than the simple existence of a network that affects 
migration. The size and composition of networks, therefore, are significant. The larger 
the network the greater the possibility of assistance for the migrant. Only 130/0 of 
Turkish Kurds had no relatives, friends or family members in the destination country 
prior to their migration. More than one third had only one person in the country of 
destination before migration. 300/0 of them knew two or three people while another 
10% had networks consisting of 4 to 6 people. The final 10% of Turkish Kurds had 
more than 6 people in the country of destination prior to migration. The mean size of 
network for current Turkish Kurdish migrants was 3.9 persons, and 7.9 persons for 
return migrants. Turkish networks are slightly greater than the Kurdish ones: 4.8 
persons for current migrants and 10.8 persons for return migrants. 
The larger networks among the Turks compared to the Kurds can be explained by the 
size of the immigrant stock in the country of destination at the time of arrival. 
Therefore, in this case, the presence of about 3 million Turks abroad could support a 
larger migration network for potential Turkish migrants than the Turkish Kurdish 
immigrant stock (around 600,000) could do for potential Turkish Kurdish migrants. 
Thus we may expect an increase in Turkish Kurdish migration to Germany (and other 
western European countries) due to an increase in the Turkish Kurdish immigrant 
stock, which means more links to recruit more migrants. 
All of the respondents of the qualitative research in Cologne also had some relatives or 
family members abroad prior to their migration except two cases of guest workers who 
arrived in the late 1960s. The migration accounts told by these immigrants revealed the 
importance of these networks. In some cases, potential migrants even considered their 
networks abroad as an insurance: "1 had thought if 1 can 'f do well, thell 1 H'ould go fo 
Germ all)" to my uncle's place. " This is how Mr. Ali Naki (Appendix 4.2) explained his 
consideration of nligration prior to his move to Germany. This \\ay of thinking \\'as 
vcry conlmon among the immigrants contacted during the field research. They often 
regarded nligration to Gernlany as the most secure life strategy before they moved. 
M . 'g "ants alTived in CololJne with such a background joining their brothers and any Imnl1 I:=-' .... 
167 
Afigration mechanisms 
sisters who were already there before helping to bring over others who were initially 
left behind in Turkey. Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne often 
wanted the rest of their family to join them. The following two examples are helpful to 
understand the role of the family in chain migration and also the nature and use of 
networks in the migration process - without neglecting their importance after arrival in 
the country of destination. 
Mr. Zivo (Appendix 4.2) brought all his family including sisters and brothers except his 
grandparents. His uncle had invited him, and his initial entry to Germany was on a 
tourist visa although he applied for asylum after arrival: 
"My uncle had come here as a guest worker in 1968. My father also came to Germany in 
1978 and returned in 1982. He couldn't find a job here and had to return ... My uncle 
asked me to come here and I came on a tourist visa. I never thought to apply for asylum 
but after arrival I thought and understood what was going on and decided to apply. In 
two months I was given a refugee pass ... All our family moved here one by one between 
1990 and 1995. After myself, first my mother and my younger brother came [in 1991]. 
Later my father joined us [1991]. Then I brought my sister [1993]. Finally, my elder 
brother quit university in Turkey and came here [1995} ... The younger brother is going 
to school,' dad is working in a factory; mom and sister are not working; and my elder 
brother and I are running this kebab shop. " 
Mr. Ali Naki also came as part of a family chain migration. He was the youngest child 
and the last migrant in his family. Following his three brothers and one sister, he fled to 
Europe: 
"There were many people from our town who left for Germany in the past. Many of my 
relatives are also here. They arrived in the past, decades ago. Before myself, my elder 
brothers and sister came. My sister is in Germany. Two of my elder brothers are ill 
France, and the third is in London. Mum and dad came later and they are staying with 
my eldest brother in Paris ... They all came at the beginning ofthe1980s. They had sent 
me money several times while I was in Turkey. I started a business, a small textile 
workshop in Istanbul but it did not go well and went bankrupt. Then I decided to go 
abroad at any cost. My brother in Paris, who is working in the airport. sent me about 
30.000 francs (£5000) for that ... Three months after my arrival, my mother and father 
F "TOW m)' cousins and some other relatives are asking us to help them to came to rance. lV' • 
h 5/'" months ago m)' aunts' husband sold everything to pa:v traffickers come over ere. ., . 
d E
· I nd "Tobodv knew he was coming until he appeared in LOlldon. Call 
an went to ng a . lV' .' 
b I · th t? Hej'ust went there and found m}, elder brother ill London. [Laughs]" you e reve a. .'
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Friends and others were often used as a source of information by immigrants 
interviewed in Cologne. However, they usually get most material support from their 
kinship networks consisting of family members and relatives. Material SUpp0I1 
basically includes invitation letters, arranging marriages, financing and planning the 
journey. These kinship networks also provide information about migration and life 
abroad (i.e. regulations, strategies of admission, secure ways in the case of illegal 
migration, income opportunities, etc.). 
Almost all Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne had migrated \vith the 
help of their families or relatives in the country of destination. Like Mr. Zivo and Mr. 
Ali Naki whose stories are told above, many others also followed the same path for 
migration, which has been characterised by considerable involvement and help from 
relatives abroad. For example, Mrs. Saliha Deniz (26) departed from istanbul to 
Frankfurt and her uncle living in Duisburg paid the costs (i.e. fake EU-Schengen visa 
and flight) for this journey. Then she received some more money from her aunt who 
lives in Aachen (Germany) and took a train to Zurich (Switzerland) to meet her elder 
sister living there. Of course here it must be noted most earlier migrants (i.e. those who 
arrived in the early 1960s) were bereft of the luxury of having friends or relatives at 
this scale in the destination. 
The TIMS data has provided some quantitative evidence about the nature of help 
received from migration networks by individual migrants prior to their migration. 
About one third of both Turkish Kurdish and Turkish migrants, prior to migration, 
received help from relatives and friends who lived abroad. This was in the form of cash 
for 20% of Turkish Kurds and 32% of Turks. Only 1 % of Turkish Kurds and 3% of the 
Turks were offered jobs by their relatives and/or friends but 4% of Turkish Kurds and 
180/0 of the Turks had assistance in finding a job. 160/0 of Turkish Kurds and 320/0 of the 
Turks were provided with accommodation by their relatives and friends. About 1 r () of 
Turkish Kurds and 34% of Turks have received information about admission into the 
country of destination. Relatives and friends abroad also helped 14% of Turkish Kurds 
and 200/0 of the Turks to get visas. About 10° 0 of migrants brought some other 
n1en1bers of their families and friends once they settled down in the country of 
destination and most of them \VCIT spouscs and children of migrants. These figures 
show that Turkish Kurds made less use of networks than their Turkish counterpaI1s. 
TI . b' 1 t d to th" .c'1ct that the Turkish miuration histon is lonucr than the 11 s n1a y e 1 e a e '" 1< ~ ~ - ~ 
Turkish Kurdish one creating a larger Turkish immigrant stock than the Turkish 
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Kurdish stock. Thereby, Turkish immigrants could have benefited from the c:\istence of 
a large community rather than individual contacts while the Kurds were dependent on 
their individual networks because their immigrant community was still emerging. 
Therefore, Turkish Kurdish migrants may have considered migration more risky 
assuming the size of networks is related to the SIze of immigrant stock and that 
networks minimise the risks of international migration. 
The role of political and religious organisations in migration networks also needs to be 
mentioned. The PKK, other immigrant associations including extreme left wing 
organisations, and religious associations played a significant role in recruiting migrants 
from Turkey according to Mr. Sefer Demir (38) who migrated from Elbistan, K.Mara~ 
to Cologne with the help of a contract marriage in 1990 but was involved in left wing 
politics as well. He condemns asylum seekers because they use political organisations 
for their own - non-political- escape: 
" ... The contribution of organisations here has been huge. The strategies of illegal 
migrants and asylum seekers were based 011 the existence of these political organisations 
here. Anybody who heard the name of any of these organisation/o4 has come here 
somehow (as a tourist or illegal migrant) and applied for asylum H'ith their help. BlI/, 
they were never convinced to such a political identity. Only 10 percent of asyillm seekers 
are really affiliated with any political organisation, Most of them have just exploited 
these organisations. They come here and attend a few demonstrations then leaw! the 
organisation once they have completed the legal procedures of getting a residence 
permit in Germany. I think among those "t'ho arrived after 1990, less than Olle percent is 
political. " 
Mr. Demir was critical about such exploitative behaviour as he was a part of a left \ving 
organisation and thinks his organisation was used by these people. Nevertheless for the 
organisations the picture might be different. They may welcome thesc people who 
intend to formulate their asylum claim in connection with a certain organisation. For 
organisations, although it is not admitted explicitly, the reason behind their positi\'c 
attitude may be the expectation of recruiting new members for their political 
movements or religious sects. Mrs. Sirin Onsa1. who \yorks for a Kurdish association in 
Cologne, adn1its that her organisation has provided this kind of help to many peuple 
who arrived in Germany in recent years: 
104 • ' "'I d DHKP-C 'The Rc\olutionan Peoples Liberation Party-Iront). D~\'-Yol 
These orgal1lSatlOns \l1l u e \, ~ . , . " " , .' 
. c ) TVP-\IL (The Turkish l ommu\llst Party-\\a1\,lst LenIl11st). dl, (The RevolutIonary .ourse, I'- ' 
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"We brought many people here. They needed invitation letters for a visa, for example, or 
when they apply for asylum we sent some of our friends to help them. 111telpretation, 
legal advice, etc .... we do these kinds of things ... 1, myself also brought my elder brother 
here in 1969; then my elder sister came in 1991 and applied for asylum. Between 1990 
and 1993
105
, all my nephews came here and most of them were granted refugee status 
h " ere. 
Political associations abroad as part of a migration network are also helpful for 
communication after arrival and settlement in the destination country. Their actiyities 
also help people to keep in touch abroad. Thus many people who were friends in 
Turkey and now living in different parts of Europe met up with each other through 
associations' activities. The Kurdistan Festival is a typical example of that. It takes 
place every year in a different German city: Dortmund in 1999, Bochum in 2000, and 
Cologne in 2001. The Dortmund Kurdistan Festival of 1999 attracted about 100,000 
Kurds from all around Europe (see photos in Appendix 9.1). Thousands of Turkish 
Kurdish immigrants travelled to Dortmund from different parts of Germany and 
Europe. This festival was a good indicator of the working transnational networks and 
their role in maintaining ties between people scattered around different countries. For 
example, a young Turkish Kurdish man, around 25 years old, along with many others 
took the train from Cologne Millheim to Dortmund to attend the Kurdistan Festival. His 
main concern, as explained to the researcher, was to meet his elder sister who was 
coming from Austria and his elder brother from Switzerland. The political and cultural 
targets of the festival were the least important motivation for his endeavour. The 
Dortmund Westfalen football ground and surrounding green were full of people 
gathered in circles of families and friends. Outside the Stadium was more crowded than 
inside throughout the day since many people were enjoying the opportunity to meet 
relatives and friends instead of the program inside. Parents were introducing their 
children to their cousins, aunts, and uncles who had probably never seen each other 
before. 
Another sin1ilar but smaller occasion was the opening ceremony of a local :\le\i centre 
in Cologne. About 100 guests met on a Sunday aften100n in .~\ugllst 1999. \ll1st of 
them were liying in Cologne but therc \\'cre also somc gucsts from London. Lindhoycn. 
d P . S of t110-=e fl'on1 outside Coloune were friends of those who cstablishcd an ans. Ol1le L' b 
lO~ ~ I "" ,I n applications in this period can be related to two bets: tir~t, the l'la~hl'S 
- The reason lor t lest: .1S) U 1 , " ' , 
1 PKK d tl ' Tllrkl'sh '\rIm were at peak in thl~ penod. Sl'cond. the period ended 111 199), bet\\een t 1e an lt: '- . 
sincl' Germany outlawed the PKK in Germany 111 that year. 
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the Alevi Centre although there were few invited people who were the representatiyes 
of sister organisations in their own cities. 
The transnational character of migration networks is displayed especially in the 
maintenance of ties between Turkish Kurds who arrived in different destinations after 
migration and in the management of migration especially in the case of illegal and 
asylum migration. The cases referred to in the previous section provide examples of 
this. A Turkish Kurdish transnational realm on the basis of routine political, social, and 
cultural activities has appeared throughout Europe in the last two decades when most 
Turkish Kurdish migrants arrived. 
However, the role of transnational networks is crucial in the journey and in the success 
of moving from home to the destination. Many Turkish Kurds have moved through the 
lines of a transnational network when they come to Germany, and for some it was even 
not the final destination but a station on the route. The following cases exemplify such 
a transnational aspect in Turkish Kurdish international migration. 
Another important feature of these transnational networks are the cooperation of 
facilitating agents, who themselves are often earlier migrants. They live in different 
transit countries such as Syria, Iraq, Greece, and Italy and help migrants to reach the 
final destination areas. For instance, one of the respondents who left Binge)i, Turkey 
saw only his fellow BingeH people on the way to Germany via Greece, Albania, Italy 
and France. 
Some people even followed the route via Moscow to reach Germany although it has not 
been a favourite route. In the past, before the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, because of the 
political rivalry between the West and the USSR, people followed a route via the 
countries of the Communist Block. Thus they eliminated the possibility of being sent 
back. However, today, it is just another strategic option for migration to Europe 
(Okolski 1999). Although this research did not interview any Turkish Kurds \\ho had 
followed a route via Moscow, it was the route for Mr. Abdullah Ocalan. leader of the 
PKK. He stopped at Moscow first at the beginning of his odyssey towards Ital: to seek 
asylun1 in 1998. 106 
lOt d f 1 PKK (K dl'stal1 Workers Part\') Abdullah Ocalan had fled to \ l(lscow in October ) The lea er 0 t 1e ur - , , 
, . l' I' f· 11 Sni'j in responsc to pressures from the TurkIsh 1.!l1\'ernment. ,\ month 
1998 follOWIng 11S c-"pu SlOn 101 '.' " , "' II ~ '",,' ) 
, 'R t", I'e passport and was arn::-.led on \:o\ember 1_.1 »)X ,\ttLl k,l\1I1g j,.,,(ll11e 
Inkr hc alTI\'cd 111 ome on a 1.1 ~ • , , ',.' 'b ' , " I qq 
n arv 16 1999. Abdullah Ocalan was captured In Kenya by TurkIsh troo~s, o~ h.: rua!) I .. i 9. 
on Ja 11. • d 1 t' t 11 ~)r leading the Kurdistan \\'orkers Party (PKK) 111 Its armed "tJuggle 
and scntenced to eat 1 or reaso l ~ 
\ -.., 1_ 
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Mrs. Zekiye Ozcan (45), born in the town of $emdinli (Appendix -+.2). fled Turkey in 
1993. Her husband and herself along with their two daughters moved to Gemlany via 
Syria, Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria. She said "the PKK asked liS 
to migrate therefore we did so. ,,]07 Her journey was achieved with the help of a 
transnational network involving the PKK guerrillas in the Middle East, friends in 
Greece, and traffickers: 
"We crossed the border over a night. The guerrillas [PKKJ met liS in Iraq and made llS 
cross to the Syrian side. Then we moved to Damascus along with some other PKK men. 
A few days later, we boarded from a Syrian port I don't know where it \ms. They said the 
ship was going to Greece. On route, it stopped in Cyprus for two days. Then ~ve took off 
for Athens, where some of our friends live. We spent a week with them '" They found a 
gang of traffickers there. The gang took us into Yugoslavia. From there to Hungwy and 
Austria ... Finally we arrived in Munich and took a train to Cologne \\'/zere we had some 
acquaintances and the Party [PKKJ was here ... We paid 10.000 DAI to the gangfor the 
whole family ... After arrival, the Party helped us. The party provided us a lml)'er. Then 
we applied for asylum and were immediately accepted. They placed liS into a heim/os. " 
Transnational networks work also as a risk minimising factor. Migrants think of the 
availability of acquaintances in several countries as a guarantee. That means even in the 
worst situation there is somebody to help. For instance, Mr. Hacl Kilimci who had been 
in Germany for two and a half years, and lives in a 'heim' (Appendix 4.2). A 
considerable portion of his family lives in Germany. A lot of friends are also in 
Germany. His two uncles and three aunts are living in different cities and another aunt 
is in the Netherlands. He came to Germany to join his wife but after arrival they 
separated. Although his wife and many relatives have lived in Germany prior to his 
migration, he entered the country as a representative of a Turkish trade union. His 
friends in Adana, members of a left wing political party. arranged trade UnIon 
membership for him. Then some other friends in Germany, \\'ho were kno\\\1 to his 
wife sent hinl an official invitation to give an address in a seminar held by their , 
association in Germany. Eventually, he arrived in Germany and applied for asylum. He 
~ K d' I If I 'See HUITI'\'e! Febman 16 1999; \Iillin:t. February 16, 1999; ();gur Politika, lor ur IS 1 se -n1 e. \ .' .' . . 
February 16, 1999; Time Online 1999) . ' , , 
107 In 1993, there "ere rumours that the PKK was (,I~cour~gm~ mIgratIOn to Europe. By dOlllt: so. the 
PKK was aiming to intimidate Europe by further maSSIve ml~ratlon flows, . . .. . , ' . 
108 ~ d 'I . ", Ised deliberatelv because the rl'spnndents otten preklIed to lI"l thiS \\ord The Gel111an wor 1elI11 1~ l . , . , . ' , 
. ' " their 'lCcounb in order to underlme unpleasant Il\'mg conditions \11 these \\Ith a negatlYL' connotatIOn \11 l 
asylum detention centres. 
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has lived in Germany for two years and is dissatisfied with what he got but still has an 
option from his transnational familial networks: 
" .. .I lost my wife... I sold everything I had in Turkey to come here... I cannor go 
back ... But life is very hard here. I didn't get more than 1000 DM (£330) per monrlz. 
Usually I work for less than that. What the government gives as 'asylum salary' is nor 
enough ... Maybe I will go to my eldest aunt's place, to the Netherlands. She is rich: has 
no children. She can take care of me ... if everything goes wrong, I will go to her. " 
Mr. Emrah Kuzucu (20), born in a village of $anlmrfa province, \vas in Germany for 
just 8 months at the time of the field research and he was keen to migrate to the UK. He 
applied for asylum on arrival in Germany following a long and dangerous jOU111ey via 
the Balkans and Austria. Although he made his application on the basis of his 
affiliation with the PKK, he later clearly stated that he had nothing to do with the PKK 
and politics. Nothing happened in his village during the clashes between the Turkish 
Army and the PKK. However, as mentioned above, he had heard that affiliation with 
the PKK would help. He also thought he would not be granted refugee status because 
of his weak application. Therefore, he thought of an alternative option, which was to go 
to the UK and try his luck there: 
" ... How is it in England? Life must be very good there? ... Do YOIl know how much the 
government pays to asylum seekers there? Here, we get about 400 DM (£130). 1 heard 
from friends it was better there ... how can I go to England? Can YOIl help me? III the 
heim (asylum seekers detention centre), we have to lil'e with many others, especially 
Kosovans. It is too crowded, the quality is vel)' bad ... England is a rich COllIlO), ... / will 
try to enter but I don't know how, yet ... but I have some friends. If 1 am refused here in 
Germany, definitely I will go to England ... " 
The UK is interestingly quite popular among Turkish Kurds. Many Kurdish asylum 
seekers have a wish to go to the UK. They suppose their chances are better in the UK 
and the reception is better than Germany. Also they think the uK is richer than 
Gernlany. Another reason is probably the language. English is a language taught in 
lTIOst secondary schools in Turkey and so immigrants are more familiar \\'ith Lngli~h 
than Gern1an. 
As seen in the cases mentioned above, net\\orks provide logi~tic ~upport before and 
f . t' b t 111aybe more importantly the journey ibclf is often only po~sible a ter I111gra lon, U . -
. 1 1 1 1 f' 1 11etworks This instant support i~ crucial in clandestine migration \vlt 1 t 1e 1e p 0 ::-,UC 1 . c 
b · !' 11 \"ll"yin o from pro\'iding information continuollsly tn aITanging and can e 111 any ion ". c ~ 
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and payIng human traffickers during different phases of the journey (i.e. border 
crossings). Mr. Ali Naki (27) decided to migrate abroad in 1996 when his business 
went broke. His route to Germany was via Bosnia, Albania, Italy, and France. Together 
-... 
with a close friend, he left Istanbul for Bosnia where he found traffickers and trayelled 
to Italy by ferry from the Albanian coast. When he arrived at Northern Italy, he \\'as 
short of money and phoned his eldest brother who was working at the airport in Paris to 
ask for money. Then he stayed two more days in Milan and withdrew the amount his 
brother transferred in his name. The next day he paid the traffickers to cross the French 
border and took a train to Paris, which was his last stop before the final destination. 
Cologne. He stayed a few days in his brother's home and then a friend of his brother 
took him to Cologne by car. 
Many immigrants have friends and/or relatives not only in Germany but also in other 
countries including France, the Netherlands, and the UK. This availability gives both a 
chance for further mobility and an opportunity to maintain social, political, and cultural 
activities beyond the borders of individual countries. These moves can be in different 
forms. As in the case of Mr. HaCI Kilimci, they may want to move from Germany to 
the Netherlands in order to join their relatives as a result of failure. Or there may be a 
political cause as in the case of the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK: 
thousands of Turkish Kurds from all around Europe went to Italy to protest the arrest. 
People may also travel long distances (i.e. from Switzerland to Dortmund) to meet their 
friends and relatives in Kurdistan festivals. 
Thus migration networks facilitate migration by providing channels of information, 
guidance, finance, and other sorts of help. Their function is not limited to periods prior 
to Inigration or the journey but also after the move it serves as a risk minimising (or 
insurance) factor. Networks can help in finding housing, jobs, and also arranging 
adn1ission into the country of destination. In this regard, migration networks are critical 
in detern1ining the type of migration (i.e. labour, family reunification, student, etc.) and 
the strategy of migration. 
7.4. Migration strategies 
Based on the nature of the migration net\\'ork and indi\'idual characteristics in terms uf 
b 'l" (' fi11ancial educational) c\crv indi\'idual mi ~rat ion movc follows a capa 1 Itles I.e, , • '-
, 1 C·t'-, hip status cxtent of family and personal rclation~. rcgulations l)f 
ul11que pat 1. 1 17Cns c, • • 
17~ 
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the country of destination and country of origin, skills and talents of the indi\'idual. and 
contextual elements including political and geographical environment are important in 
this regard. According to the combination of these, migrants may plan a strategy 
~. 
involving both legal and illegal mechanisms. The options may range from legal labour 
migration to illegal asylum seeking migration. Illegal migration increases as admission 
policies have become strict in countries of destination. Thus legal access has become 
more difficult, especially if a migration network is not available. However, it must be 
noted here that migrants can adopt strategies, which involve both legal and illegal 
mechanisms although they may opt to follow pure illegal or legal procedures. 
7.4.1. Legal strategies 
Legal labour migration is an option, which requires, for instance, agreement bet\yeen 
sending and receiving countries, and increasingly some education and skillslo9. 
Additionally, individual migrants need to find an employer in the country of destination 
and also obtain necessary documents from both countries. According to the TIMS, 20°;) 
of Turks and none of the Kurds entered the country of destination on a work permit. 
Here it is necessary to remember that the TIMS data especially comprises people who 
migrated between 1986 and 1996 only, when massive labour recruitment programs 
similar to those in the 1960s were not available. In the qualitative research, three guest 
workers were interviewed: Mr. Hasan Uzmez, Mr. Selami Sevgi, and Mr. Huseyin 
Aksu (See Appendix 4.2). They migrated to Germany following routine recruitment 
procedures and health checks in Istanbul in the early 1970s. 
A second strategy is family reunification, which has some constraints. For instance, 
eligibility depends upon having a family member who is legally resident in the country 
of destination. In the case of having a legal resident family member, the resident's 
income and accommodation should be suitable to house an additional person. Further, 
as in the case of legal labour migration, it is required to obtain necessary documentation 
from both countries. Four family reunification migrations were recorded in the 
qualitative research. Mr. Haydar Dogan, one of those intervie\\'ed in Cologne, had 
joined his parents who went there a year earlier as guest \\'orkers in 1967. 
I 1 · . t b d Tlle first t)ractica I Contract nlaniage is another ega optIOn to mlgra e a roa . t 
. Itt' t S ondh it 1 S necessary 
requirement is being unmarried pnor to t le attemp 0 mlgra e. ec .. . 
109 d . E al1 1'11t'mational labour mil!ration provi,k ~videnc~ for this. For ~xJmple. IT R~c~nt tren s 111 urope l ~". ' .. 
. d d'cal 'ectors in the UK have bccn suttcnng trom labour shorlJgcs 111 recent 
scctors 111 Germany an me 1 s 
y~ars. 
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to find a willing marriage partner. Here the potential migrant may need the help of 
intermediaries who can be friends, relatives or agencies. It brings also some additional 
costs, the most important of which is the compensation paid to the marriage par1ner. 
Then the requirements of family reunification apply. At the end, there is a risk of 
revelation and expulsion. For instance, Mr. Sefer Demir had arranged a marriage and. 
on completion of the five year period to qualifY for German citizenship, he divorced 
(and married somebody else who he loved). Contract marriage is also a commonly 
preferred method of acquiring resident status, which was mentioned as a set goal by 
some of respondents in the field research and also in the literature (see Staring 1998: 
Lievens 1997 a, 1997b). 
Obtaining a tourist or another (i.e. student) visa is also a legal migration strategy. This 
kind of entry can take several forms depending on the nature of the migration network. 
It can be a visit to a relative or friend; visit for a meeting (i.e. conference, seminar. 
sports competition); or a holiday package. A tourist visa can be obtained legally or by 
fraud or can be a totally fake visa (i.e. duplicated or stolen passport). If the migrant 
goes for the legal option then she or he should overcome the 'intending immigrant' 
presumption and find a sponsor to guarantee the stay. Also she or he needs to go to the 
nearest embassy and follow the procedures. For the fraud option, the migrant is 
required to contact fraud passport providers (often the police are involved) and in some 
cases s/he has to arrange a deal with a 'bribable' consular officer. In addition, he or she 
should afford high costs of fraud. The risk of revelation and blacklisting will remain as 
well. Overstaying on a legally obtained tourist visa is also risky as it involves the 
possibility of losing the chance of being granted visas in the future. Mr. Haci Kilimci 
obtained a visitor visa with the help of arrangements by his friends and wife and he 
filed an asylum application after arrival. Similarly, Mr. Serbilind arrived as a university 
student and on completion of his studies; he upgraded his status to German citizenship 
after being an asylum seeker for two years and a refugee for five years. 
7.4.2. Illegal strategies 
The other 111igratiol1 option is illegal entry often with the help of human traffickers. 
Apart fron1 huge financial costs, this option also in\·olves a high physical danger 
including the risks of accidental death. injury or murder. Potential migrants should, first 
of all, secure a considerable amount of money for smuggling fees. Then he or she 
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should find and arrange a deal with traffickers. Illegal entry into the immigration 
country always involves the risk of apprehension and deportation. 
Recent decades have brought more clandestine migration for Turkish Kurds as \yell as 
other people from the Middle East including Iraqi Kurds fleeing from Saddam Hussein. 
Every day, hundreds of illegal migrants are caught on the borders and shores of Ital\'. 
Greece, and Turkey. 
As observed during the field research in Germany, after selling some possessions of the 
household to secure funds for migration, a typical migration adventure of a Turkish 
Kurd begins with initial contact with one of the international human trafficking gangs 
in order to get the necessary travel documents, usually in Istanbul. In some cases, these 
can be arranged in nearby cities within the Kurdish populated region such as Mersin. 
Adana or in Diyarbaklr in the Eastern region. A valid passport can be bought at a cost 
of about £ 1 000, although prices vary according to the chosen destination and type of 
document. 
The second stage is to cross the border, usually to Greece. Land or sea crossings to 
Greece cost around £1500. After crossing the border, the first step is to reach Athens, 
where the illegal migrant could find traffickers to arrange the journey towards Western 
Europe. There are several different routes which migrants mostly use to reach 
Germany, the UK, and other West European countries. They can either go by a route 
through Albania, Italy, and France or alternatively go via Slovenia and Austria. They 
can even fly direct from Istanbul to whichever destination they choose as in the case of 
Mr. Oztlirk quoted below. 
The cost ranges from £700 to £6000 depending upon the choice of route and the choice 
of means of travel. After planning, such a journey could take 7 to 30 days if everything 
goes all right and then the 'lucky' ones have to wait for their one in ten (or cyen less) 
chance of being granted refugee status, which may take more than 6 years in some 
cases. The total cost of such a journey from Turkey to Germany costs around £ 1800. 
Son1e of the respondents in this research have preferred clandestine \\"ays to go to 
Gern1any. They reported the cost of such migrations ranges from £1000 to £2500. \1r. 
E~ref OztUrk (22), born in a yillage of $lrnak pro\ince. met traHickers in (iaziantep. an 
industrial city in the South East region: 
"111 total, I paid 6000 n,H (£]000) to traJiickcrs alld they brought 111<' he,.('. They put 111<.' 
I 'tl a /01"<.7 ' Ipas\'!wr, alld l'isa. First I \rcllt {O 0.Allfl'p ([lid mer S()/1/l' people all a p aile ll'l 1 . c .. l ( . ' 
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who were known for their help in moving abroad. They said I had to go to Istanbul and 
find another man. Then I took a coach ticket to Istanbul and found that man. I made a 
payment to him. After spending three days in a hotel everything was ready. We [he and 
his wife} went to the Airport. He [trafficker} was a friend of the airport police as well. 
They [the policeman and the trafficker} talked for few minutes and the policeman let us 
pass into the passenger lounge. Then we flew to Stuttgart. " 
Mr. Ali Naki (27) also paid about the same amount to the traffickers for a journey to 
Germany via another, more dangerous way than Mr. E~ref6ztiirk: 
"I was together with my best friend; we had known each other since we were children. 
We were looking for a way to come here and we found a contact of traffickers in Laleli, 
Istanbul. They said we had to pay 4000 DM (£1300) and after a short bargaining period, 
we agreed on 3500 DM (£1150). The next day, they brought some documents and 
passports and then we got on the bus heading to Bosnia with 20 other Kurds. From 
Bosnia, after waiting three days, we passed to Albania walking across the border. 
Albanians took us to a harbour the night after the border crossing. By dawn, we sailed 
towards Italy. We did not know where we were until we arrived in Rome ... The 
traffickers were always around. We stayed in a small town called Ventimiglia, nearby the 
French border, for two weeks. Then they put us in a small panel van. The driver was an 
Italian who has driven us into France via Milano. He left us in front of Nice train station. 
We paid 450 DM (£150) per head for that border crossing into France ... From Nice we 
took a train to Paris where my brother was waiting for us. " 
The TIMS data also provide some evidence showing that clandestine migration has 
been common among Turkish Kurds: 8% of Turkish Kurds and 60/0 of the Turks 
entered the country of destination without papers (i.e. without a valid visa, a residence 
permit or a work permit). About a further 5% of both groups overstayed their visas. At 
their last emigration from Turkey, 10% of Turkish Kurds and 19% of Turks entered the 
immigration country on a tourist visa while 19% of the former and 24% of the latter 
groups were on another kind of immigration permit. Also 40/0 of Kurds and 8% of 
Turks entered the destination country with a temporary residence permit. Of Kurds, 4% 
had travelled with a student visa whereas only less than 1 % of their Turkish fellow 
citizens had a student visa on their first migration abroad (Table 7.4). Here it must be 
remembered again that a state institute conducted the TIMS survey. Therefore it is very 
likely that many respondents might have refrained from reporting their illegal entries. 
Thus there is a large cluster of "no response "cases (60% for Kurds and 480/0 of Turks). 
If we exclude these cases as missing percentages would be much higher than they were 
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shown above. For example, proportion of visa overstayers could go up to 11 % for 
Kurds and 120/0 for Turks instead of 4% and 50/0 respectively. 
Table 7.4. Type of visa or permit at arrival in the destination country, 1996 (%) 
Turkish Kurdish Turkish Total 
Overstayed a visa 4 5 
-+ 
Without papers 8 6 7 
Tourist visa 10 19 16 
Student visa 4 0 1 
Refugee visa 0 0* 0 
Temporary residence permit 4 8 6 
Residence permit 8 7 i I 
Work permit 1 9 6 
Applied asylum at border 1* 0 0 
Other arrangements 3 1 ') 
No Response 60 48 53 
Unknown/missing 1* 2 ') -
N 172 289 461 
Source: TIMS 1996 individual data 
* 1 case 
According to these figures, Turkish Kurds seem more inclined to use clandestine ways 
than the Turks. There can be specific difficulties for Turkish Kurds in obtaining legal 
travel papers in Turkey, which may facilitate considering illegal migration. However, 
none of my respondents who arrived in Germany via clandestine ways reported such a 
difficulty specific to Turkish Kurds. They did not try legal options but often preferred 
to bypass them because they were biased about it: they often thought it was impossible 
to migrate via legal ways. The legal way is also often out of consideration because of a 
high expectation of refusal. It is clear to potential migrants that Europe does not want 
more immigrants and that legal admission is difficult. Therefore, the higher clandestine 
migration among the Kurds can also be due to such bias keeping them away from the 
legal pathway. Thus illegal migration strategies might have been considered as a 
preferable option among potential migrants. Although there are no statistics, which 
show the rate of success through legal procedures, high rates of success in illegal 
migration can make it attractive for potential migrants. Only a small fraction (about 5% 
for both ethnicities) of those who tried to migrate without the necessary tra\"l~l 
docun1ents were unsuccessful according to the TIMS data. T\\o thirds of Turks 
succeeded through illegal entry alone while the majority of Kurds needed help from 
relatives, friends and others (i.e. traffickers, bribable officers). 
Overstaying other \'isas (i.e. student, contract and business) is also an optIon for 
migration. As in the case of \ lr. Serbilind, a foreign student can enter on a study visa 
for university education and \\'hen studies are complete she or he may opt to stay in the 
ISO 
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country. Or s/he can apply for asylum after completion of her or his course. As 
mentioned above, more than half of all migrants have entered the country of destination 
on short stay visas (i.e. tourist, temporary residence, business, and student) (Table 7.4). 
This may be another indicator of propensity to migrate illegally. The proof for this can 
be the fact that 10% of all migrants who overstayed their visas. Among the respondents 
of the Cologne qualitative research, about one third of those interviewed were visa 
overstays or illegal entrants. 
Asylum seekers are difficult to categorise because of their temporary status between 
legality and illegality. They are often forced to leave their homes. However, because 
they often arrive without required documents for entry or visas, it is better to discuss 
them within clandestine strategies of migration. Asylum seekers' choice of illegal entry 
is again a reaction to the increasing difficulties in admission. For instance, almost all 
asylum seekers interviewed in the field research were those who illegally entered 
Germany. Although, there has been quite a large intake of asylum seekers from Turkey 
during the last two decades of the 20th Century, most immigrants including asylum 
seekers who were included in the field research in Cologne were not involved in ethnic 
clashes although few of them indicated their families suffered from the raids of the 
Army and the PKK. They did not report ethnic discrimination as well. Most of them 
were individuals who benefited from the context which was characterised by the ethnic 
clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Army: A context considered as increasing 
their chances for entry to and settlement in Germany. 
Stories of only three of the Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Germany were 
the escape stories of asylum seekers: Mrs. Kardelen, Mr. Murat Mete, and Mr. E~ref 
Oztiirk (see Appendix 4.2). These three were distinguished from the others with regard 
to the decisive impact of ethnic conflict on their escape, since for the others socio-
economic motives were dominant in their decision to migrate. Mrs. Kardelen left 
Turkey after the military intervention of 1980, and suffered from pressures on her 
Kurdish oriented political activities. She was involved with Kurdish communist 
factions and had been tOliured several times. Although Mr. Murat Mete also escaped 
from the military govemn1ent following the 1980 coup d' etat. he left the country 
because he was a member of an extreme left Turkish political party. Mr. E~ref Oztiirk. 
on the other hand, had to leave the country as a result of an evening raid by the Turkish 
:\rmy. He \vould either face torture or die if he stayed there because his brother \\'as a 
guelTilla in the PKK. Other Turkish Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees \vere able to 
~ 
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stay in Turkey but preferred to go abroad. Obviously, escape was not the only option 
for them. For instance, Mr. Seyhan Bayrak (27) was a successful but false asylum 
applicant. He was granted refugee status as a result of 8 months efforts following a fake 
claim of being tortured in Turkey. He pretended that he was mentally unstable as a 
result of the torture he faced in Turkey. He had been provided with psychiatric 
treatment for eight months while he was granted indefinite leave to remain in fifteen 
days following the asylum application. 
Mr. Seyhan Bayrak's case was not the only example of false asylum applications filed 
in Germany. Within the very small sample (34 immigrants) of this qualitative research 
in Germany, six of those interviewed admitted that their asylum applications in 
Germany were fraudulent. 
7.5. Concluding Remarks 
Information and migration networks play an important role in the international 
migration of Turkish Kurds. These two elements of international migration are also 
decisive in developing migration strategies. However, regulations and other broader 
characteristics (e.g. international relations, regional wars and conflicts) influence 
migration strategies and indirectly the use of migration networks. As the cases 
discussed in this chapter show, migration networks are often used to secure access to 
the destination country and minimise the risks affiliated with migration. Transnational 
migration networks transmit information about admission rules and entry strategies to 
potential migrants and also help them through and after the journey. Such reliance on 
networks ·can also be considered as a response to the tightening admission policies in 
Western Europe, which caused a high propensity towards clandestine migration. 
Transnational networks both facilitate transnational relations between fellow ethnic 
people after the journey to a destination and also provide flexibility on destination 
choices. 
Findings on the role of information prior to migration confirm previous research (e.g. 
Fawcett and Arnold 1987; Goodman 1981). For example, potential migrants are more 
interested in information on economic issues and welfare benefits such as 
unemployn1ent benefits, child allowance or health care systems. In terms of information 
sources, relatives and friends are the sources most commonly referred to. In order to 
minin1ise the uncertainty about the destination, migrants attribute high credibility to 
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Migration mechanisms 
information from relatives and trusted friends rather than official sources or 
intermediary institutions (i.e. private agencies). Among different information topics, 
admission issues are the most known subjects. Possibly due to the difficulties of entry 
into European countries, Turkish Kurdish migrants are more interested in this area of 
information. 
The role of networks is crucial in both legal and illegal migration. In illegal migration. 
the networks are more likely to be involved than in legal migration because they 
provide logistic support during and after the journey. The type of support is also 
slightly different in these two types of migration. In legal migration, the networks 
function as a source of information and as a source of marginal support (i.e. sending an 
invitation) but in illegal migration their functions vary from financing the journey to 
providing temporary accommodation after arrival. The nature of the network also 
influences the nature of migration. 
In Turkish Kurdish migration, networks are often based on familial ties. In response to 
the ethnic conflict, these familial networks facilitate chain migration of family 
members in the long run. Gender difference in networks appears as men often have a 
larger network than women but a higher proportion of women have networks than men. 
This is basically because they often accompany or join their husbands or brothers. 
Networks are also considered as risk minimising and in some cases as insurance against 
the worst possibility (e.g. bankruptcy). With the help of transnational migration 
networks, migrants may opt to move to another country from their initial destination. In 
so doing, they may cope with the difficulties of life (e.g. finding a job, housing, and 
refusal of asylum application or resident permit) in the first country of destination. 
Clandestine ways are preferred to legal migration: As long as the expectations to 
migrate via legal procedures are weak, more Turkish Kurdish migrants incline to follow 
illegal strategies. They may also opt to enter the destination country legally at first and 
then look for the ways to stay longer. Therefore, tourist and other kinds of short stay 
visas are often used to enter the destination country with an intention to overstay. Thus, 
these short stay visas, categorically, have the same function as illegal entry and they are 
less risky. At least this way does not involve any risk of physical danger. Illegal 
strategies of migration are increasingly preferred possibly as a response to tightening 
migration rules in Europe. 
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As analysed in the previous chapter, the context of Kurdish ethnic conflict in Turkey 
also serves as an opportunity framework for Turkish Kurds. This is accompanied by a 
strong belief in the better success chances through clandestine migration among the 
members of this particular ethnic group. Thus a migration pressure is likely to remain 
or even to increase from the Kurdish population of Turkey towards Europe. These 
possibilities are elaborated in the following chapter. 
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Chapter VIII 
Migrants' Future and Future Migrants 
8.1. Introduction 
"Gidip donelim 
Bakarszn goneniri~ gidip donelim 
Ben yzlmam ta~ <;ekerim <;amur kararzm ben 
Senin de gurul gurU! sa<;larzn var naszl olsa ,,110 
(Turgut Uyar, Dunyanzn En Guzel Arabistanz, 1995, p.l ()]) 
The migration patterns and processes of Turkish Kurds have been explored in previous 
chapters. The role of ethnic conflict as an opportunity framework and the facilitating 
role of migration networks have been discussed. Given the availability of similar 
migration networks (e.g. Boyd 1989), the continuation of the current state of ethnic 
relations in Turkey (Barkey and Fuller 1997) and, of course, if the present gap between 
welfare levels (e.g. Martin 1991) in Turkey and Europe maintains, it would not be 
wrong to expect further migration flows of Turkish Kurds into Europe. However, the 
migration decision is also influenced by individuals' perceptions and intentions. 
This chapter focuses on migration potentials for Turkish Kurds. The analysis lS 
particularly focused on micro level indicators since the data provided by the TIMS and 
qualitative research do not support macro level analysis of future migrations. Therefore, 
the analysis here will remain limited to the perceptions, intentions, and investment 
patterns of Turkish Kurds. However, it must be acknowledged these are not totally 
irrelevant to macro level factors. For example, it can be expected that a future trend in 
increasing racism or xenophobia in Europe could be a factor deterring future migration 
to Europe while facilitating return migration. Migrants' experiences abroad are 
important in deciding return migration as well as it may encourage future migration 
flows (Ammassari and Black 2001:22).111 
110 "Lets go and come back / then might we be better off, lets go and return / I ne\er be daunted to 
carrying stones, blending mud / and, anyway, you also have luxuriant hair." (Translation is mine). 
III In order to Ll\oid confusion between sections written from the perspective of Turkey and sections 
written from the perspectives of Germany the reader should bear in mind the distinction in the use of 
"immigrant" and "migrant." Throughout the chapter, "immigrant" is used to refer to Turkish Kurdish 
migrants inter\'icwcd in Cologne whereas "migrant" is used to indicate migrants \\'bo \\'ere interviewed 
in the Tlf\lS. To underline the difference the TIMS and the Cologne study are also referred to in some 
plal'CS. 
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Nevertheless, with the current state of affairs, Turkish Kurdish immigrants' future 
migration plans seem to be more connected to the changes in the course of the ethnic 
conflict in Turkey. Many immigrants in the qualitative research reported their 
intentions to return were conditional on the betterment of ethnic relations in Turkey. 
However, future migration potentials are not just return migration and migration from 
Turkey but also transnational movements of Turkish Kurds from their current 
destination places to other places, which may involve returning to Turkey as well, and 
it does not necessarily mean the closure of the migration cycle (King 2000). 
Studying future migration potentials on the basis of immigrants' own accounts and 
based on past trends is controversial because of the nature of the subject under 
investigation. Plans and intentions can be changed over time and can also be influenced 
by external events (e.g. an economic crisis in the countries involved in migration), so it 
may tum into a myth (e.g. Anwar 1979; AlRasheed 1994; Zetter 2000). Therefore, here 
the main task is to provide a snapshot of migration intentions and potentials and 
indicate the complicated nature of people's migration considerations. 
Migrants' and non-migrants' perceptions about various aspects of migration including 
life abroad, life in the sending places, cultural differences, socio-economic 
development are important for the interpretation of migration behaviour as they may 
affect migration intentions. Hence this chapter starts with an elaboration of perceptions 
about migration. The second section delineates migration prospects by questioning the 
intentions of individuals; whether non-migrants would like to move abroad, whether 
current migrants wish to move to another country or return to Turkey, or whether return 
migrants intend to move abroad again. The last part analyses the future plans of 
migrants by questioning the patterns of remittances and investments, which may reveal 
some patterns helpful to understand future migration trends. Analyses have followed a 
way in which the TIMS data and qualitative research data talk to each other and 
provide comparisons between migrants and non-migrants as well as between ethnic 
groups. It is also worthwhile to notice the contrast between the survey data and the 
qualitative data. 
8.2. Perceptions and Migration Potentials 
Perceptions about n1igration and nligrants are based on migration expenences and 
information about Inigration. They Inay tum into aspirations and thus hayc an impact 
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on future migration trends. It may also lead to non-migration. Migrants' own 
perceptions about their and other migrant's experiences abroad are influential both on 
their future plans and also on that of potential migrants. Where potential migrants have 
positive impressions of migrants' experiences, this can inspire potential migrants to 
migrate but if they have negative impressions, this may deter them from migrating. For 
potential migrants, what they perceive is more important than what migrants suggest or 
experience. However, referring to the role of networks as emphasised in the earlier 
chapters, what past and current migrants reported or advised is also an important factor 
to be counted. Impressions given by earlier migrants are also equally important as is 
revealed in the case of Mr. Sefer Demir interviewed in Cologne which was illustrated 
in the previous two chapters. 
To understand the future migration trends within the context which has been discussed 
here, the analyses revolve around three areas of perception. These three areas have been 
selected because they relate to migration conceptualisations emphasising the role of 
socio-economic achievement (see Chapter 2). According to the TIMS data they were 
formulated as follows: a) respect, b) financial improvement, and c) employment. At the 
same time, the qualitative research findings are also discussed for comparison. The 
section concludes with the examination of possible advice to be given by migrants to 
those who may wish to migrate abroad. Respect is a difficult indicator to measure 
because many different aspects may be involved. This study utilises the perception 
variables of the TIMS data and compares them with immigrant accounts from the in-
depth interviews. 
8.2.1. Migration and perception 
Migration influences the perceptions of people involved at the migration process. This 
includes actual migrants and non-migrants. During the process of migration, these 
perceptions may also change. Perceptions can also play a crucial role in migration 
decision-n1aking. Although it is a quite complicated phenomenon to measure respect in 
relation to migration, some trends were found in this study. The researcher considered 
them significant for understanding future migration trends of Turkish Kurds. Two areas 
of concentration were marital relations and respect in the society according to the TIMS 
data. In a conflict situation where Turkish Kurds have been suppressed by the Turkish 
gOVC111n1ent, Turkish Kurds might have been humiliated and intimidated due to their 
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different ethnic origin. Hence, being respected somewhere (e.g. abroad) may become 
an important factor in deciding migration. 
Table 8.1 presents the summary of answers to two perception questions from the TIMS 
individual data. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or not with statements 
about migration, migrants and migrants' lives. ll2 It suggests Turkish Kurdish current 
migrants are more likely to think migrants are respected abroad (940/0) than are non-
migrants (71 0/0). Among Turkish migrants the picture seems slightly different. Less 
than half (400/0) of current migrants are less likely to think migrants are respected, 
whereas a clear majority of non-migrants think so (62%). At this point, the ethnic 
conflict seems to intervene and is explained on the basis of examples from the 
qualitative research later in this section. Turkish Kurds are concerned about the 
discrimination against them and the difference between Turkey and Germany and 
because they feel their ethno-political cause is heard and their Kurdishness is not 
discriminated against abroad, they are likely to feel respected abroad. 
Table 8.1. Perceptions about migration, 1996 (%) 
Turkish Kurdish Turkish 
Current Return Non- Current Return Non-
migrant migrant migrant migrant migrant migrant 
Migrants are res~ected abroad 94 78 71 40 65 62 
Migrants are more attractive for 
marriage than local ~eo~le. 38 89 76 70 64 72 
NI13 17 46 594 20 195 1744 
Source: TIMS J 996 Individual data 
However, for the Turks, the issue of respect might be related to something else; 
xenophobic views towards the Turks in Germany and related discrimination and their 
isolated lives could be the reason that they are more likely to think migrants are not 
112 The TIMS individual questionnaire included tens of questions about the norms, values, and 
perceptions of respondents. Some of the topics covered were ideas about the economic situation in 
Turkey and future possibilities, employment, opportunities in both Turkey and destination countries, 
problems of immigrants' children in Turkey, gender relations and attitudes about decision making 
processes within the family. However most of these questions are not available in the TIMS data set 
possibly due to very high non-response rate to these questions. Therefore, only these available variables 
are used in the analysis. 
113 The reader must be careful interpreting these cross tabulations on perceptions, intentions and 
potentials throughout the chapter because of a very high rate of missing cases especially among migrants. 
There \\ere about 185 Turkish Kurdish migrant cases but 121 of whom were recorded as missing. This 
rate was about 35 percent among non-migrants. For the Turks, the missing rate was around .+5 percent 
for both migrants and non-migrants. Missing cases for migrant cases are mostly related to proxy 
respondents' incapability of ammering questions about perceptions of immigrants. (For the use of proxy 
respondents sec Chapter 4 and TIr\!S 2000). 
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respected abroad. Turkish return migrants are also very likely to think migrants are 
respected (65%). Nevertheless, the difference between Turkish and Kurdish return 
migrants is statistically insignificant (Chi Square: 3.549, Sig: 0.47).114 This can also be 
interpreted as normal because early migrants were needed and welcomed in Germany 
when they arrived as guest workers. Nevertheless, the energy crisis-led recession in the 
global economy and excess supply in the labour market through the 1970s made 
Turkish guest workers unwanted. However, more than 70% of non-migrant Turkish 
Kurds still believe that migrants are respected abroad and this may trigger migration 
flows in the future. 
Turkish Kurdish responses are often based on compansons between Turkey and 
Germany. They are the oppressed ethnic minority within Turkey and do not feel 
respected there and so feel better in Germany. There are numerous stereotypes about 
the Kurds in Turkey. For example, the most common and known saying of the Turks 
about the Kurds is "dirty Kurds" along side many others including "kzro l15 " and 
"lazy". 
The issue of respect was also reflected in the qualitative research. Frequently, Turkish 
Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne gave examples from their contacts with 
others. The emphasis was on the difference between the Turks and Germans. They 
reported that Germans understood the Kurdish cause easily but the Turks could not. It 
seems Turkish Kurdish immigrants have measured respect according to the level of 
understanding of the Kurdish cause. However, it was also affected by experiences of 
the past in Turkey. Three examples are presented below to describe these 
considerations: 
Miss. Dilane (Appendix 4.2): 
"1 have grown up with Germans here; and with Turks. Very few of these German friends 
remained with me now ... Identity is not important for friendship but understanding each 
other is important. 1 mean people become friends when they understand each other ... It 
is possible to convince German Nazis even when you tell the truth about what happened 
to the Kurds in Turkey, but Turks do not understand this. 1 am always talking to them but 
they object to 1\'/zatn'er 1 say. They even say to me )'ou are Turkish '. They don't want to 
accept my Kurdishness. " 
114 The relationships mentioned throughout the chapter are statistically significant unless otherwise 
indicated. 
115 "KIro" is one of the most common sayings about the Kurds and it means uneducated, illiterate. 
unci\'ili/cd in Turkish although it means 'boy' in Kurdish. 
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Mrs. $irin Unsal (Appendix 4.2): 
"My Turkish friends here were always joking about my Kurdishness and Alevism. They 
were saying that I could not be A levi and Kurdish. I was swearing that I am Kurdish and 
A levi. I was asking them that for being Kurdish and Alevi should we have a tail or 
horns? They did not understand anything and continued to tease me. In later years I 
stopped seeing them. Nowadays, most of my friends are Kurdish. My relations f\'ith 
Germans have always been nicer. May be it is due to the fact that we see Europeans 
differently. I mean they are modern, developed, educated. I feel myself closer to them 
rather than the Turks. But I found happiness with the Kurds, especially with Alevi 
Kurds. " 
Mrs. $ilan (Appendix 4.2): 
"When we were children, Turks were makingfun of our Turkish pronunciation ... one day 
my mother, I and our next door neighbour were chatting in our garden in the village. My 
mother said that 'let our son get married to your daughter '. The neighbour replied 'I 
would give her to a dog but not to a Kurd ' .. .I was seven years old at the time. When we 
went to the public tap to get drinking water, Uncle Mehmet [an old Turkish man from the 
village but not a blood relative] was saying, 'the dog has a God but not the Kurd '. " 
Possibly these kind of attitudes that the Kurds faced while they were in Turkey, prior to 
migration, were the reason that most Kurds expect more respect abroad than they get in 
Turkey. However, the difference between German and Turkish people, observed by 
Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Cologne, in terms of their attitude towards the Kurdish 
cause is related to the context that has been characterised by an ethnic conflict between 
the Turks and the Kurds. Whilst it is a neutral issue of human rights for Germans, for 
the Turks, it is considered as an issue of a Kurdish threat to their national territorial and 
cultural unity. 
Preferences in choosing a marriage partner also reflect perceptions about migration. 
Immigrants often share a preference for a marriage partner from the same region of 
origin (Lievens 1997a: 3). This pattern partly explains the tendency among Turkish 
Kurdish in1migrants interviewed in Cologne preferring to marry their kind of people 
and often importing their partners from their hometowns. The majority of Turkish 
Kurds and Turks in Turkey consider migrants as better marriage partners than locals 
(Table 8.1). This is only challenged by Turkish Kurdish current migrants: only 380/0 of 
then1 are more likely to find immigrants more attractive than locals. Reasons for such 
attitudes are not possible to explain through the TIMS data. However some of the 
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immigrants interviewed in Cologne put forth some ethical issues as decisive in 
choosing a marriage partner. These are virginity and obedience; for men these are two 
crucial factors when choosing a marriage partner. They often prefer virgin and obedient 
women, who, they perceive, cannot be found in Europe (see Parla 2001; Cindoglu 
1997). The Turkish Kurdish immigrant men often expressed their responses in the 
following words: "you cannot make a wife out of European woman... They are so 
'd " {'it t ' " IJJeren ... 
Kurdish women interviewed in Cologne seem to be more liberated from or less 
concerned with ethnic preferences in marriage. They did not raise any concern about 
who they would marry or were married to except Islamic concerns. Islam does not 
allow or at least does not appreciate marriages of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim 
man (Coleman 1994: 113). Therefore, for example, Mrs. Silan stated that she would not 
marry a German. However, as mentioned in earlier chapters, there was a difference 
between people from different denominations of Islam. Alevi women were not 
restricting themselves in the same way as Sunnis did. Mrs. Sirin (Appendix 4.2), for 
instance, had no reservations against marrying a German or a non-Muslim as she 
expressed; "the important thing is being human, being honest". 
Compared to women's concerns about partner selection, Islamic men's stories were 
slightly different. Islam does not restrict partner selection for males. The TIMS shows 
that migrants are less likely than non-migrants to choose a migrant as their partner. 
Those who gave in-depth interviews in Cologne also confirmed such preferences. 
Turkish Kurdish men were not willing to marry Turkish Kurdish immigrant women 
because they thought immigrant women were not "good". The word "good" means a 
lot. They think Kurdish women abroad became "open" and not like those in rural 
Turkey. Most of them do not wear the veil anymore. Some of then1 work or study and 
so are in touch with their male counterparts. More importantly they think some of the 
Kurdish women abroad have lost their virginity before marriage. Obviously, such an 
approach is not generalisable to all the Kurds but at least contributes to the explanation 
of why Turkish Kurdish immigrants are less likely to consider their ethnic fello\ys 
abroad as their n1arriage partners. One possible implication of these perceptions is 
further export n1arriages: Men living abroad would bring women from their society of 
origin to avoid the 'virginity' problem whilst women would do the same to avoid the 
'religious' problem. 
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According to the TIMS data, for a large majority of the population, migrants are 
perceived as attractive marriage partners while Kurdish current migrants thought the 
opposite as shown in Table 8.1 above. This pattern finds some explanation in the role 
of migration in improving living standards. Migrants are usually better off than their 
local non-migrant fellows. Besides, it is often assumed that migrants are better off as 
the destination countries are better off than Turkey. Thus, migrants become better 
marriage partners for non-migrants than locals. Hence, the explanation lies in 
perceptions about social economic aspects in relation to migration. 
8.2.2. Migration and economic improvement 
Economic improvement has been one of the most referred motivations for migration in 
the literature (see Chapter 2). The data used in this study enables an analysis of the 
migrants' and non-migrants' perceptions about migration. The analysis of the TIMS 
suggests that most people think moving abroad improves the financial situation (Figure 
8.1). Although among non-migrant Turks, the rate goes down to less than 60%, those 
with previous migration experiences are very likely to be convinced that it does 
improve the financial situation. The vast majority of Turkish Kurds believe in the 
magic of migration to improve their financial situation. 
The probable role of such a conviction in future migration flows of Turkish Kurds, 
therefore, would not be an astonishing finding. A high proportion of non-migrants who 
think migration improves their lives may, on the other hand, indicate a strong migration 
intention among Turkish Kurds (Figure 8.1). 
However, Figure 8.1 displays that the current migrant Kurds are less likely than their 
non-migrant and return migrant fellows to perceive migration as an improving factor 
for their quality of life although the belief in this direction is stronger among non-
Inigrants and return migrants. The comparison is similar with the Turkish current 
migrants. One of the explanations for this feature can be found in the disappointment 
expressed by Kurdish migrants interviewed in Cologne, a few examples of which have 
already been given (see Chapter 6). 
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Those immigrants interviewed in Cologne also reported similar considerations. First of 
all, their most important motivation for migration was betterment of life and secondly, 
ethnic freedoms. This can be achieved by living in a more democratic environment, or 
by earning more, or having a job. However, several interviewees could not provide a 
single positive answer to this question because it was difficult to measure. Some people 
thought that Turkish Kurdish immigrants live in unpleasant conditions in Germany 
while indicating political and cultural freedoms and economic opportunities as 
advantageous gains of emigration from Turkey. 
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Employment differentials are important factors in migration analyses. Interrelated as 
they are with the idea that migration improves the quality of life, employment 
opportunities can also influence international migration behaviour. TIMS respondents 
varied in their assumptions about whether it would be easier to get a job in Turkey or 
abroad (Figure 8.2). They were asked if finding a job is easier in Turkey or in Europe. 
A majority of Turkish Kurds believed that finding a job would be easier in a European 
country than Turkey. As they know by experience, more than 90% of Turkish Kurdish 
current migrants interviewed by the TIMS think it is easier to find a job in Europe than 
Turkey (Figure 8.2). The rate is quite high among return migrants as well. However for 
their fellow Turks in Turkey it does not seem convincing because only about half of 
them consider finding job in Europe is easier than Turkey. Only 200/0 of Turkish current 
migrants think job-hunting in Turkey would be easier than European countries, and 
none of the Turkish Kurds stand by this view (Figure 8.2). 
Given the OECD and World Bank indicators of socio-economic development, these 
perceptions are not surprising (see Chapter 3 and 5). These respondents are well aware 
of high unemployment rates resulting in difficulty in finding jobs in Turkey and they 
assumed employment opportunities are better in Western Europe. The difference, on 
the other hand, between the migrant and non-migrant populations can be explained by 
experience. Migrants had work experiences in European countries (and probably in 
Turkey before migration); therefore they may compare the levels of difficulty and find 
it easier in Europe. Non-migrants are likely to agree with their migrant counterparts but 
obviously migrants are the most likely to think employment is easier in Western Europe 
than it is in Turkey. However, the picture drawn by those interviewed in Cologne 
seems slightly different. 
Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Cologne were often happy with their economic situation 
in Gern1any which has been relatively better than their situation in Turkey prior to 
migration despite the fact that they frequently reported their dissatisfaction with their 
socio-econon1ic conditions abroad. Male immigrants interviewed in the qualitative 
research frequently complained about the hardship of work compared to their o\\"n 
experiences in Turkey prior to migration. They admit there are more jobs in Germany 
but n10st of these jobs are not suitable for them. They mean these jobs are not 
accessible for them or they are not eligible for these positions. They are not happy with 
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the fact that they have to work with Turkish and Turkish Kurdish restaurant owners and 
retailers in Cologne. However, there are not other options because they often know 
very little German and the majority of them do not have the necessary skills to be 
employed elsewhere. Also in many cases, they are staying illegally in the country and 
therefore have to work in the informal economy. As a result, the major source of 
employment in Germany for these illegal immigrants is their fellow citizens from 
Turkey: Turkish or Kurdish small entrepreneurs. 
Finding a job is a complicated matter. Although official statistics show that 
unemployment rates are higher in Turkey than Germany which may imply more 
employment opportunities in Germany compared to Turkey, finding suitable 
employment in Germany can still be difficult for Turkish Kurdish immigrants because 
of the language and immigration status issues discussed above. For example, Mr. Ali 
Naki (Appendix 4.2) moved to Germany after his boutique in Istanbul went bankrupt. 
Within a few weeks of arrival, he began to work in a doner-kebab shop as an illegal 
worker. He was paid less than the minimum wage in Germany: just 500 DM (£160) per 
month. He would never have worked in such a job in Turkey. Until his bankruptcy, he 
was earning relatively 'good money'. He owned a small workshop producing clothes 
and underwear and a small high street store to sell both his own products and the 
products of other retailers. Clearly having a small business in Istanbul is not 
comparable with working illegally in a small doner-kebab shop in Cologne. However, 
it is important to understand immigrants' comparative perceptions, which means they 
may prefer the latter to the former. This was Mr. Ali Naki's consideration as well. He 
said he was considering migrating to Germany even if he had not gone bankrupt. 
Mr. Hacl Kilimci's (Appendix 4.2) consideration was also similar. At the beginning of 
the Cologne fieldwork, he was working illegally in a Turkish restaurant in Cologne. He 
was paid 1000 DM per month, but had not received his salary for four months and the 
business had closed. He was not happy with his working hours because he had to work 
frOlTI nine in the morning until midnight seven days a week without any social security 
options. On the other hand, before his immigration, he was running a comer shop in 
Adana, Turkey's fifth largest city. He sold everything to finance his immigration and 
exploited all of his networks to get a visa as a trade union representative. He was not 
suffering fron1 any financial difficulty in Turkey: indeed. "I lVas living like a king 
there ", Evidently he was no longer a king in Cologne at the tin1e of this research when 
he \vas unemployed and living in a 'heim·. 
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Of course, the cases are not all pessimistic. Especially established immigrants who 
have been abroad for a longer period are quite satisfied with their financial situation 
abroad. Three guest workers, Mr. Hasan Uzmez, Mr. Selami Sevgi, and Mr. Huseyin 
Aksu (Appendix 4.2), who arrived in Germany in 1970-71, were primary school 
graduates and in their early twenties when they migrated from Turkey to Germany. All 
of them were farmers working with their parents in their villages. Moving to Germany 
as guest workers was the first ever job they found l16 and it was certainly advantageous 
because of the high income possibility allegedly attached to ajob in Germany. They did 
not have to sell anything but labour for their migration and they earned real moneyl17 
which was not available in their village life before migration. Previously, they received 
money only once a year when they sold their harvest. 
Perceptions of non-migrants are also shaped by accounts of migration and life abroad 
given by migrants. In most of the discussions conducted with immigrants in Cologne, 
the immigrants themselves were undecided whether they would encourage anybody 
else (in Turkey) to migrate abroad. Therefore, it is worth examining these immigrants' 
considerations with regard to their advice for potential migrants although in calculating 
migration potential what is important is what the potential migrants think. Even if 
current immigrants are ambivalent or reluctant about encouraging others to migrate, if 
potential immigrants think migrants' lives are easier abroad, they will be more likely to 
migrate - and they can even form this impression in the absence of any information. 
The Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne often did not like their living 
conditions but given the hardship of life in Turkey, they would still encourage others to 
move abroad. 
As a result of their migration experiences and the perceptions developed through these 
experiences, some immigrants interviewed in Cologne reported they would still 
encourage non-migrants to migrate. Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed III 
Cologne often discussed migration as an almost compulsory strategic option III 
response to the ethnic conflict in Turkey. Those immigrants mostly spoke about the 
necessity of moving abroad to escape from the conflict. Some of them also claimed that 
parents forced their children, especially sons, to move abroad to avoid the risk of death 
116 With the exception of Mr. Aksu \\"ho had worked in forestry prior to his migration. 
117 Mr. Hasan Ozmez used the term "real money" in the interview. He wanted to underline the local 
economy and self-satisfactory agricultural household economy prior to migration, in Turkey. in which 
everything needed is produced by family members and only few manufactured items. fertilizers and 
gasoline are bought from the market using "real money". 
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and torture if they stayed in Turkey. According to this view, parents were also afraid 
their sons would join the PKK guerrilla forces (see Chapters 3 and 5). For example, Mr. 
Baran (Appendix 4.2) had not intended to move abroad prior to migration but his 
parents said "you should go abroad; you can not stay here. If you stay you will end up 
at prison. " He said his family was afraid of his intentions: "because I am sure, if I 
stayed there I would go to school and probably will be more involved in politics. Actil'e 
politics I mean". Active politics has a clear meaning for Mr. Baran: "going to the 
mountains" and joining the PKK. 
However, on the other hand, most respondents interviewed in Cologne reported that 
their migration was not political but economic, and for them, economic criteria were 
decisive to encourage or deter others' migration. Many immigrants complained about 
the conditions in which they lived in Germany and told a story of disappointment but at 
the same time they still considered migration to Germany as a better option than 
staying in Turkey. Mr. Sefer Demir clearly stated his main motivation for migration: 
" ... but we did not have any reason to come here [Germany] other than our economic 
expectations. I mean there were no political reasons for me, for instance. " He also adds 
"but we are Kurdish". Mr. Emrah Kuzucu (Appendix 4.2) also came for economic 
reasons: "everybody was coming here. So I did the same. It was entirely economic. I 
came here to work and earn money. " 'But we are Kurdish' here implies that they had at 
least the minimum ethno-political reason to move abroad declaring 'being Kurdish in 
Turkey is not safe' . 
The following section elaborates migration prospects in terms of return migration plans 
of current migrants, return migrants' intentions to migrate again, and non-migrants' 
intentions to move abroad. 
8.3. Migration Prospects: intentions and potentials 
Throughout the previous passages, perceptions about migration and its implications for 
future migrations were discussed. Findings suggest that more migration is likely. 
However, perceptions are not reliable measures to predict future migrations. Despite a 
huge n1igration potential (up to 500/0) around the world, only a small fraction of people 
have actually migrated (see Faist 2000; Hammar 1995). This section deals \\"ith the 
migration intentions of n1igrants and non-migrants in order to reveal possible indicator~ 
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of future migration. The potential for further Turkish Kurdish international migration i 
discussed on the basis of evidence from the TIMS data and the qualitative research. 
Analysis of the TIMS data revealed quite a high rate of intended migration. Figure 8.3 
displays the intentions of migrants and non-migrants. Part A of the figure details the 
intentions of current migrants where Turkish Kurdish and Turkish trends seem 
different. While 29% of Turkish migrants want to stay in their current country of 
destination, the corresponding figure for Turkish Kurdish migrants is 42%. At the same 
time, 31 % of Turkish Kurds intended to return home whereas 43% of the Turks wished 
to do so. 
Figure 8.3. 
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Pmi B of Figure 8.3 presents the migration intentions of non- and return migrants and 
there it is shown that Kurdish non- and return migrants are more likely to intend 
lTIoving abroad in the future than are Turkish non- and return migrants. In general a 
higher proportion of return migrants than non-migrants intended to migrate abroad. 
About 60% of Turkish Kurdish returnees wanted to move abroad again compared to 
only 340/0 of Turki h return n1igrants. A similar contrast is available among non-
migrant of both ethnic group as well: whilst only 21 % of Turki h non-migrant 
wanted to l11igrate 41 % of Turki h Kurdish non-migrant wi h to mo e abroad. 
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These figures indicate a higher intention among Turkish Kurds to stay abroad or mo e 
abroad compared to their Turkish counterparts. It is probably due to the comparative 
socio-economic conditions of both ethnic groups (See Chapters 3 and 5). As Turkish 
Kurds in Turkey live in relatively deprived conditions compared to the Turks, they may 
want to leave these behind and search for a better environment abroad. The ongoing 
ethnic conflict in Turkey must also be a decisive factor in this tendency. 
However, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, only a very small proportion of 
potential migrants are moving abroad (Faist 2000: 1). This observation is applicable to 
return n1igration too. As we know from previous studies, there has never been an 
enormous return migration movement towards Turkey: only a small portion of Turkish 
immigrants has returned home (Gitmez 1984; Gitmez 1983; see also Anwar 1979). 
Therefore, the intention observed in the TIMS of around 40% of migrants who want to 
return to Turkey does not necessarily mean they would return to Turkey immediately or 
in the near future. 
Figure 8.4. First reason to return home 
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Figure 8.4 summarises the reasons given by current migrants to explain their de ire to 
retun1 to Turkey. Turkish Kurds' wish to return is related to hon1esickne and becau e 
they believe they belong in Turkey, it is their home, according to the TIM data. For 
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the Turks, a dislike of the country of destination, retirement, and low income are also 
h 118 among t e reasons. 
The qualitative research can provide a more detailed picture of return (or settlement) 
plans of Turkish Kurdish immigrants who live in Cologne. An underlined affiliation 
with a homeland was quite common among them (See Chapter 9). Whilst they were not 
happy with the current situation of the Kurdish populated areas in Turkey in regard to 
the ethnic conflict, most Turkish Kurds expressed a strong feeling of belonging to a 
Kurdish homeland. For example, Mr. Baran explicitly stated: "] do not belong here 
[Germany]". And he added, {<even if it is not free we have a homeland at least". In 
another case, Mrs. Kardelen (Appendix 4.2) expressed similar feelings in a rather 
poetic way: "] am here physically but my heart is in there... the land there calls me 
back, but the comfortable bed here hurts me. " Obviously such feelings do not indicate 
an immediate return home but at least they reflect a wish for return. At the same time, 
these expressions quoted from Mrs. Kardelen represent an implication of the 
environment of relative security discussed in Chapter 2. 
Thereby, returning home is conditional for Turkish Kurdish immigrants who live in 
Cologne. It is conditional on the freedom of their homeland. As migration took place in 
the form of an escape, return becomes conditional and postponed to an indefinite time. 
For many of them, a return plan is implicitly there. For example Mrs. Zekiye Ozcan 
(Appendix 4.2) said, "we came here for ApOl19 otherwise we would not stay here even 
for one minute. " Her expression implies both the political nature of their move and 
their intention for an immediate return whenever the conditions that brought them to 
Germany have disappeared. Similarly, Mr. Adem Seyda (Appendix 4.2) said, "!fit was 
possible] would return home just now!" Mrs. Fatma Turk (Appendix 4.2) also argued: 
"they [the Turkish Army] have not left anything safe in our homeland; they destroyed 
evel),thing, every single building. Where should] return now?" Again the emphasis is 
on that demand for a change in conditions. Only after the stabilisation of life in their 
hOlneland, can return migration be possible. At the same time, these narratives often 
ended with a sad statement about a 'compulsory stay' abroad: "1 am vel)' sad; 1 feel 
miserable because it is not possible to return to Turkey. My mother and brother are 
liS Here it must be noted, in the TIMS sample there were only 24 respondents \\ho wish to return; 10 of 
whom \,"ere Turkish Kurdish. Therefore these figures are just to give an idea about return plans of current 
mi ~rants. 
119 ~ Apo' is nickname for Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK. 
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there. My father has died of cancer and 1 could not see him before his last breath. " 
(Mf. Ali Haydar, Appendix 4.2). 
Return intentions similar to those quoted above were given by most of the immigrants 
interviewed in Cologne. However, these are also political expressions aimed at not only 
return migration intentions but also a political message saying that our homeland is not 
accessible for us now. Therefore these narratives can be called 'asylum narratives' 
which emphasise political aspects of their migration and the impossibility of return (at 
least for awhile) to their home. However, due to the ethnic conflict situation in Turkey, 
all types of migrants share similar intentions about return migration. Thus, the asylum 
narrative is not limited to asylum migrants but others as well. 
As a result, four basic approaches to return migration among Turkish Kurdish 
immigrants in Cologne are observed, but all four virtually mean they will not return 
home in a foreseeable future, since their return intentions are conditional upon "a 
suitable situation" in Turkey. These suitable conditions are not defined but often it 
means an end to the ethnic conflict in Turkey and better living standards in Turkey. The 
first tendency is to refrain from returning to Turkey or even to cease visiting Turkey for 
political reasons. These political causes are basically nationalistic (or pro-PKK in most 
cases) views revolving around the conflict between the Turkish State and the PKK in 
Kurdish speaking regions. 
The second tendency is to refrain from returning to Turkey but to keep visiting for 
holidays. The immigrants adopting this strategy often do not like Turkey and the life 
there because of the vulnerable economy, and consecutive economic and political 
crises, lack of peace among people, etc. In brief, they do not consider Turkey as a safe 
place to live in. 
The third tendency is a 'wish to return'. This last group of immigrants want to return to 
Turkey in the last instance but they have often been comfortably settled in Germany. 
For example, their children live in Germany, are married, working and have no 
intention of returning to Turkey. Or in some cases, they have investments (i.e. houses, 
shops) in Germany. They have their friends and relatives in Germany. However, they 
are also investing in Turkey (e.g. they built or bought houses, villas, and/or offices in 
major Turkish cities) and they often visit Turkey for annual vacations. 
There ren1ains another subject area to be questioned in the consideration of migration 
potentials. In1n1igrants' in\Tstn1ent plans may be an important indicator of retun1 plans 
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as well. The next section examines the patterns of remittances sent back home and their 
uses in Turkey. 
8.4. Investment Patterns of Immigrants 
Migrants' investment patterns are important because they reflect their future settlement 
or return migration plans. Remittances have been discussed in the literature mostly in 
regard to their importance for migrant sending countries, especially in terms of their 
use in development, eliminating poverty, and reducing income inequalities (Stark et al. 
1986; Stark 1991; Taylor 1998). However, apart from such influences on development, 
ties established through remittance flows mean active relations between imn1igrants 
and their home country. These relations may facilitate the inclusion of Turkey into their 
future plans. 
Figure 8.5. 
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As figure 8.5 shows, 39% of Turkish Kurdish migrant households in Turkey received 
remittances from household members who lived abroad. The corresponding figure for 
the Turks is 21 % • Family members, especially spouses, children, and brothers and 
sisters, sent most remittances (Table 8.2). The lower rate of sending remittances is 
often related to the duration of stay abroad according to the international migration 
literature. Remittances from immigrants who have stayed abroad longer often tend to 
decrease for two basic reasons: close family members may join them and / or relation 
with other fan1ily men1bers and relatives may weaken over time (Martin 1990 ' Taylor 
1998). However, given the assumption that the TIMS sample included ba icall 
migrant who had migrated in between 1986 and 1996, then the rea on for the 
difference between Kurdish and Turkish migrants have to be found in el ev here. 
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Table 8.2. Sources of remittances sent back to households in Turkey (0/0)120 
Who send remittances: 
Migrant 
Spouse 
Children 
Parents 
Brother/sister 
Relatives 
Friends 
N 
Source: TIMS 1996 household data 
Turkish 
15.8 
28.1 
31.6 
8.8 
24.6 
3.5 
o 
57 
Turkish Kurdish 
13.3 
28.9 
15.6 
11.4 
24.4 
4.4 
6.6 
45 
The patterns of sending remittances can be related to the nature of relations between 
migrants and their relatives left behind, or it may also be related to economic conditions 
of the members of the household who stayed in Turkey. If sending remittances and 
investing at home means stronger ties with home, it is clear that a majority of migrants 
of both ethnicities are not likely to send remittances. However, given the possibility of 
transnational lives even if they do send remittances and invest in Turkey it does not 
necessarily indicate a tendency towards return. Migrants can continue their lives abroad 
and control their investments without actually returning home (See Ammassari and 
Black, 2001). 
Figure 8.5 can be read differently as it may mean more Turkish Kurdish households 
seem reliant on remittances from abroad than the Turks. However, when the sources of 
remittances are examined there seems hardly any difference between Turkish and 
Kurdish households (Table 8.2). Both ethnic groups received remittances from their 
fan1ily members, and particularly from their spouses, brothers, sisters and children. The 
only divergent feature is the fact that Turkish Kurds, unlike Turks, also received 
remittances from friends. This can be related to stronger communal ties among Kurds 
than Turks. Patterns of the use of remittances elaborated below may cast some light on 
this issue (Table 8.4). Kurds received more remittances for community purposes than 
the Turks. These may have come not only from relatives, but also from friends. 
Ren1ittance sending spouses often means a divided family. This usually refers a 
husband working abroad while his dependent wife stays in Turkey. Children sending 
remittances, on the other hand, often means dependent parents left behind in Turkey. 
I~() Percentages in the table do not total 100 since some households received remittances from more than 
one sOllrcc. 
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Apart from cash remittances, many migrant households also received goods from 
abroad. 11 % of Turkish and 15% of Turkish Kurdish migrant households receiyed 
goods from their members or relatives who live abroad. While these goods consisted of 
electronic devices, consumer goods, and clothes for the Turks, they were only clothes 
and jewellery for Turkish Kurds (Table 8.3). 
Table 8.3. Household goods received from migrants (%) 
Received goods from abroad 
Not received goods from abroad 
Received television and/or hi-fi 
Received other consumer goods 
Received clothes 
Received jewellery 
N 
Source: TIMS 1996 household data 
Turkish 
11 
89 
4 
1 
10 
294 
Turkish Kurdish 
15 
85 
14 
1 
108 
Total 
12 
88 
3 
1 
11 
o 
402 
Table 8.4. For what purpose most remittances were spent in Turkey (%) 
Turkish 
Turkish Kurdish Total 
Received remittances 19.5 42.1 25.5 
Did not receive remittance 80.5 57.9 74.5 
To pay for daily household expenses (food, 
clothing, rent, etc.) 13.6 34.6 19.2 
To buy consumer goods (TV, radio, refrigerator, 
etc.) 0.3 0.2 
To buy land 0.9 0.2 
To buy fertilizer, seeds, food for animals, etc. 0.7 0.5 
To buy/build/renovate a house 0.7 0.5 
To pay for medical bills 1.4 3.7 2.0 
To repay other debts 0.3 0.2 
To finance the marriage of family members l.0 2.8 l.5 
To finance other family or religious celebrations 0.3 0.2 
Other 1.4 l.0 
N 294 108 402 
Received remittances for community purposes 10.5 16.7 12.2 
Contribution to mosque 5 5 5 
For alms in Ramadan 5 10 7 
For religious festivities (i.e. feast in Ramadan) 1 6 2 
Other 2 5 3 
N 294 108 402 
Chi Square [community purpose}: 2.766 Sig.[comm un it)' purpose}:O.096 
Source: TlAfS 1996 household data 
Cash ren1ittances are often used for paying daily household expenses including food, 
clothing, and rent. Most of the households who received money from abroad used it for 
their daily expenditures (700/0 of Turkish and 80% of Turkish Kurdish households who 
rccciycd remittances: Table 8.4). The rest of the money \\"as used for paying medical 
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bills and financing the marriage of family members in Turkish Kurdish households. 
Again a very high rate of remittances used for daily expenses probably indicates 
struggling family economies in Turkey, which are dependent on the money sent from 
abroad. This may also mean a member or members of the family who live abroad are 
obliged to take care of the finances of their families left behind in Turkey. 
There is a contrast between Turkish and Turkish Kurdish households with regard to 
remittances received for community purposes. As Table 8.4 above shows 170/0 of 
Turkish Kurdish households received such remittances as opposed to 11 % of their 
Turkish counterparts however the difference is not statistically significant (Sig.: 0.096: 
Table 8.4). Most of these contributions were used for religious purposes including 
building or repairing mosques, maintaining religious ceremonies and festivities. Among 
Turkish Kurds, two thirds of all community purpose remittances were used for alms in 
Ramadan. This is important because it can be an indicator of community level 
dependency upon remittances received from abroad, since alms in Ramadan can be the 
only source of income for poor people in some sending areas. 
Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne highlighted the dependency of 
their households left behind in Turkey. They also reported the expectations of their 
families in Turkey although they did not mention much about community needs. These 
expectations are usually in two forms: a) cash and in kind remittances to contribute to 
the family'S economy and b) help for migration of other members of the family or 
friends. 
Mr. Emrah Kuzucu, for example, is under pressure from his family who live in the 
village of Urfa, Southern Turkey. He was just 22 when he arrived in Germany in 1998 
and the cost of 8000 DM (£2700) for his journey through the Balkans and Austria was 
paid for by his family: 
"The 400 DM (£130) I receive from the [German] government is a very small amount. 
Those I left behind in the village expect money from me. They don't know my situation 
here. I have to send money to them. " 
At the san1e time, he was dealing with the expectations of potential migrants in his 
village in Turkey. 
"A(\'f;'iends [in Turkey] ask 'shall H'C come there '. I say 'no '. 'Don't come '. I say 'YOli 
should acqllire a profession first and then YOli can come here '. I am insisting that '~fyolt 
dOll 'r ha\'(> a profession, there is no job for .rOll here '. " 
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These expectations could be the results of reciprocity between the migrant and those of 
his or her family left behind. According to the qualitative research, migrants pay a high 
(higher in the case of clandestine migration) cost for their migration adventure, and the 
families left behind have often paid this cost collectively. Thus, in return, the family 
left behind expects some benefits from its investment. 
Future plans of migrants can be discussed in relation to their direct investment patterns 
as well. According to the TIMS data, a very small portion of remittances go towards 
investments in Turkey (Table 8.4) but the qualitative interviews may shed further light 
on what immigrants do with their savings. Many of the immigrants interviewed in 
Cologne reported that they own some real estate or businesses in Turkey. Immigrants' 
family members who lived in Turkey ran most of these businesses and properties. 
Such investments may be considered indicators of return plans of immigrants but in 
reality this may not be the case. For example, Mr. Sefer Demir owns two apartments in 
his hometown, Elbistan, but the story is quite complicated: 
"We are stuck here. We cannot move anywhere else; cannot go back to Turkey anymore. 
I am visiting Turkey from time to time but all our life is here now. You cannot leave 
everything and go. All my friends are here. Additionally, I don't like Turkey that much. 
Everything is rubbish there. People are strange. But I have investments there for the 
future if we ever return. I bought two apartments for instance. But we bought our home 
here as well. In short, we don't plan to return. And I am already a German citizen. My 
wife will also acquire citizenship soon. Our children are also German citizens. Why 
should we return to Turkey? We see my parents once a year ... what else?" 
The case of Mr. Sefer Demir underlines the difficulty of interpretation of investment 
patterns in relation to the return plans of immigrants. Nevertheless, the general 
tendency among Turkish Kurdish immigrants is not to return to Turkey even if they are 
not satisfied with what they have in Germany. 
The evidence given by Mr. Sefer Demir's quote above may relate to the 
transnationalism as well. As discussed in Chapter 2, transnationalism means migrants 
can pursue a life strategy which involves more than one country and they can tra\"el 
between these different locations. In this regard, Mr. Sefer Demir's investments in 
Turkey should be considered as economic investments at a transnational level rather 
than signs of a possible future return migration although it may help his return 
migration ifhe decides in the future. 
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8.5. Concluding Remarks 
The EOr in Turkey seemed to be the major determinant of future migration trends. An 
environment of relative security in the destination country has been emphasised by 
migrants but they are still inclined to stay abroad as opposed to returning to Turkey. A 
common attitude of Turkish Kurdish immigrants towards Turkey is that they do not 
consider the country as a secure place and so they often look for chances in other 
countries in the case of dissatisfaction in the first country of destination. A similar hope 
for a better life abroad is common also among non-migrants in Turkey. Therefore, 
intentions for return migration are likely to be weaker than future migrations from 
Turkey. 
Positive impressions about migration and migrants may facilitate the migration 
intentions of non-migrants. These can be categorised as material and non-material 
perceptions. Material perceptions (i.e. employment, improvement of living conditions) 
related to economic opportunities are known and influence both Turkish and Turkish 
Kurdish people similarly. But non-material perceptions (i.e. respect) influence the two 
ethnic groups differently: while Turkish Kurds wish to move abroad for more respect, 
the Turks are likely to complain about receiving less respect in the destination country. 
Therefore, the material EOr plays a role facilitating the migration of both ethnic groups 
whereas the non-material EOr rather mobilises the Kurds. 
Due to the ongoing ethnic conflict, Turkish Kurdish migrants tend to advise their 
fellows who stayed in Turkey to move abroad whereas Turks are less likely to do so. 
The propensity to send remittances to their households in Turkey is higher among 
Turkish Kurdish immigrants than their Turkish fellows. Patterns of sending remittances 
may reflect a dependency among families left behind in Turkey. This argument is also 
supp011ed by the fact that most remittances are used for daily household expenses in 
Turkey. 
A considerable portion of Turkish Kurdish immigrants would like to return but this is 
conditional on improvements in political conditions and living standards in Turkey. 
Howeyer, reflecting such a (conditional) wish for return, many immigrants also inyest 
in Turkey. In the country of destination, they buy property as they need but they also 
buy prope11ies in Turkey for their possible return in an indefinite future. Especially in 
clandestine fonlls of migration, high migration costs may create reciprocal financial 
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relationships between the migrant and his/her family or relatives and friends. These 
relations, in turn, can create further pressures on the individual living abroad. The 
pressure can be in the forms of financial expectations or expectations of help for 
migration of others left behind. 
In the last instance, migration is more likely for Kurds than for Turks and unless a 
solution is found for Turkey's Kurdish question, any change in this should not be 
expected. For the same reason, the return migration intentions of Turkish Kurdish 
immigrants will also be shaped by the possibility of such a solution. Future migrations 
and migrants' future in the case of Turkish Kurdish international migration is highly 
correlated to the ethnic conflict resulting in an EOr for Turkish Kurds. The immigrants' 
return intentions were expressed in condition to the situation of ethnic affairs in 
Turkey, although many of them intend to return as reflected in their investment and 
remittance patterns. 
The next chapter analyses the relationships between the expression of ethnicity and 
migration process in relation to the EOr. It explores the ways in which the expression 
of ethnicity is represented within migrants' narratives. Ways in which the influence of 
migration been represented by these migrants are also discussed. 
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Chapter IX 
Migration and the Expression of Ethnicity 
9.1. Introduction 
"ve ben Amerikanca birfilmi Kiirt(:e 
seyrediyorum. ,,121 
(YLlI71O::' Erdogan) 
"/ have been a strange man in a strange land. " 
(Bible, Exodus ch.2, v.22) 
This study focuses on the relation between Turkish Kurdish international migration and 
the EOI characterised by an ongoing ethnic conflict. An analysis of the changes in the 
expression of ethnicity throughout the process of international migration may add to the 
explanation of the relation between international migration and ethnicity. Previous 
chapters explored the context for the expression of ethnicity among Turkish Kurdish 
migrants. This chapter elaborates immigrant stories collected through in-depth 
interviews to understand the expression of ethnicity through the experience of 
migration. This may help to understand the role of ethnicity or at least how people 
formulated their ethnicity in relation to their migration. 
According to Barthes (1966) and Lyotard (1984) narratives exist In all cultures, 
histories, and all languages as a primary method of communication and the expression 
of experience. These expressions may change according to the context of narration, and 
therefore it is very likely that the same experience can be narrated in multiple forms 
emphasising different aspects (Jackson and Penrose 1993). 
Individuals have different stories for different situations and often more than one for 
each experience unwittingly. Within discursive consciousness (Halfacree and Boyle 
1993:336-338; Giddens 1984:xxiii), identity narratives are often used in multiple fonns 
interchangeably (White 1995). As discussed in the last section of Chapter 2, narratives 
can shift within short time periods, even within a day. For example, an immigrant 
W0111an may enact a narrative of an asylum-seeker and stranger when she feels 
hun1iliated shopping with vouchers in the afternoon. However, in the evening, when 
121 " ... and I am watching an 'Americanish' film in Kurdish". Yllmaz Erdogan is a Turkish Kurdish poet. 
His emphasis in this poem is on the fact that no matter which language the film is in, he watches it in 
Kurdish. The \\ord ":\.mericanish" is used to denote it is in American language. 
209 
Migration and the expression of etlmicit)' 
speaking to her mother on the phone she tells a welfare narrative to convince her 
mother that she is living well abroad. Thus, the narratives of 34 Turkish Kurdish 
migrants living in Cologne, Germany reflect only those stories told to the author, a 
Turkish researcher from the United Kingdom at a particular moment in the summer of 
1999. In this regard, it must be noted here that same experiences could be narrated 
totally different in another context and they are also affected by the agency, and the 
identity of the researcher (see Chapter 4). 
During the course of the interviews, several aspects of ethnicity were explored in order 
to understand changes in the expression of ethnicity in response to migration and ethnic 
conflict. The researcher prefers to use "expression of ethnicity" as a working concept in 
preference to "expression of identity", which is more complex as it intersects with other 
identities such as gender, age, and class (Horowitz 1985). A focus on "ethnic identity" 
is also not suitable for this study because it is constituted from a larger realm of texts 
ranging from ethnic practices, clothes and patterns of behaviour to belongings and self-
ascriptions (Weber 1961, Barth 1969, Eriksen 1993). For these reasons, this study is 
limited to the analysis of the expressions of ethnicity in the personal narratives of 
Turkish Kurds who have migrated to Germany. 
In the interviews, immigrants were asked to talk about their experiences of ethnic 
discrimination before departure and at their destination. Their ability to use Kurdish as 
their mother tongue was also investigated. The assumption here was that any change in 
the level of use of the mother language might be a signifier of a change in ethnic (or 
ethno-political) consciousness. The large community of Turkish Kurds living in a 
particular part of the city of Cologne allows them to live in a reasonably large Kurdish 
speaking community. Respondents' perceptions about other Kurds and their feelings of 
affiliation with them were also researched in conjunction with their feelings about 
Kurdishness. As an immediate environment with considerable potential influence on 
ethnic identity, family life was also investigated. It was examined with regard to three 
aspects; change in the use of language at home; changes in the status of women: and 
marriage preferences. As a signifier of symbolic representation of Kurdishness, 
individuals' experience of "Newroz", a spring festival, was also investigated. Finally, 
the expression of ethnicity was researched in the narratives of 'return' and 'homeland' 
to understand possible changes in terms of the expression of ethnicity. 
Tht? following sections exan1ine these aspects in relation to the themes, \vhich art? 
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drawn from in-depth interviews. The chapter starts with a broader aspect of Kurdish 
ethnicity: a contest in which Kurdish ethnicity is expressed as a challenge to the 
Turkish 'other'. Linguistic freedoms the Kurds enjoyed abroad are examined in the 
second section. In the last three sections, the practices of the Newroz festival, changing 
social relations and expressions about the homeland and diaspora are analysed. 
9.2. The Kurds and the others: 'Us' versus 'Them' 
Immigrants' stories frequently drew upon comparisons between 'the Kurdish' and 'the 
Turkish'. The Turkish 'other' was always there as a reference point while defining the 
Kurdish 'self. A Kurdish ethnicity is in part constructed around, and in opposition to 
Turkish ethnicity. The Turkish Kurdish case presents a number of similarities with their 
number one rival: the Turks. For instance, the PKK allegorically is an equivalent of the 
Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti (a union of regional resistance committees) of the Turkish 
Independence War (1919-1922). Similarly, the role of Abdullah Ocalan (Apo), the 
original leader of the PKK has been likened to that of Mustafa Kemal, founder and the 
first president of the Turkish Republic. Because of his leadership, Mustafa Kemal 
assumed the surname "Ataturk" after the war. "AtatUrk" literally means "the ancestor of 
Turks". A Turkish journalist, Ahmet Altan (1995), was fined 5 billion Turkish Liras l22 , 
and also fired from the daily, Milliyet, because he wrote an article entitled "Atakurt". 
He urged readers to consider Apo as the leader of a Kurdish national liberation war, 
just as Ataturk was leader of the Turkish liberation war, and to call him as "A takurt" , 
which means "the ancestor of Kurds". There seems a tendency among Turkish Kurds 
abroad to prove that the Kurds have everything the Turks had. The respondents 
contested most on the length of time since their ancestors first settled down in Anatolia 
or their history on the grounds of possessing Anatolia as their homeland. For example, 
Mr. Zilan says, 
" ... We, the Kurds. lived in these lands [Anatolia} for more than three thollsand years hut 
el'(,/T school book writes that the Turks came in just after 1071. 123 TVhose land is this 
now? Of course ours. We were here all the time. The Tllrks are nomads. They migrated 
ahmvs. Our ancestors taught them how to settle ... " 
Here he also places en1phasis on a skill that made the Kurds superior to the Turks: the 
122 At the time, this amount was equi\alent of approximately £50 000. 
12.1 The battIe of Malazgirt \\'hich marks the first entry of the Turks in .\natolia . 
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Kurds had known how to settle, how to build towns and they had taught this to the 
Turks. However, another respondent, Mr. Adem Seyda gave an opposite example of 
this kind of superiority concern: " .. . Among our people, the Turks have been perceived 
as superior, intellectual. They were men of wisdom. They have given advice to us. They 
were important. Everybody respected them ... " Here the Turkish 'other' becomes 
superior in regard to its merits. However, in the former, the time period referred to was 
the ancient times while the latter looks at the modem times. The following expression 
of Mr. Serbilind (born in Varto, 1960) also refers to that Kurdish superiority idea 
within a religious perspective: 
" ... Kurdish Islam is a model Islam ... It is better than what the Turks practice. Kurdish 
Islam is the Islam of the oppressed people [ .. .} Furthermore, Islam was historically born 
among us. The prophet Abraham had lived in Urfa [an old city in Southeast Anatoliaj. 
Many other prophets had also lived in our region ... " 
As mentioned above, views pointing at the similarities between the Turks and the 
Kurds were also common among the respondents of this research. This, on the one 
hand, expresses itself as a contestation and on the other hand as a way of justification. 
It is perceived in a way that if the Turks had the right to be a nation, then, the Kurds 
have the same right too. Here, Mr. Serbilind gives an example of that kind of 
justification. He shows the irony of an official Turkish discourse to claim the Kurds' 
right to self-determination: 
"It is not understandable why the Turks are against our liberation war. During all that 
long primary and secondary education years, they have taught us that Atatiirk 's war of 
independence inspired all other oppressed nations of the Third World. Why cannot we 
draw inspiration from himfor our own independence?" 
Probably as the Turks and the Kurds have been sharing the same geography for 
centuries, they developed similar organisation systems. Kurdish organisations have 
been similar to those of the Turks. With the rise of the Kurdish national movement 
under the leadership of the PKK, and especially with the expansion of its activities 
towards Western European immigrant communities, a series of Kurdish institutions 
have been founded. These may also be considered as the 'ideological instnlments' of an 
embryonic nation-state (see Althusser 1989). For example, as an alternative to the 
Federation of Turkish Alevi Associations of Germany, in the early 1990s, the 
Federation of Kurdish Alevi Associations was set up. Similarly, the Kurdish satellite 
television, MED TV appeared as an alternative to TRT, Turkish state television with its 
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programs mlrronng those of the TRT. One of my respondents, Mr. Murat Mete 
commented on MED TV while we were watching it together: 
"Kurds copy the Turks. We imitate everything they do, because they are more developed 
than us. They have better technology. Kurds are at the beginning of 
everything. "[Emphasis added] 
In the interviews, many of my respondents reflected similar ideas about resemblances 
between Turkish and Kurdish institutions and the Kurds' tendency to imitate the Turks. 
Turkish and Kurdish ethnicities seem contested in the minds of Kurdish immigrants. 
The reader should notice the underlined words and phrases in quotations throughout the 
section as they highlight different uses of the "we-they", "us-them", and "Turks-Kurds" 
dichotomies (Table 9.1). They are almost "evil" and "good" fighting each other. 
Turkish institutions, behaviour, politics, and anything affiliated with the Turks work as 
a reference point for the Kurds. Zivo, a refugee, compares the Turks and the Kurds in 
terms of their punishment behaviour: 
"The most radical of the Kurds are PKK supporters. But I never heard of Kurds 
punishing somebody because of being Turkish. But Turks do that. They killed many 
Kurds without any reason. They tried to hurt me as well. " [Emphasis added] 
Table 9.1. Common signifiers of "we" and "they" among Turkish Kurds 
We/us They/them 
• Kurds • Turks 
o Kurds from same provinces o Kurds from different provinces 
o Kurds from Turkey o Kurds from Iraq, Iran, Syria 
o A II the Kurds o Kurds 
o Turks o Germans and others 
On the other hand another feature to be noticed here are some respondents' , 
approaches, attempting to distance themselves from Kurdishness. Few Turkish Kurdish 
interviewees seemed undecided about their identity: Kurdish, Turkish, we, they? For 
example, Mr. Haci Kilimci used "we" and "Kurds" interchangeably throughout the 
interview and he was annoyed whenever he said "we" referring to the Kurds, as he 
wanted to put a distance between him and the other Kurds. Another respondent, \ 1 r. 
Seyhan Bayrak was also always saying "they" while he was talking about the Kurds. 
Such a dilen1n1a lea\'es n1any Kurds in between t\\'o ethnicities: Kurdish and Turkish, 
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although some feel equally distant from each of these ethnicities. In the stories of 
immigrants, "Turkish" and "Kurdish" appear as two ends of the same continuum of 
ethnicity rather than two opposing ethnic groups. 
Table 9.1 above displays the changes in the use of "we/us" throughout the interviews. 
The main we/they dichotomy appeared as Kurds versus Turks but in many cases, 
descriptions change. It was very common to consider "we" as the Kurds from the same 
province or all the Kurds from Turkey. A few respondents counted all Kurds including 
Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian Kurds as included in 'we'. However, in some cases, Turks 
were also considered as 'we'. This was not necessarily only in situations describing 
Turks versus Germans. For instance, Mr. Ali Naki, an asylum seeker from a village in 
Adlyaman province, generally talked about Turks and Kurds without any distinction 
referring to both as "we, Turks ... " Similarly, Mr. Hasan Kara, an asylum seeker born in 
the eastern town of Varto, disclosed in a conversation about coffeehouse attending 
behaviours: 
"Our Turks are always like this. After work, all of us go to the coffee house or pub then 
sit there until midnight. "[Emphasis added] 
He refers to the Kurds and himself by saying "our Turks". Such expressions underline 
the fact that the distinction between Kurdishness and Turkishness is not clearly 
compartmentalised in the minds of many Turkish Kurdish immigrants. 
Among the Kurds in Cologne, two groups of people are less favoured. The first are 
people from the town of Palu in BingeH province who are reputed to be in the heroin 
trafficking business. The other group is from Pazarclk town in Kahramanmara~ 
province and they are alleged to be untrustworthy, lacking in moral values, and 
addicted to amusement places (i.e. casinos, night clubs). Mr. Zivo, born in Elazlg 
province, expresses his dislike of them: 
"] prefer Turks rather than Palu people. Nothing happened there in Palu, but they are 
all here. They are in that heroin business. They say 'a fistful of white makes a bus '. IJ4 ... f 
don 'f like Pazarcze J5 people because of their cowardice. They are not the ones 1 can 
trust. They are e1'eIYll'izere ... thousands of them, What I don't like about them is that they 
spend all their time in coffee houses. But the.-v are still Ollr people, Many good people are 
also among thelll. "[Emphasis added] 
12.J This means you can buy a bus for the price of a fistful of heroin. 
12:i Pazarclk is a town of Kahramanmara~ province and has a long migration history and therefore there is 
a large immigrant population in Gemlany \\'ho came from this to\\n. 
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However, another less clear distinction is also there: urban versus rural. Those who 
came from larger towns or cities have a tendency of seeing others as inferior. They try 
to put a distance between themselves and those from villages of Eastern Turkey. Mrs. 
Sirin Unsal is originally from the town of Pazarclk but her family moved to the city of 
Gaziantep when she was a child. Therefore she prefers to say she is from Gaziantep. 
Gaziantep is the most urbanised industrial centre and metropolitan area in South East 
Turkey. She is very proud of being from this city and despises the other Kurds who 
came from villages or rural towns of the region. But it is expressed with sensitivity. She 
was sad about those who are 'inferior', 'poor', namely rural people: 
"Kurds who came from big cities are better off and educated. But those who came from 
villages are in a very bad situation. There are women who don 'f know how to get on the 
bus; don't know how to open a door. What a pity. They are more backwards than the 
Turks. "[Emphasis added] 
Being 'backward' here refers to perceived inability to understand the Kurdish cause. 
Urban Kurds like Mrs. Unsal consider their rural counterparts rude, uneducated, 
uncultured, and lazy. On the other hand, Kurds from villages and remote eastern towns 
accuse those from the cities of western Turkey of being degenerate, having lost their 
identity, and lacking in respect for the elderly. Due to this opposition, the line of 
demarcation between Turkishness and Kurdishness in the dichotomy of "we" and 
"they" as shown in Table 9.1 seems fuzzy in many cases. Such confusion is displayed 
in the use of language as well. 
The Kurdish language is not a primary medium of communication among the Kurds, as 
it was not in Turkey prior to their migration. Turkish is still the most common language 
used by them in Germany. The next section discusses the linguistic paradox among 
Turkish Kurds. On the one hand, there are efforts and opportunities for the rebirth of a 
unified Kurdish language in the diaspora. On the other hand, due to practical reasons 
explained below, the language preference of Turkish Kurdish immigrants seems to be 
in favour of speaking Turkish rather than learning their own mother tongue. 
9.3. Releasing the pressure: linguistic freedoms abroad 
As language is a signifier of ethnicity (see chapter 2), an examination of the use of the 
n10ther language is useful. Whether there have been changes in frequency of use or 
\\'hether the Kurds prefer to use Kurdish abroad n10re than they did in Turkey is the 
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question. Turkish Kurds may enjoy linguistic freedoms following their emigration to 
Europe, since they have been released from the legal restrictions on the use of Kurdish 
mother tongue experienced in the Turkish 'nation state' .126 However, two basic reasons 
make Turkish the most common language among the Kurds. First, most Kurds were not 
able to learn their language because it was banned until very recently. 127 Second, due to 
the lack of a unified education in their mother tongue, radically different dialects exist 
among Kurdish people resulting In sometimes considerable difficulties of 
communication in Kurdish between people from different locations. Therefore, Kurdish 
has developed as a language, which has been in use among closed circles like small 
villages. Thus many different dialects appeared and blocked the language being the 
medium of communication among the Kurds. There has never been a formal education 
in Kurdish language in Turkey, which would improve its use as a common language 
based on unified rules. Thus written Kurdish remained underdeveloped. Moreover, 
Turkish became the most spoken language among Turkish Kurds as a result of the 1931 
Law of Unified Education, introduced as a part of Kemalist reforms following the 
establishment of Republic of Turkey (see Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996; also White 
2000; and McDowall 1996). 
With international migration, on the one hand, Kurds abroad had the opportunity to 
develop a unified language through language courses given by local authorities and 
associations and transnational media (Hassanpour 1996). On the other hand, a mix of 
languages (i.e. Kurdish, Turkish, and German) is in use among immigrants. Ban~, the 
three-year-old son of Mr. E~ref Oztlirk, one of my respondents, presents a good 
example of this, shouting to his mother "eis ham kerf ", "I eat ice cream". "Eis" is ice 
cream in German, "ham" is "to eat" in Turkish and "ker" is "to do" in Kurdish. When 
his mother asks "Naveta r;iya?" ("What is your name" in Kurdish) he responds "E~ 
Ban~lm"; I am Ban~, which is again a mixture. In Kurdish he should say "Ez Ban~" or 
in Turkish he could say "Ban~'Im" but he mixes both. This is possibly because of the 
fact that the father and mother speak Kurdish with each other and with some relatives 
while speaking Turkish with some friends and neighbours. And the small boy gets 
son1e Gern1an when they go shopping, and when he is at the day care centre and at the 
1 ~h Here it must be noted, according to the Copenhagen Criteria of the European Union enlargement. 
Turkish GO\'l.~mment has recently introduced freedom in education in mother languages in August 2002 
(Cumhuriyct. 15 August 2002). . . 
1~7 Speaking the Kurdish language was banned after the 1925 Rebellion of Sheikh Said and only 111 1991 
\\as it lcl!alised in Turkcv (Hassanpour. 1996; McDowall, 1996). 
~ -
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health centre. 
Turkish replaced the mother language of Kurds. Muhsin Klzllkaya (2001), a Turkish 
Kurdish journalist and writer, says: 
"Everybody who was exiled from her or his mother language to another language has 
the same problem,· while living without noticing, suddenly slhe realises that these tH'O 
languages were intertwined, and even the new language replaced the mother tongue. " 
Most of the respondents from the Turkish Kurdish immigrant community in Cologne 
also reported a similar experience: They were speaking Turkish rather than Kurdish 
because it was not possible to understand each other in Kurdish. 128 They were reluctant 
to learn Kurdish as well. Since most Kurds speak Turkish, it was not worth making an 
effort to learn another language. This may also be partly due to a lack of opportunities 
to learn Kurdish. However, it was clear that they have many more formal opportunities 
(i.e. courses) to learn Kurdish in Germany than in Turkey because most Kurdish 
immigrant associations run language courses for adolescents and adults although only a 
few of them are regular. Mother language courses offered in primary schools also 
provide another opportunity for Kurdish children to learn their mother language III 
Germany. 
These mother language courses may create a unified Kurdish language for future 
generations. Also with the help of the development of a Kurdish media abroad in recent 
decades and possibilities of publications in Kurdish in Turkey since 1991, when the 
Turkish coalition government lifted cultural and linguistic restrictions, the Kurdish 
language got another chance to be unified. 129 However, currently, most Kurds seem not 
much attracted to their own language. For instance, MED-TV, a pro-PKK Kurdish 
satellite TV station, broadcasts in Kurdish and Turkish. However, it seems the viewers 
did not take MED-TV as a serious medium for learning Kurdish. Mr. Hasan Ozmez 
(bon1 in Elbistan, 1948), speaks very little Kurdish and watches MED-TV regularly: 
"It is good to have our own broadcast. I am always watching it. There are really good, 
educating programs. " 
When the researcher asked him whether he has been watching Kurdish or Turkish 
progran1s, he replied: 
''To be honest, I \I'as trying to watch \I'hen MED-TV when it )I'as first launched. 
128 For details of Kurdish dialects see Blal! (1996) and McDowall (1996). 
129 A detailed discussion of similar processes can be found in Anderson's Imagincd Commllnities (l9~n). 
Migration and the expression of ethnicity 
However, I couldn't understand its language. I can understand general things they are 
saying but not the details. Since then I stopped watching Kurdish news. Nmv I ~vait for 
Turkish news and programs. It [MED- TV} also has programs in Turkish. " 
On another occasion, the researcher visited the Federation of Kurdistan Aleyi 
Associations. There were preparations for a wedding ceremony. The researcher sat in 
the lounge with others and the TV was on. A few young Kurdish boys were discussing 
which channel to watch. Some wanted to leave MED-TV on; others wanted to watch 
Turkish channels. l3O Eventually, they ended up with MED-TV after the intervention of 
an adult. He explained simply why they should have MED-TV on: 
"It is our culture, our language; we must learn it". 
'Impressed' youngsters started to watch MED-TV's quite simple and amateur-looking 
programs. When "the news hour" program began, the researcher asked for their help to 
understand what was on the news. They could not have a consensus among themselves 
and ended up with a discussion on who knows Kurdish and who does not. If one of 
them said something, another contradicted it: "no, it did not say that. " At the end, the 
researcher could not get the briefing he asked for. The Kurdish youngsters could not 
agree on the content of the news the MED-TV broadcasted. They had different 
interpretations of it although, from the pictures shown, it was probably news about the 
earthquake in Turkey (17 August 1999) and about aid campaigns. This also reflects the 
inconsistent nature of the Kurdish language, which struggles to be a common medium 
of communication against its different dialects. 
The programs of MED-TV are aired in every dialect of Kurdish. Mr. Zilan says, "It is 
sometimes Kirmanc, sometimes Zazaki". Therefore, it is technically almost impossible 
for any Kurd to watch MED-TV continuously. It is also not possible to anticipate which 
program will be in which dialect, especially when they involve guest speakers, who 
may speak different dialects although they have allocated some periods to particular 
dialects. These are, of course, understandable problems of a low budget TV station. but 
they are examples showing how difficult it can be for an ordinary Kurdish indiyidual to 
survive on his or her Kurdish. 
Turkish Kurdish ilnmigrants were also critical of Med-TV. One of them claimed: 
"T!w\, get news froll/ the TRT (Turkish state broadcast). Other programs arc also taken 
from sO/rwwhere else. Only the round table discussions are our production" 
130 In Germany, at least 7 major Turkish national channels are available either on satellite or on cable. 
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There is an obvious contest between Turkish and Kurdish languages. Kurdish 
youngsters are inclined towards using Turkish, as it is easier for them to understand 
than Kurdish, which has many dialects not allowing a commonly agreed medium of 
communication. The PKK authorities also appear to be in confusion deciding between 
Turkish and Kurdish languages. On the one hand, they have to communicate with 
people and on the other hand, they seem ambitious to create a unified Kurdish national 
identity. With Kurdish that is not easy, and possibly therefore the only Kurdish daily 
newspaper, Ozgiir Politika131 and the PKK's official monthly magazine, Serxwebun 132 
are in Turkish while their TV, MED-TV, is half Turkish. 
Nevertheless, despite all this confusion, during the last decade Kurdish has become a 
spoken language in public areas abroad and in Turkey. In Turkey, in the remote 
villages of the East or in the isolated sub-urban neighbourhoods of the big cities like 
istanbul and izmir, the use of the Kurdish language was a private issue in the past. 
People spoke Kurdish in their homes and especially with their mothers since males and 
youngsters were often in education and therefore could speak Turkish, in many cases 
better than Kurdish. The painful experiences of learning Turkish in schools have been 
exemplified in Mr. Serbilind's case: 
"Then a primary school was opened in our village too. We did not know how they would 
assimilate us,' whose school was that? At school we were beaten every morning just 
because we were speaking Kurdish [ .. .} It starts at primary school. We learnt our 
Kurdishness as we were beaten, thus we learnt how to speak Turkish ... brothers and 
sisters became each others enemy. Each kid was used against each other. They spied for 
their friends. Whoever spoke Kurdish after school was told to the teacher. At home, 
brothers were counting each others words said in Kurdish. Then they spied to the 
teacher. Hence every morning we were beaten at school because we spoke Kurdish at 
home. " 
An immigrant Kurdish playwright, Mr. Haydar Dogan who joined his parents In 
Germany in 1968 summarizes the situation as follows: 
.. ... Just 1 1'/7 ell they moved to the big cities of Turkey's vvest and Western Europe. the 
Kurds realised that they are speaking different dialects which are not understandable for 
other Kurds comingfrom other parts of their homeland. " 
Mr. Zilan witnessed the changes in a suburb of izmir, Turkey: 
131 Although it is not officially admitted, this daily is highly linked with the PKK. 
132 Only the title, Scr.\-II·cbllll, of this monthly is in Kurdish. 
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"1 was in jzmir between 1980 and 1998. When 1 was a small child nobody spoke Kurdish 
outside the home. Our neighbours were not so friendly but 1 have never seen any 
discrimination against us. With the rise of the PKK, Kurdish became an issue 
everywhere. When Turgut Ozal [the then President] recognised the Kurdish reality in 
1990, people began to speak Kurdish in local markets and coffee houses as -well. When 1 
left for Germany in 1998, it was like an official language in a Kurdish populated 
neighbourhood of jzmir where 1 spent my childhood. " 
Another respondent, Mrs. Saliha Deniz, used the same phrase, 'official language', for 
the situation in Germany: "The official language is Kurdish in Nippes market. Kurds 
are shouting everywhere freely. " She stated that proudly but she was reluctant to learn 
Kurdish on the other hand. She says: "it is not reasonable to learn because very few 
people speak it and they also speak Turkish. Why should I bother? I'd rather learn 
G " erman. 
Her case is an example of unsettled feelings associated with being Kurdish. She 
underlines that she was born and lived in istanbul and learned very little about 
Kurdishness, since her family kept it secret until very recently due to security reasons. 
She never wished to be seen as Kurdish or to speak Kurdish, and it was a taboo to 
express Kurdishness outside the home when she was young. She was educated in 
Turkish and was proud of her good Turkish until the time she began working for 
HADEP (People's Democracy Party), a pro-Kurdish party in Turkey. She feels distant 
from other Kurds: 
"1 knew 1 am Kurdish but it was different in Turkey. Here I never felt my self to be the 
same as them [Kurds). They are different. I am trying to understand them ... but they are 
totally different. 1 do not live like them. They live together all the time. They are still 
tribal. Women never go out. Stay at home; look after kids, cook, wash! ... not for me. " 
On the other hand, this same person registered her one-year old boy's nationality as 
"Kurdish" though her husband is Turkish. However, she might feel herself distanced 
from other Kurds because she spent most of her life in Istanbul, the largest city in 
Turkey, and cut off from the rest of the Kurds. The urban-rural difference may have 
played a role here. On the other hand, the majority of Kurdish immigrants originated 
from the rural towns and villages of Eastern Turkey. For the same reason possibly, the 
most in1portant Kurdish festivity in Cologne during the period of the field research \\"as 
".r(/I1~)"C Gel" \vhich translates as the Kurdish r'illage. It was an exhibition. like a 
festival, involving folk n111sic and dance performances staged in a village scene (see 
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pictures in Appendix 9.1). 
The use of Kurdish at home among household members seems unchanged after 
migration. Among 34 respondents, only two of them reported that they use Kurdish 
now more than they did before migration. Eight of them use the language less than 
before and the remaining 24 use Kurdish at the same level as they used in Turkey. Only 
five of them tried to learn or improve their Kurdish after arrival. Another five 
considered it as totally useless, preferring to use Turkish or German. It must be noted 
here that none of the respondents were using Kurdish as the only language and, almost 
nobody's primary language was Turkish. 
Although Turkish Kurdish immigrants did not (or could not) use it, the Kurdish 
language found a breath abroad. Many Kurdish texts have been published in Sweden, 
and also some of the most popular Kurdish singers including Sivan Perwer and Ciwan 
Haco have settled in, and released their music there. Kurdish researchers and writers 
such as i. Serif Vanh and Amir Hassanpour have found a base in Western Europe and 
North America. Ordinary people have also benefited from migration abroad which has 
brought linguistic freedoms such as speaking Kurdish (as much as they could), mother 
language courses for children, and a Kurdish Media. International migration has 
contributed to the realisation of the Kurdish language in the public domain by 
providing a secure environment for Kurds within the borders of Western European 
democracies. As underlined above, these freedoms have not been largely exploited by 
ordinary Kurdish people abroad for practical reasons: a) different dialects preventing 
Kurdish being a common medium of communication. Therefore any publication or 
broadcast in Kurdish was addressed to only small groups but not the whole community. 
b) Printed resources in Kurdish have very little chance because Kurdish has not been a 
written language, and for people who hardly understand it when spoken, there is no 
chance to read. c) Many Kurds do not wish to be affiliated with the PKK because they 
either disagree with what the PKK struggles for or they have an unexpressed wish to 
return to Turkey therefore any affiliation with nationalist pro-Kurdish activity may 
prevent their chances of doing so, as the Turkish official understanding tends to 
associate Kurdish with the PKK. For these reasons, Turkish Kurds abroad have either 
perceived lea111ing and using Kurdish as difficult or found it not worthy or dangerous. 
However given the stories of earlier immigrants who arrived before the 1980s, 
inte111ational migration itself is not the sole factor or not even the most important factor 
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leading to the greater use of Kurdish and visibility of Kurdishness. Mr. Hasan Uzmez 
arrived in 1972 as a guest worker spending most of his time with Turks: 
"When we first come here all my relations were with the Turks. Everybody was Turkish 
in the factory and in the neighbourhood. 1 didn't know German, so 1 didn't want to ha\'e 
German friends at that time too. Towards the end of the 1970s, the number of Kurds 
increased. But after 1980, the PKK appeared and divisions started and polarisation 
appeared in a few years. Thereby, 1 lost some of my Turkish friends. Since then 1 have 
spoken Kurdish, time to time, when 1 am with some Kurdish friends. " 
Mr. Selami Sevgi, a guest worker who migrated in 1970, reports a similar situation: 
"Before the PKK, there was KOMKAR 133. We knew we are Kurdish but there was no 
separation. With the rise of the PKK in the 1980s, we separated from the Turks. Since 
then we have gone to our own [Kurdish} coffee houses not the Turks' one. In the past, we 
were hiding our Kurdish and Alevi identity. Now being Kurdish is not secret, everybody 
lives it explicitly. It is something to be proud of " 
The most significant factor explaining changes in the use of the Kurdish language 
seems to be the ethno-nationalist movement led by the PKK. Intensification of the 
armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish troops has had its effects in political and 
social spheres and has influenced people's behaviour. Kurdish ethno-national rivalry 
turned into a broader project of revitalising Kurdish ethno-nationalism. Kurdish 
journals, newspapers, and books have spread all around Europe and Turkey along with 
the offices of the PKK and affiliated associations such as the Kurdish Workers Houses. 
Kurdish people began to express themselves in Kurdish instead of other languages 
wherever possible. Thus, the Kurdish language left the home and found a place in the 
public sphere. It became more visible in market places all around Turkey and Europe. 
The use of Kurdish names also increased abroad. As a reaction to the official 
restrictions in Turkey, Kurdish people abroad gave Kurdish names to their children. It 
is a sign of using the freedom of giving Kurdish names. Some popular Kurdish names 
preferred by respondents for their children were Rojda, Zelal, Dilan, and Berfin along 
with some Turkish names with political connotations such as Ban~ (Peace in Turkish), 
Devrim (Revolution in Turkish), and Ozgilr (Free in Turkish). These are typical leftist 
Turkish nan1es; generally the left-wing families give such names to their children. 
m KOMKAR is an umbrella organisation of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK) for the Kurdish 
associations in Germany. The PSK was the only Kurdish Party, which began activities in Germany from 
the early 1970s until the emergence of the PKK in 1978. Now KOMKAR and PSK ha\e \cry little 
support among the Kurds abroad. 
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Another common feature is the use of Kurdish nicknames in private conversations, 
particularly among those who are more affiliated with the Kurdish political movement. 
For instance, some of my respondents were called Silan, Zivo, Dilane, or Serbilind 
instead of their Turkish real names. However, they use names strategically. For 
example, they prefer to use their Turkish names when dealing with the Turks. Some of 
the Kurdish businessmen contacted during the fieldwork used Kurdish nicknames when 
they were with Kurdish friends but they were called by their official Turkish names in 
the interactions with other people. Thus, the private nature of using Kurdish still 
remains to a certain extent. 
9.4. Reinventing N ewroz 
Newroz is an ancient spring celebration in Middle Eastern societies and among some 
Central Asian Turkic populations. However, due to the political context, it is now often 
a political manifestation celebrating Kurdish identity and culture among the Kurds. The 
music, speeches and dances at these parties frequently have a strong symbolic meaning 
for the participants. The banners displayed at Newroz celebrations have carried slogans 
such as 'down with Turkish state terrorism', 'Turkish Army! Hands off Kurdistan', 
'Long live free Kurdistan', and 'stop genocide in Kurdistan '.134 The struggle against 
the Turkish Government underlined the political meaning ofNewroz and it became just 
another way of demonstrating support for the Kurdish cause during the last two decades 
of the Kurdish ethnic revival in Turkey. 
Newroz is widely celebrated as a spring festival among other peoples of the Middle 
East, in the form of harvest festivals. 135 However, within the context of the Turkish-
Kurdish conflict, emphasis also shifted from the harvest and/or New Year festival to 
that of a conflict. According to the Kurdish Legend of Kawa, the Kurds under the 
leadership of a blacksmith Kawa marched against the cruel King Dohuk and freed all 
the Kurdish people (Ozgur Politika, 21 March 2001). The Turkish version of the legend 
of Nevruz 136 tells a story of exodus from Ergenekon, a mythical and mountainous 
plateau in Central Asia. It is about how the Turkish nation re-emerged follo\\"ing a 
1.14 Osten Wahlbeck, in his work on Kurdish refugee associations, finds this as illustrative of the political 
priorities of the associations. Since these political banners did not carry phrases such as 'fight 
ullt'l1Ipio\'IIICllt amollg refugees' or 'fight racism in the neighbourhood' (1999: 170). 
us Ne\V~oz has been celebrated as the beginning of the New Year among nations including Iran, 
Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan. and Kyrghzystan. Literally. the word 'newroz' means 'ne\\ day'. 
136 The spelling of the \\ord also reflects a political viewpoint; Turkish official sources call it '~e\mz' 
\\hcreas Kurdish sources spell it 'Newroz' 
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period of devastation after a dramatic defeat putting almost an end to the Turkish 
'race'. Interestingly, their story is also related to a journey led by a blacksmith guided 
by a wolf. In this official version, Nevruz is the day when the Turks found strength and 
a way out of Ergenekon, and then expanded throughout the World (Hiirriyet, 20 March 
2001 ).137 
Newroz became a political symbol during the peak years of the clashes between the 
PKK and the Turkish army. It seems that the PKK considered it to be an indicator of 
strength (White 2000). The significant moves of the PKK coincided with the times 
around Newroz, 21 of March. For instance, a general uprising (Serhildan in Kurdish) in 
South Eastern Turkey began in mid-March 1990 (Mackenzie 1990; Kohen 1990). 
Therefore, the operations of Turkish troops also came just before Newroz to stop the 
PKK's possible manoeuvres. For instance, a few thousand pro-Kurdish activists were 
arrested in Turkey every year prior to N ewroz throughout the intensive years of the 
conflict. 
Mr. Murat Mete, from the province of Elazlg, does not like the way in which Newroz 
was celebrated though he did not remember any celebration when he was living in 
Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s: 
Actually, there was nothing like Newroz in Turkey. I visited some parties here. KOMKAR 
celebrations were more or less like a festival but PKK parties are too much politicised 
and also they have put Islamists on the forward benches. How come I can sit along side 
them? It is much more political now. It is not something cultural but political. In the 
Newroz celebrations, everybody expresses their political messages. The basic message is 
Kurdish identity, unity, and struggle. 
Immigrant Kurds put emphasis on the symbolic meaning of gatherings like Newroz, 
since the music and folkloric dance performances helped Kurds living abroad to feel 
some connection with their homeland. 138 Miss Dilane, who was born in Diyarbaklr, 
came to Cologne in 1979, pointed this out at the Kurdish Village Exhibition in 
Cologne: 
"The Kurdish community come together 1t'ith their homeland 1t'hen they come here alld 
1,\7 The Minister of Culture, istemihan Talay also reiterates the idea that Turks brought Nevruz from 
Central Asia during the great migration of ancient times at his reception hosting school children from 15 
Eastern and South Eastern provinces of Turkey (HUrriyet. "1 March 2001). 
1.1~ The Kurdish journalist and writer Muhsin KlzIlkaya (2001) has also referred to thc importancc of 
music for Kurdi~h people. He emphasises the role of Kurdish folk songs broadcasted by Iranian, Iraqi 
and Armenian radios when Kurdish was totally banned in Turkey (See also Hassanpour 1996:~~). 
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listen to Kurdish music and dance together. Living on the land doesn't matter but living 
the culture does. " 
Newroz and annual Kurdistan Festivals are important occasions during which Kurds 
from different countries meet and enjoy themselves. They are also emotional symbols 
of freedom. Until the 1990s, the Newroz celebration was officially banned in Turkey, 
since when the Turkish Government began official 'Nevruz' celebrations marking the 
day of the Turks' ancient exodus from Ergenekon. A Turkish Kurdish woman describes 
her feelings at the 1999 Kurdistan Festival in Dortmund Stadium: 
"I am here to meet fellows from our village. I am living in Vienna but they are here in 
Cologne. The last time I saw them was at Bochum [KurdistanJ Festival. Every year I try 
to attend to see our people. " 
However, Newroz celebrations seem a novelty in the lives of most Turkish Kurds. Only 
a few of my respondents reported that they remembered Newroz from their own 
experiences prior to emigration from Turkey. Most of them learnt about Newroz in 
Germany and a few attended their first Newroz celebration in izmir, istanbul and 
Mersin after their initial moves out of the Kurdish populated provinces. Among the 
respondents, the earliest Newroz was attended in the late 1970s, roughly at the start of 
celebrations in Germany. Experiences in Turkey show that before the mid-1980s there 
were hardly any Newroz celebrations. Only two of my respondents reported that they 
had Newroz festivals, which were interrupted by the military police (Gendarmarie) 
towards the end of the 1970s. Mrs. $ilan (32), from the Northeast province of Kars, 
remembers celebrations in their village: 
"We were lighting fires on the roofs of houses, visiting every neighbour. Nobody 1l'aS 
bothered but some didn't like it. They were Turks and we weren't visiting them. There 
were huge bonfires when I was a small child. Then it was banned in 1978. Soldiers came 
to the village. " 
Turkish Kurds know Newroz celebrations as New Year festivals from the stories told 
by their grandparents and parents when they were children, but due to the long lasting 
official repression in Turkey, most of then1 had never experienced it. Newroz is an 
outdoor festivity therefore the political nature of the ethnic conflict between the PKK 
and the Turkish Army intersected with its cultural meaning. Throughout the contlict 
years, street demonstrations became a n1easure of the public support of the PKK in 
eastern Turkey. The stronger the PKK the larger the demonstrations, so more cro\\ded 
public Newroz celebrations took place. In tutTI, it meant more suppressIon b\" the 
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Turkish police forces. The results of this particular challenge can be seen in the death 
toll of Newroz celebrations during the 1990s (see Mater 1999). Within this context, 
Newroz turned into a symbol of the ethnic conflict rather than being a part of the ethnic 
culture. As most respondents reported, it also became a political manifestation, 
although that situation annoys some Kurds as they wish to celebrate it as a cultural 
event rather than a political meeting. 
Mrs. Zekiye Ozcan (born in $emdinli, 1954) summarises this change in the nature of 
Newroz with regard to her own experience in the town of Hakkari: " ... first our youth 
burnt car wheels on the hills around the city, since then the soldiers bombarded those 
hills every Newroz ... " 
However, Newroz still stands as a signifier of the expression of Kurdish ethnicity. 
Turkish Kurds in Germany attend Newroz celebrations and declare the fact that they 
are Kurdish. Such an expression of ethnicity seems to have developed throughout the 
intensive clashes and their repercussions over the last two decades in Turkey and 
abroad. Therefore, international migration motivated by the ethnic conflict provided a 
space of security for Turkish Kurds to celebrate their New Year festival, which has 
turned into a day of ethnic resistance and a declaration of their ethno-cultural and 
political existence. Most respondents witnessed or attended their first Newroz after they 
moved abroad. Nevertheless, the date of the early celebrations weakens the significance 
of the role of international migration but increases the coordination with the struggle 
led by the PKK. Even among long-term immigrants, the celebration of Newroz really 
began after the onset of the armed conflict in the early 1980s. 
9.5. Changing Social Relations 
This section focuses on changing social relations in terms of decision-making processes 
in international migration and the gender relations within Turkish Kurdish households. 
It elaborates the way in which these relations have changed through migration. Some 
works from the literature on Kurdish social structures, namely Barth (1953), Yal<;m-
Heckman (1991), and Tlirkdogan (1999), are used as a frame of reference to identi fy 
possible changes in Kurdish social relations. 
In principle, intell1ational migration enables women to move further distances but these 
n1igration decisions are still limited by their husbands, fathers or uncles (see Chapter 2, 
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also Hugo, 1998). For instance, none of the female respondents in this research had 
decided to migrate by themselves. Two of them were forced to migrate due to political 
conditions and were led by the decisions of their political organisations. Nine of them 
were partners and daughters who joined their husbands and parents. Howeyer, 
international migration influences the social relations and reshapes them within the 
context of immigrant life abroad. Some inevitable changes and shifts also take place. 
The following discussion follows the questions of how tribal relations were maintained 
after migration, how gender roles were reshuffled abroad, how marriage patterns were 
reshaped. 
Tribal leaders hips 
Turkish Kurdish society in Turkey has been characterised by tribal and strong kinship 
ties (Y al<;ln-Heckmann 1991; Turkdogan 1999). This research suggests that tribal 
("a~iret" in Turkish and "e~lret" in Kurdish) relationships have been weakened through 
international migration. Individual migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers usually 
moved to the places where their relatives and friends and ethnic fellows live but they 
did not maintain the same tribal relationships in Germany. Some religious and familial 
patterns have remained. For instance, among Alevi Kurds, "Dede"139 is still an 
important figure attracting some respect. The weakening of tribal hierarchical relations 
can be explained by the geographical restrictions imposed by international migration. 
For example, once locally strong tribal leaders have lost their authority over their 
subjects who went thousands of miles away. Mrs. Saliha Deniz's uncle took over the 
post from his ancestors who had been "Dede" but he had almost no authority now: 
"My uncle has lived here in Germany for more than twenty years. He became Dede 
years ago but it means nothing. People respect him but in the past it was different. EvelY 
week tens of people were visiting him. Now they only see him at wedding parties. That's 
all. " 
On the other hand, Alevi Dedes who stayed in Turkey are exceptions as they regularly 
visit their "cemaats 140" abroad and practice their religious duties. However. most Aleyi 
Kurds are increasingly disillusioned with them. Since the post of Dede has become a 
lucrative investment, Dedes have been receiving gifts in the form of valuables and cash 
from their followers. Mrs. Hazal Dinler, born in Dersim in 1971, accuses them: 
139 "Dede" is a religious leader with spiritual powers within the Alevi Islam religious system. 
\,)0 Cemaat means "community of men". It originates from the Arabic word "cem" \\hich means 
"gathering". In religious terminology it is the community of believers. In relation to Dedl:. it means a 
group of people who follow the same Dede as their leader. 
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"They exploit people. [Speaks angrily] They do nothing .. .just come here to collect 
money, then go. In the past it was ok. They were serving the community, but now?! We 
heard many of them went back and bought apartments there. They are richer than liS. I 
don't give a Pfennig any more. " 
Gender relations 
Migration has also changed family relations. With the exception of Alevis (White 
2000), women's status is still inferior to men within the family, although there have 
been some changes. For instance, they are still entirely bound to the decisions of their 
husbands or fathers and they do not generally participate in decision-making processes. 
Some interviews of this research were conducted at migrants' homes, during which the 
wife did not say anything although there were some exceptions. Whenever a question 
was directed to women, they either said nothing and disappeared or replied, "1 don't 
know", "My husband knows". It was quite familiar to the researcher, because women's 
responses were almost the same as those he observed during the fieldwork of the TIMS 
in Turkey in 1996. In Cologne, during the public meetings organised by the Kurds that 
the researcher attended, the behaviour was more or less the same. Many women that the 
researcher approached refused to talk about their migration experience, some of them 
just went away, and some others asked the researcher to talk to their husbands. Of 
course, here it must be noted that if the interviewer were a female, then the result could 
be different. However, it is not possible to speculate on this here, as this research did 
not attempt to approach Turkish Kurdish migrant women using female interviewers. 
Nevertheless, this study suggests as women have refrained to respond, that there is a 
continuation of male-female relationships after migration. Hence, women are still either 
reluctant or not allowed to get in touch with other men. For example, during a home 
visit in the field research, while interviewing Mr. E~ref Oztlirk, Mrs. Oztilrk did not 
join the talk even when her husband told her story. She was 19 years old and sitting 
next to her husband. 
Women's place in the home seems to be changing. For instance, wives now sit together 
in the same room as their husbands and other guests. Even so there still exists a 
hierarchy of speaking, which means the older people speak first and more than others 
but won1en also join the conversations. Nevertheless, in some cases, it was still not 
appropriate for women to be seen in public places and also to enter the rooms \yhere 
men (husband, relatives and friends) sit, even in their own homes. For the yery same 
reason, it was difficult to contact non-Aleyi \yomen in the field\york. Six of the women 
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interviewed were Alevi Kurds and five others were Sunni Kurds. The researcher 
managed to interview three of them because they were young, had grown up in 
Germany, and so they were open-minded. The other two were quite old and because of 
their ages they were able (or allowed) to talk (to other men) in public. All of them I 
could only contact with strong references from some community leaders. Among Aleyi 
women, contact was easier. 
Yalym-Heckmann (1991) described male dominancy in Kurdish households based on 
several examples from the Sisin tribe in the province of Hakkari in Turkey. There, 
household heads were identified as mostly males and very rarely as female. The public 
sphere, where these household heads act, is also described as "cemaat ", which is 
defined as "community of men" (Yalym-Heckmann 1991:159). Fredrik Barth 
(1953:138-9) also describes women's non-admittance in that public sphere among the 
Kurds in Turkey and Northern Iraq in a similar way. 
Many Turkish Kurdish women abroad still spent most of their time at home like their 
counterparts who stayed in Eastern Turkey. Most Kurdish women rarely go out and 
almost never go alone. This was a frequently reported feature in the field research: 
"Kurdish women are living here in very bad conditions. They are locked up at home . 
... don't know about anything ... don't know the city, don't know Germans. They even 
don't go to the KIOSK to buy something and they don't know where the nearest shopping 
centre is as well. The only thing they do is to stay at home, sewing and look after 
children, nothing else. They are never allowed to go for work outside the home too. The 
husband works, spends most of his time in the coffeehouse but the woman doesn't go to 
neighbours even. This is what they earned from moving here" [Mrs. Saliha Deniz] 
Mrs. Ay~e Guzel's experience is another example of this situation. She is not Alevi 
therefore has no privileged freedoms such as equality with men which is common 
among the Alevis. She has never met any Germans except the immigration officers in 
Frankfurt at the time of her first arrival, although she had been in Germany for three 
years at the time of the field research. Mrs. Guzel summarizes her life confined to her 
hon1e in Cologne. She only went out a few times when her children were ill except their 
rare visits to the relatives living in another part of the city: 
"/ am at home. / look after my tH'O children ... cooking ... se'.ving. I watch the n'. We 
han: satellite. All Turkish TVs are available. Sometimes, ibo [husband] takes me to my 
ullcles' home, here ill Por:. Last month, I H'as there for tH'O days, Once, H'e wellt for a 
picnic. " 
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Another example of changing gender perceptions was given by Mr. Sefer Demir 
originally from the Central Anatolian town of Elbistan. He came to Germany on a 
contract marriage as mentioned earlier. This experience of fake marriage compounded 
with the urban life style eventually changed his perceptions towards women: 
"Since I moved here, the thing changed most has been my understanding of relations 
between men and women. My first marriage was very effective in this change, A woman 
lives free and alone despite the fact that she is your wife! Officially she H'as YOllr wife but 
in reality she was nothing. However, I was still considering her as my wife. No matter 
fake or not. " 
Mr. Demir divorced his contract wife141 after he was granted a residence permit at the 
end of five years, and then he married a Turkish Kurdish woman from Kahramanmara~ 
province, where he was also from. Here the influence of a migration experience on a 
shift in understanding relations with women is seen. A Kurdish man began to 
understand the independent existence of a woman. She was his wife but he had no 
control over her. She was totally free of his control. This was shocking for Mr. Demir 
at the beginning but later he admitted that was the reality. 
Marriage and ethnic barriers 
Another social institution affected by migration is marriage, which is the arena where 
ethnicity was expressed explicitly. Fredrik Barth (1953:29-34) and Yal<;m-Heckmann 
(1991 :211-252) gave a detailed account of marriages among local Kurdish 
communities in Turkey and Iraq. The details of the ceremonies and procedures of 
marriages were not within the scope of this research. However, Turkish Kurds' 
perceptions about inter-ethnic marriages were significant as they reflect an expression 
of ethnicity. 
Kurdish society largely relies on endogamous marital tradition. Studies by the scholars 
mentioned above in Hakkari, Turkey and in Northern Iraq found that most marriages 
were among cousins and relatives (Barth 1953; Yal<;m-Heckmann 1991 ).1-l2 Chapter .5 
and 6 have already discussed that exogamic marriages are very rare among Turkish 
Kurds (7%), although it is much more than the Turks (10/0) (Source: TDHS 1993). It 
does not seem quite an appropriate behaviour to marry a Kurd among the Turks, 
141 He made a contract marriage to migrate to Germany (See Appendix 4,2). , . 
1-l2 One of the significant factors directing people to intra-family marria~es is ,bride-money" whIch IS very 
high, HO\\c\cr. in cousin marriages either very little bride-money IS paId or not paId. at all. The 
perccntage of cousin marriages is estimated to constitute between 50% and 60% of all marnages (Barth 
19)3:33; Ya19m-Heckmann 1991:227). 
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Similarly, marriages between Alevi and Sunni people are also uncommon. Here in this 
research, 24 married Kurds were interviewed. Four of them were married to a Turkish 
person and other two were Alevi Kurds but their spouses were Sunni. All of these 
people married abroad. Among those who married in Turkey, there was no inter-ethnic 
marrIage. 
Mrs. Saliha Deniz, a Kurdish Alevi from istanbul, is married to a Turkish Sunni man. 
She comfortably says: "such things are not a problem in our family. My mother asked 
me once; 'is he nice to you?' That was all they said". However, things are not always 
so easy. Young people still seek their parents' consent while going into such a 
challenging marital union. Mr. Mehmet Yilmaz is an Alevi Kurd from K.Mara~ and he 
is married to a Sunni Kurd from Erzurum. He was confronted by his family's refusal to 
accept the marriage: 
"Alevis don't like Sunnis. After I met with my wife, she said that she needed to consult 
her parents. So did I. I called Turkey to ask for my parents' consent. My father didn't 
say anything but my mum said 'these Hanifis143 murder us. ' She was too old. My wife's 
parents were also silent. Her elder brother had said her 'if you marry him you would 
design your own coffin. ' Her elder sister also had been scared of me as I am from 
Kahramanmara~. She thought I was Sunni and that I would force my wife to wear a 
'kara 9ar~af'144. Later she relaxed when she heard that I am Alevi. Eventually they gave 
consent and we got married. " 
Mr. Mehmet Yllmaz experienced a problem of acceptance during his marrIage In 
Germany. Nevertheless, more complicated obstacles may arise in the marriage process 
in the case of partners from different ethnicities. Mrs. Gillean Gilleryilz tells about her 
elder brothers' marriage in Turkey: 
"Our neighbours in the village had six daughters. Once my mum was talking to Ke::iban 
yenge145. She said give one of your daughters to our son. Actually, it was an informal 
offer. I translated it to Keziban yenge and she replied: 'we would rather give the 
daughter to a dog but not to a Kurd'. Her husband was also against sllch marriage .. ·1 
H'cck after, her daughter got her personal things and came to our home. The day after 
she arri1'cd, gendarmeries [military police patrolling in rural areas] came to our home. 
The girl's father called them. They couldn 'f find anything because Illy elder brother and 
14.1 Hanif! is a branch of Sunni Islam. 
144 "Kara <;ar~af' is a black cloth veil from head to heel. It is common for a \\O~lan to w.ear these among 
the n:ry consenativc, fundamental Islamist communities of the Central Anatolian provll1ces of Turkey, 
In Iran it is called 'Chador'. 
14.' Turkish word 'yenge' means the \\'ife of one's brother or uncle but is also used to call any wOl11en. 
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the girl had run away at midnight by expecting such a thing. Soldiers searched 
everywhere throwing everything all over the place. The girl's parents never talked to her 
and us again. " 
There are still some strong ethno-cultural problems experienced in inter-ethnic 
marriages both in Turkey and in Germany. Despite such ethnic obstacles, a 
considerable number of Turkish Kurds still seem to go for interethnic marriages in 
Germany. With few exceptions, all the respondents in this research also reported that 
they were not in favour of such restrictions on marriage. Mixed marriages might also 
find some explanation in the small scale of the marriage market in Germany. However, 
there is an obvious trend of relaxing the ethnic barriers on marital practices among 
Turkish Kurds abroad. The most obvious factor in such a shift is the migration from 
Turkey to Germany in the particular case of Turkish Kurds. 
Although revolutionary transformations have not happened In the social relations 
among Turkish Kurds after migration, there is some evidence of changes in gender 
relations, relations between generations, and marriage perceptions and patterns. 
Migration positively changed women's status too. Women gained a more visible place 
in public while young individuals also gained more power in decision-making 
processes, which had been monopolised by the elderly in the Kurdish homeland. It is 
certain that Kurds abroad are not in tribe-like social relations as in the Middle East (see 
McDowall 1996; van Bruinessen 1992a). However, the Turkish Kurdish immigrants 
have strong emotional affiliations with their homeland, which include its tribe-like 
affiliations. The following section elaborates the ways in which the Kurds describe 
their homeland, perceive their diasporic life abroad, prospects and plans for return. 
9.6. The Homeland, Diaspora, and Return 
Being far away from the homeland does not necessarily mean living in a diaspora. 
Although there is no agreement on definitions and uses of the term (Tololyan 2000: 
23), diaspora can simply be defined as a social form created as a result of migration 
frOtH a homeland to at least two other countries and maintaining a collective identity 
(Safran 1991: 83; Vertovec 1997: 278). Another aspect underlined in the literature is 
. diaspora consciousness' which is more relevant to our discussion of the expression of 
ethnicity here. Clifford (1994: 311) describes it as "a lived tension, the e:\pcriences of 
separation and entanglernent, of living here and remembering or desiring another 
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place". Kurdish experiences investigated in this study suggest a diasporic profile for the 
Turkish Kurdish immigrant community in Cologne. When their experiences are 
reconsidered according to Clifford's above-mentioned definition, they need to be called 
a diaspora. They have lived the ethnic tension in Turkey; the tension of being ruled by 
the Turks, the tension of denial of their ethnic existence. They experienced separation; 
separation from their ethnic identity and homeland. Finally, they have lived in 
Germany while desiring a free Kurdish homeland. 
Defining a Kurdish homeland is a complicated Issue. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
Kurdish people live in a territory that is divided by the borders of four nation-states, 
namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The population is not exclusively Kurdish in the 
areas referred to as the Kurdish region, but "the dominant culture is Kurdish" 
(McDowall 1989:5). However, the respondents in this research have narrated the 
homeland in a loose sense although there is a general tendency to describe it as the 
Eastern and South Eastern provinces of Turkey. It is loose because they sometimes 
refer to all Turkey whereas sometimes they also describe the homeland with a regional 
emphasis. For instance Mr. Murat Mete, who departed from <;e~me, a big port of izmir, 
to the Greek island, Chios, remembers the day he left: 
"I left C;e~me by boat and soon arrived at Chios ... The lights of C;e~me [a coastal town of 
jzmirJ were seen from the Port of Chios. I was upset. The Greek police took me on board 
a large ferry to Athens. I stayed on the deck for a long while, looking at the lights of 
C;e~me. Turkey was slowly disappearing from sight. This is the last thing you see, the 
lights of Turkey. That makes you upset. I knew that I would not return for a long while -
13 years now. I was trying to convince myself that I will return soon. It was just 
consolation. Disappearance of your country ... It was like you hear a friend or relative 
died and you couldn't do anything. I was about to cry. " [Emphasis added] 
Mr. Murat Mete was a political refugee who left Turkey in 1985. Although he was born 
in Elazlg, an eastern province, he spent his last few years before departure in izmir. In 
his whole interview he referred to Turkey as a whole and he never mentioned returning 
to his birthplace or to other cities of Eastern Turkey. Although he has no plans for 
return, he says if it happens he would return to izmir or istanbul but no\vhcrc else in 
Turkey. He described his departure from Turkey, the homeland left behind, in a gloomy 
way: "disappearance a/your COUllt!)' ". 
Many other interviewees use the phrase "bi~im ora" to refer to their homeland .. Bizim 
ora' means hon1etown and its surroundings. Another word often used to c\.pre~~ 
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homesickness is "memleket". It means homeland, but it is also frequently used to refer 
to a limited landscape, such as a province. Sometimes, it refers to the whole of Turkey, 
but generally it means the hometown only. The word "illke" means country, which is 
especially used by PKK sympathisers and Kurdish nationalists. It specifically refers to 
'Turkish Kurdistan'. "Vatan" (or Anavatan) means 'homeland' or 'motherland'. As 
opposed to 'lilke', 'vatan' refers to the whole of Turkey and has right-wing 
connotations. Some of my interviewees frequently used 'Turkish Kurdistan' and 
'Kurdistan', too. Table 9.2 displays a range of uses of some Turkish words referring to 
homeland in relation to their ideological and ethnic stances. It must be noted here that 
politically oriented expressions such as 'Ku rdis tan , or 'Turkish Kurdistan ' are used by 
asylum seekers and refugees rather than the others. The possible underlying factor here 
seems their concerns about their legal status in Turkey. Kurdish asylum seekers and 
refugees have no immediate possibility of return because of the risk of being arrested 
on return to Turkey. Therefore, they are free to take any stance against Turkey. 
However, the others (e.g. guest workers and family reunionists) might be refraining to 
use this sharp terminology about the homeland, because they do not oppose the Turkish 
State and wish to return either temporarily or permanently. 
Table 9.2. Turkish words referring to homeland and their affiliations 
Homeland: 
Vatan / Anavatan Tiirkiye 
(Refers to the whole of Turkey; right wing; rarely (Neutral) 
used by the Kurds to refer to Kurdistan) 
Ora / bizim oralar Ulke 
(A geographical description, used by everybody) (Political word specifically used to call a claimed 
Memleket territory, Turkish Kurdistan; used by Kurdish 
(Used to refer hometowns and surrounding areas; nationalists) 
generally used by everybody; rarely refers to (North or Turkish) Kiirdistan 
Turkey as a whole) (Used by Kurdish nationalists) 
Political life for many Turkish Kurds in Germany does not involve German politics 
(except where this is explicitly on asylum and migration issues) but is focussed on the 
politics of their homeland, the Kurdish populated areas of Southeast and East Turkey. 
Thus, Kurdish politics in Germany is mostly focused on improvements of minority 
rights in Turkey. It is also concerned about the conditions of Kurds liying in other 
European countries or potential migrants willing to enter Western European countries. 
Migration and the expression of ethnicity 
European immigration issues are central because everybody the researcher met during 
the field research had at least one relative who came to Europe and stayed by illegal 
means. 
Their political interest in Turkey is quite understandable as there has been an ongoing 
war causing more than 30,000 deaths over the last two decades. Millions of people had 
to leave their homes and farms due to clashes between the PKK and the Turkish troops. 
They were worried about their properties lost in the war. Moreover, most of them have 
relatives not only in the Kurdish provinces of the East but all around Turkey. With few 
exceptions, every Turkish Kurdish immigrant home has a satellite dish not only for 
Kurdish Med-TV but first of all for Turkish TV. By and large, they ignore German 
media and issues, except in the case of heightened debates on immigration and asylum-
seeking. They have also moved their own political agenda to Germany and are very 
busy with it. For instance, during the summer of 1999, the most important issue in 
Germany was the elections. However, the researcher did not hear anything about it 
from the Turkish Kurdish immigrants although there were also Kurdish candidates for 
local Foreigner Assemblies. More importantly, one of the candidates for City mayor of 
Cologne was a Turkish Kurdish teacher. Sengtil Senol, born in Dersim, was the 
candidate of Party of Democratic Socialism (See Appendix 9.1). 
A victim discourse is another indication of a diaspora consciousness. According to 
Gilroy (1997), diaspora people has utilised some 'biblical narratives'. The most 
common ones were 'chosen people' and 'the victim' (Gilroy 1997:319). Turkish Kurds 
are always complaining about the evil spirited alliances built against the Kurdish 
nation. Miss Sevgi D6nmez, born in Varto, is a refugee and works as a waitress in a 
restaurant: 
"In every country we are oppressed. All betrayals have been against us. " 
She accuses the German police because of working together with Turkish racists: 
"In Turkey, the police and grey wolves146 are together; here the German police 
cooperate with them. I have never seen a grey wolf beaten or arrested by German 
police ". 
Such feelings of being betrayed are quite easy to come across in the Turkish Kurdish 
146 Grey \\olf is the nickname for extreme Turkish nationalists. or racists and fascists in Tur~ey. 
Although the term is highly linked to the supporters of the Nationalist Action P~rty (MH P, cun:ently IS 111 
the coalition go\ernment of Mr. Bi.ilent Ece\it) it is a common term for all TurkIsh extreme natlOnal1sts. 
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case. It sounds tragic because the Kurds were among the founding fathers of the 
Republic of Turkey as they fought for independence in 1920s, too (Mango 1999: 
Pettifer 1998). Again it is to be said here, the impression the researcher got during the 
interviews indicates that a 'Kurdish victim' or 'betrayal' concept is also defined in 
relation to the Turkish other. Although Iraq (i.e. Ha1apca) and Iran (i.e. the 1979 
Islamic Revolution) have killed thousands of Kurds, the Turkish 'betrayal' seems as the 
most important in the imagination of Turkish Kurds in Cologne. 
Kurdish ethnicity expresses itself both as an emerging identity and as an unfinished 
national identity project. One can identify clues about this in the narratives of Turkish 
Kurdish immigrants. As mentioned earlier, laypersons have difficulty distinguishing 
themselves from the Turks. As some Turkish Kurds define themselves Kurdish and 
Turkish, they may have a dual identity. However, interchangeable referrals to Turkish 
or Kurdish observed through the interviews may also reflect confusion among the 
Kurds about their ethnic identity. This can be because of the lack of a commonly 
defined Kurdish ethnic identity. In most cases, Kurdishness is only defined with an 
opposition to the Turkish other. The Kurdish victim discourse, which was, earlier, 
identified as a signifier of diaspora consciousness, is also seen in the narratives of some 
intellectual Turkish Kurds. The stories of those Turkish Kurds who have been 
community leaders explicitly reflect an effort to create a Kurdish whole on the basis of 
cultural, linguistic and political unity. It is also accompanied by the idea of preserving 
the Kurdish culture. The interview with Mr. Serbilind was a long account of what has 
to be done to save Kurdish youth, Kurdish culture, Kurdish morality, and eventually 
Kurdish Islam: 
"Kurdish Islam is a model Islam. Allah is with the one who is oppressed, who is in need. 
Kurdish Islam is the Islam of oppressed people. It is a denied, repressed, and hurt 
nations' religion .. , We, the Kurds, should teach this to everybody. All Kurds must agree 
on this ... Our language is being standardised ... we teach our youth how to behave well. 
Women and men are equal according to the Koran ... They are learning the true Islam 
not the traditional one ... We have to protect and maintain our culture. We should protect 
Ollr children from coffeehouses, from discos, from drugs, heroin. All of them are wasting 
their time ill coffee houses and pubs. We are asking some simple questions: Where is 
YOllr fami~r. your wife? Do you talk to her e1'E)I~\' day? No! This is against A'urdislz 
cultllrc. We are im'iting them into cultural centres ... to talk. to produce something. There 
is a lot to do. The political part of the project is complete but the morality pan is still 
cmpty. I han> ,'isited heims (asylulII detention centres). We are losing the Kurdish YOllth. 
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Parents are sending their children from Turkey to save them from possible torture and 
death. But what is waiting for them here? They are directly going into heroin business. 
They came from the nature. They are surprised with the metropolis. " 
He was one of the prominent members of the HiK (Kurdistan Islamic Movement), who 
came to Germany as a university student twenty years ago and settled down in Cologne 
after completion of the course. Therefore, the Islamic motives dominate here. However, 
a relative environment of insecurity is also identifiable in the ideas of both Mr. 
Serbilind above and Mrs. Unsal below. Mrs. $irin Unsal in the FEK (Kurdistan Alevi 
Federation) is also referring to some plans about the Kurdish youth though her project 
is dominated by Muslim-Alevi motives: 
"We advise our people not to hide their Alevi and Kurdish identity. In the past, 
everybody was in Itakiyye"147. They were pretending to be Turks and Sunnis. Alevi Kurds 
have discovered their own identities after thirty years here. Other Kurds came very late, 
anyway. Before 1985, there was no Kurdish immigrant. "[Emphasises added] 
The underlined sentence displays another sort of ethnic division among the Kurds. Here 
in Mrs. Unsal's words, non-Alevi Kurds first become 'other Kurds' then nothing in her 
consecutive sentence: "Before 1985, there was no Kurdish immigrant. " She implies 
that the Kurds have been liberated after 1985 and since then they have been declaring 
their identity. In the way she continues to talk about their duties to build up and 
preserve Kurdish culture: 
"The Kurds were not well off in Turkey but ashamed of their Kurdishness and Alevism. 
This has changed, although the living standards and cultural level is very low among the 
Kurds here too. Especially the status of women is very sad. They are in a vegetal life 
here. Their lives are limited to their small homes. They don't live anything for 
themselves. The Kurds who came from the villages are in very poor conditions. They 
dOll't know German. They don't know how to live in the city. But the Kurds generally 
learn German easier. [ ... than the Turks, of course- i.s.] We must live together with 
Germans bllt we must preserve our own values, moralities, and culture. There are fe\\' 
[Kurdish] people who tried to be German. They lose all their Kurdish values. This is too 
sad. "[Emphasises added] 
Turkish Kurdish immigrants have stopped pretending to be Turks as Mrs. C nsal 
described. Before the rise of the ethnic rivalry in Turkey, the Kurds avoided out\\"ard 
147 The word "fakl)Yc" means a strategy of pretending. Here it refers to Alevi-\luslims who pretend \l) 
be Sunni-Muslims to hide their religious identity. 
237 
Migration and the expression of ethnicity 
identification as Kurds. Despite the confusion around self-ascription of Kurdishness as 
is mentioned earlier, they now are openly Kurds and largely not pretending to be 
something else and not feeling ashamed of their ethnicity. However, reference points 
are understandably always Turkey and the past life in Turkey, which makes it a 
relational identity. 
This Turkey-oriented life, however, often does not involve a return plan to the 
homeland. Most Turkish Kurds in Germany, especially those who came earlier, have 
given up ideas of return, mostly because their lives and their children are firmly settled 
in German society. Mr. Selami Sevgi is a guest worker who arrived in 1970. His elder 
daughter is a lawyer in another German city and two sons have their own restaurant 
business in Frankfurt. All three of them were born in Germany and are German 
citizens. The more he settled down in Germany, the more the interval between visits to 
Turkey increased: 
"In the past, I counted the days to go back to Turkey every year. We spent all ollr 
holidays there. Then my children grew up and set up their businesses here. Most of lily 
relatives also moved here. Now there seems no reason to go to Turkey so frequently. The 
last time I went was five years ago... This house is my own. I have two shops as well. 
Now, I am retired. I walk through the parks with my grandchildren. I play dominoes in a 
coffee house at all other times. " 
However this settled profile does not exclude him having some investments in Turkey 
as well, but these are rather part of the transnational life (or investments) of the family: 
"Yes, we have some properties in Turkey. In jstanbul, I have five flats; my elder son is 
taking care of them. He goes to jstanbul every year. We also have a cottage near 
A Ik148" yva 1 
Although, Mr. Sevgi's story had a happy-ending, one of his peers, Mr. Huseyin Aksu 
who came to work in the Ford factories in 1970, tells a story of his exhausted hope to 
return: 
"Germanr.' Gerl71 a 111 ,.' ... lI'e came and are still here ... 1 visit Turkey e\'eIT year. ;\/issing 
./ --
(m!r one )'(!or during the last thirty years, I go to Elazzg, Illy hometmm, ('\'(,I~\, year. I 
. . 
brought Illy H'(fc here in 1975. I Salt' the conditions here ill Germany. It was Ilot good/or 
a H'onWIl and sent her back. I came here to work for a felv years and Sal'e mOlley to buy a 
tractor and a house. But I am trapped here. We lI'il/ die like that. .. 
I-I~ !\y\alIk is a holiday resort town in the Acgl'an Coast of Turkl'Y· 
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Plans for settling in Germany are not so strong among the immigrants who came later 
although the desire for getting German citizenship is enormous, especially among 
asylum seekers and refugees, for predictable reasons. They speak more about their 
wishes to be back home and the impossibility of return due to the current conflict 
between the PKK and the Turkish army or better to say environment of insecurity as \\"e 
defined in earlier chapters (See Chapter 2 and 5). For example, Mr. Huseyin Kalkan, an 
asylum seeker who arrived in 1991 and says that "/ would immediately return if it H'GS 
possible". Another asylum seeker arrived in 1993; Mrs. Hazal Dinler is very 
dissatisfied with the life in Germany. She translates her wish of return into a political 
message: 
" T.T7 rr e, all of us, all the Kurds, want to go back our homes but our land has been 
occupied. " 
However, these expreSSIOns can be just a political rhetoric, which rather wants to 
emphasise the ethnic question in Turkey. On the other hand, feeling of being stuck is 
also very common. Mr. Sefer Demir has been in Germany for ten years and was 
granted German citizenship five years ago with the help of his first - contract -
marriage. He does not want to return but he is cautious too: 
.. We are stuck here, can't move anymore. I visit my relatives in Turkey once in two-three 
years but all our plans are in here now. It is not possible to leave them and go away. All 
my friends are in here. On the other hand, I don't like Turkey too much. People are 
strange there. But of course I am investing there as well. What if we would go back one 
day? Who knows? I bought two [multi-storey] apartments there in my hometmnI. But 
here also we have a house of our own. In short, there is no return plan for us. And also 1 
became German citizen. My wife will also be,· my son is also a German citi:ell. Will' 
should we return? We already visit my parents once a year in Turkey. " 
Return is not only a matter of being settled down in Germany or the impossibility of 
going back home due to political reasons. There are also cases related to individual 
success (or non success) stories. Many of the Turkish Kurds in Cologne reported the 
involvement of youngsters in drug dealing as a result of their desperate unemployment. 
Migrants' responsibilities for families left behind in Turkey can be a reason for trying 
illegal ways of earning money. Many of them have families in Turkey and these 
fan1ilies expect them to send money back home. The migrants, in this regard, are 
obliged to be successful. 
Mr. Hac1 Kilimci, .+0 years old, came to join his \yife in Germany in 1997 and then she 
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divorced him. He has lived illegally, and applied for asylum but he was not expecting 
his application to be accepted: 
"1 had a shop in Turkey. Everything was better than here. Look 1 am living ill a 
dormitory and 1 am in need of that poor DM 390 asylum salary to live on. 1 am sure ther 
will not accept my asylum application. 1 explained my asylum need on the basis of 
Alevism. 1 had nothing to do with the Kurdish conflict ... 1 cannot return to Turker. NOl 
because of ethnic problems, but 1 cannot. Since 1 cannot look at nobody 's face there. J 
will be ashamed of my failure here. 1 couldn't earn money. I lost Ill)' H'([e. HoH' can J go 
back and look at their faces? They all are going to blame on me. 1 will feel lhe shame. 
Only the shame, if 1 go back. 1 don't want to go back. " 
Mr. Kilimci's only hope is his 10 year old son. The boy lives with his mother in 
Germany and access would require his father to stay in Germany. Hence, if the boy 
wants his father's company then there will be no problem of residence permit for Mr. 
Kilimci. Until then, he must stay in Germany, whether legally or illegally. 
9.7. Conclusions 
"Kurtler 1990 'dan sonra Kurt oldu ,,}49 
Mr. Zivo' s statement above underlines a fact which is frequently expressed by the 
Kurds in Germany. The analysis of these interviews suggests that Turkish Kurdish 
immigrants in Germany today manifest their ethnic identity more frequently and loudly 
than they did in the past. Two factors seem significant in that change: One is the ethno-
nationalist revival of Kurds in Turkey and its repercussions all around the world 
(especially world of Kurds). The second is the increase in the numbers of the Kurds in 
Germany by international migration. Hence, Mr. Zivo rephrases what Mrs. $irin Unsal 
said earlier: "the Kurds became Kurdish after 1990". The use of Kurdish and the 
expression of Kurdish ethnic identity outwardly appear as important indicators of such 
process of being Kurdish in these cases observed in Cologne. According to immigrants' 
experiences recorded in the Cologne study, there is a clear connection bet\\ccn 
intell1ational n1igration and the expression of ethnicity and hence with the cthnic 
conflict since this expression of ethnicity is often enyeloped in a broader ethno-
political conflict discourse. 
Turkish Kurds either moved abroad due to the ethnic conflict to c:\press t hC1l1sd\'cs 
l-ll) "Kurds became Kurds after 1990." 
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freely or they utilised the ethnic conflict context as an opportunity framework to realise 
their individual migration projects. However, the fact is that through migration they 
arrived in an environment enabling them to express their ethnicity freely. This is clear 
in their considerations presented throughout this chapter. Nevertheless, the main 
marker of these improvements in the expression of Kurdish ethnicity appears to be the 
ethno-nationalist revival led by the PKK since the mid-1980s. International migration 
seems a key component of the whole picture, which enables the expression of ethnicity 
that has been triggered by the ethnic conflict. The ethnic conflict had facilitated 
migration but was not the sole reason. Migration itself has also been a deliberate goal 
for many Turkish Kurds so it was not a side effect of the ethnic conflict. 
Throughout the interviews, a disagreement on the definition of Kurdishness became 
apparent among Turkish Kurdish migrants. In other words, it can be said that Turkish 
Kurds expressed their ethnicity in a relational format, often based on comparisons with 
their Turkish counterparts but not as an entity on its own. At the same time, 
Kurdishness and Turkishness were intertwined in most cases. A similar mix-up was 
seen in their understanding of 'homeland'. Turkey and Kurdistan were often used 
interchangeably, as in the case of Turkishness and Kurdishness. They did not describe a 
certain territory as their homeland; and their return plans, if there were any, were 
usually not directed to a Kurdish homeland but to Turkey. This can be related to the 
fact that these were the migrants who used the EOI as an opportunity framework. 
Turkish Kurds abroad seem attracted to their own political institutions (e.g. Kurdish 
organisations, Annual Kurdistan Festivals, Med-TV) and the activities of these 
institutions. For example, the attendance was around 100,000 at the 1999 Kurdistan 
Festival. Meanwhile, some traditional social institutions, which were effective in the 
Kurdish populated areas of Turkey, seem to have changed and some have lost their 
powers. For example, changes in gender relations were evident in terms of the status of 
women and in men's perceptions about women and marriage. Similarly, tribal and 
religious frames of relations have been weakened with the separating effect of 
intell1ational migration, which made it practically impossible for tribal and religious 
leaders to impose power over the Kurds far away. 
In the narratives of Kurdish immigrants, there is a certain rise of ethnic consciousness, 
and increasing confidence in declaring their Kurdishness, but the emphasis placed ~in~s 
credit to the development of Kurdish nationalism and the PKK and the upsur~e in 
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clashes since the early 1980s. The effects of international migration seem marginal in 
'-' 
this regard, and migration appears only as a space of enactment, which means some of 
the Kurds have found expressing their Kurdish identity outwardly easier after 
migration. However, politically, the Kurdish cause gained respect among Western 
populations only with the help of demonstrations and informal diplomacy of immigrant 
populations in the European capitals (e.g. White, 2000; van Bruinessen 1998). Thus, 
the expression of ethnicity has been affected by the combined impact of both the ethnic 
conflict in Turkey and international migration. These two factors have mutually 
supported each other. While ethnic conflict served as a push factor for international 
migration, international migration brought freedoms for Kurdish ethnic groups abroad 
which in tum facilitated their ethno-national revival. 
Finally, there is a strong relationship between international migration, ethnic conflict 
and the expression of ethnicity. On the one hand, Kurdish immigrants experienced a 
progressive change in their ethnic practices through migration. Moving from Turkey to 
Germany represented a move from oppression to freedom for the Kurds. However, 
individual experiences observed in this research do not reflect a total shift in this 
direction. Since many Kurds were not involved in Kurdish language and cultural 
practices when they were in Turkey and they continued their indifferent attitudes 
abroad. Therefore, it is hard to put forth that Kurds have been practising their ethnic 
cultures more after migration. On the other hand, behind all such moves towards more 
explicit expression of Kurdishness, there lays the momentum generated by the ethno-
national struggle led by the PKK. 
Summa!)' and conclusion 
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Summary and Conclusion 
10.1. Introduction 
"It requires a very unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious" 
(A, N Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 19]5) 
"Just as weather moves from areas of high pressure to low, so too transnational 
migration flows from areas of high political, social or economic insecurity to what 
migrants tend to perceive as areas of lower insecurity" (Heisler and Layton-Henry, 
1993: 148). The migration movement of Turkish Kurds has also followed this very 
pathway from an environment of insecurity to an environment of relative security. The 
aim of this thesis has been to describe and explain the international migration of 
Turkish Kurds from Turkey to Cologne, Germany from a variety of perspectives and 
within its broader context of ethnic conflict involving socio-economic and political 
structures. A comparative perspective has also been adopted to distinguish Turkish 
Kurdish migration patterns within the broader (and well-studied) Turkish migratory 
regime. For this purpose, survey data has been analysed comparing Turkish Kurds with 
their Turkish fellow citizens. 
This chapter discusses the various aspects of the research. The next section presents a 
summary of the main findings, drawing together the results from the different levels of 
investigation. The third section focuses on the substantial implications of this study 
while the last section suggests avenues for future research. 
10.2. A summary of the main findings 
In agreement with the quote at the very beginning of section 10.1 of this chapter, 
Turkish Kurdish international migration has been a movement from an area 
characterised by a high level of socio-economic and political insecurity \yhich \\as 
elnbodied in the EOI to an area of lower insecurity. The armed ethnic conflict between 
the Turkish army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in Turkey and discriminatiun 
against the Kurds led them to flee abroad. This armed conflict \\JS an outcome of a 
long lasting ethnic tension caused by an ethnocentric go\'emment in Turkey. 
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Therefore, one of this study's major findings is that Turkish Kurdish international 
migration to Germany was strongly interrelated with the ethnic conflict. This ethnic 
conflict because of an ongoing ethnic tension turned into an armed conflict in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The EOr, this study has shown, is also facilitated by this ethnic conflict and 
acted as a combined set of push factors for international migration of Turkish Kurds. At 
the same time, as comparisons between Turkish and Turkish Kurdish populations 
presented in chapters 5 to 8 proved, the EOr is ethnically selective and seems to target 
the Kurds but not the Turks. 
This study defined the EOr as a combination of factors influencing international 
migration. It involves socio-economic differentials, the immediate political 
environment, and demographic features. The socio-economic EOr is influential at three 
levels: differences between Turkey and destination countries, regional differences and 
differences between the experiences of Kurdish and Turkish populations. 
The political EOr as described in Chapter 5 is particularly relevant for the Kurdish 
population. It is fortified with a discriminating political atmosphere and a legal 
framework. It includes de facto institutional discrimination in terms of obstructions 
during election campaigns and discretionary raids into Kurdish organisations' 
buildings. Again related to the legal framework and the authoritative nature of politics 
in Turkey, military involvement is very high and reinforces the pressure on the Kurdish 
population. 
The socio-demographic environment IS related to the deprivation of the Kurdish 
population due to the unavailability of adequate health and education facilities and 
inaccessibility of them as displayed in the analysis of TDHS data. Larger and crowded 
households, thus, are exposed to further deprivation in terms of the limited resources 
available to them. This in tum can cause demographic pressure for international 
migration. 
The second major finding is an unexpected role of the EO!. Given the difficulties and 
day-to-day tightening restrictions in entry into the industrialised and rich countries of 
the West, the EOT also serves as an opportunity framework for those \\'ho already had a 
potential n1igration project. Despite being a minority among all migrants. many Turkish 
Kurds moved to Germany during the heightened years of the conflict as they thought 
their adn1ittance chances were high. This brought large tlO\\S of asylum seekers into 
Europe. Obviously, giyen the oyerarching pressure of the EOl on the Kurdish 
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population in Turkey it is easy to find reasons to flee the country. However, for some 
Kurds who were aware of the difficulties of admission and who had the intention and 
resources to migrate, the EOI acted as an opportunity framework enabling them to 
migrate. Here the emphasis is not on the 'fraudulent asylum migration' but the role of 
the EOI as a facilitator. The question raised here should be the definition of asylum 
migration which is discussed in the next section. 
Within this context characterised by strong push factors at home and tightening 
immigration controls in Europe, the Turkish Kurdish migratory regime, in recent 
decades, has developed into an irregular migration channel dominated by asylum 
migration and illegal migration instead of legal migration. 
Besides the two major findings mentioned above, the overall patterns of Turkish 
Kurdish international migration to Germany found in this study could be summarised 
as follows: 
• As mentioned above, the international migration of Turkish Kurds is often due 
to the EOI as defined in Chapter 2 and described in Chapter 5. The EOI in the 
Turkish Kurdish case is ethnically determined; therefore, their migratory 
movement also reflects the ethnicity factor. Comparisons between Kurdish and 
other ethnic groups in Turkey indicated that Turkish Kurds have followed a 
different migratory regime despite some similarities found between Turkish and 
Kurdish migration patterns. The similarities can be attributed to structural 
factors, for example members of both ethnic groups are citizens of the same 
nation state therefore they are subjected to the same sort of regulations imposed 
by that country of origin and by the international relations of that particular 
country, especially with the receiving countries. However, the differences can 
be credited to the ethnic conflict and the context of an EO!. The motive for 
migration for the Kurds often seemed to be to "escape" [from troubles] rather 
than to "improve" [living conditions]. In other words, it has been migration 
from an environment of insecurity to an environment of (relative) security as 
• 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
The fear of persecution expressed as a reason for migration in the Colugl1e 
study also explains the importance of asylum and clandestine migration. 
Motivations for migration are often represented as part of a broader story for 
Turkish Kurds in Cologne. Economic. family or study rea~on~ are uften 
• 
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enveloped in the context of the ethnic conflict. However, within this 
contextualisation, economic motivations have been the leading factor for a Yast 
majority of male migrants, while female movement has been dominated b\-
family migrations accompanying or joining their husbands or marrymg 
somebody abroad. 
Although the analysis of the T!MS data did not provide evidence for people 
escaping from persecution due to their ethnicity, the Cologne intervie\\"s 
included several accounts of people who had experienced persecution. At the 
same time, the EO! described in Chapter 5 together with the context defined in 
Chapter 3 alone presents strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
emigration of Turkish Kurds has been largely due to the ethnic conflict causing 
an EOr. Thus, for instance, the Kurds appear to be more likely to migrate than 
their Turkish fellow citizens are. 
• Beside the EO! and related features, Turkish Kurdish international migration 
has been shaped by migration networks involving families, friends, information 
cycles, and perceptions about migrants and migration. The family plays a 
crucial role in migration decision-making in the Kurdish case. It also provides 
almost all the necessary resources through mobilising its assets in the country of 
origin and its members in the country of destination. Major practical support 
often comes from family members or relatives whereas the sources of 
information about migration and destination countries usually include friends 
and community organisations (i.e. religious, political, and cultural). Among the 
topics of information obtained prior to migration, economic issues are on top of 
the list. Later comes information about health care systems. For obvious 
reasons, another well-known subject is admission issues. 
• At the same time, the impact of perceptions gained through observations of 
earlier migrants was important. Before the migration, many Kurds thought 
employment opportunities were better abroad and they expected more respect 
for themselves abroad. However many of them witnessed a mismatch between 
pre-migration perceptions and the reality they faced afterwards. Expectations 
and information haye also had a great influence on the chosen path of 
migration: regular or irregular? These pre-migration perceptions are abo found 
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to be important in determining future migration trends as they contribute to the 
"imagined security" which is discussed later in this section. 
• There was, and there is, an agreement among Turkish Kurds interviewed in 
Cologne about the impossibility of success in migration via legal means. It is 
expected to be an unsuccessful attempt; therefore, many Turkish Kurdish 
migrants followed clandestine, irregular paths. This often happened as an illegal 
entry into the country of destination or as a legal entry followed by an illegal 
overstay, or asylum application. This study found a tendency among them of 
avoiding legal migration procedures which were thought to be less successfuL 
by default, probably due to known difficulties in admission. 
• Transnational migration networks appeared to be the most important element 
especially in clandestine migration. In irregular migration, the networks are 
more likely to be involved than in legal migration because they provide logistic 
support during and after the journey as discussed in Chapter 7. Such reliance on 
networks can also be considered a response to the tightening admission policies 
in Western Europe, which caused a high propensity to move clandestinely. 
Transnational networks both facilitate transnational relations between fellow 
ethnic people after the journey to a destination and also provide flexibility on 
destination choices as they serve also as risk minimising factors. For instance, 
in utilising transnational migration networks, migrants, once they failed in 
gaining access to their initial destination, may choose to move to another 
country to seek better opportunities. 
• The nature of the network also influences the nature of migration. In Turkish 
Kurdish migration, family networks are very functional. Once a member of the 
family is admitted into the country of destination, he or she acts as a Trojan 
horse and brings in other potential migrants of the family. Gender differences in 
the networks appear as men often have larger networks than women but a 
higher proportion of women have networks than men do due to the fact that 
they often accompany or join their husbands or brothers. 
• Migration patterns of Turkish Kurds are not so different from the pattenb 
comn10nly referred to in the inten1ational migration literature: migrants arc 
often better off compared to their non-migrant fellows: are mainly dominated by 
young males: are often more educated than non-migranh: and cultural 
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characteristics such as religion and the status of women affect the composition 
of migration flows. Therefore, for example, female participation in Turkish 
Kurdish migration was also variable depending on religious affiliation (Aleyi 
vs. Sunni). Similarly, compared to the Kurdish experience, for the Turks 
migration was almost exclusively a male business and women stayed behind to 
wait for the end of this temporary movement. However, the EOI is also relevant 
here since once to escape is the concern then age, sex, economic, educational 
differences seems erased in the case of Turkish Kurds. 
• Destination preferences are also different for Turkish Kurds and the Turks. The 
Kurds are more likely to migrate to West European democratic countries than 
other popular destinations for Turkish migration flows because they are also 
concerned with their ethnic freedoms along with economic betterment. For the 
Turks, migration motives are governed by economic concerns and therefore 
their destination preferences include a larger variety of countries. However, 
regardless of ethnicity, international migration from Turkey is mainly directed 
towards Germany, which is largely related to the history of migration to 
Germany and the volume of Turkish immigrant stock in this country. 
• Investigating the role of ethnicity, this study found that the expression of 
ethnicity of Turkish Kurds has changed through international migration. 
Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Germany today manifest their ethnic identity 
more frequently and loudly than in the past. Migration has brought the Kurds 
into an environment of relative security enabling them to express their ethnicity 
freely. The main marker of the improvements in the expression of Kurdish 
ethnicity appears to be the ethno-nationalist revival led by the PKK since the 
mid-1980s. International migration is also a key component, which enables free 
expression of ethnicity triggered by the ethnic conflict. However, freedom in the 
expression of ethnicity was not the first and most important reason for most 
migrants. 
• An10ng the Kurds in Germany the research found there is a certain rise of ethnic 
consciousness, and increasing confidence in declaring their Kurdishness. but the 
en1phasis placed gives credit on the development of Kurdish nationalism and 
the PKK and the upsurge in clashes since the early 1980s. The effects of 
intell1ational n1igration seem marginal. Migration appears only as a space of 
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enactment. Hence, some of the Kurds have found expressing their Kurdish 
identity outwardly easier after migration. However, politically, the Kurdish 
cause gained respect among Western populations only after the help of 
demonstrations and through the informal diplomacy of immigrant populations 
in the European capitals (e.g. White, 2000; van Bruinessen 1998). Thus, the 
expression of ethnicity has been affected by the combined impact of both the 
ethnic conflict in Turkey and international migration. These two factors have 
mutually supported each other. While ethnic conflict served as a push factor for 
international migration, international migration brought freedoms for Kurdish 
ethnic groups abroad which in tum facilitated their ethno-national revival. 
• There is a strong relationship between international migration, ethnic conflict 
and the expression of ethnicity. On the one hand, Kurdish immigrants 
experienced a progressive change in their ethnic practices through migration. 
Moving from Turkey to Germany represented a move from oppression to 
freedom for the Kurds. However, individual experiences observed in this 
research do not reflect a total shift in this direction. It is difficult to claim that 
Kurds have been practising their ethnic cultures more after migration. 
• The return of Turkish Kurds is conditional on improvements in political 
conditions and living standards in Turkey. However, reflecting an implicit (and 
conditional) intention to return, many immigrants have investments in Turkey. 
In the last instance, migration will remain more likely for the Kurds than for the 
Turks unless ethnic tension is resolved in Turkey. Return migration intentions 
are also going to be shaped by improvements in ethnic relations. Of course. 
these changes must be accompanied by substantial economic improvements in 
the areas of origin to cut back future migration pressures. 
• The EOI in Turkey seemed to be the major determinant of future migration 
trends, too. Despite an environment of relative security in the destination 
country reported by migrants, they still tend to stay abroad instead of returning 
to Turkey. Many Turkish Kurdish immigrants have found their places in the 
lower classes in Germany because either they were unskilled or their skills \\'crc 
not compatible or due to discrimination. However. they still fa\'our adyising 
their fellows in Turkey to move abroad. Similar attitudes to\yards migration 
abroad are also common an10ng non-migrant Turkish Kurds in Turkey, Gi\'en 
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the encouragement by experienced migrants and the support (i.e. financiaL 
informational, moral) from them (e.g. see Chapter 8 for remittances): the 
likelihood of future migrations of Turkish Kurds from Turkey will remain high. 
However, this is often related to an "imagined security" than the reality. 
Chapters 5 and 8 provide examples of immigrants who followed their dreams 
based on the impression they got from earlier migrants visiting their hometowns 
in Turkey. Eventually, some of them figured out that these were not true and 
many migrants have just been pretending they had a good life abroad. This kind 
of attitude creates an "imagined security" about the countries of destination 
among potential migrants. 
10.3. Substantial implications of this study 
The previous section has elaborated the contribution of this study to existing 
knowledge at the level of empirical findings. With this regard, this study is going to fill 
an important gap in the literature as a comprehensive analysis of Kurdish migration but 
also as one of a few studies on international migration from Turkey. This contribution 
has also conceptual implications and implications for policy formulations, and these are 
addressed in this section. First, the conceptual contribution of this study needs to be 
highlighted. 
Challenging the clearly separated categories of the theoretical assertions discussed in 
Chapter 2, the findings of this study indicate that the reality is more complicated than 
that predicted by the existing literature. The categories defined in the conceptual 
framework often overlap with each other and their boundaries are not clear-cut. For 
example, options against the EOI are not as clear-cut as they were first depicted in 
Figure 2.1. It has been found in this study that there are also people who swing between 
status quo and exit alternatives while their expression of ethnicity may also be a 
changeable, situational, and / or mixed one. 
The researcher has been cautious about the conceptual categorisations when applying 
the EOI conceptualisation onto the Kurdish international migration case. Catcgories 
created for conceptual sin1plicity were necessary and this study proves that they remain 
as a problematic area of EOI as a conceptual tool. For instance. the material and non-
n1aterial el1yironn1ent of insecurity distinction is progressi\'ely \veakened throughout 
the thesis. HO\\,CYtT. as mentioned aboyc, problems related to these catcgorical 
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distinctions referred in this study were not unexpected, since they were just used for 
conceptual simplicity. Nevertheless, this conceptual framework of the EOI enhanced 
with a refined set of arguments driven from the international migration literature still 
stands as a successful attempt. 
The theoretical framework set out at the start of this study represents also a good 
example to support the argument proposed by some scholars such as Portes (1997) and 
Faist (2000) that there may be no need for a unified theory of international migration 
but a set of useful approaches. This study has successfully used an eclectic conceptual 
framework to address different aspects of international migration posed by the complex 
case of Turkish Kurds involving conflict, migration, and socio-economic deprivation 
simultaneously. 
Hence, the EOI framework used in this research constitutes a real contribution to the 
field of migration study. This framework can possibly be utilised in other cases. It can 
be applied to similar cases such as the Berbers of North Africa and Eritreans in the 
Hom of Africa. The common features of these specific cases with the Kurdish case can 
be summarised as follows: A) These ethnic populations are living in divided territories. 
Kurds are living in a geography which is mainly ruled by four nation states, namely 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Similarly, the Berbers in North Africa is ruled by Libya, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. B) They experienced a long lasting ethnic conflict in 
different forms ranging from armed clashes to latent tension through assimilation 
policies of the ruling nation states. C) These ethnic populations are very likely to be 
distinctively involved in broader migration flows from those countries due to the ethnic 
tensions they faced. 
Thus this study opens new avenues utilising the enhanced EOI framework for further 
research on these specific cases such as Berbers and Eritreans (e.g. Silverstein 1996; 
Hoffn1an 2002). It is also worth attempting to use this very framework in some other 
cases such as Bosnians and Kosovans which seem to involve a relationship bet\\ccn 
ethnic conflict and international migration (Lyon 2002; Hoffmann 2002). With this 
regard, the main contribution of this framework is its emphasis to the central role of the 
ethnic conflict in international migration practices of ethnic populations. 
This framework, at the same time, constitutes a contribution to the field of asylum 
migration research. First, it rejects the distinction between economic and political 
mi oration because it is often not clear what motivations are inyoh'cd in migration and 
o 
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m most cases people have more than one type of motivation to migrate. Then it 
identifies the components of ethnic conflict with a historical perspective that allows the 
researcher to examine the current situation with reference to possible ethnic influences 
in the formation of that particular case. Then, socio-economic deprivation, for example, 
can gain further importance as an ethnic oriented underdevelopment that can trigger 
migration flows from a particular ethnic population such as Turkish Kurds. Therefore, 
asylum migration can be researched more comprehensively by utilising the conceptual 
framework of this study. 
There are also shortcomings of the conceptual framework drawn in this study, which 
need to be further elaborated and cured in future research. Return migration is rather 
overlooked. This was due to the assumption that migration in the context of conflict 
stands as a strategy of escape therefore return migration is less likely. The findings of 
this research indicate that return migration is also a part of the process. Despite the fact 
that it was portrayed as a latent option conditional on the improvements in ethnic 
relations at home (Turkey in Kurdish case), many immigrants are likely to continue 
investing in their home country. This return option becomes crucial in cases where the 
ethnic conflict acts as an opportunity framework. In this respect, this study also shows 
there is a need for future research possibly gathering information in the countries of 
origin focusing on the return migration prospects. 
This study is a contribution to the literature in a sense that some earlier studies could be 
different if they were informed of the findings of this study. The recent study of 
Thomas Faist (2000) that has been well praised among the international migration 
researchers can be such an example. Its understanding of international migration 
leading to an approach underlining the importance of meso-level in migration research 
could be changed to include more emphasis on the ethnic conflict and its possible 
implications for the Turkish international migration to Germany to which Faist 
particularly made references in his conceptual study. This thesis has proven the utility 
of such an approach using the EOI as a conceptual background framework and thus it 
has the potential to change future migration research since it eases the tension bet\\'cen 
econ01111C and political migration by combining them into a single model \\'here 
migration can be examined with regard to different economic. political and other 
motivations involved. In this respect it has also the potential to eliminate 
1·' f ~ ml'gratl'on and economic migration since thc-;e t\\O compartn1enta IsatlOn 0 relugee 
fields of study need to talk to each other more than e\er given the 111crea-;mg 
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hybridisation of international migration flows which tend to involve more migrants 
with vague concerns about economic differences, political issues, and so on. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the existing literature in relation to different theoretical approaches 
on international migration to incorporate them into the framework of EOI, centralising 
the ethnic conflict. In this attempt some of them appeared as more useful than the 
others. Obviously those economic oriented approaches remained important since they 
are influential in deciding the direction of migration flows but equally important is the 
individual perceptions of these differences. Imagined security, which this thesis 
referred, is an example of the importance of perceptions rather than the reality. 
The political emphasis of "world system" theorists seems relevant but again the 
network systems are effectively in force. On the other hand, political proximity against 
geographical proximity as proposed by the systems approach was a valuable variable 
that was welcomed in the framework of this thesis. Related to these approaches 
highlighting the importance of networks, transnationalism stands as an important 
component within the conceptual package of the EOI framework. Transnationalism is 
useful to understand the future moves of immigrants as well as the information 
resources created by transnational communities which clearly enable those potential 
migrants to think big. They can see most of the options and also they can have the 
possibility of moving to another place after they reach the destination. These issues are 
also important in regard to the increasing volume of clandestine migration which 
requires a more difficult journey involving a network of logistic support throughout the 
journey as well. The cumulative causation approach of Massey and others (1993) can 
also be considered as useful at the level of networks and established migration 
practices. 
The political aspects of international migration seem to be separated from the rest of 
the literature as they tend to focus on refugee studies. However, forced migration (both 
political and environmental) needs to be incorporated into the models of international 
migration since, as mentioned earlier, it is often very difficult to identify forced and 
voluntary elements in migration experiences. Democratic deficit (Geddes 1995) and/or 
ethnic tensions are significant underlying factors in migration but they might be 
overshadowed by other more obvious factors such as economic depriY<.ltion. 
Gender roles have been Inentioned in this thesis but not studied in detail. Ho\\"c\ cr, 
cspecially in terms of ethnic differences, gender relations appeared important. 
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Therefore future research should also reconsider the gender dimension within the 
conceptual framework. 
From a policy point of VIew, there is an increasing tendency towards irregular 
v 
migration among Turkish Kurdish people. Although specific characteristics of this 
particular ethnic group within a specific context have been highlighted, there still 
remain some features which can be applied to other similar cases. Therefore, a similar 
tendency can be found in other (especially developing and underdeveloped) parts of the 
world. Hence, there is need for improved migration policies with more understanding 
approaches to asylum migration. These policies are also required to be case sensitiye at 
the ethnic group level rather than considering larger national regimes. 
Regarding the fact that many immigrants have either lost their hope for return or never 
had one, legislation about immigrant minorities needs to be renewed and should 
seriously consider the permanent settlement prospects of immigrants. Instead of return 
and deportation programs, sensitive and understanding immigrant integration (or 
acculturation or incorporation) plans need to be formulated. 
At the same time, the EOI resulting from a long lasting ethnic conflict has been the 
major factor at play in the Turkish Kurdish case. Therefore policy priorities should be 
given to develop plans and programs to resolve such conflicts rather than immigration 
control which has proved to be ineffective by the increasing volume of irregular 
migrants. More international cooperation and enforcement for democratisation in 
(especially conflict tom) developing areas of the world could help to reduce the 
destruction of the lives of migrants and their families while providing less need for 
immigration control. This is not a task exclusive for receiving countries but also for 
sending countries. The impacts of recent changes in Turkish legislation providing 
freedom for the use of Kurdish language and outcomes of Turkey's integration with 
European Union will possibly be seen soon. These may repress or trigger further 
migration pressures. 
Another significant implication based on the findings of this study' is the need for a 
reconsideration of the tension between economic migrants and asylum seekers. This 
study clearly shows that immigrants usually followed a mixed and rather complicated 
reasoning through their migration experience. Economic moti\ations are often 
intertwined \vith other concerns. In n10st cases, seeking asylum because of a fear of 
persecution does inyolye economic \\orrics as \vcl1. Familv reunification is a]-.;l) 
254 
Summa!)' and COil elusion 
important and immigrants including so-called economic migrants and asylum seekers 
tend to bring their families into where they live. The bottom line is indiyiduals and 
households are seeking to better their lives when they decided to migrate and often they 
are not satisfied with ethno-cultural and political freedoms without economic 
improvements. 
Meanwhile, it is also true that people seeking a better life abroad will tend to take all 
possible chances to get into the industrialised welfare zones of the West. The migration 
motivations, therefore, have been complicated and often involve economic and political 
reasons. Recently, Castles and Loughna (2002) discussed the periodisation of 
immigration in Europe since the Second World War and they wrapped the history of 
migration with a focus on asylum migration. According to their discussion, early 
asylum seekers arrived in Europe as guest workers since they did not want to bother 
with asylum seeking procedures. Towards the eighties, they arrived with "mixed 
feelings" and some sought asylum while some did not. The final phase has been 
characterised by asylum seekers appearing as illegal migrants. Therefore, migration 
policies should be carefully reviewed and the dichotomy of economic migrants against 
asylum seekers should be abolished, as the current division between the two does not 
reflect the complex nature of the current situation. 
10.4. Suggestions for further research 
The difficulties and successes of this research have suggested some implications for 
further studies in fulfilling the gaps in the knowledge of Turkish Kurdish international 
migration. Methodological and practical concerns have also been identified as useful 
for further research. 
This study provides a successful example of using mixed methodologies. Combining 
data from two nationwide questionnaire surveys (i.e. TIMS and TDHS) with the 
qualitative material from the Cologne research has proved to be an optimum strategy 
for understanding Turkish Kurdish migration. Sometimes these two different data 
d· h h b t tally consl'derl'n U their own strengths and sources contra lCt eac ot er u even u :::-
weaknesses, this conflict has produced rich material helpful for the success of the 
investigation. Future research should follo\\' a similar mixed method approach for 
con1prehensi \'e studies because only by doing so it is possible to sec the patterns along 
with in-depth explanations that can n1ake a difference in understanding, 
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Some practical methodological issues were also important. First of alL ethnographic 
research involving the collection of qualitative material needs to be spread out through 
an extensive time scale. This would be both useful for the improvement and better 
deployment of research instruments, and for the researcher to familiarise him or herself 
with the community under investigation. It would also be helpful for a better "on-site 
on-time" analysis providing a better opportunity for follow-ups. 
Secondly, the characteristics of the researcher and that of the subject population 
appeared to be of extreme importance. Further research should also be careful about the 
issues of gender and ethnicity, since the researcher in this study found it a significant 
obstacle. The reception sensitivities of the community under investigation should be 
carefully handled to get better results. Contesting ethnicities can cause delays in 
settlement process of the researcher within the target research community as it has been 
the case for the researcher in Kurdish case. The researcher, a Turkish PhD student from 
England, had to overcome the biases arising from his being Turkish and investigating 
the Kurdish immigrants who were likely to be escaping from the oppression of the 
Turkish nation-state (see Chapter 4 for details). Concerns about the gender relations of 
the population under investigation also need to be paid attention in future research. The 
researcher found it difficult to access the female population because he was not allowed 
to approach women due to the traditions of Kurdish society. At this point, it should also 
be noted, that specific research on gender roles or research from a women's perspective 
could also be a great contribution to the literature, since during this research it was 
evident that some social processes were described better and with more details by 
women compared to male accounts. 
This study has been a pioneer work on Turkish Kurdish international migration, and it 
has shown that new and further research is necessary into the complex processes of 
international migration of ethnic minorities within broader migration flows in Europe. 
Turkish Kurdish migration patterns have differed from those of their Turkish fellO\\'s. 
Whether these different patterns are peculiar to the Turkish Kurdish case, or \\'hether 
they are n10re general features applying also to other ethnic minority cases, needs to be 
assessed conducting similar studies, ideally through cross-national comparisons and 
longitudinal investigations. This could also help to understand whether these are 
uni\'ersally applicable processes. Howe\,er. a gap in the literature on international 
migration still ren1ains: a comparison between processes operating on the regulation 
side and the indi\'idual side. The findings of this study reflected many distinct 
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individual migration strategies which were developed through tackling with the 
restrictions imposed by governments of sending, receiving and transit countries. 
Therefore there is need to conduct focused research on this issue of these individual 
challenges against structural regulations. Studies in this direction would provide the 
opportunity of understanding much more successfully the significance of local, national 
and regional contexts and actions as opposed to the individual strategies and 
manoeuvres to tackle them. 
This study also indicated the fact that there is need for further studies focusing on the 
"relative insecurity" in the countries of destination. People from areas with lower 
security will probably continue their pursuit of well being to find the "imagined 
security". However, the reality behind this still constitutes the unknown in the literature 
of international migration and requires further research to be undertaken. 
Future research directions should also consider focusing on two subject areas which 
seemed important after this research: unachieved migrations and illegal migrations. The 
researcher observed that migration has an important communal dimension. Migration 
often involves multiple actors determining migration such as family members, 
household members, and it also involves communication with members of local 
communities (e.g. neighbourhoods, villages). Many respondents mentioned their 
friends and relatives who want to migrate. That implies there can be a considerable 
number of people who want to migrate, or who attempted to move, but failed to do so 
due to the fact that migration is not an easy task and is increasingly getting more 
difficult. International migration studies have been dominated by analyses of realised 
migrations. Recent literature suggests it is important to understand who stays as well as 
who moves (e.g. Hammar 1997; Faist 1997). Therefore, there is a need for future 
studies that will primarily focus on these unsuccessful migrations, since the reality of 
these failed migrations may provide important references for policy making and 
individual decision making in receiving, sending and transit countries. Such a research 
would provide insights with the realm of factors which may impede international 
migration at the individual level, along with the contextual factors as they are percei\'~d 
by those would-be migrants. 
Another direction of research would be more detailed studies of illegal migrations. The 
research on which this thesis is based unexpectedly inyolyed many illegal migrants. 
Illegal, irregular or clandestine migration has become increasingly important and the 
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current state of affairs indicates that this trend will continue in the near future. Southern 
Europe seems particularly important as it is the border of the European Union, an 
affluent geography, and the Middle East, a transit and relatively deprived geography. 
Following the pathway opened up by this current thesis, some important questions for a 
future investigation on illegal migration could focus on the following issues: a) the 
dynamics of illegal migration in the Southeastern border of the EU; b) characteristics of 
undocumentedlirregularlillegal migrants; c) perceptions about the potential 
destinations; d) tackling strategies of individuals with regulatory authorities in the 
border areas and vice versa; e) possible conflicting areas of supranational regulations 
and local applications of these rules and f) the role of trafficking networks and possible 
economIC effects of eliminating trafficking in underdeveloped local economies in 
Balkans. 
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APPENDIX 3.1. 
Protests following the arrest of the PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan, February 1999 
[Source: BBC News, 29 June 1999] 
Kurds in the German city of Bonn show their feelings . Germany has a large Kurdish population 
Protesters gather in Rome in front of the Turkish embassy. Security has been tightened at many U and 
Turkish embassies 
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Kurdish demonstrators march down London's Oxford Street 
About 1,500 anti-Turkish demonstrators in Moscow chant ""Free Ocalan" and "Turkey i a terrori til 
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APPENDIX 4.1. 
Interview Agenda 
Appendices 
a.I sex: male 3 a.2. Name of the a.3. Marital aA. Date of a.S. No. of children 
female 3 neighbourhood: __ status: arrival? 
-
Birth date: 
a.6. Birth place: a. 7. Pennanent residence in Turkey: a.8. Migrant status: worker: 
--
provmce: city 3 town 3 village 3 political refugee/asylum: 
-
town: name:province/town / family reunion: 
other: 
a.9. Occupation? a.IO.Education: 
b.I. PrevIous mIgratIOn expenences; mternal, mternatIOnal, types, ways. 
c.l. Living conditions in Turkey before migration (economic, social, etc.). Family life, marriage patterns 
and traditions, relations between generations and gender relations. 
c.2. Thoughts about Kurdish question and its relevance to migration and relevant experiences (armed 
conflict, deaths, evacuations, etc.). 
c.3. Knowledge and use of Kurdish in Turkey. Living patterns of Kurdish culture. Legends, Newruz 
celebrations. 
cA. Social relations in Turkey. with Turks, with Kurds, business, marriage, etc. 
c.S. Ethnic and migration networks. Their relevance and contribution to migration 
c.6. Reasons for migration. 
c. 7. Process of coming to Gennany; migration decision, ways. 
d.l. Experience of the first day abroad. 
d.2. Social and personal relations in Gennany. Attendance to "kahve", associations. Relations with 
Turks, Kurds and Gennans. Meeting places. Relations with Kurds in other countries. 
d.3. Changes in life style after migration. economic, social, cultural, religious, political, traditions, gender 
relations, etc. 
e 1. Future plans. return, settlement plans, business plans, Gennan citizenship. 
e.2. Experiences and ideas on racism, ethnic discrimination. Comparisons with experiences in Turkey. 
e3. Self identification. Feelings about Kurdishness, Identifications with other Kurds (and Turks abroad). 
Changes in perceptions about self-ethnic identity after migration. 
e4. Thoughts about the lives of Kurds abroad and in Turkey. General considerations about life styles, 
ethnic relations, etc. 
e.S. Leisure activities, behaviours, using spare time (football, picnics, etc.). 
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Individual profiles of the respondents of the qualitative research 
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KEY TO ROUTE l\J1AP S 
11, Temp oral)'. short stay 
l~-' Year of amval 
.... .. Le gal air travel 
... ... .... Ille gal air travel 
, . '., Le gal feny travel 
... Illegal feny travel 
,.,...... Legal ground travel 
,.-J Ille gal ground travel 
MOl: Asylum seeker: Mr. Hiiseyin Kalkan was born in Karakocan, Elazig in 1969. His family moved to 
Mersin in 1976, from where he moved to Izmir in 1990 and then illegally he migrated to Germany via 
Hungary and Austria in 1991. He is married with two children but his family stayed in Mersin, Turkey. 
Primary school graduate and currently unemployed. 
~;.n, 
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• Marseille 
. V,,~, 
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.......... 
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M02: Asylum seeker: Mr. Ali Haydar was born in a village of Dersim in 1972. His family mo ed to 
Mersin in 1975. He moved to Ankara in 1990 and to Izmir in 1991 for work. When the hip, he 
working in, arrived in Marseilles, he stepped out and went to Paris in 1993 . From there, hi eld r 
brother sent him to Cologne via Bielefeld. He is divorced with one son. Hi family live in Col gne. 
He is a secondary school graduate and works in a laundry. 
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FOI: Asylum seeker: Mrs. Hazal Dinler was born in Karakocan, Dersim in 1971. Her family migrated 
to Mersin in 1976. She is married with one daughter. She met her husband in Mersin and he had gone 
to Germany in 1991. In 1993, she joined him via Bosnia, Croatia, Sovenia, and Austria on a fake 
passport. She is a housewife and a secondary school graduate. 
~ -
M03: Family reunification: Mr. Sefer Demir was born in a village of Elbistan in the pro ince of 
K.Maras in 1961. In Antalya, he met his Dutch wife and married in 1990. Then migrated to Rotterdam. 
After five years dissolved marriage and moved to Numberg, where he married a Turkish woman with a 
son. In 1998, he moved to Cologne for work. Secondary school graduate, works as a chef in a 
Restaurant. 
295 
Appendices 
~ . 
M04: Guest worker: Mr. Hasan Uzmez was born in Elbistan, Maras in 1948. After having passed the 
health examination in Istanbul came to Germany by train as a guest worker invited by Ford Factories 
in 1972. Married with three children. All the family live in Cologne. Both children are German citizen. 
Pensioner. Primary school graduate. 
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M05: Refugee: Mr. Zivo was born in Elazig in 1974. He is married. He first mo ed to I tanbul III 
1989. A year later, came to Germany as a tourist invited by his uncle in 1~91. A~ter a fev we k . h 
applied for asylum and two months later was granted refugee status. He 1 mamed. He \ ork In a 
kebab shop and is a secondary school graduate. 
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F02: Refugee: Mrs. Saliha Deniz was born in Istanbul in 1973 and married with a son. She came to 
Germany with a fake visa on a valid passport in 1995. After having visited Frankfurt and Zurich, she 
decided to stay in Cologne. She was granted refugee status after two years of arrival. She left 
university after two years and is currently a housewife . 
• D,~. t:?tt:::::;;I> 
~ .. ':9-.:.. ~ ~ ~ 
• - • (J 
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M06: Guest worker: Mr. Selami Sevgi was born in Dersim in 1937 and married with three children 
born in Germany; all of three are German citizens. He came to Germany in 1970 through the Turki h 
Recruitment Office and worked in Ford factories unti l retirement. He is a retired worker and a primary 
school graduate. 
Appendices 
~ -
M07: Refugee: Mr. E~ref Ozmrk was born in a village of Idil in the province of Simak in 1977. He is 
married with two children one of who left in Turkey. He fled Idil in 1994 following a raid by Turkish 
troops. He stayed few months in Mersin along with some relatives. Then he went to Istanbul and got a 
fake passport. He paid a bribe to Police officers at the airport and flew to Stuttgart where his brothers 
lived and was granted refugee status after a week of arrival in 1995. He works on construction sites 
and is a primary school graduate. 
~Olo~e 1998 "Frankfurt 
..... -
1996 
•• ~ &7"'" ~ ... 
do" .. ':!I-~ 0' .. 
~ •• '(7 
F03: Asylum seeker: Mrs. A""'y~e Ouzel was born in Simak in i980. She is married wit~ two childr n. 
She moved to the city of Mersin in 1995 and after a year they came to Frankfurt, apph~d for a I.um 
and are still awaiting a decision. She is a housewife. Her husband goe for temporary Job. he 1 a 
primary school graduate. 
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M08: Asylum seeker: Mr. Mehmet <;elik was born in a village of Tunceli in 1959. He is married with 
three children. He came to Germany on a tourist visa by the invitation of his cousin in 1998 and 
applied for asylum. He was a farmer in Turkey but works in a cafe here. He is a secondary school 
graduate_ 
." -
M09: Guest worker: Mr. Huseyin Aksu was born in the town of Cemiskezek in the province of 
Tunceli in 1946_ He is married with 5 children, three of whom are German citizens and two Ii e in 
Turkey. He came to work in the Ford factories in 1970 as a guest worker and retired from Ford in 
1998. He is a secondary school graduate. 
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F~4: Family reuni~c~tion: Miss Dilane was born in Diyarbakir in 1977. She came in Cologne in 1979 
with her mother to Jom her father who came earlier in 1973 as a guest worker. She is currently in high 
school and also attending art courses at the Kurdish House in Neuss, Cologne . 
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MIO: Asylum seeker: Mr. Ernrah Kuzucu was born in a village of Urfa in 1976. He is single. In the 
past, he went to Adana for seasonal work in cotton fields , which was his only migration experience. He 
arrived in Bonn in 1998 and applied for asylum in Cologne after a dangerou journey on a fak 
passport arranged in Istanbul via Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, and Austria. He completed primary chool; 
works in temporary illegal jobs. 
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Mll: Asylum seeker: Mr. Hacl Kilimci was born in Ovacik town in the province of Dersim in 1960. 
He is divorced with a son. First he migrated from Dersim to the city of Adana in 1984 and where he 
married. Following his wife's migration due to political reasons in 1988, he arrived in 1997 as a tourist 
after his wife left him applied for asylum and currently living in asylum detention house and lives on 
temporary undocumented jobs. He is a primary school graduate . 
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F05: Family reunification : Mrs. Sinn Unsal was bo~- in 1949 in the city of Gaziantep. ~e i married 
with two children. Her husband was a guest worker. To join him, she moved to Cologne III 1967. he 
i a secondary school graduate, and works in a council office as secretary. 
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M12: Refugee: Mr. Murat Mete was born in the town of Elazig in 1960. He is married with two 
children. His family migrated to the city of Kayseri in 1972 from where he fled to Istanbul after the 
1980 military intervention. His family also moved to Izmif. He joined them in 1983 in Izmir and 
arrested in 1985. After escaping from prison he fled to Germany via Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in 1986. Granted refugee status after two years of 
arrival. He is currently seeking employment and living on social help provided by government. He was 
quit from high school. 
• wiye, 1982 
F06: Refugee: Mrs. Karde~n was born in the tow~ of Sariz of the province of Kay rio .h .i 
widowed with one son who is missing since he arrested in 1993. She went to n~ara fo~ ed~cat\On ~n 
1958 and settled down there. During the mili tary intervention of 19 0 she wa PrJ oned 111 01 ~rb kif. 
She escaped in 1982 and fled to Syria . She lives on social help of governm nt. he had to qUit fr m 
university. 
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M13: Asylum seeker: Mr. Baran was born in the town ofPazarcik in the province ofK.Maras in 1971. 
He is single and is a high school graduate. Before coming to Germany, he went to Mersin and Antalya 
for work between 1986 and 1989. He paid 4000 DM (£1350) for traffickers and came to Cologne via 
Istanbul, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria in 1991. He currently works undocumented temporary 
jobs. 
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F07: Refugee: Miss Sevgi Donmez was born in a village of Varto in 1977 and .rno. ed to Izmir in 1991 
due to an increase in the clashes between the PKK and Turkish troops . She IS mgle and econdary 
school graduate. She works as waitress in a restaurant. She was granted refugee tatu aft r 5 month 
of arrival in 1991. 
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F08: Refugee: Miss Giilcan Giileryiiz was born in the city of Bingol in 1971 and moved to Bomova, 
Izmir in 1985. She came to Cologne in 1988 on a fake passport and visa and applied for asylum and 
was granted refugee status in 1990. She is single and works as assistant to a hair dresser. She is 
secondary school graduate. Her father came as a guest worker in 1967 after the earthquake in Varto, a 
town nearby Bingol. 
~ -
F09: Family reunification: Mrs. Silan was born in a village of Kars province in 1967. h came t 
Cologne first in 1978 and returned in 1982. She migrated to Istanbul in 1984 an~ fro m. where he mo:'ed 
to Cologne second time in 1996. She is primary school graduate and is a hou eWlfe domg ome part time 
work as a tailor. 
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K.Maras 
;:-:--------' 1969 
M14: asylum seeker, later family reunification: Mr. Mehmet Yllmaz was born in the city of KMaras in 
1969 and migrated to Izmir in 1993 for work. From Izmir, he came to Germany on a tourist visa in 1995; 
first overstayed then applied for asylum and got married in 1996 when he withdrew his asylum 
application and got resident permit as his family had permanent residence permit. He works in a food 
factory and is a primary school graduate. 
• • '\, de::> 1980 
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MIS: Asylum seeker: Mr- H:san Kara was born in a '~illage of the district of Varto in 1978 and migrated 
to Izmir to join his uncle's in 1980. He moved back to Varto in 1993 for high school and after l~ft for 
Germany in 1996. His journey was on a trafficking route via Izmir, Istanbul, Hungary, and Au tna. H 
paid 5000 DM for trafficking. He works as a shopkeeper-
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M16: University student: ML Serbilind was born in a village of Mus province in 1960. He is married 
with 5 children. He came to Cologne for university education in 1980 and settled down. He is a 
university graduate and runs a grocery shop and works for the PIK (Kurdistan Islamic Party). 
",--:;-- .. 
'. 
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MIS: Refugee: Dr. Zeki was born in a small town of Elazig province in 1939 where he was elected as 
mayor in 1989. After being wounded in an attack by the Turkish anny he escaped to Gennany via 
Istanbul in 1989. He was granted refugee status immediately after arrival. He is married with 4 children. 
He is a medical doctor but currently unemployed. (Regretfully the researcher heard later he committed 
suicide). 
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FlO: Asylum seeker: Mrs. Fatma Turk was born in 'Kiziltepe town of ~ardin pro ince i.n 193 . h i-
married with two children. She migrated to Istanbul for health reasons In 1963. After beIng arre t d b 
police and tortured in 1992, she fled to Germany on a fake pas~port. and 1 a In 1993 . h ha n 
education and is a housewife. Her son also was an asylum seeker aITlved m 19 9. 
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Fll: Refugee: Mrs. Zekiye Ozcan was born in the district ofSemdinli in the province of Hakkari in 1954 
and married with two children. She, together with her family fled to Germany in 1993 via Iraq, Syria, 
Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria by the help of a trafficking gang. After four weeks of 
arrival they were granted refugee status. She is a housewife with no education . 
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M19: Family reunification: Mr. Haydar Dogan was born in a village of Dersim province In 1959 and 
brought to Munich by his guest worker family in 1968. In 1996, he moved to Col~gne to \ ~rk [or the 
Kurdish House and for his theatre activities. He is single and has a university degree In loumah m. 
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M20: Asylum seeker: Mr. $tikrti Erdogan was born in a village of Batman province in 1965 . He came to 
Germany with the help of traffickers via Istanbul, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Italy, and Switzerland in 1998. 
He is married with 4 children, all of whom are in Turkey. He works as janitor illegally and is a primary 
school graduate. 
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M21: Asylum seeker: Mr. Zilan was born in a villag~ of the province Mus in 1977. He and hi family 
migrated to Izmir in 1980 after the military intervention in Turkey. He took a flight to Germany on a fake 
passport and visa in 1998 and applied for asylum in Cologne after arrival. He is a primary chool 
graduate and unemployed. 
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M22: Refugee: Mr. Seyhan Bayrak was born in a village of Elazig province in 1972, where he moved 
with his family to Istanbul by 1975. He took a flight to Berlin on a fake passport and visa and applied for 
asylum in 1993. After 8 months he was granted refugee status based on a false claim of having been 
tortured in Turkey. He is single and a secondary school graduate. He works as a waiter in a Turkish 
Restaurant. 
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M23: Refugee: Mr. Adem Seyda was born in a village of Mardin province and married t\' 0 
children . He, with his wife and children , fled to Germany by paying traffickers in 1995 ia yri a. 
Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria. They were granted refugee sta~ imm~diately aft r 
their arrival on the basis of their religious (Yezidi) discrimination in Turkey. He 1 a pnmary cho I 
graduate and works in building construction sites as unskilled labourer. 
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GAP: The South East Anatolian Project 
(Source: http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/FrameslJr 1. html) 
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The GAP is the largest, most extensive regional development project ever to have been carried out in 
Turkey. It consists of number of individual dams, waterpower, and irrigation projects in the Euphrates 
and Tigris basins in South East Turkey. It covers ten percent of the whole Turkey's land and affects 
about six million people who live in the region. It is expected by the completion of the project by 2020 
Turkey will be able to fulfil its own energy requirements and even to export energy. ' 
The project plans the construction of 22 dams, 18 water power plants and irrigation of 1.7 hectares of 
land. Estimated total cost is around $20 bn. (US). 
WHAT IS GAP? 
GAP is a multi-sectoral and integrated regional development project based on the concept of sustainable 
development. Its basic aim is to eliminate regional development disparities by raising people's income 
level and living standards; and to contribute to such national development targets as social stability and 
economic growth by enhancing the productive and employment generating capacity of the rural sector. 
The project area covers 9 provinces in the Euphrates-Tigris basins and Upper Mesopotamia plains 
(Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa and Sirnak). 
The original initiative consisted of irrigation and hydroelectric energy production projects on the 
Euphrates and the Tigris. Along the 80s, the project was transformed into a multi-sectoral regional 
development programme of a socio-economic character. This programme covers such sectors as 
irrigation, hydraulic energy production, agriculture, urban and rural infrastructure, forestry, education 
and health. Its water resources programme envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 power plants 
and irrigation schemes on an area extending over 1.7 million hectares. The total cost of the project is 32 
billion US $. The total installed capacity of its power plants is 7476 MW which means an annual 
production of27 billion kWh. 
The project is based upon the concept of sustainable development which aims at generating an 
environment in which future generations can fully develop themselves and reap the benefits of 
development. Equitable development, participation, protection of the environment, employment 
generation, spatial planning and infrastructure development are the basic strategies of GAP. 
HISTORY OF SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP) 
The decision to utilize water resources in a rational manner belongs to Ataturk, the founder of Turkish 
Republic. While the country was making drives forward for development and change in all fields, the 
need for electricity in particular appeared on the forefront as one of the most urgent. Consequently, the 
Electricity Survey Administration (EIEI) was established in 1936 upon the order of Ataturk to produce 
energy from otherwise vainly flowing streams of the country. 
Geological and topographical works over the narrow passage of Keban is started in 1938. Then, in the 
1950-1960 period, emphasis was shifted by the EIEI on drillings on the Euphrates and the Tigris. Later, 
upon the emergence of new needs, another organization, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) was 
established in 1954. 
The first work for the development of water and land resources in the Euphrates basin was started by the 
Euphrates Planning Authority established in Diyarbakir in 1961. As a result of these works, the 
"Reconnaissance Report for the Euphrates Basin" appeared in 1964 with clarity on the irrigation and 
energy potential of the basin concerned. Another one, the "Reconnaissance Report for the Lower 
Euphrates Basin" followed the first one in 1966. 
In 1968, the proposed water storage facilities and hydraulic plants and irrigation schemes of the Lower 
Euphrates Projects were contracted. These contracted works were completed in 1970. Finally, in 1977 
projects related to these two basins were merged and adopted as a single one under the title the "South-
eastern Anatolian Project". 
The South-eastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Organization was established by the 
Government Decree no 388 in Force of Law, published in the Official Gazette dated 6 November 1989. 
Upon the completion of the Project, 28% of the total water potential of Turkey will be br~u?ht und~r 
control through facilities on the Euphrates and Tigris which jointly flow more than 50 billion cubIC 
meters of water per year. Furthermore, 1.7 million hectares ofland will be under irrigation, and it will be 
possible to generate approximately 27 billion kWhs electric energy annually with an installed capacity of 
7476 megawatts. 
The high potential generated in both agriculture and industry by the GAP will increase ~h.e in~ome le~'el 
of the Region fivefold and generate employment opportunities for 3.8 million people IIvlllg III a regIOn 
whose total population is projected to be over 9 million in 2005 . 
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The GAP is presently the grand project of the Republic of Turkey with its estimated total investment 
cost, US$ 32 billion. Of which about $ 13.7 billion was actually spent as of the end of 1998 for the 
realization of the Project. 
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF GAP 
The GAP strives to eliminate inter-regional development gaps and contribute to a balanced development 
process. As such, its success largely stems from familiarity with the people of region and their 
participation and support to the project. Therefore, social surveys and practices basing upon such surveys 
and studies as "Trends of Social Change", "Population Movements", "Status of Women and Their 
Integration to Process of Development", and "Problems of Resettlement and Employment of People 
From Areas to Remain Under Dam Lakes", the GAP Social Action Plan was phased in to ensure 
people's participation to sustainable development. 
What is targeted by public investments under the GAP is to materialize sustainable human development. 
This principle implies the creation of opportunities by which the people of the region can materialize 
their preferences and full potential in a just and equitable way. In line Multi-Purpose Community Centres 
(CATOM) for women since 1995. There is cooperation with various governmental and non-
governmental organizations and such international organizations like UNICEF to expand these centres 
further. The GAP Administration had launched CATOM first in one rural and one urban settlement in 
Sanliurfa in cooperation with the Governorate of Sanliurfa and the Labour Placement Office. There are 
22 such CATOM's in the region as of the end of 1999. 
The project has the objective of raising the status of local women who, for some economic and cultural 
reasons, have difficulty in access to basic social services, in reaping the benefits of development and 
change, and in taking part in social processes as equal individuals. The Project has so far reached 15,000 
women. The number of CATOM increases upon the request of local people and CA TOM activities has 
already gained a sustained character. The plan for the near future is to give these centres a semi-
autonomous and institutionalized character with the support of various voluntary organizations. As such, 
CATOM activities have a special priority for the GAP Administration. 
As far as social projects are concerned, the GAP Administration is also implementing several others 
including the Rehabilitation of Street Children in Diyarbakir, School Bussing Services in Rural Areas 
and Youth Projects in Mardin. 
GAP AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
At the time when the headway is taken in the context of sustainable human development has reached a 
point of no return, foreign countries and organization have also increased their contributions to the 
project. In this sense, the year 1997 was a turning point when the project package "Program for 
Sustainable Development in GAP" was launched in cooperation with the UNDP. 
The basic objective of this joint effort by the GAP Administration and UNDP is to reduce socio-
economic disparities in the GAP region. The program stresses on the human dimensions of development 
through projects on basic social services (education, health and housing), gender equity, urban 
management, environmental sustainability, institutional and social capacity building and grassroots 
participation. The program consisting of 29 sub-projects has a cost profile of £3.2. 
The World Bank contributes to projects related to the improvement of urban and rural infrastructure in 
the GAP region. This contribution has become definitive for two projects for the time being. These are 
"Sanliurfa-Harran Plains On-farm and Village Development Project" and "GAP Urban Sanitation and 
Planning Project". The Bank granted 650,000 US Dollars for the preliminary works related to these two 
projects. The Bank is expected to contribute further £128.5 million for the further stages of 
implementation. 
The cooperation between Turkey and US in the context of GAP is flourishing. The US Trade and 
Development Agency (USTDA) forwarded grants for the GAP International Airport. and G~P-G.IS 
projects. Also, there are promising contacts with Arizona State University (ASU), San DIego UnIVersIty 
(SDSU) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to conduct joint projects and training activities. . 
Steps have been taken to conduct joint researches and projects on rural development wI~h the 
International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA). There is agreement ':It~ t~e 
International Cooperation Centre of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MASHA V) to organIse Jomt 
training courses. At present, training in rural development issues is taking place in Israel and in the GAP 
regIOn. 
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 
To raise the income level in the GAP Region by improving the economic structure in order to narrow the 
income disparity between the Region and other regions, 
To increase the productivity and employment opportunities in rural areas, 
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To enhance the assimilative capacity of larger cities in the Region, 
To contribute to the national objectives of sustained economic growth, export promotion and social 
stability by efficient utilization of the Region's resources. 
GAP SOCIAL POLICY OBJECTIVES 
The basic principles of the "GAP Social Action Plan" which is prepared for the improvement of the 
situation in general, quickens the development are as follows: 
·To provide the participation of the regional people in the planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation process to be done for the development of the nature and human resources within the GAP . 
. To provide the accessibility of the basic resources and to take measures to increase their productivity. 
·To take benefit of the man power and other potentials (finance, equipment, know-how etc.) of the 
institutions by cooperating with the public institutions, local and volunteer organizations. 
·To give priority to the women and youngsters. 
PROVINCES COVERED IN GAP MASTER PLAN 
Adlyaman 
Batman 
Diyarbakir 
Gaziantep 
Mardin 
Kilis 
Siirt 
Sanliurfa 
Simak 
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A language other than Turkish or a language prohibited by law 
Excerpts from Turkish Laws and Decrees 
(All translations are unofficial and emphasises added.) 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey/Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi 
(No. 2709, Adopted November 7, 1982) 
Preamble, (Amended: 1995/4121.1) (Paragraph 5) 
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No protection shall be given to thoughts or opinions that run counter to Turkish national interests the 
. ' fundamental pnnciple of the existence of the indivisibility of the Turkish state and territory, the 
historical and moral values of Turkishness, or the nationalism, principles, reforms, and modernism of 
Atatiirk, and that as required by the principle of secularism there shall be no absolutely no interference of 
sacred religious feeling in the affairs of state and politics; 
Article 4: The provisions of Article 1 of the constitution establishing the form of the state as a Republic, 
the provisions of Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provisions of Article 3 shall not 
be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed. 
Article 26-Freedom of Expression and the Dissemination of Thought 
26.1 Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thought and opinion by speech, in writing, or 
in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This right includes the freedom to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference from official authorities .... 
26.2 The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purpose of preventing crime, punishing 
offenders, withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation and rights 
and the private and family life of others. '" 
26.3 No language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any 
written or printed documents, phonograph records, magnetic or video tapes, and other means of 
expression used in contravention of this provision shall be seized by a duly issued decision of a judge or, 
in cases where delay is deemed prejudicial, by the competent authority designated by law. 
Article 27-Freedom of Science and Arts 
27.1 Everyone has the right to study and teach freely, explain, disseminate science and arts and to carry 
out research in these fields. 
27.2 The right to disseminate shall not be exercised for the purpose of changing the provisions of 
Articles 1, 2, 3, of this constitution .... 
Article 28-Freedom of the Press 
28.1 The press is free and shall not be censored. The establishment of a printing house shall not be 
subject to prior permission and to the deposit of financial guarantee. 
28.2 Publication shall not be made in any language prohibited by law .... 
2804 In the limitation of freedom of the press, Articles 26 and 27 of the constitution are applicable. 
28.5 Anyone who writes or prints any news or articles which threaten the internal or external security of 
the state or the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, which tend to incite offence, 
riot or insurrection, or which refer to classified state secrets and anyone who prints or transmits such 
news or articles to others for the above purpose shall be held responsible under the law relevant to these 
offences .... 
Article 42.9: No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens in 
teaching and learning institutions. Foreign languages to be taught at learning and teaching institutions 
and the rules under which schools conducting training and education in a foreign language are to be 
determined by law. The provisions of international treaties will be respected. 
Turkish Penal Code/ Tiirk Ceza Kanunu (No. 765, Adopted March 1, 1926) 
Article 155: Those who, except in circumstances indicated in the aforementioned articl~s, ~ublish 
articles inciting people to break the law or harm the security of the country, or make pubhc~t\Ons ~r 
suggestions that make people unwilling to serve in the military or make speeches to that end III publIc 
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meetings or gathering places, shall be imprisoned from between two months to two years and be 
punished with a heavy fine of between twenty-five and 200 lira. 
N.B.: The monetary fine in the article written is raised 180 times. 
Article 158-(Amended: 19611235): Whoever insults the President of the Republic face-to-face or 
through cursing shall face a heavy penalty of not more than three years. 
If the insulting or cursing happens in the absence of the President of the Republic, those who commit the 
crime will be liable to imprisonment of between one and three years. Even if the name of the President of 
the Republic is not directly mentioned, allusion and hint shall be considered as an attack made directly 
against the President if there is presumptive evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the attack was 
made against the President of Turkey. 
If the crime is committed in any published form, the punishment will increase from one-third to one-half. 
Article 159-(Amended:19611235): Those who publicly insult or ridicule the moral personality of 
Turkishness, the Republic, the Parliament, the Government, State Ministers, the military or security 
forces of the state, or the Judiciary will be punished with a penalty of no less than one year and no more 
than six years of maximum security imprisonment.. .. 
If insulting Turkishness is carried out in a foreign country by a Turk the punishment given will be 
increased from one-third to one-half. 
Article 311-Inciting to commit a crime, Threatening with the goal of inciting panic and fear-
(Amended: 1953/6123); (Amended: 198112370) 
One who publicly incites the commission of a crime shall be punished in the ways below. 
1. If the penalty of the felony incited is higher than the duration of the heavy penalty, a heavy 
imprisonment of between three and five years; 
2. If limited heavy imprisonment or imprisonment is necessary, it will be from three months to three 
years imprisonment in accordance with the type of crime. 
3. In other circumstances, a heavy fine of between 1,000 and 5,000 lira will be applied. (Fine later 
increased three times according to Turkish Penal Code Article 119). 
(Amendment: 198112370) 
If the incitement occurs by various means of mass media, sound tapes, records, films, papers, periodicals, 
or with other press instruments, or by writings written by hand and then multiplied and printed or 
distributed, or by signs or written announcements hung, the heavy imprisonment and fines which will be 
determined according to the paragraphs above will be doubled. 
Article 312--(Amended: 198112370): One who openly praises an action considered criminal under the 
law or speaks positively about it or incites people to disobey the law shall be sentenced from six months 
to two years of imprisonment and to a heavy fine of between 2,000 and 10,000 lira.(Fine later increased 
three times.) 
One who openly incites people to enmity and hatred by pointing to class, racial, religious, confessional, 
or regional differences will be punished by imprisonment of between one to three years and a heavy fine 
of between 3,000 and 12,000 lira. (Fine later increased three times.) If the incitement is done in a way 
that could possibly be dangerous for public security, the punishment given to the perpetrator is increased 
from one-third to one-half. 
Penalties given to those who carry out crimes in the paragraphs written above by means outlined in the 
second paragraph of Article 311 will be increased accordingly. 
Anti-Terror Law/Terorle Miicadele Kanunu (No. 3713, Adopted April 12, 1991) 
Article 8-Propaganda against the indivisibility of the State-(Amended: 1995\4126.1) 
Written or oral propaganda, along with meetings, demonstrations, and marches that have the goal of 
destroying the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation of the Republic of Turkey cannot 
be conducted. Those who conduct such activities shall be punished with imprisonment of between one 
and three years and a heavy fine of between 100 million lira and 300 million lira. If this crime is 
conducted habitually, imprisonment cannot be converted into a monetary fine ... (Parliament amended the 
Anti-Terror Law in October 1995. Before its amendment, Article 8 punished all so-called separatist 
propaganda "regardless of the method, intent or idea behind it.") . . 
If the propaganda crime determined in the first paragraph is committed by means of periodicals 
determined in the third article of the Press Law No. 5860, the owner will also be given a monetary fine of 
an amount up to ninety percent of the past month's average sales even if the frequency of the periodil'ai 
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is less than a month. This fine, however, cannot be less than 100 million lira. The responsible editor of 
the periodicals will be subject to one-half of the monetary fine given to the owner as well as 
imprisonment of between six months and two years. 
If the propaganda crime determined in the first paragraph is committed by press works or other mass 
communication instruments outside of the written periodicals in the second paragraph, the responsible 
editor as well as the owners of the means of mass communication will face imprisonment of between six 
months and two years and a heavy fine of between 100-300 million lira. In addition, if the act is 
committed by means of radio or television, a broadcast prohibition of between one and fifteen days can 
be given to the said radio and television stations. 
If carried out by means explained in the second paragraph or by methods of mass communication 
outlined in the third paragraph, the punishment determined in paragraph one will increase from one-third 
to one-half. 
Political Parties Law/ Siyasi Partiler Kanunu (No. 2820, Adopted April 26, 1982) 
Article 81: Preventing the Creation of Minorities 
Political parties: 
a) cannot put forward that minorities exist in the Turkish Republic based on national, religious, 
confessional, racial, or language differences .... 
b) cannot by means of protecting, developing, or disseminating language or cultures other than the 
Turkish language and culture through creating minorities in the Republic of Turkey have the goal of 
destroying national unity or be engaged in activities to this end; 
c) cannot use a language other than Turkish in writing and printing party statute or program, at 
congresses, at meetings in open air or indoor gatherings; at meetings, and in propaganda, cannot use or 
distribute placards, pictures, phonograph records, voice and visual tapes, brochures and statements 
written in a language other than Turkish; cannot remain indifferent to these actions and acts 
committed by others; however, it is possible to translate party statutes and programs into foreign 
languages other than those forbidden by law. 
The Law concerning the Founding and Broadcasts of Television and Radio/ Radyo ve 
Televizyonlarl n Kurulus ve Yaylnlarl Hakklnda Kanun (No. 3984, Adopted April 13, 1994) 
(Until 1993, television and radio broadcasting was state controlled under Article 133 of the constitution. 
In 1993, parliament amended Article 133 to allow for private radio and television stations.) 
Article 4: Broadcasting principles: Radio and Television broadcast are to be carried out m the 
understanding of public service according to the principles below: 
Broadcasts cannot be contradictory to the following: 
a) the existence and independence of the Turkish Republic, the indivisible unity of the state with its 
territory and nation; 
b) the national and spiritual values of society .... 
d) the general morality, civil peace, and structure of the Turkish family; 
Must be conducted in accordance with: 
h) the general goals and basic principles of Turkish national education and the development of national 
culture; 
i) fairness and objectivity in broadcasting and the fundamental principle of respect for the law .... 
1) to present news in a speedy and correct way; . . 
m) the principle that broadcasts will not be made that have a negative effect on the phYSical, mtellectuaL 
mental, and moral development of children and youth.... . ' 
t) radio and television broadcasts will be made in Turkish; however, for the purpose of teachm~ or of 
imparting news those foreign languages that have made a contribution to the development of universal 
cultural and scientific works can be used. 
Foreign Language Education and Teaching Law (No. 2923) 
Article 2 
a) The mother tongue of Turkish citizens cannot be taught in any language other than Turkish .... 
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c) Taking into consideration the view of the National Security Council, the Council of Ministers by its 
decision will determine in Turkey what foreign languages can be taught. 
Decision No. 92/2788, Official Gazette, March 20, 1992 
2-.. .1t had been decided by the Council of Ministers on March 4, 1992 that in official and private 
courses education and teaching are to be made in the following languages: English, French 
German as well as Russian, Italian, Spanish, Arabic, Japanese, and Chinese. ' 
The law concerning fundamental provisions on elections and voter registriesl Se~imlerin Ternel 
Hiikiimleri ve Se«;men Kiitiikleri Hakklnda Kanun (No. 298, Adopted April 26, 1961) 
Article 58: ... .It is forbidden to use any other language or script than Turkish in propaganda 
disseminated in radio or television as well as in other election propaganda. 
Press Lawl BasIn Kanunu (No. 5680, Adopted July 15, 1950) 
Article 1: The press is free. 
The publishing of printed works is subject to the written directives in this law. 
Article 16-Criminal responsibility for crimes committed by means of the press--(Arnended 
1983/2950) 
1. The responsibility for crimes committed in periodicals belongs, together with the person who caused 
the crime, whether the writer, news writer, artist, or caricaturist, to the periodical's responsible editor. 
However, punishment'S depriving liberty given to responsible editors without regard to their duration 
shall be converted to monetary fines .... Responsible editors cannot be punished with security detention. 
2. The responsible editor is not required to give the name of writers, news writers, artists, or caricaturists 
who publish with a pen name or alias. Without regard to the first paragraph, the responsibility for a 
writing, or a news report, or a picture, or a caricature, where the author of a work is not clear or where 
the author's names is not revealed in a true manner by the responsible editor at the latest during the first 
court interrogation, shall fall to the responsible editor as if he were the person who through writing, or 
news writing, or making a picture or caricature caused the crime. 
3. The responsible editor is not responsible for writings, news, pictures, or caricatures published by the 
periodical's owner without his approval. Under such circumstances, the legal responsibility of the 
responsible editor belongs to the person who publishes the writing, news, picture, or caricature. 
4. In crimes that are committed in publications that are not defined as periodicals [books], the legal 
responsibility belongs to the publisher together with the writer, translator, or artist. However, regardless 
of the duration, all verdicts giving the penalty of imprisonment for the publisher shall be converted to 
fines. Computation of the fine is based on the amount mentioned in the Law No. 647 on the Execution of 
Penalties, Article 4, Paragraph 1. Publishers are not to be penalized with security detention. 
In the case where the author of the printed work published as a non-periodical is not identified, the 
responsibility belongs to the publisher without regard to the aforementioned articles. In the case when the 
work is published without the knowledge and consent of its writer, translator, or artist, only the publisher 
becomes responsible as if the one who created the work. 
When the above mentioned persons are not identified or a case in a Turkish court is not opened against 
them, the responsibility belongs to the seller and distributor when the publisher is not known. 
In quotations that are made in publications published in Turkey without the consent of the owner, the 
responsibility belongs to the one who made the quote. 
If publication is made in any language prohibited by law, the relevant articles which envision 
converting into monetary fines and of not giving a penalty of placing under security detention shall not 
be applied. 
Article 31-(Amended 1983/2950): The entry or distribution into Turkey of works published in a 
foreign country that contradict the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, national 
hegemony, the existence of the Republic, national security, public order, general law and order, the 
common good, general morality or health can be outlawed by a decision of the Council of Ministers. 
Provincial Administration Lawl _I Idaresi Kanunu (No. 5.t·t2, Adopted June 10, 1949) 
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Article 2/d/2 (Amended 1959:7267): Village names that are not Turkish and give rise to confusion are 
to be changed in the shortest possible time by the Interior Ministry after receiving the opinion of the 
Provincial Permanent Committee. 
Police Duty and Responsibility Law/ Polis Vazife ve Selahiyet Kanunu (No. 2559, Adopted July 4, 
1934) 
Article 8-(Amended: 1985/3233): If the police are in possession of incontrovertible evidence and by 
order of the district's highest civil servant, areas where plays are conducted, presentations given, films or 
videos shown that will damage the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, 
constitutional order, or general security or common morality can be closed by the police or have their 
activities stopped. 
If the reason for the closing or ceasing of activities requires a legal investigation by the state, the 
investigation file shall be immediately given to the judiciary .... 
The Law concerning crimes committed against Atatiirkl Atatiirk Aleyhine Islenen Su~lar 
Hakklnda Kanun (No. 5816, Adopted July 25, 1951) 
Article 1: Anyone who publicly insults or curses the memory of Atatiirk shall be imprisoned with a 
heavy sentence of between one and three years. 
A heavy sentence of between one and five years shall be given to anyone who destroys, breaks, ruins, or 
defaces a statue, bust, or monuments representing Atatiirk or the grave of Atatiirk. 
Anyone who encourages others to commit the crimes outlined in the paragraphs above will be punished 
as if committing the crime. 
Article 2: If the crimes outlined in the first article are committed by a group of two or more individuals, 
or publicly, or in public districts or by means of the press will have the penalty imposed increased by a 
proportion of one-half. 
If the crimes outlined in the second paragraph of the first article are committed using force ... the penalty 
will be doubled. 
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APPENDIX 5.3. 
Table 5.3.1. Durable goods in possession of household by ethnicity, 1993 (0/0) 
Kurdish Turkish Total 
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
Refrigerator 88.4 72.5 81.5 96.2 79.3 90.7 94.7 74.1 87.4 
Oven 49.7 36.2 43.9 81.8 45.1 69.8 75.4 37.8 62.1 
Washing machine 37.3 8.8 25.0 76.1 24.5 59.2 70.5 21.6 53.2 
Dishwasher 1.1 0.0 0.6 11.0 0.6 7.6 10.4 0.5 6.9 
Vacuum cleaner 26.3 10.6 19.5 74.8 22.8 57.8 66.7 18.5 49.6 
Television 83.6 66.1 76.1 95.7 83.7 91.8 92.8 75.5 86.7 
V ideo recorder 4.4 3.5 4.0 17.1 4.2 12.9 15.6 3.6 11.4 
Radio cassette player 68.7 76.8 72.2 83.0 75.9 80.7 79.2 72.2 76.7 
Music set 8.5 2.8 6.0 24.8 6.7 18.9 22.0 5.3 16.0 
Telephone 47.6 29.3 39.7 70.2 41.2 60.7 68.4 37.9 57.6 
Car 8.1 11.9 9.7 26.8 15.8 23.2 23.8 12.7 19.9 
Computer 0.3 0.0 0.2 3.4 0.3 2.4 3.2 0.2 2.1 
More than 30 books 10.7 2.1 7.0 34.5 7.7 25.8 31.1 6.3 22.3 
Total number of households 495 328 823 3525 1714 5239 5563 3056 8619 
Source: TDHS 1993 household data 
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APPENDIX 6.1. 
Table 6.1.1. Some characteristics of household by ethnicity 
Number of persons per sleepin2 room 
Non-migrant 1 52.30% 29.80% 36.40% 47.70% 
2 35.80% 45.80% 59.10% 38.20% 
3 and 4 11.00% 21.30% 4.50% 12.90% 
5 and more 0.80% 1.30% 
Migrant 1 56.70% 34.60% 50.00% 50.70% 
2 37.50% 39.30% 50.00% 38.10% 
3 and 4 5.10% 24.30% 10.20% 
5 and more 0.70% 1.80% 0.90% 
Roofin2 of the house 
Non-migrant manufactured 75.10% 43.90% 71.40% 59.10% 
mud earth 24.90% 56.10% 28.60% 30.90% 
Migrant manufactured 83% 74.50% 80.80% 
mud earth 17.00% 25.50% 19.20% 
Type of toilet 
Non-migrant Flush toilet 39.10% 17.80% 14.30% 34.60% 
open pit 12.10% 38.70% 38.10% 17.70% 
Latrine 46.70% 40.90% 47.60% 45.60% 
none 1.70% 2.70% 1.90% 
Migrant Flush toilet 27.20% 11.30% 50.00% 23.10% 
open pit 21.10% 19.80% 50.00% 20.90% 
Latrine 50.30% 65.10% 54.00% 
none 1.40% 3.80% 2.00% 
Source of water 
Non-migrant piped into house 59.88% 49.77% 28.57% 57.39% 
well 16.13% 20.44% 14.28% 16.92% 
natural-other 23.99% 29.79% 57.15% 25.69% 
Migrant piped into house 57.10% 48.50% 100% 55.10% 
well 19.40% 27.10% 21.30% 
natural-other 23.50% 24.40% 24.60% 
Water use 
method 
Non-migrant Private 85.60% 61.50% 66.70% 80.90% 
Shared 14.40% 38.50% 33.30% 19.10% 
Migrant Private 89.70% 81.30% 100.00% 87.60% 
Shared 10.30% 18.80% 12.40% 
Total Non-Migrants 931 226 21 1178 
Migrants 293 106 2 401 
Source: rIMS 1996 household data 
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